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Abstract 
 
Community sport policy is characterised as complex and multi-faceted partly due to 
the number of agencies involved. This thesis explores the community sport policy 
process in England, specifically the significance of the relationship between CSPs and 
NGBs in the community sport policy process. The four key objectives of this study are 
(i) to analyse the significance of the relationship between CSPs and NGBs with 
regard to the national community sport policy process; (ii) to analyse the significance 
of the relationship between CSPs and NGBs in local-level policy making and policy 
implementation; (iii) to identify CSP and NGB attitudes and perceptions toward the 
community sport policy process; and as the study focuses on the meso-level of 
analysis, (iv) to evaluate the explanatory value of selected meso-level theories of the 
policy process in developing a better understanding of the community sport policy 
process.  
 
This study uses a mixed method comprising a questionnaire and semi-structured 
interviews. Initially, a quantitative questionnaire was used to gather information 
regarding CSPs and NGBs and support the selection of CSP cases. From this CSP-
based case studies were developed involving semi-structured interviews with CSP, 
NGB and local authority representatives. The study draws attention to the 
hierarchical nature of the community sport policy process, the implications for 
collaboration, the mediating role of CSPs in national and local policy settings, and 
the associated challenges that agents face in implementing community sport policy. 
The study emphasises the value of theoretical pluralism in analysing the community 
sport field, particularly the combined used of meso-level frameworks such as the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework and the Policy Networks Approach with micro-level 
considerations from implementation theory and the partnership literature. It 
concludes that empirically, it is only by giving policy agents a voice that we can 
develop a more accurate understanding of the policy process and that practically only 
by harnessing the commitment and energy of the grassroots can we step toward a 
more effective policy community. 
 
Keywords: community sport, CSPs, NGBs, policy process, implementation, 
England 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Research aims, objectives and theoretical context 
The focus of this thesis is the community sport policy process in England. More 
specifically, the aim of the research is to analyse the significance of the relationship 
between county sport partnerships (CSPs) and national governing bodies of sport 
(NGBs) in the community sport policy process.  Specific detail concerning the role 
and responsibilities of CSPs and NGBs is provided in Chapter 4. 
 
Community sport itself is a relative newcomer to the sport policy landscape in 
England. Located between school sport and elite sport, community sport retains a 
somewhat vague conception as an instrument by which political, economic and social 
goals can be achieved or as an end in itself. An assortment of terms is often used 
including: grassroots sport, mass participation, sport for all, recreational sport, 
informal sport, club-based sport, and competitive (but not performance level) sport. 
Whilst recent political announcements suggest that community sport policy is 
concerned with both the intrinsic and instrumental value of sport, the operational 
definition of community sport policy remains fixed on frequency of participation (i.e. 
regular once a week) at the grassroots level (Sport England, 2012a). More 
specifically, the current (2012) goals of community sport policy are: (i) a year-on-
year increase in the number of people who play sport for at least once a week for at 
least 30 minutes, particularly amongst people aged 14-25, and (ii) a reduction in the 
number of young people who drop-out of sport. Interestingly, whilst community 
sport may be viewed as a relative newcomer to the sport policy landscape, increasing 
participation in sport and reducing drop-out are both issues that can be traced as far 
back as the CCPR commissioned Wolfenden report published in 1960. In 2008 the 
Department of Culture, Media, and Sport (DCMS), through Sport England, identified 
NGBs as the lead agency for achieving community sport objectives and also identified 
CSPs as key supporting institutions at the sub-regional level. Just as the relationship 
between Sport England and NGBs at the national level is central to community sport 
policy, the relationship between CSPs and NGBs at the sub-regional level is crucial to 
effective policy implementation. 
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The empirical element of the thesis uses a mixed methods approach involving a 
quantitative phase of research followed by a qualitative phase of research. The 
quantitative phase of research involved 47 of 49 CSPs located in England together 
with 27 of 441 ‘Whole Sport Plan 08-13’ NGBs. This phase of research was primarily 
undertaken to identify CSP-based cases, thus the results are appended to the thesis 
and will be referred to in the methodology chapter. The qualitative phase of research 
involved three case studies selected at the CSP level and included the CSP Director, 
the CSP NGB Lead Officer, and the CSP Chairperson. In addition, regional or county-
level NGB representatives from eight sports and sport development professionals 
from three local authorities were also involved in each of the three case studies. The 
cases will also refer to the quantitative research, as and where appropriate. 
 
In order to ensure that the overarching research aim detailed above is met, a number 
of more specific research objectives have been developed:  
 
 To analyse the significance of the relationship between CSPs and NGBs with 
regard to the national community sport policy process 
 To analyse the significance of the relationship between CSPs and NGBs in local-
level policy making and policy implementation 
 To identify CSP and NGB attitudes and perceptions toward the community 
sport policy process 
 To evaluate the explanatory value of selected meso-level theories of the policy 
process in developing a better understanding of the community sport policy 
process 
 
Whilst a central feature of this study is the value of meso-level theory in examining 
the community sport policy process, it has been positioned within a broader, macro-
level framework to identify and reveal the distinct power relations between the state 
and society. This also enhances our awareness of who the important policy actors 
are, the role they play, how they come to be in privileged positions, and whose 
interests they serve (Marsh & Stoker, 1995). Furthermore, the theoretical framework 
                                                          
1 There are 46 sports producing whole sport plans across a total of 44 NGBs. Some NGBs are responsible for more 
than one whole sport plan. 
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draws from micro-level theory, specifically that related to implementation and 
partnership given their relevance to the study’s objects. 
 
Rationale for investigating the community sport policy process 
The very basis of community sport—that is, increasing participation in sport—has 
been at the forefront of sport policy since the introduction of the Advisory Sports 
Council in 1965 (Houlihan & White, 2002). However, it has been a relatively 
turbulent policy area with numerous shifts in focus, most notably oscillation between 
sport and broader physical activity, young people or adults aged over 16, and changes 
in the way in which community sport policy implementation has been led and 
coordinated, from a local authority-driven system in the 1990s, to a CSP-led system 
in the early to mid-2000s, and from 2008 onwards, an NGB-led process via the 
Whole Sport planning process (Harris, 2012). In addition, the focus for community 
sport has shifted from the broader instrumental use of sport (development through 
sport), to a more recent concentration on sport for sport sake (cf. Collins, 2010). In 
short, community sport is a highly politicised policy field, in relative terms, one 
which is often subject to the ‘whim and caprice’ of the latest Secretary of State or 
Minister for Sport (Houlihan & White, 2002: 206), making it fertile ground for a 
study which seeks to bring closer attention to the policy process, specifically the 
significance of the relationship between key actors, and their attitudes and 
perceptions towards the policy process. 
 
Whilst the future of community sport policy is far from guaranteed, particularly in 
the longer term, it has been offered some level of safeguarding against far-reaching 
central government cuts, primarily due its position as a key priority within the 
explicit legacy aspirations flowing from the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic 
Games. Whilst the original targets for increased sports participation have been 
downsized, the notion of using the Games as a catalyst to drive and increase 
“grassroots sports participation” remains2. The legacy aspirations add to the interest 
in community sport, in particular they draw attention to the realism of the goals, the 
machinery responsible and the beliefs, values and perceptions that underpin the 
system.  
                                                          
2 a year-on-year increase in the number of people who play sport for at least once a week for at least 30 minutes, 
particularly amongst people aged 14-25. 
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This analysis of the delivery system and its beliefs, values and perceptions is made 
more urgent by the participation statistics revealed by the annual Active People 
survey (Sport England, 2o12a). Whilst these statistics revealed a recent upturn in 
once a week participation in a small number of sports, the participation trend 
between 2008 (baseline year) and 2012 has been declining for the majority of sports, 
despite millions of pounds of investment. Indeed, some sports have witnessed 
significant decreases in participation (swimming, golf), whilst a small group of sports 
(athletics, cycling, netball, boxing, and table tennis) are witnessing sizeable growth 
due primarily to the expansion of “convenience-laden” and relatively low-cost, 
informal participation opportunities (see Table 1.1 below for a more detailed 
breakdown by sport). This is a key driver in terms of presenting a rationale for 
investigating the community sport policy process as the data suggests policy failure—
that is, that either the notion of increasing sports participation is fundamentally 
flawed or that the plans prepared and delivered up to this point have, for the majority 
of sports, been largely ineffective. This research will provide a more detailed analysis 
of the key actors charged with leading the delivery of community sport policy as well 
as study their relationship with CSPs. 
 
Table 1.1 Once a week participation rates by sport (source: Sport England, 2013) 
 
  *Sample size not sufficient (or in case of Angling, no data collected 2006-2008) 
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Another key driver underpinning this study is the implicit delivery system required, 
for most sports, to actually realise and achieve growth in participation. To grow their 
sport, make it more accessible to more people, and sustain this growth, an NGB 
requires the collaboration of networks, organisations, and individuals at the local 
level, particularly voluntary sports clubs (VSCs). This is a concern for community 
sport insomuch as the governance arrangements for the Games Legacy (and thus for 
community sport) tend to follow a hierarchical, top-down process (see Figure 1.1). In 
this model of governance, government departments agree the precise definition of 
policy objectives and how they should be implemented. Non-Governmental Public 
Bodies such as Sport England agree the rules upon which resources will be allocated, 
provide support to NGBs, allocate resources, and then measure and evaluate the 
impact of their investment. NGBs develop their Whole Sport Plans detailing what, 
how and where the plans will be implemented.  
 
 
Figure 1.1 Governance arrangements for the 2012 Games Legacy (source: adapted from DCMS, 2008) 
 
The primary cause for concern emerges at the delivery or implementation stage 
particularly in the relation between NGBs, CSPs, local authorities and local deliverers 
(such as VSCs). Here, VSCs (and others) are expected to deliver plans which they 
have had little, if any, involvement in developing. Moreover, many VSCs have been 
found to lack awareness of community sport policy aspirations and, when advised of 
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these aspirations, respond either with a resistant or indifferent attitude (Harris et al., 
2009; May et al., 2012). This study will give this issue greater attention, specifically 
the awareness that CSPs and NGBs have regarding this tension, and more 
importantly, the strategies that CSPs and NGBs are utilising to increase participation 
in sport and reduce drop-out from sport amongst young people. 
 
The final rationale for this study is the government’s stated intention to replace the 
traditional ‘Westminster model’ of governance and facilitate local-level governance 
through local partnerships and networks—thus redistributing power from the state to 
society (Cabinet Office, 2011). Supporting this neo-liberal position the government 
have launched a range of ideas, initiatives and government bills such as the Big 
Society, local community ownership or asset transfer, and the localism bill to 
empower local communities to drive and achieve social change (ibid, 2011). 
However, the extent to which these ideas truly reflect the transference of power to 
local communities remains open to debate. Within this context, this study will seek 
to analyse the perceptions and attitudes of key actors involved in the policy system to 
assess whether decentralisation is rhetoric or reality. 
 
Thesis structure 
Chapter 2, Theorising the policy process, sets out the study’s theoretical framework 
and examines macro-, meso- and micro-level theory. This begins with a review of 
three notable macro-level theories of the state – pluralism, Marxism and 
corporatism. The chapter then reviews meso-level policy analysis frameworks, with 
emphasises on frameworks that meet certain conditions relating to stability, 
completeness, relevance and analysis over the medium term (10 years). Using these 
criteria, four frameworks have been identified and reviewed: institutional analysis, 
multiple streams, advocacy coalitions, and policy networks. The final section of the 
chapter focuses on micro-level theory, specifically a review of implementation and 
partnership. This is an important addition as it enables magnification of certain 
aspects of the policy process that are not given detailed attention yet are important in 
relation to the aims of the study. The chapter does not conclude with 
recommendations regarding the most suitable theoretical approach for analysing the 
community sport policy process. Instead, the evaluation of theory takes place 
retrospectively after the empirical exercise and is discussed more fully in Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 3 highlights the study’s research strategy and the methods used to achieve 
this. It sets out the differing philosophical assumptions associated with research and 
details the study’s philosophical paradigm. The chapter demonstrates a logical flow 
in the methodological decision-making process, from the ontological assumptions 
underpinning the study through to the methods that are used to gather data. The 
chapter underlines the strategic-relational view of structure and agency, which 
considers the role of the strategic actor against the broader strategic context within 
which they act. It also emphasises the value of the case study method in unpacking 
the complexities of social and political life, allowing for a thick description of actor’s 
realities (Geertz, 1973).  
 
Chapter 4, The Government policy context, follows the recent evolution of 
government policy. The chapter is divided into two parts, with the first section 
tracing the evolution of community sport policy in England. This gives particular 
consideration to key political and policy landmarks that have both shaped and 
represented community sport as well as more recent developments that resulted 
from the 2010 change in political leadership. The second section provides a 
contextual overview of broader political concerns regarding modernisation and 
partnerships and contrasts this with community sport policy. The aim here is to 
demonstrate the broader political and policy framework that community sport works 
within as well as highlighting how broader government policy can influence sport 
policy as well as showing how, at times, sport policy appears to contradict broader 
government policy. 
 
The evidence from the three cases is presented in chapters 5, 6 and 7. Each chapter 
starts by considering the organisational and geographic context of the CSP case. It 
then presents a range of evidence in relation to the range of factors that shape the 
CSP-NGB relationship, the role of CSPs-NGBs in the policy process, and the beliefs, 
attitudes and experiences of CSP/NGB agents regarding the community sport policy 
process. The dimensions are particularly important as they address the research 
objectives directing the study. Each chapter concludes with a brief summary of the 
key themes and distinctive features of each case. 
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The final chapter, the Discussion, directly addresses the research objectives 
presented in Chapter 1. The first section utilises the theoretical, methodological and 
contextual insights to illuminate the empirical findings. In particular, attention is 
given to the predominant themes across cases or the distinctive nature of themes in 
relation to specific cases and/or particular organisations. The second section 
provides a more detailed evaluation of the study’s theoretical insights. More 
specifically, the empirical exercise is used as a guide to ascertain the utility of the 
four meso-level frameworks in analysing the community sport policy process. A 
reflection on the research process, including the potential for future research in 
community sport, is addressed in the third and final section of the chapter 
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Chapter 2 
Theorising the policy process 
 
Introduction 
Theory relevant to policy analysis can largely be divided into three categories: macro, 
micro and meso-level (Houlihan, 2013). Macro (or grand) theory refers to theories 
covering a broad social landscape and attempts to explain social life, history or 
human experience (Turner & Boyns, 2006). Notable examples of grand theory and its 
application to sport include pluralism, Marxist theory and feminist theory (cf. 
Houlihan, 2013). Micro-level theory attempts to explain more specific issues, 
decisions and organisations, usually involving local cases. Meso-level analysis is 
focussed on national organisations, specifically government departments, Non 
Departmental Public Bodies (NDPBs), NGBs and other interest groups. Theory at the 
meso-level aims to bring the processes of sport policymaking into sharp relief whilst 
also explaining policy stability and change (ibid, 2009).  
  
This chapter provides a theoretical framework for the study, focussing on macro-, 
meso-, and micro-levels of analysis. However, it should be noted that the principal 
level of analysis will be at the meso-level due to the study’s central focus on national-
level policy and the relationship between national-level NGBs of sport and sub-
regional CSPs (Houlihan, 2005; Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Marsh & Stoker, 1995). The 
chapter begins with an evaluation of three theories of the state: namely pluralism, 
Marxism and corporatism. This is followed by an overview of power and power 
relations between the state and other key actors. The chapter then provides an 
evaluation of the conceptual innovations in policy analysis, focussing on meso level 
analytical frameworks that are believed to be useful in unravelling sports policy. The 
chapter will conclude with an exploration of the key tenets of implementation theory 
as well as an overview of the partnership literature.  
 
Macro-level theories of the state 
It is important for this study to consider macro-level theory insofar as it recognises 
that meso-level frameworks are founded on macro-level assumptions. It also focuses 
on the state and examines power relations between the state and society as a whole 
(Hill, 1997). That said, macro theory is exceptionally broad and it is beyond the scope 
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of this thesis to analyse all available theories. Therefore, this section will summarise 
the dominant macro-level theories, in particular those that share a clear relationship 
with the meso-level theories reviewed below, namely pluralism, Marxism and 
corporatism.  
 
Pluralism 
Pluralism is a broad construct and involves many different interpretations (see 
Smith, 1995: 209-227). It is not within the scope of this thesis to provide a review of 
all interpretations here. However, it is important to provide a summary of classic 
pluralism. This is most commonly thought to emanate from Dahl’s 1961 work, Who 
governs? Classic pluralism recognises and values diversity in social, institutional and 
ideological practices (Vincent, 1987). Thus, the reality of the modern, liberal state is 
that ‘power in society is dispersed among the politically active citizenry’, and no 
single group, class or organisation can dominate (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987; 
Houlihan, 1991: 155). Normative pluralism asserts that political decisions are made 
in the interests of the public they serve. Given the competitive nature of modern 
society, entwined with ‘complexity and divisions of interest’, decisions will never 
entirely be in the interests of the public or achieve ‘the ideals of Athenian democracy’ 
(Held, 1996: 201). In this regard, the classical pluralist position posits that interest 
groups have more dominant influence over governing decisions than the electoral 
process (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987). Interest groups are the most commonly noted 
feature of the pluralist perspective and their influence is primarily manifest by 
applying pressure and lobbying government decision makers, as was seen to be the 
case with the NGB lobby for greater responsibility pre-2008 in the leadership of the 
community sport policy process. Such interest groups do not necessarily represent 
the public view but are comprised of agents who pursue particular agendas tightly 
aligned to their own interests.  
 
Importantly then, pluralists focus on groups, and the relationship between the 
state—at differing levels—and these groups (Ham & Hill, 1993). Whilst politics and 
decisions may be primarily directed by government, pluralism acknowledges that 
many non-governmental agencies use their resources to exert influence on 
government (Connolly, 1995). In this respect, groups form an important part of the 
political process, insomuch as politics can be seen as a means by which conflicting 
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interests can be resolved (Smith, 1995). Indeed, in order to function effectively, 
Smith argued the need for ‘some degree of consensus concerning the fundamental 
values of a society shared by competing groups’ (1995: 213). Thus, government can 
be viewed not as the creator of grand majorities, but as a way of maintaining ‘steady 
appeasement of relatively small groups’ (Dahl, 1956: 145). 
 
So, at its centre, pluralism is firmly concerned with the distribution of power across 
the state and non-government agencies and, specifically, the power held by particular 
interest groups. Consequently, it is important to discuss the implications of power in 
the context of individual interest groups. The first consideration is that often interest 
groups are concerned with only a specific issue or small range of issues; therefore, 
their overall power is limited to a very small sub-section of the state (Dunleavy and 
O’Leary, 1987). These authors continue to argue that even in cases where interest 
groups do become overly powerful, counter groups are likely to form in order to 
resist or oppose it (ibid, 1987). Interest groups are also likely to have cross-
membership between groups, so internal divisions and subsequent weaknesses are 
inevitable (Held, 1996). As a result, power tends to be dispersed across a wide range 
of units, a situation viewed positively by classical pluralists (Jordan, 1990). Finally, 
Smith (1995) suggested an interpretation of pluralism which views the policy-making 
process as open, with no particular interests being permanently excluded—he also 
warned against mistaking opportunities to express views and consultations for real 
influence over the resultant policies (ibid, 1995). 
 
In recent years, a number of challenges have been made in relation to classical 
pluralism. First, citizens and groups are not as politically aware as is assumed in 
pluralist thinking (Bogdanor, 1981). Second, some interests are sufficiently powerful 
as to restrict the ‘openness’ of the policy system and therefore prevent issues getting 
onto the agenda (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970). Third, Lindblom (1977) argued that 
corporations must be viewed as privileged participants rather than just one of a 
number of interest groups due to their power and pre-eminent position in directly 
impacting significant government objectives, namely employment and economic 
growth. Fourth, Lukes emphasised that Dahl’s notion of power, which underpins 
classical pluralism, is misleading (Lukes 1974). Dahl (1961, 1967) contended that A 
has power over B to the extent that A can get B to do something that B would not 
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otherwise do. Lukes argued that this view of power is one-dimensional and fails to 
recognise ‘the less-visible ways in which a pluralist system may be biased in favour of 
certain groups and against others’ (1974: 179). Power, as an implicit part of the policy 
process (Giddens, 2006), is a particularly important analytic concept for this thesis 
and will be given more detailed attention below. 
 
As a result of these criticisms, a number of competing approaches have evolved, the 
most notable being the neo-pluralist perspective (Held, 1996). The neo-pluralist 
position maintains a commitment to pluralist values, in particular the view that 
liberal democracies attempt to satisfy, albeit inadequately, the wants of the masses 
(Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987). The discernible difference of this approach is its 
‘concern to describe political processes more accurately and to take account of the 
ambiguities and paradoxes in the policy-making process’ (Houlihan, 1991: 156). The 
theory emphasizes the significance of business interests in shaping policy (Held, 
1996), and acknowledges ‘active participation’ of the state, rather than control by 
citizens (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987). Moreover, neo-pluralism provides a more 
realistic account of the complexities of the policy process (Held, 1996), where 
piecemeal change, bargaining, compromise and negotiation all play integral roles 
(Houlihan, 1991). Thus, neo-pluralism can be seen to illuminate the nature of the 
relationship between actors and the strategies that actors adopt to influence policy, 
as well as identify the resources available to different actors involved in the 
negotiations (Houlihan, 1991). In this respect, neo-pluralism starts to call into 
question the principles, features and conditions of democracy (Held, 1996)—a similar 
position to that of Marxism. 
 
Marxism 
Class structure and class struggle are key features of Marxist literature. In any state 
where there is private ownership of capital, those who own or control the means of 
production form a dominant or ruling class (Marx, 1964). The dominant class 
exercises both economic and political power over the working class in order to 
further its accumulation of capital (Vincent, 1987).  
 
Marxist theory can be divided into two strands commonly referred to as 
instrumentalist and structuralist (Held, 1996; Pickvance, 1995; Taylor, 1995). The 
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instrumentalist account views the state and its policy as being controlled by the 
dominant class in order to promote their interests and preserve their power 
(Milliband, 1982). Indeed, a distinctive aspect of instrumentalism is that capitalists, 
state bureaucrats and political leaders are grouped into a single cohesive group 
unified ‘by their common social origin, similar lifestyles, values and by the existence 
of numerous networks and forums where coordinated strategies for public policy are 
hammered out’ (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987: 237).  
 
In sharp contrast, the structuralist approach distinguishes the state from the ruling 
class, stressing the state’s ‘relative autonomy’ from the control of the dominant class 
(Poulantzas, 1972). However, it is still ‘constrained by those who own and control the 
means of production’ (Taylor, 1995: 249) as the state’s key function is to preserve ‘the 
political unity of the ruling class’ (Houlihan, 1991: 154). This can only be achieved if 
the state is in a position to mediate between the various class factions, although the 
state is highly likely to support and act in the interests of capitalism (ibid, 1991). 
However, Poulantzas (1972) contended that the structural mechanisms of the state 
ensure that the dominant class remains organised; the state presents itself as neutral 
and as having ‘relative autonomy’, but in reality acts in the interests of capitalism. 
This is in line with Gramsi (1971) who highlighted the use of cultural and ideational 
leadership approaches to produce hegemonic rule with the consent of the 
subordinate class. Conversely, Offe’s (1975, 1984) neo-Marxist writings offer a 
different perspective of the relationship between the state and capitalism. He 
suggested that the state must maintain the illusion of impartial arbiter—particularly 
in relation to class interests (Offe, 1984). However, at the same time, state finance is 
directly affected by private accumulation, which it does not directly control (Offe, 
1984). This brings into focus the ‘institutional self-interest of the state’, particularly 
with regard to strengthening the capitalist economy. Such efforts help to support the 
continuation and development of the state (Held, 1996). Thus, it is possible to 
observe a convergence of theoretical thinking between elements of pluralism and 
Marxism (Held, 1996; Marsh & Stoker, 1995). 
 
Corporatism 
Whilst corporatism can be viewed as the least developed of the macro-theories 
reviewed, Cawson (1986) argued that it offers three specific perspectives of the 
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interaction between public and private sectors: (i) that which is primarily focused on 
the economy (Winkler, 1976), (ii) that which views the state as taking on specific 
forms of representation and intervention (Jessop, 1990), and (iii) the most 
commonly applied perspective, which attempts to illuminate the relationship 
between government and interest groups in specific sectors (Smith, 1993). These 
relations are a result of the increased complexity of industrial society, combined with 
the concentration of power within particular groups, which forces the state to 
incorporate groups into the policy process in order to ensure economic growth and 
avoid class conflict (ibid, 1993). In addition, corporatism refers to the relations 
between groups and political authority with restrictionist implications for economic 
policy (Bealey, 1998). In this context, those in favour of corporatist solutions want to 
reduce confrontation and conflict, while those opposed view conflict as inevitable 
and welcome the prospect of competition (ibid, 1998).  
 
Schmitter (1974) contended that the key feature of corporatism was the existence of, 
so-called ‘peak’ organisations that share a special relationship with the state. Peak 
organisations enjoyed a privileged position where they could access the inner 
workings of the state and discuss the creation and formulation of policy, not to 
mention be in a strong position in discussions relating to policy implementation 
(Birch, 2007). To clarify, Schmitter viewed corporatism as 
 
... a system of interest representation in which the constituent units 
are organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-
competitive, hierarchically ordered categories, recognised or 
licensed (if not created) by the state and granted deliberate 
representational monopoly within their respective categories in 
exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders 
and articulation of demands and supports (1974: 93-94). 
 
Birch (2007), in support of the primarily economic view held by Schmitter, argued 
that corporatism involved a tripartite relationship between government and peak 
organisations either representing business or labour at the national level. This is 
where the views of corporatism differ most, specifically in relation to (i) the scope of 
the theory, (ii) the interests represented by peak organisations, and (iii) the degree to 
which the theory is applied. For example, Cawson (1978), and Cawson & Saunders 
(1981) contended that ‘corporate relations tend to characterise the politics of 
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production, whilst competitive politics dominate the politics of consumption (in 
Ham & Hill, 1993: 39). Cawson (1978) argued against a single economically-focused 
theory, stating that the various units of the capitalist state are subject to different 
political influences. Thus, Cawson’s view of corporatism is broader, acknowledging 
corporatist relations beyond those groups purely focused on business or labour, as 
well as considering local- as well as national-level relations (1978). 
 
Clearly, corporatism shares similarities with pluralism, particularly the neo-pluralist 
position assumed by Lindblom (1977). Whilst not reviewed here, certain strains of 
corporatism are closely aligned with elitism, specifically the focus on a small number 
of elite agencies who maintain influence over the policy agenda (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 
1987). However, Birch (2007) contended that the acknowledged presence of peak 
organisations separates it from both pluralist and elitist perspectives.  
 
The following section discusses in more depth the concept of power which is central 
to both macro- and meso- level theorising. 
 
The concept of power 
As Lukes acknowledged, ‘thinking clearly about power is not easy and it gets more 
difficult, offering more opportunities for confusion when we try to think about power 
in social life, not least because we all talk and write about it … in confusingly different 
ways’ (2005: 70-71). Despite the definitional debates associated with power, many 
researchers turn to Weber’s original conception as a starting point. This definition 
permits a broader articulation of power as both ‘power over’ and ‘power to’. Weber 
(1976) defined power as the ‘opportunity to have one’s will prevail within a social 
relationship, also against resistance, no matter what this opportunity is based on’3. 
Thus, power can be viewed as a ‘relational phenomenon in that it cannot be grasped 
without first identifying a social relationship’ (Berenskoetter, 2007: 4). This social 
relationship is viewed as the environment where an individual’s will is formed and 
the behaviour that takes place is ‘adjusted and oriented towards each other’ (Weber, 
1976: 13). Second, it can be understood as an opportunity or potential which does not 
                                                          
3 Many English texts use the translation of Weber found in Dahl. However, this translation has been offered as 
Dahl’s translation is criticised for understanding the German ‘chance’ as probability, whereas Berenskoetter 
argued that Weber more likely meant opportunity 
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have to be realized; Weber’s orientation provides for power as both a capability and 
an effect (Berenskoetter, 2007). Also, the acceptance that resistance need not be a 
feature of all forms of power leaves us with a conception involving both resistance 
and cooperation (Weber, 1976 in Berenskoetter, 2007), enveloping both ‘power over’ 
and ‘power to’.  
 
The ‘power over’ conceptualisation assumes that A holds power over B (Dahl, 1961). 
Thus, power is a zero-sum enterprise in that there is limited power distributed 
between different actors (Goehler, 2000). This perspective sees A using their power 
in order to achieve their interests, whilst B may use the power at their disposal to 
resist this, either overtly or covertly (Kenny, 1975). In this regard, the study of power 
is about the achievement, or otherwise, of specific outcomes (Lukes, 2005). The 
primary authors in the ‘power over’ school are Dahl, Bachrach & Baratz, and Lukes. 
Each has developed a specific conceptualisation based on differing ontological and 
epistemological foundations. The initial one-dimensional view of power was 
developed by Dahl and is often referred to as the pluralist view of power (Lukes, 
2005). Dahl was primarily fixed on the visible exercise of power in specific decision 
making processes (1956). In particular, actors working in diverse policy systems have 
very specific and transparent interests which are acted upon rationally in 
negotiations and conflicts within political arenas (ibid, 1956). Focused on behaviour, 
decision-making, preferences and overt conflict, the one-dimensional view sees 
power as intentional and active (Lukes, 2005). In this sense, power could be 
measured by examining the extent to which various actors are able to achieve their 
stated aims (Polsby, 1963 in Lukes, 2005). 
 
The second dimension of power was primarily developed by Bachrach & Baratz, who 
criticised the one-dimensional view as being limited by its focus on overt decision 
making (1970). Whilst they accepted the one-dimensional view as a partial 
explanation, they contended that power has two faces (Lukes, 2005). The second face 
of power underscores what Bachrach & Baratz term the ‘mobilization of bias’; in 
other words, the systematic bias which influences the status given to various issues 
(Parsons, 1995). Thus, the exercise of power in this second dimension is less 
transparent or not as visible as the first. The exercise of power is more discrete, 
hidden by the debate of what issues shall be included and more importantly by 
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ignoring any reference to those issues that may threaten the interests of privileged 
agents involved in the policy process (Lukes, 2005; Scott, 2001). 
 
Lukes’ (1974) critique of the second dimension argued that it is inadequate to assume 
that power is conceived exclusively through overt or observable behaviour—thus, it is 
unacceptable to simply conceive of power through a focus on behaviourism. In a 
move away from positivist discourse, Lukes pointed to the need for a more nuanced 
view which would consider how A exercises power over B ‘by influencing, shaping or 
determining his very wants’ (2005: 27). This third, more insidious form of power 
exists in the control and manipulation of ideas (Scott, 20o1), following along the lines 
of the Gramscian notion of hegemony. For example, political leaders and the mass 
media are identified as commonly exercising power to keep certain issues from 
reaching the political agenda (Lukes, 2005). In this way, political leaders and the 
mass media propagate a false consciousness (Goverde et al., 2000), shaping and 
manipulating perceptions, cognitions and preferences, thereby preventing grievances 
from occurring as agents are either unaware of alternative solutions or view the order 
of things as natural (Lorenzi, 2006). Importantly, the absence of grievances then 
does not necessarily denote consensus; it could equally point to the manipulative and 
insidious exercise of power. As Lukes asserted, ‘the collective forces and social 
arrangements … the socially structured and culturally patterned behaviour of groups 
and practice of institutions’ (2005: 28) influence our preferences. Thus, ‘preferences 
can themselves be the effect of the exercise of power’ (Isaac, 1987: 13). 
 
However, the conceptualisations of power presented thus far have been criticised for 
over-emphasising power as a purely conflictual phenomena or focusing wholly on the 
power of one over another (Haugaard, 2000). In addition, other criticisms have 
accentuated the inability of Lukes’ work to empirically establish real interests 
(Young, 1988), critiqued its overly agency-focused conceptualisation (Hayward, 
2006), and questioned its overly subjective and ‘condescending conception’ (Hay, 
1997: 48). As a result Lukes added a further two chapters to the 2005 edition of 
‘Power: A Radical View’, which readily acknowledges some of the inadequacies of the 
original edition. He addresses criticisms that the original text was unsatisfactory due 
to the over-emphasis of domination and the lack of attention to the multiple ways in 
which power can be “productive, transformative, authoritative, and compatible with 
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dignity” (Luke, 2005: 109). Still, he goes on to defend his original thesis and leaves 
the remainder of the text unaltered.  
 
In contrast, a number of scholars have approached power as a process that affects 
outcomes (Habermas, 1986), and in particular as the capacity for action (Arendt, 
1986), and/or harnessing the potential for collective action as opposed to the 
domination of one actor over another (Goehler, 2000). Parsons (1963) developed a 
particular line of enquiry exploring the consensual nature of power. In addition, this 
contrasting notion of power as capacity, collective, and consensual is viewed as a 
‘positive-sum game’ where the actions of rational actors benefit not only themselves 
but others (Parsons, 1963, Scott, 2001). Indeed, in cases of collective power, Goehler 
(2000) argued that power becomes self-reinforcing, thus the more power is exercised 
the greater the drive for more intensive collective effort which in turn enhances levels 
of power. 
 
However, Lukes has argued that these conceptualisations of power, whilst ‘rationally 
defensible ... are of less value’ than those he proposed (2005: 34). In particular, the 
‘power to’ proposition is challenged as it is viewed as overly normative (Goehler, 
2000; Habermas, 1986), ignoring the ‘power over aspect’. As a result, ‘the conflictual 
aspect of power, the fact that it is exercised over people—disappears altogether from 
view’ (Lukes, 2005: 34). Thus, the central feature of power relations—that is, an 
interest in securing people’s compliance by overcoming and averting their 
opposition, is lost in the ‘power to’ theory (Lukes, 2005).  
 
Thus, it is plausible then to present power as a dichotomy—we accept either the 
coercive or consensual interpretation. Considerately, both Lukes and Parsons offered 
insights where the researcher can begin to integrate these concepts and present a 
more thorough, inclusive representation of power. First, Lukes argued that Parsons 
and Arendt’s commitment to consensual behaviour could be included in the third 
dimension of power, as opposed to simply replacing it. Luke’s argued that ‘members 
of a group acting in concert are exercising power’, viewing this as ‘co-operative 
activity where individuals or groups significantly affect one another in the absence of 
conflict of interests between them’, and categorised it as influence within his 
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conceptualisation of the third dimension (Lukes, 2005: 35). Second, Parsons noted 
the need to consider both perspectives, offering 
 
 … a resolution of the old dilemma as to whether power is 
“essentially” a phenomenon of coercion or of consensus. It is both, 
precisely because it is a phenomenon which integrates a plurality of 
factors and outputs of political effectiveness and is not to be 
identified with any one of them (1963: 258). 
 
Furthermore, Foucault offered a conceptualisation of power which pulls on both the 
coercive or repressive form of power as well as the cooperative, productive elements 
discussed above. Fundamentally for Foucault, ‘power is not a thing or a capacity 
which can be owned by the State, social class or particular individuals’ (O’Farrell, 
2005: 99). Rather, power is omnipresent and is located at the micro-level of social 
relations between agents (individuals and groups) (Faubion, 2000). Thus, power in 
Foucault’s conception is constructed as a pervasive, ubiquitous feature of all social 
relations (Hindness, 1996). In his more recent accounts of power and resistance, 
Foucault articulated power as a way of changing people’s conduct or a mode of action 
upon the actions of others (Foucault, 1982: 341; O’Farrell, 2005: 99). Importantly in 
this conception, he argued that ‘agents will always seek to modify the actions of 
others, whilst assuming that agents at the same time will resist such attempts’ 
(O’Farrell, 2005: 109). Thus, power can only be exercised over free subjects, as ‘there 
is no power without potential refusal or revolt’ (Foucault, 1981: 324). 
 
In addition, Foucault distinguished his ideas on power by pointing to those notions 
of power purely residing in the State (Foucault, 1977). This aspect of Foucault’s work 
is highly relevant to this study as it draws attention to the ‘complex micro-relations 
of power at every level of the social body’ (O’Farrell, 2005: 100). In other words, 
individual agents in CSPs, NGBs, local authorities and sports clubs are connected to 
one another in myriad ways, so the policies and ‘grand strategy of the State rely on 
the cooperation of a whole network of local and individualised tactics of power in 
which everybody is involved’ (O’Farrell, 2005: 100). 
 
The third and final point from Foucault draws on his broader view of power as not 
only coercion and resistance, but also productive in that it can support cooperation, 
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contribute to and generate knowledge and further cultural order (Faubion, 2000). Of 
particular interest is Foucault’s notion of ‘the microphysics of power’ and ‘capillary 
power’ where ‘power reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies, 
and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes, 
and everyday lives’ (Foucault, 1975: 39). It is this form of omnipresent power, which 
touches all individuals, that Foucault views as productive rather than repressive 
(O’Farrell, 2005). This account of power has been criticised by Lukes (2005) for 
being overly normative and not permitting individuals the freedom embedded within 
his third dimension. In support of Lukes, Dowding criticized Foucault for an 
“idealist’ model which views ‘all social relationships in the same relativistic light and 
where all—dominant and dominated alike—are subject to the same power relations 
and moral responsibility’ (2006: 136). That said, Foucault’s approach does give 
attention to both coercion and cooperation. It also offers tools that help to better 
understand the tactics of power at the local level and the implications of this in terms 
of the CSP-NGB relationship. In short, the broader notion of power is inseparable 
from the policy process. It plays a critical role in the more obvious range of factors 
that directly shape and constrain the policy process, for example the easy to view 
arena of interests that are harnessed in the formulation of policy. At the same time it 
plays an important role in the more discrete mechanisms that influence agent 
behaviour and network interactions. Thus, it is important for policy analysis tools to 
give explicit attention to power and the way in which it affects the policy process. 
This will be considered further in the following section. 
 
Analytical Frameworks of the Policy Process 
Policy processes and systems are being reported as becoming increasingly complex 
(de Leon & Vogenbeck, 2007; Sabatier, 2007), challenged by a range of variables that 
singularly or collectively disrupt and, in some cases, derail the policy process. These 
variables include (i) the myriad actors involved in the policy process; (ii) the time 
required to make, implement and evaluate policy; (iii) the various programmes, 
levels of government and the impact of programmes on a range of issues; (iv) 
technical disputes concerning the nature of the problem, its causes and the likely 
impact of alternative policy ideas, and (v) the authoritative coercion used to secure 
support and validate policies (Sabatier, 2007: 3-4). Such wide-ranging (and in some 
cases discrete) variables make it extremely difficult for the analyst to look for and see 
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everything. The risk is that analysis is shallow, incomplete or inaccurate. In assessing 
approaches to policy analysis, Sabatier presented two strategies: the first is a ‘method 
of common sense’, whereby the analyst’s world view is informed in an ‘implicit, ad 
hoc’ manner, based principally on prior experience (2007: 5). The alternative 
strategy relies wholeheartedly on science; ‘its fundamental ontological assumption is 
that a smaller set of critical relationships underlies the bewildering complexity of 
phenomena’ (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Fundamentally, this science-based approach, 
whilst overly positivist for some social scientists, is designed to identify errors, self-
correct and drive the development of coherent and logical theories (Sabatier, 1999).  
Theoretical frameworks are therefore helpful in providing a systematic response to 
this complexity, offering the analyst ‘the very tools to understand the broader 
questions of public policy’ (Birkland, 2005: 14). 
 
In addition, analytical and normative theorising plays an important role in allowing 
the researcher to move beyond rational models of policy making and investigate 
critical issues such as belief systems, principles relating to collective action, and the 
broad range of actors that contribute to specific policy systems (Sabatier, 2007).  
Houlihan (2005) demonstrated, through his adaptation of the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework, the value of theoretical approaches in identifying patterns of behaviour 
amongst interest groups, the impact of exogenous factors (e.g. recession), dominant 
and service specific policy paradigms and the way in which power affects policy 
outputs and outcomes. Theory offers the possibility of a richer, deeper understanding 
of the policy process, facilitating what Birkland referred to as a ‘healthy criticism’ of 
those aspects that do little to address the broader public interest (2005: 22).  
 
Whilst the final chapter of the thesis will include a fuller analysis of the value of each 
framework, set against the empirical findings, there is a need for a set of criteria to 
undertake a preliminary evaluation of the frameworks’ potential and, thus, their 
inclusion in the theoretical review. To support this, previous work from Sabatier 
(1997), who developed criteria for the selection of frameworks for non-specific policy 
analysis, has been combined with Houlihan (2005), who developed a criteria to select 
frameworks for the analysis of sports-related policy. Synthesis of these two 
approaches offers a clear and logical set of principles to support a preliminary 
evaluation.    
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First, any framework should be able to sufficiently explain both policy stability and 
change (John, 1998, Sabatier, 1999).  Houlihan stressed that this capacity to explain 
change has particular import in the sports domain due to the relatively quick 
turnover of sports policy in many industrial countries (2005:167).  The second 
criterion is the ability to identify and clarify a range of aspects associated with the 
policy process.  Too many frameworks focus attention on discrete elements or stages 
of the process.  They lack a holistic view, and many are deficient in terms of 
examining the interrelationship between actors, aspects or stages (Houlihan, 2005).  
Sabatier supported this stating that ‘each framework must be a positive theory 
seeking to explain much of the policy process (1999: 8).  The third criterion is 
relevance to contemporary policymaking, ensuring that frameworks have been 
applied to a wide range of policy disciplines (Houlihan, 2005) and appropriately 
scrutinised and tested by policy scholars in order to confirm their value as models 
and frameworks that can sufficiently analyse the policy process (Sabatier, 1999, 
2007).  The fourth and final criterion relates to time, insomuch as a certain number 
of years need to pass to reasonably distinguish minor adjustments in policy 
(Houlihan, 2005; Sabatier, 2007).  In addition, a significant time span is a 
prerequisite when aiming to identify causal drivers and other explanatory factors 
(Houlihan, 2005; Sabatier, 1999).  Therefore, both Houlihan (2005) and Sabatier 
(1997; 2007) recommended that any framework should facilitate a medium term 
(~10 years) analysis of policy change.  In the following subsections, four dominant 
frameworks will be outlined and evaluated against the above criteria. 
 
Institutional Analysis 
Institutions are central to the policy process as the arena within which policymaking 
takes place (John, 1998). Institutional analysis has therefore emerged as a robust 
theoretical paradigm within political science that focuses on the influence of 
institutions in defining the behaviour of actors through rules, regulations and norms 
(Di Maggio & Powell, 1983; Peters, 1999). Taking this view into account, there is a 
need to develop and refine our understanding of institutions as independent and 
intervening variables in the process (Houlihan, 2005: 170). Analysis of the critical 
role of institutions in shaping sports policy is an area previously addressed by Green 
(2003), Henry (2001), Houlihan (2005), and Houlihan & White (2002). However, 
for some, institutions are a highly abstract and invisible element of the policy 
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environment, meaning that the term requires clear definition (Ostrom, 1999).  
Institutions may be formally described in legislation, policy or procedure or 
informally viewed as norms, operating practices or habits (ibid, 1999). Individually, 
or nested in a set of more formal arrangements, they are mechanisms for 
coordinating behaviour and activities amongst two or more individuals (Hurwicz, 
1994). Houlihan (2005) offered clarification, identifying two orientations in the 
literature that distinguished institutional analysis. The first relates to the importance 
of institutions as organisational entities (parliament, government departments, non-
departmental public bodies, NGBs, Local Authorities etc.). The second is concerned 
with what Houlihan terms cultural institutionalism (2005:170), which represents 
shared values, norms and beliefs. This, in particular, gives attention to the social 
construction of meaning, specifically how specific organisations, interest groups, 
politicians and others decide their policy preferences (Fischer, 2003). 
 
As a leading scholar in the field of institutional analysis, Ostrom (1999, 2007) 
through an Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD), viewed the 
policy process as being centred on an action arena, whereby groups of individuals 
make decisions over some course of action. Drawn from the political economy field, 
the framework (Figure 2.1), assumes that processes and outcomes are influenced by 
variables exogenous to the individual, specifically physical and material conditions, 
attributes of the community of which actors are part, and rules that create incentives 
and constraints for certain actions (Ostrom, 1999; 2007). 
 
 
Exogenous variables 
Polski & Ostrom advised that the institutional framework allows the analyst to work 
forward through each stage, or work backward through the flow diagram to re-affirm 
Figure 2.1 Framework for institutional analysis (source: Ostrom, 2007) 
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or revise policy objectives or evaluate policy outcomes (1999: 7).  This illuminates the 
factors that affect action arenas and policy outputs and aids in the organisation and 
explanation of actor behaviour and action in specific policy systems (Polksi & 
Ostrom, 1999). The IAD framework is based on the principle of ‘bounded rationality’; 
in other words, the idea that individuals will try to maximise utility but are 
constrained by cognitive limitations and what Vincent Ostrom (2007) termed ‘socio-
psychological limitations’ (access to resources, knowledge, social influence). The 
framework enables the analyst to consider exogenous factors and the role that these 
factors play in influencing and shaping actor behaviour (Ostrom, 2007). Thus, whilst 
we may presume that actors involved in policymaking engage in rational decision 
making processes based on sound evidence, this is not always the case (Polski & 
Ostrom, 1999). Three exogenous factors are reported to significantly influence 
behaviour amongst actors in the action arena: physical and material conditions, 
attributes of community, and rules-in-use. Physical and material settings refer to the 
physical and human resources required to produce goods and services (Polski & 
Ostrom, 1999). This includes production inputs such as capital costs and workforce 
costs (i.e. labour and training) as well as sources of funding and delivery 
mechanisms. Factors such as availability of funds, training, and delivery mechanisms 
can significantly affect action situations and constrain behaviour in the action arena. 
For example, in the sport policy system, many actors are faced with decisions 
regarding allocation of resources within policy subsystems, for example school and 
community sport. Value judgements about the relative importance of the subsystem 
will influence resource allocation as well as actor behaviour within the action arena. 
The attributes of a community that directly affect policy include the demography of 
the community, the accepted norms about policy activities, the level of 
understanding amongst participants about policy activities and the extent to which 
community preferences are homogenous (Ostrom, 2007). As Polski & Ostrom noted, 
investigating community and cultural attributes is notoriously difficult, and the 
validity and reliability of findings are frequently controversial (1999: 14). However, 
the same scholars strongly encouraged analysts to make an effort to understand the 
cultural context, citing the vast literature that sees policy failure primarily as a result 
of inconsistencies with cultural norms and routines. A notable example is the lack of 
understanding of cultural norms within voluntary sport and the implications for 
community sport policy. This includes ambitious targets for voluntary sport without 
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taking account of the attributes of the voluntary sport community or addressing the 
previous literature identifying the key issues confronting the voluntary sports 
community (see Cuskelly et al., 2006, Harris et al., 2009; Nichols & James, 2008; 
Taylor et al., 2003).  
 
The types of rules applied are important in ‘explaining policy related actions, 
interactions and outcomes (Polski & Ostrom, 1999: 15). Despite rules being seen as 
abstract phenomena (ibid, 1999), it is possible to define several types of rules-in-use 
that can be seen to structure behaviour within the action arena, see Table 2.1. These 
rules demonstrate the range of variables that can influence actor behaviour as well as 
highlight the role of the institution in determining the action of agents. 
 
Table 2.1 Rules-in-use (source: Ostrom, 2007) 
Rules Explanation Examples in sport 
Entry and exit rules Determine the quantity of individuals 
involved within an action arena and the 
restrictions placed on them in terms of 
decision making 
Sport England conditions of grant-
aid applied to the whole sport plan 
process 
 
Position rules 
 
Define the set of positions or roles that 
participants assume in an action situation 
 
Decisions taken by the CSP 
regarding the structure of its board 
and its core team 
 
Authority rules Specify the actions participants in given 
positions may take 
 
The job descriptions and work 
programmes of individual agents 
working within CSPs and NGBs 
  
Scope rules Distinguish the possible outcomes and 
from a subsequent position agree the 
actors responsible for the outcome 
The role of NGB senior 
management teams in determining 
who will be responsible for what 
outcomes  
 
Information rules 
 
Controls what information (type and 
amount) is available and to who 
 
Sport England’s presentation and 
dissemination of Active People data 
 
Aggregation rules 
 
Establish the capacity of control that an 
actor can exert within an action situation 
 
The capacity of the CSP to 
strategically coordinate actions for 
sport at the sub-regional level 
 
Payoff rules 
 
Determine the costs, payments and 
sanctions that determine action         
 
The carrot and stick approach of 
Sport England and the way in which 
this determines action (to strive for 
rewards and reduce risk of 
punishment). 
 
Ostrom (2007) presented the IAD as a multi-tier conceptual map, explaining that 
part of the framework is primarily concerned with action, patterns of interaction, the 
resulting outcomes and the evaluation of these outcomes. Action arenas operate at 
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the operational, collective-choice or constitutional level, with myriad groups of actors 
involved at each level (Kiser & Ostrom 1982; Ostrom et al., 2004). The operational 
level involves activities that ordinarily affect society on a day-to-day basis (Ostrom et 
al., 2004). The actors within this action arena typically involve the community 
affected by policy and constitutional rules (Imperial & Yandle, 2005). Examples of 
operational actions in sport might include the task of encouraging CSPs to support 
clubs in the pursuit of club accreditation standards or delivering more hours of 
community sports coaching in areas that are likely to help grow participation in 
community sport. The collective-choice (or policy) level is where rules are created 
and re-created by decision makers (Ostrom, 2007). The decisions taken at this level 
affect both the structure of the arena and the operational actions agreed by actors 
(Ostrom, 2007). Recent examples in community sport include changes in the 
philosophical foundation of policy. Over the past 20 years, this has also included the 
frequently shifting sands of prioritising one sports policy objective (i.e. elite or school 
sport) over another, (i.e. community) and with this, varying levels of commitment to 
different institutions involved in strategising and implementing policy (particularly 
the differing priorities and views toward NGBs and Local Authorities). Finally, the 
rules that govern who is eligible to participate in policy making as well as the rules 
that govern the policy-making process are established at the constitutional level 
(Ostrom, 2007). Examples in sport include the Royal Charter bestowed on UK Sport 
and Sport England.  
 
Patterns of Interaction 
Flowing from the action situation is what Ostrom (1997) termed ‘patterns of 
interaction’, also referred to as a behavioural consequence of action situations (Rudd, 
2004) that allows an examination of how actors involved in the action arena behave 
(Hess & Ostrom, 2004). A range of issues require consideration when reflecting on 
patterns of interaction, for example; ‘are participants able to gain sufficient 
information about the structure of the situation, the opportunities they and other 
participants face, and the costs of diverse action, that they develop increasing trust 
that the situation helps to generate productive outcomes and in the expected 
behaviour of others (ibid, 2004: 19)?’ In a tightly constrained policy environment, 
with little or no uncertainty, actors have very few strategy options and analysts can 
make strong inferences and predictions about likely patterns of behaviour (Ostrom, 
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et al., 2004). However, the majority of policy decisions are less certain and more 
complex to predict. Rather than entirely independent decisions, individuals make 
decisions within the context of ‘community norms’ or they meet with other actors in 
the situation to solve problems. In these situations, a more diverse range of strategic 
options exist and strategies can develop and change over time as stakeholders learn 
about the results of previous actions (Polski & Ostrom, 1999: 23:24). Consequently, 
analysis in these policy areas is complex and inferences relating to interaction and 
outcomes are weaker. Furthermore, patterns of interaction can be subject to high 
levels of conflict, especially in situations where there is change in the actors involved 
in the action arena, their values and goals (Ostrom, 2007) or perhaps a change in the 
balance of power between actors. In addition to conflict, interactions may prove 
unfocussed or muddled, where quick wins or quick-fix solutions take priority over 
collaborative, more analytical processes (Hess & Ostrom, 2004). 
 
Outcomes 
Analysis of outcomes is essentially an analysis of the performance of the policy 
system (Ostrom, 2007). Just as patterns of interaction flow logically from a rigorous 
analysis of the actors involved and the action situation, ‘insight about outcomes flows 
from similarly well-founded observations about patterns of interaction’ (Hess & 
Ostrom, 2004: 25).  In order to undertake objective assessment, some form of 
comparator data is required to track change. For example, the Active People dataset 
provides the community sport policy objective with baseline data at a range of 
geographic levels (i.e. national, regional, sub-regional and local). This allows 
performance, in outcome terms (i.e. overall participation levels) to be evaluated and 
compared. In addition, analysts will want to undertake more extensive evaluation of 
outcomes together with the anticipated outcomes that could be achieved under 
alternative institutional arrangements (Polksi & Ostrom, 1999). Ostrom focussed 
attention on six criteria: (i) economic efficiency, (ii) equity through fiscal 
equivalence, (iii) redistributional equity, (iv) accountability, (v) conformance to 
general morality, and (vi) adaptability (2007: 33). Elsewhere, contribution to 
knowledge has also been included as a key criterion to include in the evaluation of 
outcomes (Hess & Ostrom, 2004: 21). 
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Evaluating the framework 
Institutional analysis provides a valuable insight into the role of institutional 
pressures in shaping human incentives and behaviour (Ostrom, 1997). In evaluating 
the relevance of institutional analysis to sports policy, Houlihan (2005) highlighted 
the potential of the approach to challenge the pluralist doctrine that views 
organisations as establishments in which politics occur, rather than exogenous 
variables that determine policy.  Institutional analysis illuminates the behaviour of 
actors and the structures in which they operate (Hall, 1986). 
 
Despite the strength of the framework, there are substantial criticisms regarding its 
ability to analyse aspects of the policy process (Houlihan, 2005).  Campbell (2004) 
argued that the framework lacks a theoretical foundation in institutional change and 
fails to clarify the underlying causal factors behind change.  An example is the 
framework’s inability to consider internal and strategic factors when explaining 
institutional change, relying instead on an explanation based on exogenous factors 
(Skille, 2008).   This led Houlihan (2005) to conclude that institutional analysis was 
severely limited in explaining policy stability and change.  In contrast, its strengths 
include its consideration of rules and norms on individual incentives (Rudd, 2004), 
its examination of criteria that influences institutional performance (Imperial & 
Yandle, 2005), its multiple levels of analysis at different levels of rule making 
(Imperial & Yandle, 2005; Ostrom, 1999), and its ability to examine power and its 
relation to the policy-making process (Houlihan, 2005; Ostrom, 2007; Skille, 2008).  
Despite these advantages, Houlihan argued that the framework is limited in relation 
to the second criterion, essentially as a result of its bias toward structure over agency 
(2005:171).  Further, Houlihan (2005) has criticised institutional approaches for 
their rational actor approach which ‘depends on a vague ideational formulation, or 
which collapses into a crude form of institutional determinism’ (2005: 170).   With 
regards to the third criterion, the framework has been scrutinised and applied in 
numerous policy systems (see Ostrom, 2007) and deemed useful in concentrating 
attention on the significant role of organisational and cultural structures on 
policymaking (Houlihan, 2005; Ostrom, 2007).  In this regard, with organisational 
and cultural context a central tenet of the framework, institutional analysis is well-
equipped to meet the requirements of the final criterion, providing a framework that 
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can adequately manage and analyse policy over the medium term (Houlihan, 2005; 
Ostrom, 2007; Sabatier, 2007). 
 
In summary, whilst institutional analysis offers clear strengths, particularly in 
relation to organisation, culture and norms it fails to address (i) the degree to which 
institutions impact the policy process; (ii) the circumstances in which institutions 
may be more or less important; and (iii) equal consideration of agency alongside 
structure.  Further, the framework is seen as an overly complex analytic model, 
difficult to apply to real-life situations (Schlager, 2007).  Whilst complexity can be 
overcome, this is far from ideal in policy systems such as sport, particularly UK sport, 
where there is a long and turbulent past with diverse characteristics, norms and rules 
and where boundaries with other policy areas, particularly education, health and 
community cohesion, are blurred (Houlihan & White, 2002). 
 
Multiple Streams Framework 
The Multiple Streams (MS) Framework explores the relationship between three sets 
of interrelated factors contributing to policy agenda setting. In contrast to the 
dominant rational actor paradigm of other approaches, the MS framework 
emphasises ambiguity, complexity and randomness in policymaking (Houlihan, 
2005). Kingdon (1995) classified the causal factors contributing to policy formation 
into three streams which run parallel through the policy system. The streams 
comprise of a problem stream consisting of the issues which have been identified 
and require attention, and two secondary streams encompassing prospective 
solutions to the problem—the policy stream and the politics stream, independent to 
the other streams and primarily concerned with politics and public opinion. The MS 
framework asserts that policy formulation is a result of the confluence of these 
streams at specific stages in time, rather than being dependent on the power of 
interests (John, 1998). 
 
Windows are opened by significant problems or events that may occur in the political 
stream and this encourages policy change, such as that in political leadership, or by a 
‘focusing event’ (Zahariadis, 2007) that highlights policy failures and provides 
opportunities for policy learning (Birkland, 2005). The opening of a policy window 
can be exploited by advocates of proposals to divert attention to specific problems in 
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order to raise an issue on the agenda (Kingdon, 1995). Birkland (2005) used the 
example of the impact of 9/11 events upon airline security and regulations to 
demonstrate the ‘coupling’ of the problem, policy and politics streams, creating a 
policy window or opportunity for policy change. 
 
In a sporting context, one can look to the clarification of sport policy objectives 
brought about in early 2008, by (i) rising levels of childhood and adult obesity being 
reported in the media, (ii) reported increases in school sports participation, 
improved Olympic and World Championship results but declining (or, at best, 
stagnant) adult community sports participation, (iii) declining sports club 
membership, (iv) a change in the Secretary of State for Culture and Sport (Jowell to 
Purnell) and Minister for Sport (Caborn to Sutcliffe); (v) the need for a high-profile, 
high-impact legacy as part of the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games; and 
(vi) a very powerful NGB lobby galvanised by the Central Council for Physical 
Recreation (CCPR).  Here, as Buamgartner & Jones (1993) argue, the chance of 
policy change is more likely due to what they term ‘focussing events’ in each of the 
streams and the resultant impact of these on the relationships in a policy arena, the 
way in which they might attract negative attention to existing policy as well as 
provide opportunities for policy learning. The MS framework is based on five 
structural elements: problem, policies, politics, policy windows and policy 
entrepreneurs (Figure 2.2). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Multiple streams framework (source: Zahariadis, 2007) 
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Problem stream 
The problem stream consists of issues and conditions which some actors wish to view 
as problems that require attention (Kingdon, 1995). These issues are often raised 
through indicators such as the release of statistics (obesity or Active People statistics, 
for example), events (Olympic expenditure) and feedback from policies (unrealistic 
participation targets). The particular issue may not be seen as a problem by all actors 
involved in the policy system and on occasions the phenomena can be ambiguous or 
difficult to define (Zahariadis, 2007). In addition, actor’s values and ideological 
beliefs will shape their view of certain phenomena. Therefore, it is likely that actors 
will try to advocate or even manipulate the definition of the problem, presenting it in 
such a way that promotes their interest (ibid, 2007). 
 
Indicators can be monitored either routinely or through special studies (Zahariadis, 
2007). For example, data from the Active People survey is completed annually to 
assess a range of variables including participation, volunteering and club 
membership across different communities. These indicators can be used to assess the 
magnitude of conditions as well as drive discussion about the scope for change 
(Zahariadis, 2007). Focusing events are a further trigger for opening policy windows 
by drawing attention to problematic conditions (Birkland, 2005). Attention is 
typically set by media or policy entrepreneurs who direct attention to specific 
evaluative dimensions of particular problems—an unrealistic target to achieve 70% of 
the English population as active, for example (see DCMS, 2002). Finally, feedback 
from previous policies will highlight which interventions have been successful and 
which have been unsuccessful (Zahariadis, 2007). Whilst a small number of 
journalistic case studies may exist, sport has to do much more to embed robust 
evaluation into the design and delivery of interventions and ensure a reliable source 
of information about what works in terms of increasing participation in sport. 
 
Policy stream 
The policy stream consists of ideas conceptualised by coalitions which compete for 
attention within policy networks. Zahariadis reported this as a ‘soup of ideas that 
compete to win acceptance in policy networks’ (2007: 72). In other words, ideas 
generated and presented by politicians, National Sport Organisation (NSO) and NGB 
officials, academics and other specific actors (e.g. CSP representatives, Local 
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Government Association representatives, CCPR etc).  Within the UK sport policy 
system, proposals for change amongst specialists include lobbyists from groups that 
form a consensus about a particular policy subsystem such as elite sport (DCMS, UK 
Sport, NGBs, British Olympic Association, English Institute of Sport), community 
sport (DCMS, Sport England, NGBs) and PE and school sport (The Department for 
Education, DCMS, Youth Sport Trust, Sport England, school sport partnerships). Out 
of the numerous issues that circulate within the policy stream, a relatively small 
number receive serious attention (Zahariadis, 2007). Ideas survive, are integrated 
into new proposals or disappear. Ideas are more likely to receive serious attention if 
they are considered technically feasible (i.e. general agreement that the idea can be 
delivered within certain resource parameters) and clearly align to the dominant 
values of the key actors involved in the policy community (Kingdon, 1995).  
 
Political stream 
The political stream, independent of the other two streams, consists of three key 
elements: national mood (elsewhere referred to as public opinion), political forces 
(made up of political parties and interest groups) and government (Kingdon, 1995; 
Zahariadis, 2007). Through monitoring public mood, the government can act to 
promote certain items on the agenda or conversely, dim the prospects of others 
(Zahariadis, 2007). For example, the success of the British Olympics Team at the 
Beijing 2008 Games resulted in greater government investment into team 
development for the London 2012 Games, as well as an ongoing and proactive 
commitment to hosting more international sports events in the UK.  
 
Further, changes in key government personnel can be seen to have had a significant 
impact on sport policy objectives over the last decade or so. For example, the 
installment of New Labour in 1997 brought with it an ostensible commitment to a 
policy paradigm of social investment strategies to address multiple deprivation 
(Lister, 2001), overcome social exclusion (Giddens, 2006), deliver departmental 
modernisation (Houlihan & White, 2002) as well as embed education as the central 
plank of social reform (Giddens, 1998). More recent changes in ministerial 
appointments have also played a key role in a change of focus on a tighter definition 
of sport (pure sport as opposed to sport and active recreation) as well as adopting a 
more conservative policy goal for community sport. 
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Policy windows 
Kingdon (1995) defined policy windows as the result of the three streams coinciding 
or being coupled at critical moments. These are seen as rare occasions that enable 
lobbyists and other actors involved in the policy process to divert attention to their 
specific problems. There are two types of policy window, those that open in the policy 
stream and those that open in the politics stream (Kingdon, 1995: 168). A window 
that has been created by a problem triggers a search for suitable ideas in the policy 
stream, where the definition of the problem may be in progress at the same time. A 
policy window opened in the politics stream implies that ideas relating to problems 
are being presented. The ability to predict the opening of policy windows varies 
(Howlett, 1998; Kingdon, 1995). Howlett (1998: 499) further explained that windows 
can be opened with high or low predictability, which results in four types of window 
(see Figure 2.3). 
 
This indicates that the opening of some windows is easier to predict than others. 
However, coupling is not an automatic response and windows are usually only open 
for a short period of time. While a window is open, a lobbyist or policy entrepreneur 
must be ready to take action and push attention to their particular problems and 
solutions. Policy entrepreneurs must be cautious, however, as Zahariadis (2007) 
warned problems can arise when advocates seek to push issues using the wrong 
window. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Types of Policy Window (source: Howlett, 1998)  
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Policy entrepreneurs 
Individuals who attempt to couple the three streams are known as policy 
entrepreneurs (Kingdon, 1995). Policy entrepreneurs are highly influential in the 
policy process, proposing solutions to problems, assembling opinions and 
influencing institutions to ensure their initiative is well distinguished (Zahariadis, 
2007). Importantly, in contrast to other frameworks presented here, the inclusion of 
the policy entrepreneur attempts to rebalance structure and agency and allows for a 
more detailed analysis of agency and its impact on the policy process. Houlihan and 
Green (2006), for example, presented Sue Campbell (then Chief Executive of the 
Youth Sport Trust) as a key policy entrepreneur in advocating the potential of PE and 
school sport to support the broader academic agenda. Campbell’s persuasion of civil 
servants and ministers allowed her to push her ideas onto the agenda despite initial 
departmental criticism of these ideas (Houlihan & Green, 2006). Clearly, the policy 
entrepreneur must be highly skilled at coupling the three streams together and 
finding politicians who will give support to their ideas. Evidently, this was the case 
with Campbell, who exploited the policy window (with the New Labour manifesto 
commitment of ‘education, education, education’ as the focussing event) in order to 
attach problems (poor educational standards) to solutions (the use of PE and school 
sport to re-engage certain pupils and, therefore, improve educational performance). 
Entrepreneurs must also ‘employ manipulating strategies to accomplish their goal of 
coupling the three streams’ (Zahariadis, 2007).  
 
Evaluating the framework 
The MS framework offers a reassuring critique of the assumption of rational 
decision-making seen in other policy analysis frameworks.  It offers a more 
reasonable insight into the sometimes irrational and often ambiguous policy-making 
process (Zahariadis, 2007).  In addition, the framework offers escape from the single 
focus on institutional interests that distort the political system (Houlihan, 2005: 
172).   However, further evaluation of the framework, specifically against the four 
specific criteria, reveals a range of limitations.  First, whilst the framework considers 
agency through the analysis of the policy entrepreneur, this is only a partial focus 
and attention remains fixed on structural factors and institutional power (Houlihan, 
2005).  In addition, a number of critics have argued that the three streams are not 
independent of each other, as changes in one stream can trigger or reinforce changes 
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in another, making coupling less unexpected and the process of policy windows 
opening more purposive and strategic (Mucciaroni, 1992). Second, the MS 
framework is primarily concerned with policy formulation, specifically agenda 
setting (Zahariadis, 2007), and offers little currency in analysing aspects of the 
process, such as implementation (Houlihan, 2005), thus diminishing its appeal as a 
framework that can be applied to the entire policy process (Sabatier, 2007).  Third, 
the MS Framework has been widely applied, both generally (Birkland, 1997, 2004; 
Kingdon, 1995; Zahariadis & Allen, 1995) and specifically to sports policy (Chalip, 
1996; Houlihan & Green, 2006).  Its usefulness in illuminating the sports policy 
process is highlighted in Houlihan (2005) and Houlihan & Green (2006), who 
identified its value to sports policy, particularly in the concept of ‘spill over’ 
(Kingdon, 1995), whereby adjacent policy sectors are influenced by one another.  A 
crucial issue is the framework’s application to the UK policy system. Although the 
framework has been shown to be an effective method of sports policy analysis, it was 
designed to accommodate a federal system of decision making such as that in the US 
and consequently its transfer to a centralised political system in the UK may not be 
as insightful (Houlihan, 2005; Sabatier, 2007). Nevertheless, Houlihan (2005) 
argues that its applicability should not be overlooked given its capacity to pinpoint a 
range of issues which are likely to be relevant in a number of different political 
systems.  Fourth, with its focus on the coupling of three streams over time, the model 
lends itself particularly well to the analysis of policy over the medium term 
(Houlihan, 2005; Zahariadis, 2007). 
 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) has much in common with the policy 
network school (John, 1998: 169). It is regarded as a highly sophisticated method in 
the field of policy analysis designed to analyse a broader set of processes than 
previous works (Green & Houlihan, 2004; Houlihan, 2005; Sabatier & Jenkins-
Smith, 1993; Sabatier & Weible, 2007; Schlager, 1995). According to its founder, the 
framework aims to synthesise the best of top-down and bottom-up perspectives of 
policy (Sabatier, 1993). The framework is based on three ‘foundation stones’ 
(Sabatier & Weible, 2007: 191-192): (i) a macro-level view that policymaking occurs 
amongst specialists in a policy subsystem and that their behaviour is affected by 
relatively stable parameters and external events; (ii) a micro-level view of the 
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individuals involved in the policy subsystem based on their beliefs; and (iii) a meso-
level assumption that the most effective way to analyse the behaviour of myriad 
actors is to cluster them into ‘advocacy coalitions’. Further, the ACF predicts that 
policy change is initiated when four processes conducive to policy change disturb the 
policy subsystem: policy orientated learning, external perturbations, internal 
perturbations, and negotiated agreements. Figure 2.4 illustrates the key components 
of the enhanced ACF framework (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). It shows the role of 
advocacy coalitions within the policy subsystem and the interrelationship with 
factors exogenous to the policy subsystem that directly or indirectly shape the 
constraints and opportunities affecting the policy community (ibid, 2007). The 
section below will aim to present more information concerning each of these 
components. 
 
External factors 
The majority of policymaking occurs within the policy subsystem as a result of 
negotiations between actors (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). However, actor’s 
behaviour can be influenced by two sets of exogenous factors, one fairly stable and 
the other dynamic (ibid, 1993). The relatively stable parameters represent a set of 
exogenous factors consisting of the basic attributes of the problem area, the basic 
distribution of natural resources, the fundamental socio-cultural values and social 
structure and the basic constitutional structure (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). 
Consequently, they rarely impinge on policy change, although they do play a key role 
in influencing the resources and constraints that affect policy actors. The dynamic (or 
external) events include changes in socioeconomic conditions, changes in the 
governing coalition (i.e. from Sport England leadership to NGB) and policy decisions 
from other subsystems. These factors also influence actor behaviour, ‘their ability to 
change substantially over a period of 10 years or more make them critical factors in 
affecting major policy change’ (ibid, 2007: 193). 
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Policy subsystem 
It is the relatively stable parameters that structure policymaking within a policy 
subsystem (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999). The policy subsystem encompasses a 
collection of actors from various institutions and at various levels, all of whom seek 
to influence decisions in a specific policy domain (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). 
Typically, policy subsystems contain two to five competing coalitions comprised of 
actors grouped around similar policy-orientated beliefs (ibid, 2007). Policy 
subsystems are characterised by their size, policy area, and the plethora of actors 
involved from interest groups, media, academia and various levels of government 
(Kingdon, 1995; Sabatier & Weible, 2007). The sports policy subsystem is defined by 
the multiplicity of actors who seek to influence policy decisions. These actors could 
include government agencies (particularly DCMS, The Department of Education, 
Communities & Local Government, and The Department of Health), Non-
Department Public Bodies (Sport England, UK Sport), other relevant organisations 
(NGBs, Central Council of Physical Recreation, British Olympic Association and 
CSPs), and specific academic institutes and media organisations. However, defining 
policy subsystems is not always a straightforward task due to links between various 
policy participants (Sabatier & Weible, 2007).  For example, sport overlaps with a 
wide range of government concerns including health, education, community 
Figure 2.4 The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (source: Sabatier & Weible, 2007)  
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cohesion, community safety, foreign affairs and employment. Despite this 
definitional challenge, the framework has the flexibility to consider a range of actors 
from different backgrounds, making it highly relevant and more applicable to the 
study of a wide range of policy arenas (ibid, 2007). 
 
Much like the IAD framework, the ACF assumes individuals to be ‘rational utility 
maximisers’ and more likely to ignore information that does not accord with their 
key beliefs (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Indeed, actors may discount information that 
challenges their beliefs and are likely to be more apprehensive of individuals with 
different views (ibid, 2007). Belief systems are therefore relatively stable and can be 
resistant to change (Sabatier, 1993). Critically, when forming coalitions, individuals 
will seek others who share similar beliefs, helping to galvanise support for their cause 
and create greater cohesion within coalitions (Houlihan, 2005). At the same time, 
this greater cohesion amongst actors can stimulate and intensify greater levels of 
conflict amongst competing coalitions (Sabatier & Weible, 2007).  
 
The framework’s micro-level analysis of the individual organises belief systems into a 
three-tiered hierarchical structure. This structure also reflects varying levels of 
resistance to change, with the highest level being more resistant (ibid, 2007). At the 
highest level, deep core beliefs consist of normative ideas that define an individual’s 
personal philosophy, such as the relative priority of values associated with freedom 
and power (Sabatier, 1993).  These beliefs span most policy subsystems, and as a 
product of childhood socialisation, they tend to be firmly rooted, ontological 
assumptions about human nature that are exceptionally difficult to change (Sabatier 
& Weible, 2007). At the next level are policy core beliefs, applications of deep core 
beliefs that span the entire policy subsystem (ibid, 2007: 194). The general 
assumption is that effort will be invested strategically ‘to apply certain deep core 
beliefs and to develop policy core beliefs in that subsystem’ (ibid, 2007: 195). 
However, not all “policy core beliefs” correspond with “deep core beliefs” (Sabatier & 
Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Sabatier & Weible, 2007). For example, whilst the Conservative 
ideology provides a strong preference for market solutions, the present Conservative-
Liberal coalition promotes the importance of the 2012 legacy plan and therefore the 
need to retain a significant leadership role in the pure-sport related objectives 
detailed in the plan (cf. DCMS, 2008). The third level consists of secondary beliefs. 
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These are narrower in scope than deep core and policy beliefs and address specific or 
causal issues, for example rules or budgets applied to specific programmes or the 
cause of particular problem (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Secondary beliefs are most 
susceptible to change or revision due to their specific nature and the requirement of 
modifications necessary for policy core maintenance (ibid, 2007). 
 
Advocacy coalitions  
The framework assumes that actors will gravitate towards others with similar policy 
core beliefs in order to translate their policy core beliefs into actual policy (ibid, 
2007). Allying themselves with actors who share consensus on policy objectives 
significantly increases the chances of policy change occurring (Sabatier & Weible, 
2007). An advocacy coalition, therefore, is simply distinguished by policy actors with 
homogenous policy core beliefs who engage in coordinated action (Sabatier & 
Jenkins-Smith, 1999). In relation to sport, Green & Houlihan (2005) found that an 
advocacy coalition existed in the sport policy domain, with UK Sport and the NGBs 
found to be the salient coalitions behind elite sport success. Further, the sport policy 
domain can be seen to represent murky waters, where there is little clarity regarding 
the coalition(s). It is unclear whether sport is a single policy subsystem advocating all 
forms of sport (mass/elite, youth/adult), or in fact a fractured policy subsystem 
where various actors are scrambling for resources for their particular area of interest 
(i.e. Youth Sports Trust: school sport, Sport England: community sport, UK Sport: 
elite sport). The waters are further muddied by the interest of various actors who are 
principally concerned with the utility of sport as a means to deliver broader social 
benefits (particularly local authorities) against those more concerned with 
commitment to sport for its own sake (NGBs). The degree to which these actors work 
cooperatively within one policy subsystem or competitively in differing coalitions 
remains open to question. 
 
Policy brokers 
Conflicting strategies from coalitions are mediated by policy brokers whose concern 
is to find a reasonable compromise between coalitions (Parrish, 2003: 9). Consensus 
is most likely to be reached if the broker ensures that each advocacy coalition’s core 
beliefs and values remain unthreatened or unchanged. Houlihan (2005) states that 
the role of the broker is applicable to the UK sports system due to the level of 
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organisational complexity in UK sport, an issue that is further complicated by the 
dual role of key policy brokers such as Sue Campbell, chair of UK Sport and chair of 
the Youth Sports Trust. 
 
Resources  
The ACF hypothesises that policy actors will utilise a set of resources to initiate 
strategies that may influence future policy, although the degree of detail related to 
types of resource was an area previously underdeveloped (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). 
Using a number of studies (from Kelman, 1984; Sewell, 2005), a range of resources 
that actors can use has been identified, including (i) the formal legal authority to 
make decisions (i.e. officials, legislators and judges), (ii) public opinion – a major 
resource where this accords with actor’s beliefs, (iii) information, particularly 
intelligence regarding the problem and how to address it, (iv) mobilising troops – 
bringing lobbyists and the attentive public together to advocate and demonstrate on 
particular issues, (v) financial resources – to fund research, think tanks and possibly, 
programme development, and finally (vi) skillful leadership – highly skilled policy 
brokers are seen as a critical to policy change. 
 
Critical paths to policy change 
The analysis of individual behaviour presents a framework which allows for a more 
explicit understanding of change within the policy subsystem. The creation of 
advocacy coalitions comprising actors with similar belief systems makes it 
improbable that group members will change policy core beliefs voluntarily (Sabatier 
& Weible, 2007). Thus, the ACF identifies a total of four paths to major policy 
change: policy-orientated learning, external perturbations and shocks, internal 
shocks and negotiated agreements (ibid, 2007). Policy-orientated learning results 
from previous experience or information which may result in implications or the 
revision of policy objectives (ibid, 2007). The influence on policy change is 
straightforward in that policies are modified due to coalition members amending 
their perception of existing policies (Norstedt, 2008). However, due to the 
hierarchical structure of belief systems, the capacity for policy change varies 
depending on the type of belief affected.   
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Perturbations and shocks external to the policy subsystem, such as socioeconomic 
conditions or disaster, are credited as a further underlying factor to policy change 
that shifts agendas and focuses public attention (Houlihan 2005; Sabatier & Weible, 
2007). Significantly, external shocks can result in a redistribution of resources or a 
replacement of the dominant coalition (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Sabatier & 
Weible, 2007) due to changes in socio-economic conditions, public opinion, a 
governing coalition or as a direct result of policy decisions from other subsystems 
(Sabatier & Weible, 2007). The poor performance of the UK swimming squad at the 
London 2012 Games provides an apposite example. The squad’s performance has led 
to increased negative media attention to the structure of the sport as well as 
significant funding cuts for team development ahead of the Rio de Janeiro Games in 
2016. 
 
Finally, since the publication of the second edition of Sabatier’s Theories of the 
Policy Process (2007), two further factors have been identified as critical paths of 
policy change, the first of which is internal shocks within a policy subsystem. 
Sabatier & Weible (2007) argued that this can affect policy change by highlighting 
the inadequacies of a coalition and their subsequent belief systems, or through the 
redistribution or drawing in of political resources such as financial or public support. 
A recent example in the community sport policy domain is the reallocation and 
distribution of substantial lottery funding to NGB whole sport plans for the period 
2009-13, primarily a result of ministerial changes coupled with intense NGB-led 
lobbying. The second factor concerns the integration of literature on alternative 
dispute resolution to allow analysis of the causal drivers and conditions where 
agreements involving policy change are developed by previously ‘warring’ coalitions 
(Sabatier & Weible, 2007: 205). A recent example of negotiated agreement in 
community sport was the attempt to galvanise a clear and cohesive ‘single-system’ or 
‘delivery-chain’ for community sport, where clear roles and responsibilities and 
collective commitment were key tenets.  
 
Evaluating the framework 
The ACF attempts to explain stability in terms of ‘dominant coalitions and the 
persistence of deep core and policy core beliefs (Houlihan, 2005: 173).  However, the 
approach has been criticised for its overly heavy focus on the hierarchy of belief 
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systems which are perceived as stable across all actors within coalitions.  Schlager 
(1995) argued that it is not feasible to suggest that within a coalition all actors will 
share the same beliefs; rather, it is more practicable to suggest coalitions are made 
up of actors with a difference in opinions.  Further, belief systems embedded in the 
ACF can only be predicted rather than determined, being an exceptionally difficult 
phenomena to measure.  (deLeon, 1994).  Also, individual beliefs cannot be 
distinguished from the policy interests of the organisation with which they are 
affiliated due to the supposition that policy actors agree with the beliefs advocated by 
their organisations (Oliver, 1991).  The framework is also criticised for its lack of 
consideration regarding the influence of institutions (Skille, 2008), a significant 
omission given the power of institutions to affect action (Schlager, 2007).   The 
framework’s explanation of change is considered ‘complex’ and not particularly 
convincing, relying on a combination of rational assumptions, exogenous events and 
policy learning, with a lack of attention to the concept of power that may flow across 
and between coalitions (Houlihan, 2005).  Therefore, the framework only partially 
meets the requirements of the first criterion. 
 
The ACF is seen by some as a holistic framework for analysing multiple levels of the 
policy process, offering a broader focus than that of other frameworks (Sabatier & 
Weible, 2007).  Whilst it may facilitate a comprehensive analysis and a broad view of 
the entire policy-making process, it fails to consider the relative influence of multi-
tier policymaking, that is, policymaking at a variety of levels, local, sub regional, 
regional, national and transnational (Houlihan, 2005).  Similarly, the theory does 
not offer an examination of the implementing actor, the sports club, for example.  
The framework fails to address implementation at the local level (Skille, 2008), 
despite claims that the framework was  designed to provide a holistic analysis of all 
stages of the policy process by integrating the best of “top down” and “bottom up” 
approaches (Sabatier, 1999; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999).   Elsewhere, the theory 
has been criticised for a lack of insight into ‘the organisational arrangements of the 
state and of state civil society interaction’, such as governmental departments, county 
sports partnerships, local authorities and sports clubs (Green & Houlihan, 2004: 
401).  Therefore, with regards to the second criterion, whilst the framework can be 
seen to offer a wide-ranging analysis of the policy process, it does not sufficiently 
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offer insight into the organisational arrangements that affect the policy process, 
particularly the implementation of policy.   
 
The ACF has been applied across a range of policy areas in a range of countries 
(Sabatier, 2007).  Its application to the UK context has recently been enhanced 
through the incorporation of ‘community opportunity structures’ as a means for 
increasing its fit with non-pluralist systems (Sabatier & Weible, 2007).  Certainly, 
this relates to the UK system where decision making is more centralised (John, 
1998).  Indeed, Sabatier & Weible’s (2007: 200) assertion that within centralised 
systems ‘participation is restricted to a small number of central government 
authorities and leaders of peak association’ certainly applies to the UK, where 
decision-making is less open than the US federal system and primarily coordinated 
by a smaller number of agencies (Sabatier & Weible, 2007).   Despite its limitations 
(Houlihan, 2005), the relative use of the framework could be argued to be reasonable 
to good (see Green & Houlihan, 2005; Houlihan, 2005; Parrish, 2003).  Therefore, 
with regards to the third criterion, the framework can be seen as a credible approach, 
tested in a variety of contexts and with utility in analysing the sport policy domain.  
Finally, the framework clearly meets the fourth criterion as it was specifically 
designed for the purpose of analysing policy change over the medium-term (Sabatier 
& Jenkins-Smith, 1999). 
 
Policy Networks/Communities 
Policy network theory has developed, partly in response to an overly rational and 
limited view of policy making resulting from government interest (Heclo, 1978), 
which disregards the influence of the numerous organisations that exist in between 
organisations and beyond formal rules (Miller & Demir, 2006).  Howlett (1998) 
reinforced the position of policy network theory as a major analytical approach to the 
study of public policy making. One of the challenges of this approach, however, is the 
lack of a single, accepted definition (John, 1998; Peterson, 2003). Kickert et al., 
(1996: 6) defined policy networks as ‘stable patterns of social relations existing 
between interdependent actors, which take shape around policy problems and/or 
programmes’.  In a similar vein, Benson (1982: 148) observed policy networks as 
‘dependency relationships that emerge between both organisations and individuals 
who are in frequent contact with each other in particular policy areas’. Others 
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highlighted the non-hierarchical patterns of interaction between government 
agencies, interest groups, elected officials, other institutions and individuals 
exogenous to formal government organizations (Kenis & Schneider, 1991), and how 
these interactions modify the way power is exercised and influences the actions of the 
government (Miller & Demir, 2006). To summarise the variety of approaches to 
network analysis, Dowding (1995) and Marsh & Smith (2000) agreed that there were 
four notable approaches (i) rational choice, (ii) personal interaction, (iii) formal 
network analysis, and (iv) the structural approach.  
 
The interactions amongst actors in numerous policy subsystems in varied contexts 
has resulted in the use of a plethora of concepts, including policy communities, policy 
networks, iron triangles and issue networks (Miller & Demir, 2006). Thus, it is 
helpful to utilise the Marsh & Rhodes (1992) typology, which provides a framework 
for categorising networks by membership, integration, resources, and power. This 
provides the analyst with a spectrum to plot various networks depending on their 
varying characteristics, with policy communities at one end and issue networks at the 
other (Figure 2.5). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Network classification (source: Marsh & Rhodes, 1992) 
 
Policy communities are characterised by their close-knit, integrated structure with 
members sharing a common set of values (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Miller & Demir, 
2006). Government is often the key agency in a policy community, with other 
agencies often consciously excluded (Rhodes & Marsh, 1992). At the other end of the 
spectrum, issue networks are characterised by their large memberships with diverse 
affected interests (ibid, 1992). They are often viewed as ‘unstable’, being seen to lack 
stability over time and are frequently associated with policy consultation rather than 
being directly involved in the development of policy (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992). This 
categorisation of network types is useful in demonstrating the various forms of 
partnership that exist at different levels of the policy process (i.e. international, 
multi-national, national, regional, sub-regional and local). Table 2.2 provides a more 
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detailed insight into the varying characteristics of policy communities and issue 
networks. However, Smith (1993) cautioned that policy communities and issue 
networks simply represent extreme forms of a policy network, whereas in practice, 
networks do not generally exhibit all the characteristics of either. 
 
Table 2.2 Types and characteristics of policy networks (source: Marsh & Rhodes, 1992) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Such typologies are criticised for inconsistencies of approach, with numerous 
typologies utilising different labels to explain the same phenomena or the same 
labels to explain different phenomena (Adam & Kriesi, 2007). In an attempt to start 
afresh, Adam & Kriesi proposed a two dimensional typology which captures ‘essential 
network characteristics’ (2007: 133). Policy networks involve two fundamental 
elements: actors and the relations between them. Consequently, two variables clarify 
these elements: (i) composition variables—these relate to actor attributes and (ii) 
structural variables, referring to the types of relations between actors (Adam & 
Kriesi, 2007).  With regards to composition variables, Adam & Kriesi (2007) pay 
particular attention to capabilities, in particular the distribution of capabilities across 
the group of actors. In other words, the first part of Adam & Kriesi’s typology is 
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concerned with the distribution of power across the set of actors involved in the 
policy subsystem. This aspect considers whether power is concentrated in the hands 
of one dominant actor or coalition or whether power is shared across actors. 
Borrowing from the advocacy coalition framework, the typology assumes that actors 
will be organised into a limited number of coalitions with varying degrees of power in 
the policy process (ibid, 2007).  
 
A subsidiary element of the distribution of power is consideration of the relative 
share of power across different coalitions. It is important to assess the structure of 
coalitions and acknowledge the different actors involved. Adam & Kriesi (2007) 
distinguished between state actors and three other actor types (political parties, 
interest groups and nongovernmental organisations or social movement 
organisations); although it is important in the context of corporatism-pluralism to 
extend interest groups to include a larger range of participants that may be involved 
in the policy process. State actors are separated from other actors due to their unique 
characteristics: for example, they have access to resources and decisions are 
generally considered binding (Coleman & Perl, 1999). A final consideration is that 
coalitions can be composed of one type of actor only (homogenous) or different actor 
types (heterogeneous) (Adam & Kriesi, 2007: 134). 
 
The second aspect of the typology addresses the degree of cooperation between 
actors and coalitions and illuminates specific arrangements within networks. It also 
demonstrates how these relate to policy change and policy outcomes. Cooperation is 
distinguished in one of three predominant forms—(i) conflict/competition, (ii) 
cooperation and with elements of both, (iii) bargaining/negotiation (Adam & Kriesi, 
2007). The consideration of distribution of power and the type of interaction within 
policy networks reveals six network types that are useful in determining the potential 
for and type of policy change (Figure 2.6) (Adam & Kriesi, 2007). 
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Figure 2.6 Typology of Network Structures (source: Adam & Kriesi, 2007) 
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Alongside the typology, Adam & Kriesi provided a detailed insight into the 
determinants of policy networks, in particular ‘the territorial and functional 
specificities’ of policy networks, where political and domain-specific issues shape and 
formalise a network (2007: 137). For example, for policy networks within European 
sport, we would need to consider European, domestic and the domain-specific 
contexts. Figure 2.7 sets out in further detail Adam & Kriesi’s perspective of the 
determinants of policy networks and illustrates the impacts associated with networks 
(2007: 148). This model is assessed in more detail below:  
 
Transnational Context 
The growing influence of international factors must be taken into account when 
considering the form of domestic policy networks (Adam & Kriesi, 2007; Coleman & 
Perl, 1999). Coleman & Perl noted growth in connections between international, 
national, regional and sub national levels in public policy domains, arguing that 
‘domestic policy making is increasingly constrained by international economic, 
political and cultural forces’ (1999: 692). In a sporting context, Green & Houlihan 
(2005) alluded to the homogenisation of elite sport policy in the UK, Australia and 
Canada based on the global environment, where ‘international states interpret and 
adapt external policy pressures to their particular national circumstances and 
history’ (Houlihan, 2009: 66). Further, it is reported that transferable policies are 
initiated into domestic ones based on the scanning of the global policy environment 
as well as an international process of regime development which together contribute 
to the homogenisation of aspects of sports policy (Houlihan, 2009).  
 
 
Figure 2.7 The Network Approach (source: Adam & Kriesi, 2007) 
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International policy environments are believed to influence domestic policy networks 
through the redistribution of resources, opening of new access points and creation of 
new venues that allow for reopening matters previously settled at the national level. 
International redistribution policies within the sport policy domain are limited but 
have been more common in recent years, with notable examples including 
transnational investment in sport for development projects led by organisations such 
as Right to Play in addition to the International Inspiration programme, which was 
an integral part of the Singapore vision (see UK Sport, 2009) and a key plank within 
the London 2012 Legacy Plan. 
 
Transnational contexts are, however, insufficient in explaining influences upon 
policy networks at domestic level (Adam & Kriesi, 2007). Global influence on 
domestic policy systems is significant, but responses are difficult to predict, and do 
not necessarily result in a uniform reaction or secure cooperation across policy 
systems. 
 
National Contexts 
Adam & Kriesi (2007) asserted that both components of their typology are influenced 
by the formal national institutional context. Using Ljiphart’s (1999) typology of 
democracies, it is necessary to distinguish between specific country institutional 
structures and how power is concentrated (Adam & Kriesi, 2007). For example, 
consensus democracies apportion power across a number of institutions, whilst 
majoritarian democracies concentrate power amongst a smaller group of political 
institutions and actors. Kriesi et al., (2006) argue that consensus democracies are 
more likely to experience a fragmentation of power due to the plurality of power 
amongst political institutions, whilst majoritarian democracies are likely to resemble 
networks where power is concentrated in a smaller number of institutions. Further, 
patterns of interaction are expected to be more cooperative in consensus 
democracies than majoritarian democracies, where competition among actors is 
more likely to occur (Adam & Kriesi, 2007).  
 
Borrowing from Ljiphart (1999), Adam & Kriesi (2007) categorise countries in three 
groups: consensual-federal democracies (such as Switzerland or Germany), 
consensual-Unitarian democracies (Scandinavian nations, Netherlands, Italy) and 
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majoritarian-federal (United States or Spain). The UK system is a majoritarian-
unitarian democracy as decision making is concentrated amongst a small number of 
institutions and actors (Adam & Kriesi, 2007). Coleman (1988) advised that uneven 
political distribution of power is directly related to policy formulation and 
implementation and that specific configurations of subsystem membership and 
modes of interaction are directly linked to propensities for specific types of policy 
change.  
 
Policy-specific and domain-specific contexts 
The consideration of policy-specific factors reveals the structure of policy networks in 
policy-specific subsystems. Two types of variables affect the structure of policy 
networks: (i) general policy-specific variables (see Coleman & Perl., 1999; Kenis, 
1991; Schneider, 1992) and (ii) situational policy-specific variables (see Dudley & 
Richardson, 1996; Marsh & Rhodes, 1992). In terms of general variables, the context 
that is specific to a particular policy subsystem and the features of that subsystem 
will inevitably influence the shape and structure of the policy network (Coleman & 
Perl., 1999). Specifically, policies and networks differ according to the resources and 
incentives provided for network formation, the expectations that are generated, their 
visibility among the mass public and the ability to measure impact (Adam & Kriesi, 
2007). Linking these to the typology above, those policy subsystems with invited 
group formation are likely to produce networks with fragmented structures (Adam & 
Kriesi, 2007). Policies characterised by high expectations, high visibility/salience and 
easy traceability of policy effects may cause conflict as state actors have to defend 
their positions against important groups as well as the mass public (Adam & Kriesi, 
2007).  
 
Situational policy-specific variables analyse the reason for change within networks. It 
is assumed that the characteristics of a policy network remain stable unless affected 
by exogenous shocks or the mobilisation of competing coalitions (Adam & Kriesi, 
2007; Baumgartner & Jones, 1993).  Exogenous factors may destabilise the structure 
of policy networks (Sabatier, 1993; Houlihan, 2005; Sabatier & Weible, 2007). They 
can include ‘significant events’ brought about by changes in socio-economic 
conditions, public opinion, the governing coalition or policy decisions from other 
subsystems (Sabatier, 1993; Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Although a number of authors 
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have recognised the pertinence of this concept to fields such as national security 
(Birkland, 2005), its application to the sports policy process is limited. Green (2004) 
and Green & Houlihan (2004) highlighted the impact of the national lottery in 
providing a more systematic approach to UK elite sport development in the UK as 
just one example of an exogenous factor on policy change. Indeed, the influence of 
lottery funding significantly altered the approach to elite sports development, with 
more methodical, scientific approaches and methods being developed in order to 
maintain the UKs position in the sports-performance league table (Green, 2004). 
Another driver of policy change is the influence of ‘ideas, values and knowledge’ 
(Adam & Kriesi, 2007: 142). It has been suggested that idea change precedes changes 
in policy (Hay, 2002) as ‘new ideas and information to [lead to] new patterns of 
behaviour’ (Haas, 1992: 3).  
 
Impact of policy networks 
Networks are believed to directly impact policy change and outcomes. Indeed, the 
‘extent and speed of change’ in policy is influenced by networks and, in particular 
their ‘capacity to mediate, and often minimise, the effect of such change’ (Marsh & 
Smith, 2000: 8). Subsequently, policy change should not be seen as a purely rational 
response to problems but as a result of a range of interrelated factors, including 
agents and the interaction of agents in networks (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992). Towards 
this end, researchers have studied the structure of networks to assess relationships 
between network type/structure and policy change. Coleman & Perl., (1999) claimed 
that it was more likely for abrupt policy change to occur in pluralist networks 
whereas negotiated change is the norm in corporatist networks. Extending this work 
specifically to the field of implementation, corporatist networks are seen as 
cooperative, working collectively and sharing the burden of policy delivery (see 
Schneider, 1992), whereas the competitive character of pluralist regimes often leads 
to conflict and may require legislative intervention (Adam & Kriesi, 2007).  
 
Thus, policy networks are connected to policy outcomes and the type of change 
within policy subsystems that leads to these outcomes (ibid, 2007). To highlight the 
likelihood and type of policy change, Adam & Kriesi (2007) linked their network 
typology with the potential for and type of policy change. They argued that the type 
of interaction between network actors largely determines the form of policy change 
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(ibid, 2007: 145). Networks that experience more routine conflict usually generate 
rapid policy shifts, whereas in networks where bargaining is common, slower, 
incremental policy change is more likely and cooperative structures are likely to 
preserve the status quo (ibid, 2007). Further, the network dynamic and potential for 
change is further altered by the distribution of power. Adam & Kriesi (2007) 
assumed that the potential for change was greater if power is fragmented, as the 
pendulum is more easily swayed by the competing coalition (ibid, 2007). Conversely, 
if power remains concentrated, others lack the resources to break the policy 
monopoly (Figure 2.8) (ibid, 2007). 
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Figure 2.8 Potential of type of policy change (source: Adam & Kriesi, 2007) 
 
Prior to the development of the Adam & Kriesi model, Marsh & Smith reviewed the 
four principal approaches to the study of policy networks (rational choice, personal 
interaction, formal network analysis and the structural approach) and found that 
whilst each had particular strengths, their common failure was little, if any, attempt 
to ‘use policy networks as an explanatory variable’ (2000: 5). In contrast to the Adam 
& Kriesi model presented above, Marsh & Smith (2000) presented a dialectical 
model of policy networks which aimed to illuminate the two-way relationship 
between variables and the way in which one variable might affect the other in a 
continuing iterative process (Marsh & Smith, 2000). In much the same way as Adam 
& Kriesi have attempted, Marsh & Smith’s dialectical approach has helped to develop 
a greater understanding of the way structural context affects networks. However, the 
models differ and Marsh & Smith offer a potentially more insightful model in their 
explicit representation and consideration of agent as well as analysing the 
interrelationship between structure and agency, network and context, and network 
and outcome (2000: 5). 
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With regards to structure and agency, Marsh & Smith stressed the need for a model 
that considers both structure and agency as although ‘structures matter, it is agents 
who interpret these structures and make decisions (2000: 5). The dialectical model 
(see Figure 2.9) highlighted that broader structural context influences both the 
network structure and the resources that agents have at their disposal (ibid, 2000). It 
also stressed the innate skill and learning that shape the agent and their ability to 
influence network interaction (Marsh & Smith, 2000). Network interaction is not 
only shaped by the actors’ skills and resources, but also by the network structure 
(Marsh & Smith, 2000). Thus, Adam & Kriesi’s (2007) typology could be used within 
this model, pointing to types of interaction and power distribution within networks. 
In addition, network interaction is affected by policy outcome, in particular policy 
learning and the realisation that network interaction influences policy 
implementation (Adam & Kriesi, 2007).  Similarly, policy outcomes shape network 
structures as do the interaction amongst networks, the skills and resources of actors 
and the structural context (Marsh & Smith, 2000). The model also considers the 
critical drivers of policy outcomes, namely network structures and network 
interaction (Marsh & Smith, 2000). However, there appear to be aspects of Adam & 
Kriesi’s (2007) work that have utility within the dialectical model; the use of the 
typology of network structures in the examination of structures and the interaction 
between them, for example. 
 
In addition to the focus on agency (as well as structural context), the dialectical 
model differs to Adam & Kriesi (2007) in its presentation of the two-way relationship 
between variables. In this way, the model offers greater utility in examining the role 
of structure and agency and well as the interrelationship between context, agents, 
network structures, interaction and outcomes. 
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                                   Figure 2.9 Dialectical model (source: Marsh & Smith, 2000) 
 
Evaluating the framework 
The policy network approach provides a rich vein of information that is useful in 
highlighting a range of variables that are integral to policy change and, more 
generally, the policymaking process. The policy network literature is helpful in 
analysing stability change, particularly in relation to sport policy (cf. Enjolras & 
Waldahl, 2007; Lindsey, 2006).  That said, some notable authors have criticised 
network approaches for lacking a theoretical basis.  Specifically, the network 
approach has been seen more as a ‘theoretical toolbox’ than a theory (Borzel, 1998; 
Dowding, 1995; Miller & Demir, 2006) and has also been criticised for developing 
informal models that lack formal modelling robustness and do little to explain the 
policy process beyond that which could be achieved by good quality empirical work 
(Dowding, no date).  In addition, the policy network approach has been criticised for 
its lack of consideration of institutions or the role of the state in particular in the 
interactions of policy networks (John, 1998), although this is an issue which both 
models presented above arguably address by recognising the network structure, 
network interactions and structural context affecting these variables.  Despite these 
criticisms, Lindsey’s (2006) application of the dialectical model to the sport policy 
domain illustrates its utility, specifically its analytical value in explicitly considering 
structure and agency as well as the interrelationship between network structure and 
agents, the network and the context it operates in, and the network and policy 
outcomes.  In summary, whilst the network approach is not without its limitations, it 
offers a helpful analytic framework in constructing specific empirical work to review 
policy stability and change in the sport policy domain. With regards to the second 
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criterion, Marsh & Smith’s dialectical model addresses the limitations of previous 
work (specifically Marsh & Rhodes, 1992) which focuses more specifically on 
structure, paying insufficient attention to agency (Dowding, 1995).  The dialectical 
model, however, places a specific emphasis on the role of agency and demonstrates 
that policy outcomes are ‘the result of the actions of strategically calculating subjects’ 
(Marsh & Smith, 2000: 6).  In addition, the model considers the structural elements 
that ‘constrain and facilitate’ the agents that operate within them (Marsh & Smith, 
2000: 5).  However, despite the above models’ explicit mention of network 
interaction and the influence of power, the network approach is widely criticised for 
its inability to fully consider and analyse the distribution of power beyond a meso or 
sub-systematic level of governance (Peterson, 2003).  There is a need to deploy 
theories that explain outcomes at different levels of governance (i.e. international, 
multi-national, national, regional, sub-regional and local) (Bomberg & Stubb 2003; 
Peterson 2003).   This is a particularly important consideration in relation to the UK 
sport policy domain given the structural arrangements and multi-level governance 
practices that are evident within UK sport.  Overall, network approaches are 
generally favoured for their ability to import relevant theories and provide a tool for 
holistic analysis of the policy process.  However, it is important to be mindful of the 
limitations of the approach, particularly with regard to multi-level governance and a 
consideration of power distribution across these levels. 
 
In terms of relevance, policy networks have been the subject of growing debate and 
literature and numerous publications have focussed attention on network 
approaches and their utility in policy analysis (see Sabatier, 2007).  However, a 
major problem is defining policy networks (Miller & Demir, 2006) as numerous 
approaches and concepts are developed under the banner of policy networks with a 
lack of consistency in terminology and/or application (Adam & Kriesi, 2007).  In 
addition, literature is often focussed on ‘trivial questions of terminology and can be 
embarrassingly self-absorbed’ (Peterson, 2003: 15).  This results in an ambiguous, 
confusing and, at times, unproductive literature which does little to aid good quality 
analysis of policy.  Whilst the general quality and credibility of literature focussing on 
policy networks is good, the confusing variety of approaches is not helpful.  As a 
result, any study with a policy network focus should ensure that it clearly refers to 
the specific literature being used from the policy network family. The two approaches 
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presented above, with consideration of structural context, agency, network structure 
and interaction, require a commitment to medium-to-long term analysis in order to 
identify policy change and/or analysis of the outputs from various interrelationships 
within the dialectical model and the overall impact on policy outcomes, thereby 
meeting the requirements on the fourth criterion. 
 
Summary of Policy Analysis Frameworks 
This section has examined four relevant policy analysis frameworks. When used in 
isolation, a number of limitations are exposed which render the frameworks 
inadequate when used as individual tools of analysis (Houlihan, 2005). Furthermore, 
the tools fail to provide the necessary precision to facilitate a full analysis of policy 
implementation. Whilst it forms part of the ACF and policy network frameworks, it 
lacks specific attention to the range of features that exist within implementation 
theory. The former challenge infers a need for theoretical pluralism, an issue that will 
be discussed further in Chapter 8 in the evaluation of policy frameworks. The latter 
issue will be addressed in the following section. This looks more closely at highly 
relevant micro-level theory including implementation and partnerships. The 
following review demonstrates the applicability of the literature and the way in which 
it can be synthesised with policy analysis tools to provide a fuller, more 
comprehensive analysis of the policy process. 
 
Implementation theory 
This section briefly considers the term implementation, gives attention to the 
evolution of policy implementation literature, evaluates the top-down and bottom-up 
approaches to implementation and concludes with a synthesis of the top-down and 
bottom-up approaches. 
 
The founding fathers of implementation, Pressman & Wildavsky, defined 
implementation as ‘the process of interaction between the setting of goals and the 
actions geared to achieve them (1984: xi-xxiii). A clear focus on the interaction of two 
variables, namely the setting of goals and strategies, programmes, initiatives, etc., 
that form part of the process of actions that—for the rational agent at least—work in 
tandem to deliver the initial policy goal. Pressman & Wildavsky made clear that 
implementation theory was about more than ‘impact’ in that it relates to what 
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happened but is more about the reasons why it happened (1973). More generally, de 
Leon reported that implementation was primarily concerned with ‘what happens 
between policy expectations and policy results’ (1999: 134). More specifically, van 
Meter & van Horn (1975: 447-8) defined implementation as ‘encompassing actions 
by public and private individuals (or groups) that are directed at the achievement of 
objectives set forth in prior policy decisions’. A more formal, legally-bound definition 
of implementation has been offered by Mazmanian & Sabatier (1981: 20-1): 
 
Implementation is the carrying out of a basic policy decision, 
usually incorporated in a statute but which can also take the form of 
important executive orders or court decisions. Ideally, that decision 
identifies the problem(s) to be addressed, stipulates the objective(s) 
to be pursued, and in a variety of ways, ‘structures’ the 
implementation process. 
 
Whilst these definitions help to draw common parameters around what 
implementation is (and is not), they fail to adequately recognise the importance of 
actors, and specifically the interaction amongst actors involved in the 
implementation process. This is a central aspect of this study; thus consideration of 
actors and the interaction amongst them is considered a vitally important part of the 
very large black box which sits between what O’Toole referred to as ‘government 
intention and actual results’ (1995: 43). In an attempt to get closer to an operational 
definition that fits the parameters and objectives of this study, Barrett & Fudge 
asserted that implementation 
 
needs to be regarded as a process on interaction and negotiation, 
taking place over time, between those seeking to put policy into 
effect and those upon whom action depends (1981: 4). 
 
Seen as part of a policy-action continuum developed by Barrett & Fudge (1981), this 
approach provides insight into the ‘organic growth’ of the relationship between 
policy and action. The policy-action continuum views the state and local-level 
deliverers as mutually interacting elements of an adaptive policy system (ibid, 1981). 
Critically, power is a central force within this model, particularly when considering 
‘bargaining and negotiation over the control of resources’ (ibid, 1981: 25). It views 
policy implementation as a multi-dimensional, multi-organisational field of 
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interaction. Thus, policy is not viewed as constant, but a property which is mediated 
by actors, ‘which inevitably undergoes interpretation and modification and, in some 
cases, subversion’ (ibid, 1981: 21). 
 
Part of the reason for the rich and vastly diverse definitions of implementation is the 
evolutionary nature of the field, coming in and out of vogue in public administration 
and political science, as an area of ‘relevant’ study over the past 30 years (Barrett, 
2004). Indeed, it is possible to delineate three generations of research into policy 
implementation, although this appears contentious with different scholars referring 
to different phases in the history of implementation (see Goggin et al., 1990; Pulzl & 
Treib, 2006). This thesis is concerned with Goggin and colleagues’ more recent 
analysis of implementation and also refers to previous, classical works dating back to 
constitutional theorists such as Hume.  
 
First-generation policy implementation theory tended to be based on the Weberian 
notion of a bureaucratically and rationally-led society (Cantelon & Ingham, 2002). 
This classical model of policy administration and the resulting metaphor of 
government as a ‘machine’ supported the commonly held view of implementation as 
an automatic cog controlled by the rationalised machinery of government (ibid, 
1982). Building on this, a number of case-based studies were completed in the post-
second world war period looking at chains of command and the carrying out of single 
decisions, primarily focussed on reconstruction and social welfare. Pressman & 
Wildavsky’s work is a prime example of implementation studies undertaken in the 
first generation (Hill & Hupe, 2002). Their research began to pinpoint the limitations 
associated with the rational and machine-like system of policy implementation, 
highlighting the complexities of the policy implementation process, and referring to 
it more as a process of ‘muddling through’ (Lindblom, 1977). As this generation 
evolved through the 1980s there was a more focussed effort to analyse and 
understand the factors that facilitated or constrained the policy implementation 
process (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1981). 
 
The second-generation implementation literature primarily focussed on the 
relationship between policy and practice (Goggin et al., 1990). Empirical work 
revealed a number of important issues including the importance of time periods (i.e. 
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the time needed to implement policy) (van Horn, 1987); the reality that policy very 
often does mandate what matters at the local-level; the fact that values and beliefs 
are central to local responses; and the understanding that effective implementation 
relies on a careful balance of pressure and support (McLaughlin, 1987: 176). This 
period also saw the construction of the first analytic models to help explain policy 
implementation success and failure (Goggin et al., 1990). Indeed, much of the 
research in this period focussed on implementation failure or implementation gaps, 
that is, the difference between outcome and the original policy intention. Emerging 
from the study of failure were two distinctive schools of thought. The first, top-down 
perspective was based on the premise of clear national level policies and compliant 
implementers. The bottom-up perspective argued that effective policy is ultimately 
contingent upon its implementation; thus, theory should start from this position and 
work upwards (Hill & Hupe, 2009).These differing approaches to studying policy 
implementation are explored further below. Whilst the first and second generation 
provided an understanding of what implementation is, and how and why it varies, it 
has not offered a distinct or robust theory of policy implementation identifying 
casual mechanisms or independent variables that have general import in 
implementation performance (Lester et al., 1995). Indeed, a major criticism of the 
first and second generations has been the ongoing focus on producing and adding to 
the list of variables that may affect the policy implementation process (Goggin, 
1986). However, the contribution of policy network theorists (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; 
Marsh & Smith, 2000; Smith, 1993) and coalition-based contributions from Sabatier 
(1993, 1997; see preceding section for detailed account) has arguably done much to 
fill the void and provide explicit theoretical models which integrate the macro system 
of policymaking with the micro system of policy implementation (Barrett, 2004; Hill 
& Hupe, 2009). But as a point of note, Matland observed ‘if implementation research 
is to provide explanation or understanding it should be tied to a specific policy, 
rather than to all actions in a policy field (1995: 152). Further, it is argued that a 
specific problem associated with the development of the policy networks and 
frameworks addressed above is the difficulty of separating policy formation from 
implementation, ‘which in turn is part of a wider problem about how to identify the 
features of a very complex process, occurring across time and space and involving 
multiple actors’ (O’Gorman, 2010: 143). This reinforces the limitations of meso-level 
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theory, in particular the difficulty of extending to the micro-level and examining with 
sufficient detail issues such as implementation processes (Hill & Hupe, 2009). 
 
As previously mentioned, the second-generation literature witnessed a distinct 
division in theoretical approaches to implementation with the evolution of top-down 
and bottom-up perspectives toward implementation (see figure 2.10). Both top-down 
and bottom-up research aimed to illuminate the major reasons for implementation 
failure, pointing to issues such as the difference between political intentions and 
administrative practice, the nature of social problems, the policy design process, 
governance systems, organisational arrangements in which policy must operate, and 
the awareness, desire and capacity of the agents expected to implement policy (van 
Meter & van Horn, 1975). Many of the theoretical contributions were based upon 
principal–agent (Braun & Guston 2003) and/or rational choice (O’Toole 1995; 
Sabatier 2007) theories, in which the principal relies upon local-level agent(s) to 
implement policies. In this context, the agent’s actions are directed by rational 
choice, where utility maximization is a primary principle directing human behaviour. 
Thus, both principal and agent are viewed as being motivated by self-interest, 
meaning that incentives and evaluation systems are important in terms of 
influencing local-level agents. In addition, a lack of clarity in policy objectives—
particularly in respect of the requirements of local-level implementers’ can 
compromise the success of policy implementation (Mazmanian & Sabatier 1981; 
Pressman & Wildavsky 1973; Van Meter & Van Horn 1975; Wetherly & Lipsky 1977). 
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Figure 2.10 Top-down, Bottom-up, and Hybrid Theories: Major Contributors (source: Adapted from 
Pulzl & Treib, 2006) 
 
Traditionally, top-down theorists have an interest in the centralist model of policy 
formation, the compliance of implementers, and argue that implementation is largely 
successful if those responsible for implementation are compliant. In contrast, 
bottom-up theorists are more interested in the perspectives of grassroots 
implementers or ‘street-level bureaucrats’ as it is these agents that possess ultimate 
power in relation to implementation success or failure. That said, one of the most 
bewildering aspects of implementation is whether the top-down and bottom-up 
perspectives relate to the reality of the policy system (for example, the study of a 
centralist, top-down system), or the perspective from which an empirical analysis of 
implementation should be undertaken, or a combination of the two. 
 
The top-down perspective tends to reflect the Weberian idea of social order via 
bureaucratic hierarchy (Cantelon & Ingham 2002). Theorists utilizing top-down 
approaches tend to focus on centralist policy formation, usually at national level. 
This is then translated and delivered via a chain of command (Pressman & Wildavsky 
1973), descending through national, regional, sub-regional levels, and finally onto 
local level. Thus, the top-d0wn approach presupposes a rational top-down chain of 
command whereby governments and others issue policy, and street-level workers 
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(e.g. clubs, schools, coaches, private enterprise) implement it. Advocates of the top-
down perspective point to factors they argue result in successful implementation, 
including policies with clearly defined goals (van Meter & van Horn, 1975), a single 
authority responsible for the policy (Birkland, 2005), responsibility for 
implementation with agencies sympathetic to the policy’s objectives (Sabatier, 1986; 
van Meter & van Horn, 1975), and the presence of an ‘implementation chain’ which 
operates linearly (Birkland, 2005).  
 
Notably, Pressman & Wildavsky’s (1973) research pointed to implementation failure 
as a result of lack of coordination between the collaborative agencies involved in 
implementation. Resources, particularly funding and lines of communication from 
the central level down were reported as relatively strong, thus the implication was 
that one of the major problems was local-level coordination and, in particular, the 
way in which policy was implemented (or not). Van Meter & van Horn (1975) built on 
Pressman & Wildavsky’s (1973) pioneering insights into implementation to provide a 
systematic model of the implementation process (see Figure 2.11).  
 
 
 
Directed by three strands of literature (organizational theory, public policy impact 
and intergovernmental relations), van Meter & van Horn (1975) suggested that the 
degree of participatory consensus and the extent of change initiated by the policy 
must be taken into account if successful implementation is to be achieved. They 
argued that successful implementation is likely only when marginal policy change is 
required and when consensus amongst policy implementers is high. Six variables are 
seen as key to the policy outcome, beginning with the initial policy objectives and 
allocation of resources, then filtering hierarchically through inter-organizational 
communications, characteristics of implementing agencies and current economic 
        Figure 2.11: The Policy Implementation Process (source: van Meter & van Horn, 1975) 
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and political conditions, concluding with the disposition of implementing agents 
(van Meter & van Horn 1975: 482). The authors also argue that implementation is 
more likely to be undermined if policy objectives do not agree with the implementers’ 
personal values, sense of self-interest and/or extra-organizational loyalties, or if 
implementation is likely to alter features of the organization or procedures that 
implementers like. May et al., (2012) argued that this model has analytic value in the 
community sport policy process insofar as it provides both an analysis of both top-
down mechanisms and gives detailed attention to the dispositions of grass-roots 
implementers, specifically their awareness of policy, their direction of response to it 
(i.e. acceptance, neutrality, or rejection), and the intensity of that response. 
 
Adding to the debate, Dunsire (1990) focussed on implementation failure 
articulating this as a breakdown in rationality, meaning that those responsible for 
carrying out policy either failed in the design or execution of programmes or plans, 
or simply failed in following instructions. Similarly, Elmore’s conceptualisation of 
‘suboptimization’ required greater delegation of authority coupled with a strong top-
down agent overseeing performance and minimising the potential for 
implementation gaps or mistakes (1978, 1979). Further, the central agent must 
‘psychologically attune’ implementers’ views, ensuring that they align with the aims 
and aspirations of the central agent (O’Gorman, 2011), an assertion which mirrors a 
Gramscian hegemonic view of policy implementation, or perhaps the notion of 
‘shaping agents’ preferences’ associated with Lukes’ third dimension of power. 
Whilst on first sight Elmore’s perspective may appear highly relevant to the 
community sport policy system, its overly rational assumption of agents at the top of 
the chain being willing to delegate power to subordinates, and of implementation 
failures being a result of poor performance by implementers is too mechanistic and 
simplistic in a complex, dynamic policy environment such as community sport.  
 
Further criticisms of the top-down perspective include the presupposition that 
policymakers can simply issue a new policy-based command and expect those below 
them to deliver successful outcomes. This assumes boundless rationality amongst 
implementers (O’Gorman, 2011), fails to take account of the diverse nature of the 
policy process, the problematic nature of inter-agency collaboration (as with CSP and 
NGB in the community sport policy), and fails to fully consider norms, behaviours, 
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values and attitudes of implementing agents (Barrett & Fudge, 1981; Hjern & Hull, 
1982; Lipsky, 1980). Thus, the top-down perspective is considered naive (Hill & 
Hupe, 2009). Top-down approaches are also heavily criticised for ignoring the 
potential for service deliverers to subvert or modify the original policy decision. For 
example, Garrett’s (2004) study of Voluntary Sports Clubs (VSCs) receiving sports 
Lottery funding found them habitually resisting the demands of sport policies as a 
result of their independent nature and the increased expectations and interferences 
that current policy objectives place on them (May et al., 2012). For Skille (2008), 
VSCs’ willingness and ultimate decision regarding policy implementation are 
influenced by local contexts. The imposed policy goals of others may therefore be 
rejected if agents’ interpretation of them does not correspond to their aims (Skille, 
2008; van Meter & van Horn, 1975).  
 
These criticisms of the traditional top-down approaches led to bottom-up models 
where a more realistic understanding of implementation emerges by analysing it 
from the perspective of the service deliverer (Hill & Hupe, 2009). The bottom-up 
school generally sees policy implementation on two levels (Berman, 1978). At the 
macroimplementation level programmes and initiatives are devised. At the 
microimplementation level, local organisations respond to these macro level plans, 
develop their own programmes, and implement them (ibid, 1978). Indeed, this 
situation is clear to see in community sport with initiatives such as the School Games 
and Sportivate being conceived nationally and being delivered locally by CSPs and 
NGBs alongside numerous other programmes. In this regard, most implementation-
related problems stem from the interaction of a policy with the micro-level 
institutional setting. Central actors have limited direct control over micro-level 
settings; thus, there is potential for a wide variation in how the same national policy 
is implemented locally (ibid, 1978). This is a reported issue within the sport policy 
system, going back to the policies of the 1990s with sports development initiatives 
such as TOP Play, BT Top Sport, Champion Coaching and Girl Sport; specifically, the 
challenge is that of implementing a centrally developed, one-size-fits-all programme 
in a number of differing environments. This is reinforced by Matland (1995) who 
argued that contextual factors are critical, more so than the nationally conceived 
parameters governing policy. Therefore, if local-level implementers are not given the 
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freedom to adapt programmes to local conditions, implementation is likely to break 
down and fail (Palumbo, et al., 1984). 
 
Importantly, the bottom-up model is mediated by negotiation and consensus 
building within the policy system in which they are working, where skills, abilities of 
actors, and the culture of their organisations are all important factors that shape the 
environment within which policy is implemented. Whilst normative elements can be 
found in bottom-up perspectives (Barrett & Fudge, 1981; Hjern, 1982; Lipksy, 1980), 
the predominant view is incrementalist in that it concentrates attention on the 
numerous actions of the implementer (Hill & Hupe, 2009). Proponents of the 
bottom-up approach argue that this produces a more realistic mode of operation for 
implementing agents, since their decisions and routines established to cope with the 
increased burden of policy delivery essentially become the policies delivered. This is 
partially due to the paradox of the street-level worker, as Lipsky asserted: 
 
On the one hand, the work is often highly scripted to achieve policy 
objectives that have their origins in the political process. On the 
other hand, the work requires improvisation and responsiveness to 
the individual case (2010: xii). 
 
Attached to this, Lipsky argued that workers’ self-perception is that of being a cog in a 
system, ‘oppressed by the bureaucracy within which they work’ (O’Gorman, 2010: 
148). At the same time the worker experiences substantial freedoms and autonomy 
(Lipsky, 1980). Thus, whilst the worker has freedoms, they are ultimately constrained 
by the nature of the work, resource allocation and outcomes. This provides a variant 
on the Marxist dictum ‘man makes his own history even though he does not do so 
under conditions of his own choosing’ (Hill & Hupe, 2002: 53). 
 
Street-level bureaucracy originally referred to public workers performing under 
certain conditions, where typically they interact with citizens and have discretion in 
exercising authority. In addition, Lipsky opined that street-level workers did the best 
they could in adverse work-related circumstances (Lipsky, 1980). This was primary 
because ‘jobs cannot be performed according to the highest standards of decision 
making in the various fields as street-level workers lacked the time, information or 
other resources necessary to respond properly (ibid, 1980: 12). Thus, workers 
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‘manage their difficult jobs by developing routines of practice and psychologically 
simplifying their clientele and environment in ways that strongly influence the 
outcomes of their efforts’ (ibid, 2010, xii). Therefore, the actions of street-level 
workers lead to ‘agency policy’ (ibid, 2010: 221), or in other words, ‘the decisions of 
street‐level bureaucrats, the routines they establish, and the devices they invent to 
cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become the public policies 
they carry out’ (ibid, 1980:12). Further, Lipsky qualified this by stating that whilst 
street-level bureaucrats may make policy, ‘they do so only in the context of broad 
policy structures of which their decisions are a part (2010: 221). Thus in a broader 
analysis of policy it is important to consider the entire policy context within which 
street-level workers operate (ibid, 2010). 
 
In addition to Lipsky’s seminal work, Hjern and a number of his colleagues (Porter, 
Hanf, & Hull) contributed significantly to the bottom-up literature (Hill & Hupe, 
2009), criticizing the top-down perspective as overly hierarchical and viewing 
implementation from the perspective of central decision-makers rather than agents 
more directly affected by the societal environment within which policy is to be 
implemented (Hanf, 1982; Hjern & Hull, 1982; Hjern & Porter, 1981). Articulated as 
the ‘organisational networks approach’ (Hanf, 1982), the ‘implementation structures 
approach’ (Hjern & Porter, 1981), or as ‘empirical constitutionalism’ (Hjern & Hull, 
1982), they stressed that politics and administration are so closely bound that 
implementation research should not assume them to be distinct in the first place 
(ibid, 1982). In addition, they argued that the ‘ordering principle of implementation 
research should not be policy problems as defined … by the formal political system 
but as defined and addressed by relevant social actors (Hjern & Hull, 1982: 114). In 
particular, Hjern and colleagues emphasised the ‘network constellations’ of service 
deliverers (Hjern & Porter, 1981), where activities are bound by ‘implementation 
structures formed from within pools of organizations and formed through processes 
of self-selection’ (Hill & Hupe, 2009: 53). This enabled an understanding of the 
strategic coalitions formed at the local level as well as the unintended effects of policy 
and the dynamic nature of policy implementation (Matland, 1995). Hjern’s work 
related to Bermans (1978) essentially pointing to the problem of centrally conceived 
policy initiatives and how these tend to be ‘poorly adapted to local conditions’. In 
large part ‘programme success depends on the skills of individuals in the local 
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implementation structure who can adapt policy to local conditions; it depends only 
to a limited degree on central activities’ (Matland, 1995: 149). 
 
Elmore’s (1979) concept of backward mapping was also a notable addition to the 
bottom-up school (Parsons, 1995). It suggested that the lowest level or end point of 
the implementation process should be the starting point in any analysis of policy 
implementation (Elmore, 1979), as it illuminates the reality of implementation rather 
than the rhetoric associated with policy statements and strategies. This makes it 
possible to analyse the implementers’ cognition of policy as well as patterns of 
behaviour and any prevailing conflict. Further, de Leon & de Leon (2002) and 
Dunleavy (1991) argued that service deliverers may be more compliant implementers 
if they are involved in the initial policy decision. This proposition relates to the 
policy-action continuum idea offered by Barrett & Fudge (1981). As briefly 
mentioned above, this model views power as the central feature, particularly when 
considering bargaining and negotiation in relation to resource allocation (ibid, 1981). 
Importantly, policy and action are the focus in an interactive process between those 
seeking to put policy into effect and those upon whom actions depend (ibid, 1981: 
25). In this regard, Barrett & Fudge argued that policy is an ‘agency-centered 
property which inevitably undergoes interpretation and modification and in some 
cases subversion’ (1981: 251). Thus, a critical dimension of this approach is the need 
for an open and honest environment in which those responsible for action can 
bargain and negotiate with those responsible for policy, the result being a more 
closely aligned policy-action dynamic focussed on the performance of policy rather 
than conformance (ibid, 1981). However, the work of Barrett & Fudge pinpointed 
methodological problems in that if it is not possible or advisable to separate policy 
formation from policy implementation, how do we set limits for implementation 
studies (Hill & Hupe, 2009)? For example, an analysis of community sport policy 
solely from the perspective of grassroots deliverers would likely evolve and be 
revised, leading to difficulties in identifying the initial collective policy agreed 
centrally by the DCMS, thus providing limited utility in studying the implementation 
of centrally developed policy. 
 
The bottom-up perspectives underline the mediating influence of policy 
implementers and the broader social context within which implementation occurs, in 
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particular the neatness of fit between nationally constructed policies and 
programmes, and the implementers’ perception of them, not to mention the reality 
underpinning local conditions. Despite offering these valuable insights, the bottom-
up perspective is criticised for both normative and methodological shortcomings. 
The normative-based criticism is that, in a democratic society, ‘policy control should 
be exercised by actors whose power derives from their accountability to sovereign 
voters through their elected representatives’ (Matland, 1995: 149). Thus, actors at the 
top of the top-down paradigm can be seen to possess political legitimacy. If power is 
to be shifted to the local level, then this should only occur within the context of 
central authority. The second criticism focuses on a misrepresentation of the level of 
autonomy experienced by street-level workers (Matland, 1995). Whilst classic 
organisational theory has provided a plentiful supply of examples of actors 
subordinating government or institutional goals (cf. March & Simon, 1958, Merton, 
1957, Michels, 1962, Selznick, 1949), variations in policy actions can largely be 
explained by local contextual differences (Matland, 1995). In these cases, policy 
actions fall within a relatively limited range, usually specified by centrally 
determined policy (ibid, 1995). In addition, bottom-up approaches simplistically 
overstate the intervention of central government in the policy formation process, 
whilst ignoring their common function whereby they empower other special interest 
groups (e.g. environmental groups) to enforce policies that are in their interests 
(Sabatier, 1993). 
 
In sum, there are limitations and value in both the rational, top-down as well as the 
incremental, bottom-up models of implementation. Whilst it has been argued that 
the incremental view may be a little closer to the reality of policy implementation 
(O’Gorman, 2011), the notion of rationalism—not least its representation of the way 
in which community sport policy is conceived (see May et al., 2012)—is seen as both 
authoritative and highly relevant. Thus, there is a need to balance ‘the desirability of 
a prescriptive approach and the reality of the need to recognise that implementation 
involves a continuation of complex processes of bargaining, negotiation, and 
interaction’ (Hill, 1997: 112). As a result, authors have argued that the approaches are 
complementary, not contradictory (Sabatier, 1993), and that the approaches 
combined offer a richer, more insightful analysis of the implementation process than 
either does alone (Fox, 1990, O’Toole, 2004; Sabatier, 1999). 
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To get the best of both top-down and bottom-up approaches, researchers have made 
attempts to synthesize the two. On the one hand there have been concerted efforts to 
combine the two approaches within one model, and on the other an analysis of the 
conditions under which one approach is more appropriate than the other (Matland, 
1995: 150). In more recent years, however, it is important to acknowledge that the 
top-down and bottom-up debate, whilst still in existence, has to a large extent been 
superseded by a new third generation of policy literature (i.e. ACF and Policy 
Networks, discussed in detail, above). That said, it is important to review the 
synthesis of top-down and bottom-up perspectives in order complete the discussion 
of traditional approaches to the study of policy implementation so that appropriate 
distinctions can be drawn between these and the aforementioned third generation 
models. 
 
Elmore’s concept of forward and backward mapping (1982, 1985) aimed to bring top-
down and bottom-up approaches into one model. For example, in forward mapping, 
Elmore (1982, 1985) argued the need to set out clearly the precise nature of policy 
objectives, analyse means-ends schemes, and specify exacting criteria to evaluate 
policy at each stage of the process. Backward-mapping consisted of stating the 
behaviour’s requiring change at grassroots-level of delivery, clarifying the 
mechanisms that are likely to bring about change, then ‘repeating the procedure 
upwards by steps until the central level is reached’ (Matland, 1995: 151). Whilst it is 
possible to observe some contradictory elements in this approach (i.e. backward 
mapping as a bottom-up approach, while highlighting the need to change the 
behaviour of the grassroots implementer to match that of the centralist policy 
maker), it does consider both the nature of policy, which tends to be top-down in 
approach, as well as the needs of micro-level implementers and target groups.  
 
Goggin et al., (1990) created a scientific, meta-theoretical (de Leon and de Leon, 
2002; Goggin et al., 1990) ‘communication model’. It presupposes that the primary 
implementation problem involves organisation management, specifically 
communication between different levels in the implementation system (Cline, 2000). 
In sum, the communication model is based on a conceptualisation of policy-making 
as an ‘implementation subsystem full of messages, messengers, channels, and targets 
operating within a broader communications system’ (Goggin et al., 1990, 33). It is 
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concerned primarily with the interactions between Federal and State regulators, and 
the extent to which messages are accepted or rejected between the different levels of 
the implementation system. Whilst the model attempts to refocus from the previous 
top-down versus bottom-up debate, there remains an implied bias towards the 
rational assumption of hierarchical, Federal leadership, and an assumption that state 
and local-level implementers adapt to fit Federal requirements (Cline, 2000). Also, 
the model is overly rational, failing to take account of ‘interests, objectives, 
perceptions, and strategies of other actors and the institutional context in which they 
function (Kickert et al., 1997: 184). This limits the model’s applicability to policies 
delivered through partnerships or networks (Cline, 2000). 
 
Schofield (2004) developed a ‘model of learned implementation’, asserting that there 
is ‘a tendency to assume that managers actually have the detailed technical 
knowledge by which to enact such new policies (ibid, 2004: 283). In reality, local-
level workers have to learn a range of new techniques to be able to implement what 
are often unclear or ambiguous policy directives (ibid, 2004: 284) which reflects an 
assertion previously identified by Marsh & Smith (2000) in their dialectical model of 
policy networks (presented above). Schofield’s model, based on the British National 
Health Service, utilized six organizational variables to demonstrate how learning 
occurs and also identified the problems that are intertwined with the introduction of 
new policies (Schofield, 2004). Furthermore, it highlights how local-level 
implementers operationalise these policies, over time, into work schedules and daily 
working practices (ibid, 2004). However, this model has been criticised for its 
myopic analysis of learning at the expense of other important factors, as well as 
adding to the list of variables upon which implementation can be analysed without 
exploring the relationship between them (O’Gorman, 2010). 
 
Stoker (1991) argued that in addition to the view of single-authority management of 
the implementation process, it is important to acknowledge that conflict of interest is 
often an inherent part of the process. This means it is necessary to analyse and 
understand how agents elicit cooperation from those who participate in the 
implementation process (ibid, 1991). Stoker developed an institutional regime 
framework which considers regimes to be both ‘an institutional arrangement that 
institutionalises values important in public decision making’, and ‘a set of 
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organisational arrangements that helps define and support the political in it’ (1991: 
55). ‘At the organisational level a regime consists of a set of rules, norms and 
procedures’ that shape ‘the interaction of participants in collective decision making’ 
(Cline, 2000: 556). Moreover, Stoker pointed to an implementation regime as ‘an 
arrangement among implementation participants that identifies the values to be 
served during the implementation process’ (1991: 55) and provides an organisational 
framework in which these values can be espoused. Of particular importance is the 
need to reconcile the desire for central leadership with the reality of diffuse 
implementation authority (ibid, 1991). In particular, such diffusion requires the 
participation of implementers who may ‘represent interests that are divergent from 
the national policy’ (Cline, 2000: 556).  
 
Thus, Stoker argued that the critical factor within implementation is the creation of a 
context that will promote cooperation despite the presence of conflict (Stoker, 1991). 
Stoker, then, articulated context as both strategic and institutional (1991). Strategic 
context refers to the degree of conflict that exists between the key agents involved in 
the implementation process (ibid, 1991), and the idea that cooperation can only exist 
in the aftermath of conflict (Keohane, 1984). Stoker viewed cooperation as 
‘negotiation to bring separate entities into conformity with one another’ (Keohane, in 
Stoker, 1991: 61). An example of this in community sport is the conflict over the 
leadership of community sport given to NGBs in 2008 (Collins, 2010; Harris, 2008). 
What followed was a year or two of negotiation with some NGBs working closely with 
CSPs and others continuing the work on which they had previously been focused. 
However, over time, Sport England developed a core specification which reflected the 
common needs of NGBs and required CSPs to cooperate by ensuring that key aspects 
of the CSPs strategy, work programmes and daily activities aligned with these needs. 
This attempt to enhance cooperation amongst CSPs and NGBs was by no means 
subtle, and the extent to which it has brought implementing agents closer will be 
examined further in the results and discussion chapters. In contrast, the institutional 
context refers to the processes and mechanisms used to promote cooperation (Cline, 
2000). Stoker posited that long-term relationships rely on the expectations of future 
interactions and a commitment of resources to promote trust and reciprocity 
(Axelrod, 1984; Stoker, 1991). Examples of this in community sport include CSPs 
hosting NGB development staff, CSPs and NGBs developing joint programmes and 
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initiatives, and complementary secondment arrangements where CSP and NGB 
personnel can switch roles, thereby transferring knowledge and gaining a deeper 
understanding of what the community sport world looks like from the other 
viewpoint. Finally, Stoker (1991) recognised that regimes did not evolve in a political 
vacuum; indeed, there are frequent situations where ‘policy formulators must seek 
partnerships with those who control enough resources to have leverage in an 
otherwise gridlocked world’ (Stone, 1989: 230). An example of this in community 
sport could be the disproportionate level of funding awarded to large, resource-laden 
NGBs in the 2013-17 whole sport plan funding (e.g. football, tennis, cricket, rugby 
union, rugby league, swimming), rather than smaller, relatively resource-poor NGBs 
(table tennis, triathlon, softball, lacrosse, etc.). 
 
In a recent study O’Gorman (2011) argued that Matland’s conflict and ambiguity 
model has utility in examining specific sports policies. Matland (1995) asserted that 
this model provides a much more careful evaluation of the characteristics of policy 
implementation, arguing that top-downers typically evaluate relatively clear policy, 
whereas bottom-uppers tend to study policy with ‘greater uncertainty inherent in the 
policy’ (Matland, 1995: 155). He went on to argue that because so many of the studies 
are single-case studies, very few approaches consider how implementation varies 
when different policy is evaluated (ibid, 1995). Thus, evaluating the inherent 
characteristics of policy can be far more insightful and lead to a richer understanding 
of implementation (ibid, 1995). Using organizational and decision-making theory, 
Matland identified two central characteristics—ambiguity and conflict, he argued 
that these can be observed in all policy, although the extent to which they occur 
varies according to policy area (ibid, 1995). Conflict plays a central role in decision-
making processes; both the rational and bureaucratic politics model of decision-
making assume that agents are primarily motivated by self-interest (ibid, 1995). 
These models differ, though, on the extent to which goal congruence exists. Rational 
models assume that policy-makers and implementers agree upon policy goals, where 
the bureaucratic politics model assume that there is no agreed upon goal, so conflict 
is its principle interest (ibid, 1995). As with the work of Stoker (above), it posits that 
conflict drives change and agents resort to processes and mechanisms such as 
bargaining, performance oversight, incentives and penalties to secure cooperation 
and hold loose coalitions together (Matland, 1995). It is important to note that these 
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measures do not normally secure agreement on goals, but do secure agreement on 
the actions required to meet goals (ibid, 1995). Moreover, for conflict to be present 
there must be an interdependence of actors, an incompatibility of objectives, and a 
perceived zero-sum aspect to the interactions of agents (Dahrendorf, 1958). In 
addition, policy conflict is likely when some implementing agents see policy as 
directly relevant to their goals and others have resistant or indifferent views 
(Matland, 1995). 
 
The second part of Matland’s model states that policy ambiguity relates to either (i) 
the ambiguity of policy goals, and/or (ii) the ambiguity of policy means. Central to 
this argument is the extent to which policy goals and the means to achieve them have 
been explicitly mentioned in strategies and plans. Where this is the case, Matland 
(1995) pointed to the democratic principle and suggested that policy-makers goals’ 
have a superior value. In such cases, implementation success is dependent on loyalty 
to prescribed goals (O’Gorman, 2011). But, when a policy does not have clearly stated 
goals, standardization is complex and more general societal norms and values come 
into play (Matland, 1995: 155). 
 
Interestingly, policy ambiguity is often negatively correlated with policy conflict. 
Matland (1995) concluded that ambiguity can be used to cloak inherent risks 
associated with policy implementation, particularly those that affect implementation 
agents’ interests, and thus ambiguity can be used as a strategy to avoid conflict. 
Ambiguity of policy is prevalent when there are uncertainties about the roles of 
agents, or when the implementation environment and/or policy goals make it 
difficult to know what tools and techniques are needed to succeed, as seems to be the 
case with the implementation of community sport policy (see Active People 
participation data – Sport England, 2012b). Whilst the conflict and ambiguity model 
provides an interesting analysis of characteristics inherent in policy implementation, 
it fails to take account of the broader range of variables such as those relevant to the 
study of implementation. In addition, the model offers the greatest utility when 
comparing policy implementation in a range of policy areas, rather than single case 
studies. 
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This completes the review of synthesized implementation literature. All that remains 
is to point out the paradox created by policy and implementation-related studies. On 
the one hand, the availability of third-generation ‘network-based’ policy analysis 
frameworks offer researchers a more complete, holistic evaluation of the policy 
process. On the other, the lack of specific consideration to implementation in these 
new models means that their utility in examining implementation is limited. As 
Matland argued, if implementation research is to provide an explanation or 
understanding, it should be tied specifically to an examination of implementation 
processes in a specific policy area, rather than to all actions in a policy field (1995). 
Furthermore, the breadth and comprehensive nature of the policy analysis 
frameworks may not be well-suited to the specific nature of policy implementation 
per se but more suited to the analysis of context and all actions in a policy field. 
Alongside the need for a framework that considers implementation is the need for 
specific attention to partnerships. As detailed in Chapter 4, the community sport 
policy process has for many years depended on collaboration and partnership in 
order to work toward policy outcomes. Partnerships form an important and 
distinctive part of the community sport landscape. The following section is focused 
on the partnership literature, in particular the different models of partnership and 
the factors that help or hinder collaboration. 
 
Partnership literature 
In normative terms, partnerships have been understood as being positive or 
inherently progressive (McDonald, 2005). According to Finlayson (2003: 63) 
‘partnership is an up word that makes things sound exciting, progressive and 
positive’. The notion of partnership tends to be justified in that it increases the pool 
of resources (expertise and administrative capacity), promotes greater effectiveness 
and efficiency, and enhances legitimacy through the involvement of a range of 
stakeholders close to the end user (McQuaid, 2000). For Mackinstosh (1992), the 
rationalisation for partnerships rests on the potential to expand budgets, add value 
through the more effective use of resources, and multiply the potential benefits as a 
result of different organisations working together. An additional explanation which 
helps to explain the growth and formalisation of partnerships in community sport, 
and one which wholeheartedly exploited the normative view of partnership, is the 
national lottery sports fund. Not only did this promote the normative ideal of 
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partnership working, but went so far as to require applicants to demonstrate 
partnerships with a variety of local and sub-regional agents. The following section 
aims to give more attention to the notion of partnership—in particular, four models 
of partnership which aim to explicate the diversity of partnership types as well as an 
analysis of the range of factors that can aid or adversely affect collaboration.  
 
The first model to be reviewed is Scheberle’s (2004) typology of working 
relationships. This analyses the interaction between federal-level and state-level 
implementers, specifically in relation to environmental policy in the United States. It 
is important and highly relevant as it focuses primarily on working relations between 
agents involved at different levels in the implementation of national-level policy. 
Whilst federal- and state-level interaction is not applicable to this study, the range of 
factors considered in Scheberle’s work provides a model for evaluating the working 
relations between Sport England, national, regional and sub-regional-level NGBs, 
and sub-regional level CSPs. 
 
The ‘role orientations’ of agents involved in implementation, particularly those at the 
federal or national level, can have a significant impact on working relationships and 
the effectiveness of implementation at the street level (Scheberle, 2004). In fact, 
researchers have noted that there are problems associated with national agents 
leaning too heavily on local-level implementers to secure compliance with their goals 
(Agranoff, 2007). Seeing that coercion was not the most effective approach for 
national oversight of policy implementation, Scheberle (2004) developed a 
conceptual model highlighting the conditions which are more likely to facilitate 
effective working relationships between implementation agents that are separate yet 
interdependent. Two characteristics emerged as ‘most critical in predicting’ the 
effectiveness of working relations between implementing agents: specifically, mutual 
trust and involvement (Cline, 2000; Scheberle, 2004: 20). High levels of trust exist 
when implementing agents ‘share similar goals, respect the actions of others, allow 
flexibility, and support individuals within the programme’ (Scheberle, 2004: 20). 
The typology of working relations reflects this in its assertion that individuals have 
either low or high levels of trust for implementation agents outside their own 
organisation, see Figure 2.12 (ibid, 2004).  
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The other critical characteristic—involvement—relates to the extent of involvement 
or oversight by national-level implementers, such as Sport England and/or NGBs. 
The typology reflects both low and high involvement, as shown in Figure 2.12. 
Involvement includes a wide range of interactions such as communication (formal 
and informal), monitoring and evaluation activities, funding provision, sharing 
resources, and giving advice (ibid, 2004). Scheberle advised that whilst trust is 
normative (more is good), this is not necessarily true for involvement, insomuch as 
high levels of involvement may be perceived as micromanagement and ‘could be 
counterproductive’ in establishing highly effective working relations between 
implementation agents (2004: 21). Scheberle argued that creating ‘synergistic 
relationships’ is not easy and involves considerable work and the commitment of all 
organisations (2004: 27). She also pointed out that working relationships do not 
exist in a vacuum, emphasising that working relations between implementing agents 
are an integral part of policy implementation (ibid, 2004). Whilst the model does not 
seek to analyse policy systems or even implementation processes, it does examine an 
aspect of implementation given scant attention and also provides a framework which 
is directly relevant to the aims of this study.  
Figure 2.12 Adapted typology of working relations (source: Scheberle, 2004) 
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The second model, conceived by Mackintosh, was inspired by the ambiguity and 
conflict present in an ever increasing private-public partnership environment. It 
examines the three types of processes at work within partnerships (Mackintosh, 
1992). The first process considered is synergy. This includes the synergies that exist 
across partners, and, the extent to which resources, skills and power are combined to 
achieve mutually beneficial outcomes (ibid, 1992). The second process relates to 
transformation, in particular the work of one or more partners to transform the 
objectives and cultures of other partners so that they more closely match their own 
(ibid, 1992). The third process, budget enlargement, relates to the acquisition of 
resources from external sources. A major criticism of this theoretical model is the 
overly normative view of partnerships and limited consideration of power (Hastings, 
1996). 
 
Third, Ling (2000) offered a typology of partnerships using four dimensions to 
analyse partnerships. The first is membership, including consideration of who the 
members are, whether they are individuals or organisational representatives and 
how they came to be members of the partnership (ibid, 2000). The second dimension 
is links between partners. This includes the nature of the links (formal/informal), 
levels of trust and equity, and the way in which partners affect each other during the 
lifetime of the partnership (co-evolution, coupling, convergence). The third 
dimension relates to scales and boundaries; for example, the primary focus of the 
partnership (broad/specific), how and where boundaries are drawn, and whether 
these are mandated or self-directed (ibid, 2000). The final dimension relates to the 
partnership context, including issues such as alignment between the partner 
organisation (culture, structures) and the partnership, the maturity of the 
partnership, and the extent to which the partnership is dependent on external 
resources (ibid, 2000). While Ling’s typology holds the potential for a broader 
critique of partnerships, it does not consider inter-partnership resources (expertise 
and funding) and the resultant status or power of different actors within the 
partnership.  
 
Fourth, McDonald’s (2005) theoretical approach to partnerships principally 
combined the Habermasian theory of communicative action and Newman’s model of 
governance. The model differentiated partnerships using two dimensions: change 
 
 
-77- 
 
(between the extremes of continuity and innovation), and control (between the 
extremes of central control and decentralisation). These two dimensions and their 
extreme positions created four models of partnership (see Figure 2.13): (i) an 
innovative, flexible, open systems model predicated on flows of power within the 
partnership; (ii) a strategic, criteria-driven, rational goal model wedded to systems of 
hierarchical or managerial power; (iii) a standardised, hierarchical model directed by 
formal authority; and (iv) a self-regulated, self-governance model based upon citizen 
or community power. In sum, the model provides a comprehensive, if somewhat 
complex, theory of partnership working,  
 
Figure 2.13 Differentiated theory of partnership working (source: McDonald, 2005) 
 
The partnership literature explores a range of factors that can facilitate or work as 
barriers to effective partnership working. Among facilitators, the skills of the 
workforce are critical. Organisations need an actor that has the range of skills 
required of a ‘collaborative leader’ (Chrislip & Larson, 1994; Feyerherm, 1994)—one 
who can lead where issues are complex and ambiguous, and ‘one able to promote a 
broader good amongst competing parochial interests’ (Williams & Sullivan, 2007: 
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41). Researchers note that the success of the partnership often depends on the 
leaders’ skills, particularly the commitment, energy, and ability to fully leverage the 
partnership’s potential (Bleak & Fulmer, 2009). Also relevant to leadership in 
partnerships is the role of ‘boundary spanners’ (Daft, 1989; Tushman & Scanlan, 
1981). These individuals have certain characteristics (see Table 2.3) which allow 
them to build shared meaning and trust with individuals involved in the partnership, 
regardless of real or artificial boundaries. 
 
Table 2.3 Characteristics of boundary spanners 
Ferlie & Pettigrew, 1996 Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002 
 Strong interpersonal, communication and 
listening skills; an ability to persuade; a 
readiness to trade and to engage in reciprocal 
rather than manipulative behaviour and an 
ability to construct long-term relationships. 
 
 The ability to cross a variety of occupational, 
organisational, social and political boundaries; 
an ability to speak different languages; an 
ability to act as an interpreter between 
different groups; to be credible with a range of 
different groups. 
 
 Tolerance of high levels of ambiguity and 
uncertainty; a long term as well as a short term 
view; a good strategic sense, vision and ideas; 
an ability to reflect on experience and to 
conceptualise; a capacity to learn quickly and 
to adapt to new situations.  
 
 An ability to impart knowledge to others; to act 
as teacher and mentor; an ability to transfer 
knowledge from one setting to another; an 
ability to convey requisite standards and 
attitudes to others inside and outside the 
organisation. 
 Critical appreciation of environment and 
problems/opportunities presented;  
 
 understanding different organisational 
contexts; 
 
 knowing the role and playing it;  
 
 communication; networking; negotiating; 
conflict resolution; risk-taking; problem 
solving; self-management. 
 
A second critical success factor is the clarity and stability of the partnerships’ 
objectives (Houlihan & Lindsey, 2008). Clarity is particularly important in a 
discretionary policy space such as community sport given that policy objectives have 
been subject to frequent change (Collins, 2010; Houlihan, 2011). CSPs have been 
known to confuse policy advice from one government department (e.g. five bouts of 
physical activity per week, Department of Health) for a policy objective from another 
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department (e.g. at least 30 minutes of sport and active recreation three times a 
week, DCMS) (personal communication, 2008). This would not be noteworthy 
except that (i) the CSP involved was genuinely confused about which policy they were 
implementing, and (ii) was developing strategies and programmes focused on the 
former, whilst being evaluated on the latter. 
 
Stability of objectives is also an important issue. For example, there is potential for 
significant variation in the organisational objectives of the 49 CSPs. While this 
requires further investigation, if this is the case, it could create confusion for any 
partner organisations that work beyond the sub-regional level with more than one 
CSP. Also, there needs to be space within partnerships ‘to negotiate a shared sense of 
purpose and common objectives’ (Houlihan & Lindsey, 2008), which is often an 
intricate and time-consuming process of balancing involvement and ownership with 
appropriate goals that match both national and local priorities (Huxham & Vangen, 
2005).  
 
A number of scholars have explored the reality of partnership and how it deviates 
from the rhetoric. For some, the advantages of partnership are outweighed by the 
disadvantages (Houlihan & Lindsey, 2008). Some of the problems common to 
partnerships include a large and unwieldy membership, mission drift (Goss, 2001), a 
lack of consensus, a tendency for one or two members to dominate (McQuaid, 2000), 
overcoming cultural differences, building trust, and the fine balance between gaining 
advantage through collaboration and the development of committee-based inertia 
(Huxham & Vangen, 2005). In their study of local sports development officers, 
Bloyce et al., (2008) identified a bureaucratisation associated with partnership 
working, where development officers devoted more time to managing complex 
figurations4, decreasing the time available for developing sport within their 
communities.  
 
Some of the principal barriers that prevent or restrict partnerships within the 
community sport policy context include policy congestion (Houlihan & Lindsey, 
2008), power imbalance within partnerships (Goodwin & Grix, 2011; Grix, 2010a; 
                                                          
4 The concept of figuration refers to individuals and their relationships with others, otherwise referred to as 
networks of interdependency (Bloyce & Smith, 2008) 
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Houlihan & Lindsey, 2008), and lack of ‘collaborative capacity’ (Hudson et al., 
1999). Policy congestion refers to the need for agencies to compete with others for 
space within a busy and tightly bound policy environment (Houlihan & Lindsey, 
2008). The range of agencies includes CSPs, NGBs, local authorities, CSNs/CPANs, 
Universities, Further Education Colleges, School Games Networks, the community 
trusts of professional teams (football, rugby, and cricket), and myriad voluntary-run 
sports clubs involved in the implementation of community sport. Despite recent 
attempts to organise these agencies into a single system for sport, there remains a 
very real risk ‘that the establishment of a cluster of delivery mechanisms results not 
in synergy and the development of specialist expertise, but in confusion, competition 
and congestion’ (Houlihan & Lindsey, 2008: 239). 
 
The predominant concern regarding partnerships is the substantive yet sometimes 
indiscernible issue of power (ibid, 2008). While some partnerships may offer a 
modern and effective form of governance, ‘others may be ideological fig leaves for 
dominant powers’, reproducing and reinforcing existing patterns of power among a 
multiplicity of actors (McDonald, 2005: 579). It is more accurate to view 
partnerships as the product of existing power relations, rather than a new, 
democratic form of governance (Houlihan & Lindsey, 2008). One must be fully 
sensitised to the notion of partnerships as a vehicle ‘for legitimising and diverting 
attention away from embedded power inequalities’; while the rhetoric of partnership 
may offer the illusion of equality, it actually ‘masks a substantive inequality in 
influence’ (Houlihan & Lindsey, 2008: 227).  
 
Looking at the complexity of power relations within the partnership environment, 
Bloyce et al., (2008: 376) pinpointed a potentially significant unintended outcome: 
  
[W]hile government policy has increasingly constrained SDOs to 
work with a wide variety of other organizations in order to achieve 
the government’s non-sport policy goals, the outcomes of this 
increasingly complex interweaving of the actions of the many 
different groups may well have made it more difficult for SDOs to 
achieve the government’s goals in relation to sports development 
proper, an outcome which it is fair to assume was neither intended 
nor desired by government. 
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The notion of partnership assumes equity between members, obscuring the reality of 
power imbalance, resource dependency, and hierarchy (Grix & Phillpots, 2011). Such 
hierarchy and asymmetrical relations tend to be prevalent in partnerships founded 
on enforced cooperation, where—despite differences of culture, leadership, strategy, 
and priorities—agencies are required, usually as condition of grant aid, to 
demonstrate effective partnership working (Phillpotts et al., 2010; Robson, 2008). 
Such enforced partnerships can fundamentally compromise the principle of 
partnership (Powell & Glendinning, 2002). Reinforcing this view, Rummery argued 
that enforced partnerships are contractual relationships rather than true 
partnerships: 
 
Contracts bind the parties into behaviours that they would 
otherwise not engage in. If a partnership needs to be ‘enforced’ 
through a contractual relationship, can the relationship be said to 
be a partnership at all? (2002: 236). 
 
This is a particularly relevant issue insofar as the partnership between CSPs and 
NGBs is enforced as a condition of funding to both the NGB (via the whole sport plan 
mechanism) and the CSP (via the core funding). NGBs in particular are required to 
demonstrate how they will work alongside CSPs as part of the whole sport plan 
process. This is then evaluated in the NGB reporting process and the ongoing 
discussions between NGBs and the NGB relationship team at Sport England. 
Similarly, CSPs are required to support NGBs in delivering cross sport support 
services to meet NGB priorities, and to develop and maintain the strategic alliances 
and local networks NGBs and SE need to drive, deliver and secure resources (Sport 
England, 2012c). The extent to which the CSP is achieving these goals is evaluated in 
the CSP quarterly performance review and through ongoing dialogue with NGBs. The 
substantial funding of NGBs in comparison to CSPs (see Appendix 1), not to mention 
the privileged position of NGBs in the evaluation process, are likely to create and/or 
maintain a power imbalance between the two organisations.  
 
The third barrier relates to ‘collaborative capacity’ (cf. Beckley et al., 2008; Chaskin, 
2001; Hudson et al., 1999; Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002). This version of capacity refers 
to the collective ability of the group to combine various forms of capital within 
institutional and relational contexts to produce desired results or outcomes (Beckley 
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et al., 2008: 60). More specifically, collaborative capacity has been viewed as ‘the 
interaction of human capital, organisational resources, and social capital’ that can be 
used to solve collective problems and maintain the wellbeing of a given partnership 
or community (Chaskin, 2001: 295). The challenges arising with collaborative 
capacity at the individual agent level tend to be related to skills, attributes and 
attitudes (Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002). Barriers at the strategic or organisational level 
include a lack of clarity regarding vision or divergent goals (Sullivan & Skelcher, 
2002), competition for resources (Jansen et al., 2008), expectations concerning 
other partner agencies based on prior behaviour or reputation, and the level of 
mutual respect and trust which ultimately directs the organisations’ willingness and 
commitment to the partnership (Huxham & Vangen, 2005). These factors, 
particularly trust and respect, can be positively influenced as part of a positive 
feedback loop when outcomes have been achieved and this is directly attributed to 
the partnership effort. In such cases, the achievement of outcomes can then serve the 
function of developing collaborative capacity to achieve future outcomes (Huxham & 
Vangen, 2005). However, this path relies on small or quick wins to incrementally 
build trust and respect. This is unlikely in contractual partnerships where specific 
funding is allocated in order to achieve a goal by a certain deadline (Huxham & 
Vangen, 2005). 
 
The scale and complexity of the barriers listed above are not insignificant, 
particularly in the context of community sport, where trust and respect have been 
shaped by deviations in sport policy, directly influenced by agents who appear to 
have had the Minister’s ear (cf. Bloyce et al., 2008; Collins, 2010; Keech, 2011). The 
purpose of this summary of partnership literature and context is not to argue against 
the notion of partnership, it is to emphasise the reality, rather than the rhetoric, of 
partnership, and to move away from an overly normative view of partnership 
working. 
 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter evaluated three prominent macro-level perspectives of state theory, the 
concept of power, four meso-level approaches to policy analysis, and implementation 
and partnership theories. The purpose of the following summary is to identify its 
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most relevant aspects and to clarify the way in which these aspects connect to each 
other. 
 
The first aspect relates to macro-level theory. This is an important consideration for 
this study as it ‘provides an overall perspective from which one sees and interprets 
the world’ (Houlihan 2013, 12). Macro-theories examine policy influence and the way 
in which this shapes policy and determines what the state does (Hill, 1997). Of 
particular relevance to this study are macro theories that give direct attention to the 
relationship between the state and society and, in particular, the distribution of 
power within society. Neo-pluralism offers a particularly apposite perspective as it 
does not privilege ‘a single, dominant causal factor (whether it be market processes 
or class struggle)’ (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1987 in Green, 2005). Instead, it views the 
state as an active participant in the policy making process in protecting and 
promoting its own interests (Houlihan, 2013) and highlights the fragmentation of the 
state, the growth of decentralised networks, and the role and influence of Non-
Departmental Public Bodies (Green, 2005). In this way, neo-pluralism provides a 
clearly focussed lens through which the fragmented structure of community sport 
can be analysed. For example, it has particular relevance in drawing attention to the 
nature of interactions between a range of national, sub-regional and local groups 
(SE, NGBs, CSPs, local government, CSNs, and clubs, etc.) as well as underlining the 
largely unequal influence of agents involved in the community sport policy field 
(Houlihan, 2013).  
 
Set within macro-level theory and guided by its broader theory of power, meso-level 
frameworks take as their starting point the assumptions inherent within macro-level 
theory. In considering a more precise insight into the integration of macro- and 
meso- level theories, Daugbjerg & Marsh offer the following: 
 
 … the macro-level of analysis deals with the relationships between 
the state and civil society, that is state theory, and, more 
specifically, the broader political structures and processes within 
which the policy network [or policy subsystem] is located. State 
theory offers an explanation of the pattern of inclusion and 
exclusion within the network and an hypothesis about whose 
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interests are served by the outputs from the network. The meso-
level deals with the pattern of interest group intermediation … it 
concentrates upon questions concerning the structures and patterns 
of interaction within them (1998: 54). 
 
The range of variables contained within the meso-level frameworks, and the 
relationship between them, serve as a conceptual map to guide the analyst, 
facilitating a deeper, more rigorous study than would otherwise be possible through 
ad hoc exploration (Sabatier, 2007). More specifically, the frameworks highlight a 
range of variables that are likely to influence policy stability and change, including 
the policy environment, administrative arrangements, interaction between interest 
groups, as well as values, beliefs and norms. Despite their utility, however, all 
frameworks contain weaknesses, leading some researchers to conclude that they are 
inadequate as individual tools of analysis (Houlihan, 2005). Consequently, the 
researcher has three options. The first option is to develop a new policy framework, 
although it is important to recognise that previous work has advised that this will do 
little other than adding another framework (and its associated limitations) to the 
numerous frameworks already published (Houlihan, 2005; van der Heijden, 2012). 
Second, one could utilise the framework offering the greatest potential in analysing 
the policy process whilst accepting its associated limitations. Here, the network 
concept that forms a central part of the Policy Network approach as well as a notable 
part of the ACF, would be likely to provide the greatest utility in analysing a policy 
field such as community sport that is characterised by networks (e.g. NGBs, SSPs, 
CSPs, CSNs, etc.). Marsh & Smith’s (2000) Policy Network model could also have 
considerable potential, primarily due to its dialectical consideration of structure and 
agency as well as its central focus on resources, actors skills, actor learning and the 
way in which these shape and are shaped by network structure and network 
interaction. The third approach to analysis is via theoretical pluralism (Cairney, 2011; 
van der Heijden, 2012). Theoretical pluralism encourages the use of complementary 
theories that reveal a richer insight of policy. The key point here is that theories be 
complementary so that the different approaches are aligned and closely associated, 
thus enabling a cogent and coherent analysis, rather than simply selecting theories 
with little or no consideration of their relationship. With this in mind, neo-pluralism 
together with the associated meso-level frameworks of either the ACF or the 
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networks approach hold the greater potential to provide a deeper, more persuasive 
analysis of the community sport policy process. This pluralist approach, with the 
close association of neo-pluralism together with the networks approach and an 
examination of advocacy coalitions, gives attention to the state as an active agent, the 
fragmentation of the policy community and the unequal power across agents. It also 
underscores the importance of the structure and interaction of different groups, the 
way in which interaction is shaped by values and belief systems, as well as the 
dialectical nature of the policy process, one where agents are shaped by events as well 
as directly shaping their environment. 
 
The analysis can be further enhanced with consideration of micro-level theories, thus 
extending beyond the state and organisational level to consider individuals and their 
role in the policy process. Particularly relevant here is the close relationship between 
the network approach and the implementation literature, particularly that which 
gives attention to the values, beliefs and ideas of individual implementing agents 
such as that presented by Lipksy. Furthermore, the realist examination of 
partnerships such as that presented by Scheberle (2004) provides a clearer, more 
coherent benchmark against which partnerships can be analysed. This work, giving 
attention to trust and involvement together with Huxham & Vangen’s (2005) 
insights into the difficulties of achieving collaborative capacity within enforced 
partnerships, is considered particularly valuable given the structural context of the 
community sport policy process, in particular the enforced nature of the CSP-NGB 
relationship (discussed further in Chapter 4). 
 
In sum, the use of multiple theories provides a richer, more complete analysis of the 
policy process, bringing the societal, institutional and individual levels into view and 
providing multiple perspectives from which to analyse the policy field. Furthermore, 
the use of diverse (but complementary) theories helps guard against the potential for 
a Rashomon effect, where different but equally plausible accounts of policy can 
emerge from the use of a single lens (van der Heijden, 2012). A more detailed 
evaluation of theory to analyse the community sport policy process will be presented 
in Chapter 8. Here, the empirical evidence will be used to further examine the utility 
of theory, particularly those at the meso-level. 
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Chapter 3 
Research Methodology 
 
Introduction 
This chapter explains and evaluates the research strategy employed for this study 
based on an understanding of the philosophic assumptions that underpin research. 
The purpose of the proposed research--that is, the knowledge it seeks to develop—is 
largely a product of a researcher’s ontology and epistemology. These philosophic 
traditions dictate the researcher’s view of reality—her world view and understanding 
of what there is to be known, as well as his understanding of how we can acquire 
knowledge, or how we can know about reality (Grix, 2002, 2010b). It follows that 
these deep issues lay the foundations upon which research ideas are formulated, and 
specific research questions created. It may therefore appear illogical or out of 
sequence to present the research aim and questions before the philosophic issues. 
However, doing so clarifies the overall purpose of the research and the key areas of 
enquiry, thus providing a point of reference and context for the philosophic 
assumptions set out in detail below.  
 
The aim of the study is to analyse the significance of the relationship between CSPs 
and NGBs in the community sport policy process. This broad aim has the following 
objectives: 
 
 To analyse the significance of the relationship between CSPs and NGBs with 
regard to the national community sport policy process 
 To analyse the significance of the relationship between CSPs and NGBs in local-
level policy making and policy implementation 
 To identify CSP and NGB attitudes and perceptions toward the community 
sport policy process 
 To evaluate the explanatory value of selected meso-level theories of the policy 
process in developing a better understanding of the community sport policy 
process 
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Philosophic assumptions 
Ontological and epistemological assumptions either implicitly or explicitly form the 
basis of research, which is guided by deep philosophical assumptions that ultimately 
dictate the nature and purpose of the research enterprise (Sparkes, 1992). 
Clarification regarding the researcher’s ontological and epistemological position 
enhances the reader’s awareness of the critical issues of assumption and decision-
making, and is significant in understanding the researcher’s capacity to interpret the 
nature of social reality.  It is particularly important to be aware that different 
paradigms offer a different view of reality and, therefore, competing interpretations 
of how the social world can be known (Blaikie, 1993). Understanding this brings 
greater transparency and appreciation of the core assumptions associated with 
research and those factors that instruct the choice of research questions, 
methodology, methods and sources (Bryman, 2008; Grix, 2010b). Similarly, 
understanding these issues provides the rationale for developing specific methods 
and avoids treating the ‘philosophical position’ as a pullover that is to be put on when 
addressing such issues and taken off when doing the research (Marsh & Smith, 
2000). Ontology and epistemology are not merely a response to academic research 
protocol, they form the very base of the research, revealing deep-seated, 
philosophical assumptions that shape the researcher’s paradigm (Sparkes, 1992) and 
provide insight into the guiding principles that instruct important decisions 
regarding the research strategy (Bates & Jenkins, 2007). 
 
Grix (2002) advised that ontology and epistemology, whilst closely linked, are 
separate terms and that ontological considerations should be the logical starting 
place in setting out one’s philosophical position. Sparkes (1992: 14) underlined the 
point: 
 
Ontological assumptions give rise to epistemological assumptions 
which have methodological implications for the choices made 
regarding particular techniques of data collection, the 
interpretation of these findings and the eventual ways they are 
written about and presented. 
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To the social scientist, ontology is a branch of philosophy that is primarily concerned 
with the nature of reality (Marsh & Furlong, 2002). Blaikie, in an oft-cited quote, 
clarified ontology as: 
 
The claims and assumptions that are made about the nature of 
social reality, claims about what exists, what it looks like, what units 
make it up and how these units interact with each other (2000: 8). 
 
Ontology is therefore concerned with the matter of reality and an awareness of ‘what 
exists that we might acquire knowledge of’ (Hay, 2002: 61 in Grix, 2010a) or the 
meaning of what is to be known (Blaikie, 2000). Varying positions exist within the 
ontological branch, principally represented by ‘objectivism’ (or actualism) and 
‘constructivism’ (Blaikie, 2000; Grix, 2002). Objectivism is an ontological position 
where ‘social phenomena and their meanings have an existence that is independent 
of social actors’ (Grix, 2002: 177). Thus, knowledge is generated through social 
structures, beyond the influence of social actors, and these external structures dictate 
reality (Bryman, 2008). The constructivist paradigm offers an alternative view, 
whereby phenomena and their meanings are continually shaped by social actors 
(Bryman, 2008; Grix, 2010b). Thus, the constructionist view of the actor is of 
particular import, where the social actor interprets, constructs and continually 
revises a reality based on his numerous experiences and interactions (Blaikie, 2000; 
Bryman, 2008; Grix, 2002).  In summary, this is where the objectivist-constructivist 
paradigmatic debate fundamentally resides; where the objectivist believes in an 
objective truth, the constructivist assumes the real world is mediated by our social 
construction of it. 
 
However, dividing this dualism is a third, midway paradigm5, commonly referred to 
as critical realism (Bhasker, 1975; 1978). Critical realism combines a general 
philosophy of science with a philosophy of social science to underline the deeply 
intertwined relationship between the natural and social world (Bhasker, 1978). It 
accepts that social reality exists, whilst also accepting that knowledge is a social 
construct (Baert, 2005). One of the major difficulties associated with critical realism 
is its diffuse nature, evidenced by the wide range of terms used and the identification 
                                                          
5 Midway insomuch as it occupies the midway point on the continuum of ontological approaches to social science 
research (Wood and Kruger, 2000).  
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of particular traditions or strands within the paradigm. In particular, the two critical 
realist strands of radical humanism and radical structuralism (Bryman, 2008; May, 
2001) represent opposing interpretations of how one can know the world. Radical 
humanism represents a position more closely aligned to interpretivism whilst radical 
structuralism is closer to positivism (Sparkes, 1992).  However, critical realists reject 
both positivist and interpretivist positions based on their incomplete accounts of 
social behaviour, in particular, the lack of attention to political or ideological contexts 
(Cohen et al., 2000). From a critical realist perspective, positivism is criticised for its 
sole focus on observable events and its failure to relate how these observations are 
influenced by prior causal mechanisms and external influences (Collier, 1993).  In a 
more positive vein, critical realists acknowledge the utility of interpretivist 
approaches in understanding the causal mechanisms related to human behaviour. 
However, realists are ultimately critical of interpretivism as it fails to consider the 
extent to which social phenomena are influenced by social structures (Hindess, 
1996). Critical realism helps to ‘bridge the object-subject gap’ (Neuman, 2003: 85), 
allowing a fuller consideration of agency and the relationship between this and the 
social structures that shape and condition human behaviour (Bhaskar, 1979). 
 
Linked to the ontological and located between it and the methodological is the 
epistemological. Epistemology is concerned with the theory of knowledge, paying 
particular attention to methods, validation and the variety of ways of gaining 
knowledge of social reality (Blaikie, 2000). Whilst ontology is concerned with ‘what 
we may know’, epistemology is concerned with how knowledge of the social world is 
constructed and, in particular, the principles and procedures that are used to 
uncover this (Bryman, 2008). In other words, epistemology focuses on ‘how we come 
to know what we know’ (Grix, 2002: 177).  
 
As with the ontological branch, it is possible to distinguish between positivist 
(functionalist or foundationalist) and interpretivist (anti-foundationalist) traditions 
that underpin epistemological assumptions. Positivism is idealised in the notion that 
reality consists of what is available to the senses (Bryman, 2008).  In other words, 
positivists view the social world as an entity involving facts and figures that can be 
observed, measured and understood (Sparkes, 1992). Value is placed on those 
phenomena which can be observed and measured, and thus valid knowledge is 
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ostensibly free from values attributed to it by individuals (Bryman, 2008). As a 
result, the beliefs and perceptions held by individuals are not considered knowledge. 
Adopting a positivist viewpoint requires a methodology capable of testing the 
relationship between variables in order to assess the validity of particular hypotheses 
or theories (Guba & Lincoln, 1998).  
 
Interpretivism, in direct opposition to positivism, is humanistic. Knowledge is 
essentially viewed as a ‘human construction’ which is gained from individual 
interpretations of social reality (Blaikie, 1993; Sparkes, 1992). Interpretivism places 
value on the individual’s experience, belief and understanding, and respects the 
differences between people. Whilst interpretivism identifies social reality as the 
interpretation that individuals have of the social world in which they exist, this is not 
to argue that all individuals develop a different interpretation of reality. As Blaikie 
asserted, ‘social reality is regarded as the product of processes by which social actors 
together negotiate the meaning for actions and situations (1993: 96). Furthermore, 
these interpretations are not normally fixed but open to constant construction and 
refinement (Bryman, 2008).  By its very nature, interpretivism requires the social 
scientist to grasp the ‘subjective meaning of social action’ (ibid, 2008), aiding the 
researcher in developing a more emphatic meaning of human action rather than 
concentrating on the external forces that act upon it (Blaikie, 1993).  Consequently, 
research is not merely an exercise of generating objective facts and explanation but 
rather an interpretive understanding. The interpretivist position facilitates 
consideration of experience, belief and understanding, and by doing so demonstrates 
the highly subjective nature of human behaviour (Bryman, 2008).  
 
Grix, in his work on the border between epistemological positions, criticises the stark 
dichotomy between foundationalism and anti-foundationalism, arguing that this may 
impoverish research and restrict real-world research in the ‘messy social sciences’6 
(2010b: 12). In an attempt to clarify epistemological positions, Grix (2002) noted 
that the positivist or foundational view can be seen to rely wholly on empirical 
realism, a world made up of observable objects, and no unobservable qualities 
(Sayer, 2000). Post-positivism, however, tends towards critical realism, a broad 
                                                          
6 Grix (2010, p12-13) uses messy because people are often unpredictable and emotional, the motives for their 
actions are often the same. 
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research paradigm which Bhasker (1978) viewed as ‘critical social science’. Sayer 
(2000: 2-3) advocated the value of the post-positivist epistemology, offering a 
powerful alternative to positivism through its emphasis on the ‘interpretation of 
meaning’. Thus, a post-positivist epistemology allows the researcher to link positivist 
and interpretivist perspectives, thereby combining the objective, explanatory value of 
positivism with the subjective understanding offered by interpretivism (Blaikie, 
2010; Bryman, 2008; Grix, 2002).  
 
The Research Paradigm 
This section will set out the ontological and epistemological assumptions that 
underpin the study, otherwise known as the research paradigm. The term ‘paradigm’ 
is widely attributed to Kuhn (1962), who defined it as: what is to be observed, the 
kind of questions that are supposed to be asked in relation to this subject, how these 
questions are to be structured, how the results of scientific investigations should be 
interpreted, and how the experiment is to be conducted. Thus, the research paradigm 
can be seen as the cluster of beliefs that direct key decisions and guide the research 
(Bryman, 2008), or the ‘basic belief system or worldview’ with which the research is 
inextricably bound (Guba & Lincoln, 1994).  
 
Blaikie (2010) provided an elaborate presentation of classical and contemporary 
research paradigms, where the classical approach considers positivist, critical 
rationalism, classical hermeneutics, and interpretivism, and the contemporary 
includes paradigms as diffuse as critical theory, ethnomethodology, social realism, 
contemporary hermeneutics, structuration theory, feminism and complexity theory. 
Grix (2002) and Guba & Lincoln (1994) presented a broader overview of 
paradigmatic positions focussed on positivism, post-positivism, and constructivism 
(or interpretivism). In the case of the latter, they present an additional position 
which they refer to as critical theory – a blanket term representing Marxism, 
feminism, materialism, etc. (Guba & Lincoln, 1994: 109). Figure 3.1 presents a 
continuum of research paradigms, synthesising ideas from Grix (2002) and Guba & 
Lincoln (1994) and illustrating how these align to ontological and epistemological 
assumptions as well as showing the key differences in the explanatory and 
interpretative value attached to each position on the continuum. This approach was 
considered more useful to the discussion of research paradigms for this study as it 
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provided a broader, yet clearly defined classification; it aligned with the philosophic 
assumptions presented above, and it was highly relevant to the field of political 
science, which provides the major theoretical basis of this study (Hay, 2002; Marsh 
& Stoker, 2002).  
 
As Marsh & Smith (2001) reminded us, political science requires ontological and 
epistemological issues to be taken seriously. Epistemology, they argue, represents a 
skin—a permanent, irremovable commitment; not a position that can be changed or 
adapted to suit. All researchers have ontological and epistemological positions and 
all research contains assumptions directed by these positions. The issue, then, is 
about ensuring that (i) the researcher is fully aware of these positions/assumptions, 
and (ii) is clear and transparent about their specific position. 
 
  
          Figure 3.1 Continuum of research paradigms (source: adapted from Grix, 2002; Guba &  
          Lincoln, 1994) 
 
 
The research has been directed ontologically by critical realism—viewing reality as 
both objective and socially constructed, and a post-positivist epistemological 
position—whereby knowledge is seen to be socially and historically conditioned (Hay, 
2002). It is important to note that critical realism is distinct and separate from 
critical theory. That said, the two do share some assumptions, specifically: (i) an 
active critique of positivism, whereby both reject concepts of naturalness, (ii) a 
commitment to real problems as both a subject, and as a justification for theorising, 
(iii) the application of hermeneutic techniques to interpret the multiple realities of 
actors, and (iv) the emancipatory objective, that they seek not only to identify and 
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explain problems but to provide tools for resolving them, thereby enabling people to 
acquire more control over their lives (Gibson, 1983). 
 
Primarily driven by the work of Bhaskar (1975, 1979), critical realism is seen as a 
legitimate critical paradigm that provides a robust, methodical approach to the social 
sciences whilst also offering a lucid critique of objectivism (Baert, 2005). At its 
foundation, critical realism (and the other labels used to represent it) rests on two 
fundamental beliefs. First, positivists consider that the scientist’s conceptualisation 
of reality directly reflects that reality, whereas critical realists view this simply as a 
way of knowing (Bhaskar, 1975). Thus, realists recognise the fundamental distinction 
between the objects that are the focus of their study and the ways in which they 
describe and understand them (Bryman, 2008). Second, critical realists will admit 
into their explanations theoretical considerations that are not directly observable, 
although their effects are (ibid, 2008).  Thus, critical realists maintain that events 
and discourses occurring in the social world can only be measured accurately 
through a combination of empirical investigation and theory construction (McEvoy & 
Richards, 2006). Critical realism understands reality as a construction of both 
observable and unobservable features, a consideration of both structure and agency 
(Bhaskar, 1975). Observable features include the actions of individuals as well as 
organisations, while unobservable features include those deeper structures and 
relations that are not directly observable but lie behind the surface of social reality 
(Bryman, 2008). In this regard, critical realists argue that a distinction exists 
between the social and natural world, and that social structures are maintained and 
reproduced by the activities of agents, whilst the activities of agents are shaped by 
pre-existing social structures (Bhaskar, 1975).  
 
As such, critical realism enables a consideration of reality as both objective and 
socially constructed via a stratified ontology which views reality as multilayered. 
Bhaskar’s (1975) domains of reality present three overlapping positions: the real, the 
actual and the empirical (see Figure 3.2). The ‘domain of real’ refers to processes, 
structures and causal mechanisms (Bryman, 2008). Bhaskar asserted that ‘causal 
structures and generative mechanisms of nature must exist and act independently of 
the conditions that allow men to access them, so that they must be structured and 
intransitive’ (1978: 56). In other words, these generative mechanisms are wholly 
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independent in that they function or occur regardless of whether anyone knows 
about or observes them. Importantly, these generative mechanisms should be seen as 
‘tendencies of things, not conjunctions of events’ (Bhaskar, 1975: 10). Tendencies can 
be viewed as omnipresent, although they may not be productive or active 
(Danermark et al., 2002). In addition, the activation of such generative mechanisms 
is not contingent upon a specific sequence of events (Bhaskar, 1975). Thus, they are 
explained as tendencies. 
 
The ‘domain of actual’, as opposed to real, refers to existing phenomena, both 
observable and unobservable. Thus, this domain is primarily concerned with the 
events and experiences resulting from the generative mechanisms detailed above. 
Bhaskar (1975: 56) argues that ‘events must occur independently of the experiences 
that are apprehended’.   
 
 Domain of real Domain of actual Domain of empirical 
Mechanisms √   
Events √ √  
Experiences √ √ √ 
Figure 3.2 Domains of reality (source: adapted from Bhaskar, 1975) 
 
The third and final domain, ‘the empirical’, is concerned with direct observation, the 
sense-experience mediated by individual perceptions of actual events (Bhaskar, 
1975). It is possible for results of the real to go unobserved or unnoticed in which 
case the real would remain within the domain of the actual.  
 
Critical realism offers an approach which allows for the synthesis of the intransitive 
real with the socially constructed experience. In other words, it understands the 
differences between appearances and reality (Hay, 2002). Ontologically, this 
research adopts the realist view, that the world is seen as existing independently of 
our knowledge of it (Bhaskar, 1975). This approach accepts that whilst the researcher 
can investigate reality at the empirical level, it cannot be used as evidence of reality 
as it does not include consideration of unobserved phenomenon (Bhaskar, 1975).  
 
Epistemologically, this research accepts that knowledge is based on the subjective 
perspective of participants, which in turn is shaped by structures, organisational 
 
 
-95- 
 
relations and other conditions (Sparkes, 1992: 39).  While the observation of agents 
and some structures may be possible, other ‘deep’ structures may not be directly 
observable. As a result, research in the post-positivist tradition uses theory to 
identify and clarify the influence of these unobservable structures (Bryman, 2008; 
Marsh & Smith, 2001). For example, the study aimed to explore the realities and 
perceptions of individuals within CSPs, NGBs and local government, and developed a 
sense of both individual and organisational perspectives in an attempt to provide a 
detailed analysis of the implementation of community sport policy.  However, some 
of the key underlying structures that affect the role of CSPs in delivering policy 
objectives were unobservable. As a result, the meso-level theory presented above can 
help to explicate and clarify the underlying structures which affect policy 
implementation and, ultimately, policy outputs. To develop the point about structure 
further, it is necessary to be explicit about the position of the research in relation to 
the structure and agency problem. This problem is largely concerned with that which 
‘guides, determines, constrains or facilitates actions’ (Grix, 2002: 49). Some research 
places structure—that is, the social context in which individuals act—as the key driver 
or constraint of change, whereas others prioritise individual agency, seeing the 
individual as that which creates and develops the social context and institutions 
around them (Grix, 2002, Hay, 2002). 
 
More recently, the academic literature has developed a more elaborate consideration 
of the structure and agency problem. In this regard, Hay (2002) presented a useful, if 
broad, starting point in developing a clearer understanding of the relationship 
between structure and agency and, in particular, the way in which the two are 
inextricably bound: 
 
Agents are situated within a structured context which presents an 
uneven distribution of opportunities and constraints on them. 
Actors influence the development of that context over time through 
the consequences of their actions (2002: 166-7). 
 
Greater clarity on the position can be attained by considering three differing 
approaches: structuration theory (Giddens, 1979), morphogenetic (Archer et al., 
1998) and the strategic-relational approach (Hay, 2002). 
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Founded on the ontological assumption of the duality of structure and agency, 
structuration theory presents structure and agency as one, and the division between 
structure and agency is essentially seen as false (Giddens, 1979). Thus, ‘social 
structures are both constituted by human agency, and at the same time are the very 
medium of its constitution’ (Giddens, 1976: 211). Whilst structuration does accept 
that structures exist independently of individuals, their very creation and 
reproduction is a result of human action. Indeed, Giddens (1979) suggested that 
individual agency actively seeks to create structures and institutions as all individuals 
desire a degree of predictability in their lives. As a result, Giddens (1979) rejected the 
notion of agents as puppets of society, stressing the ability of all agents to exercise 
choice.  
 
Archer et al., (1998) criticised structuration theory, arguing that, through its dualistic 
foci, reasonable attention is not given to the significance of structure.  This was first 
articulated by Urry (1982) and developed by Thompson (1989) who claimed that, in 
his efforts to make them enabling as well as constraining, Giddens reduced 
structures to such a point that it is next to impossible to see, let alone analyse, them. 
The result is analytic paralysis, where it is impossible to separate and analyse each 
element (Hay, 2002). 
 
In contrast to structuration theory, Archer (1995) presented her morphogenetic 
approach, which rests on two principles. First, that effective sociological research 
requires a clear distinction between actors and structures. Archer argued that ‘our 
explanations will be unable to do justice to what we observe unless, for the sake of 
analysis, we think of societies and individuals as different things’ (1995: 158). 
Second, the ontological approach in Archer’s morphogenetic theory is inextricably 
bound to critical realism, so the ontology becomes a prerequisite for empirical work 
(ibid, 1995). This latter issue is the major criticism of morphogenetic theory, with 
Hay (2002) suggesting that this combination may lead to subtle differences in 
understanding the relationship between structure and agency. Further, this 
ontological requirement may be seen as limiting the range of potential debate as well 
as restricting our view of new or interesting phenomena (Healy, 1998). 
 
 
 
-97- 
 
An alternative approach, which goes beyond the duality of structuralism theory, is to 
examine structure in relation to action, and action in relation to structure (see Hay, 
2002; Jessop, 1990). Framed as a strategic-relational approach, this views structure 
and agency as interwoven and mutually constitutive, as Hay confirms: 
 
Structure and agency are best seen, not so much as flip-sides of the 
same coin, as metals in the alloy from which the coin is forged. . . . 
Structure and agency, though analytically separable, are in practice 
completely interwoven (we cannot see either metal in the alloy only 
the product of their fusion (2002: 127). 
 
Whilst the strategic-relational approach stresses the relational interaction between 
structure and agency, as stated above, the approach advocates separation in order to 
facilitate a detailed and thorough analysis of the relationship between each element 
(Grix, 2002). Thus, the strategic-relational approach develops the artificial dualism 
of structure and agency into a duality between a strategic actor who exists in a 
strategically selective context (Jessop, 1990). The CSP or NGB representative or 
organisation exists through their relational interaction with a strategically selective 
context—in this regard, the strategic context surrounding the aspiration to sustain 
and grow adult participation in sport, which includes the DCMS and Sport England 
national strategies, the comprehensive spending review, and the 2012 Games Legacy 
Plan. In addition, and perhaps more important, is the need to consider the 
relationship between agency and wider, strategic context or structural issues such as 
competing demands (i.e. school sport, elite sport, the DoH Physical Activity 
framework), resource dependency (i.e. majority of funding from one source) and the 
demography issue (i.e. the demographic make-up of populations differs substantially 
across the country and this results in unique structural relationships for different 
CSPs and NGBs).  
 
With regards to the criticisms of the strategic-relational approach, Akram (2010) 
argued that it privileges agency and ideas over structure. In addition, despite Hay’s 
(2002) criticism of Rational Choice Theory, the strategic-relational approach 
primarily conceives of ‘agential consciousness and intentionality’, with limited 
consideration of the unconscious and pre-reflexive aspects of agency (Akram, 2010: 
13). With reference to the latter, Akram (2010) criticises the lack of attention given to 
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consideration of the unconscious in Hay’s account of agency, which prioritises 
strategic and intentional actors. 
 
Having considered the issues presented above, this research adopted a similar 
position to that advocated by the strategic-relational approach. This was primarily 
attributable to (i) the emphasis within the strategic-relational approach on the 
strategic context of action (Hay, 2002) and the direct relevance and importance of 
this to the research aim, and (ii) no criticisms of the approach that would 
fundamentally affect the research aim or the ability to address the research 
questions. 
 
In summary, the strategic-relational approach recognises that actions are motivated 
by the intention to realise certain outcomes, and also understand that to be 
successful, ‘action must be informed by a strategic assessment of the relevant context 
in which the strategy occurs and upon which it subsequently impinges’ (Hay, 2002: 
129). A key point with regard to this study is that the strategic-relational approach 
recognises the reality of ‘uneven context’ and the way in which this can favour certain 
strategies over others (ibid, 2002). Thus, this approach allows for the perceptions 
and reflections of individual and collective actors about the identities and interests 
that shape their strategies. Individuals can be reflexive, can reformulate their ideas 
and identities, and can engage in strategic decisions about the objective interests that 
flow from these identities (Jessop, 1990). In addition, the strategic-relationship 
approach could help to illustrate ‘how specific structures and structural 
configurations selectively reinforce specific forms of action and discourage others’ 
(Jessop, 2002: 8). As a result, this approach will enable continuing interaction 
between the reflexive reorganisation of strategically selected contexts to be assessed, 
as well as examine the selection and retention of specific strategies and tactics 
oriented to the selected contexts (Jessop, 2002). 
 
Research strategy and methodological issues 
This section will clarify the research strategy and a range of methodological issues 
flowing from the choice of strategy. Specifically, these include: a brief consideration 
of different forms of data, identifying the most appropriate data to meet the 
 
 
-99- 
 
requirements of the research aim, issues relating to the reliability and validity of 
data, and issues concerning the relationship between researcher, and the research. 
 
Research strategy 
The research strategy can be seen as the ‘logic of enquiry and series of stages’ that 
will combine to answer the research questions (Blaikie, 2010: 104). To do this, the 
researcher needs to understand and differentiate methodological approaches in 
relation to how they consider the sources of theories and hypotheses and how these 
are tested (Gill & Johnson, 2002). In this respect the researcher has two distinct 
approaches, deductive (theory to data) and inductive (data to theory) research (Daft, 
1985). A deductive approach seeks explanation through existing theory, where theory 
is ‘borrowed or invented and expressed as a deductive argument’ (Blaikie, 2010: 86). 
The conclusion of the theoretical idea presented forms the proposition or hypothesis, 
which is then tested against empirical data to see if it can be accepted or rejected 
(ibid, 2010). Thus, the process begins with a broad conceptualisation of theory in an 
attempt to apply the theory in such a way as to identify new findings or observations 
(Bryman, 2008). The outcome is either (i) un-falsified findings that explain the past 
and/or predict the future, or (ii) the falsification and discarding of theory, as 
proposed by Popper (1972). According to Collis & Hussey (2003), deduction is the 
dominant research approach in the natural sciences and is more commonly aligned 
to the positivist research paradigm (Grix, 2002). 
 
In sharp contrast, induction involves the development of generalisable inferences out 
of observations (Bryman, 2008), or the process by which conclusions are drawn from 
direct observation of empirical evidence (Landman, 2000, 226). Therefore, the 
starting point shifts to the empirical and the collection of data, which is used to 
construct an explanation and possibly a theory regarding that which has been 
observed (Blaikie, 2010). The researcher is therefore looking for characteristics, 
patterns and relationships in the data to help construct an understanding or 
explanation of a particular phenomenon (Blaikie, 2010; Bryman, 2008). Gill & 
Johnson (2002) advised that the modern justification for taking an inductive 
approach in the social sciences is predicated on (i) explanation being seen as 
worthless unless grounded in observation and experience, and (ii) the close 
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relationship between deduction and positivism, where the social world is seen to be 
observed in the same way as the natural.  
 
In his reflection on the distinction between deduction and induction, Grix (2002: 
114) asserted that this separation is ‘useful only up to a point’. Using grounded theory 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967) as an example of a priori assumptions, Grix (2002) 
questioned the exact terms of the deductive and inductive approaches and argued, in 
support of Ragin (1994), that in practical terms, most research relies on the 
interaction between theory and observation and therefore uses both induction and 
deduction. Ragin (1994) refers to this as retroduction, a reflexive approach that 
enables the researcher to move, as required, between evidence and ideas (Grix, 
2002). Bhaskar (1978) added that retroduction involves the creation of hypothetical 
models to depict those structures and mechanisms that produce empirical 
observations. The process starts from the data and works backwards, using theory to 
develop a possible explanation (Blaikie, 2010). Given its realist position and the 
nature of the research aim, this research will follow the structuralist version of the 
retroductive research strategy advocated by Bhaskar (1978) and more recently 
developed into research practice as an explanatory model by Pawson & Tilley (1997). 
This strategy is particularly relevant for this research as it will attempt to reveal the 
mechanisms (within social rather than cognitive structures) that influence the role of 
the CSP in the community sport policy domain as well as enhance understanding of 
the contexts in which they operate. Furthermore, this approach upholds the 
aforementioned strengths of the inductive approach and addresses the theoretical 
separation of evidence and ideas as presented by Grix (2002). 
 
Methodological issues 
 
Forms of data 
In simplistic terms, data is available in two principal forms, as numbers or words, 
although other forms of data, visual data in the form of images—video for example—
are increasingly used by social scientists. Whilst on the surface this seems to be a 
clear distinction, the ‘status of the distinction is ambiguous’ (Bryman, 2008: 21). For 
some, there is a fundamental distinction, for others a false antithesis (Layder, 1985; 
Grix, 2002; Bryman, 2008). On one level, there is a clear difference in that the 
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quantitative approach seeks to measure, whilst the qualitative approach does not 
(Bryman, 2008).  Of a more fundamental nature is the perceived connection between 
theory, the ontological and epistemological assumptions underpinning the study and 
the research methods, where the general tendency is for positivists to take a 
deductive approach and utilise quantification to test theories, and for constructivists 
to emphasise an inductive approach and interpret the empirical data with the aim of 
generating theory (Bryman, 2008). However, it should be stressed that this is a 
tendency, not a law, and others see no reason why methods should not be mixed, so 
long as the methods are relevant to the enquiry, and accurately used and reported 
(Grix, 2002). 
 
The questions guiding this project focussed on the role of CSPs and NGBs in relation 
to community sport policy, specifically the significance of the relationship between 
CSPs and NGBs.  This emphasised the differing structure and strategy of CSPs and 
NGBs, their influence on policy outputs at a national or local level, the mechanisms 
and processes that underpin effective relations, and the challenges that inhibit the 
community sport policy area.  
 
Justification of mixed methods approach 
Given these questions and the research paradigm detailed above, a mixed methods 
approach was considered the most appropriate for the following reasons: first, whilst 
mixed methods are generally regarded as a partner to the philosophic position of 
pragmatism (Denscombe, 2007), others remind us that methods are tools for 
collecting data, and are not of themselves ‘rooted in ontological or epistemological 
commitments’ (Bryman, 2001: 445; Halfpenny, 1997). There should, therefore, be no 
problem associated with the relationship between the research paradigm and the 
methods used so long as the researcher remains aware of how specific methods are 
being used, the purpose of their use and how this relates to the use of other methods 
(Grix, 2002).  
 
Second, Bryman (2008) argued that combining qualitative and quantitative methods 
brings together the strengths and benefits of each while reducing their respective 
weaknesses and limitations. Qualitative data emphasises the importance of 
contextual understanding of behaviour, whereas quantitative research is more 
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concerned with quantification or measurement in order to accept or reject a 
particular hypothesis (Bryman, 2008). For example, a survey of CSPs could yield 
useful quantitative data about certain aspects of their strategy, structure and context, 
but could not explore, in depth, the experiences and underlying perceptions of paid 
staff and volunteers involved in the CSP’s operation. Conversely, conducting 
interviews with a sub-sample of CSPs provided a ‘thick description’ of CSP 
experience and perception in relation to the community sport policy-making process. 
However, this approach did not identify the full range of CSP strategy as the study 
involved only three of 49 CSPs. However, the combination of approaches offered a 
pragmatic solution to the collation of a wide range of data that helped to address the 
research objectives.  
 
Third, and connected to the previous point, the selection of the mixed methods 
approach was determined by the study’s objectives, not the research paradigm. There 
are different approaches to mixed methods research based on the priority and 
sequence decision (Morgan, 1998). Priority relates to whether the qualitative or 
quantitative method is the principal data-gathering tool, and sequence refers to order 
or sequence in which one method may follow the other. Given the objectives 
directing this study, the mixed method approach followed that of M4 shown in 
Figure 3.3. Elsewhere, this approach has been presented as a facilitative mixed 
method approach (Hammersley, 2000). This is an important justification for this 
study as this pragmatic approach allowed a complementary combination of methods, 
where the first stage of the research--in this case a quantitative approach—supported 
and facilitated a deeper qualitative enquiry. This was particularly helpful to the aims 
of this study as it allowed for a range of data to be analysed across a greater number 
of CSPs and NGBs than would have been possible using qualitative approaches. 
Moreover, the mixed methods approach generated the necessary data to identify and 
differentiate CSP types, thereby aiding the selection of CSP cases. This in turn 
facilitated a deeper exploration of the role of these different types of CSP in the 
community sport policy process, and in relation to the strategic context within which 
they operate. As indicated above, the qualitative element of this research provided 
the more substantive data in relation to the study’s objectives. 
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Fourth, whilst there may be purists on both sides that advocate the incompatibility 
thesis, (i.e. the incompatibility between specific paradigms and methods see 
discussion above, see Howe, 1988 for a more detailed insight), more pragmatic 
researchers (including Brewer & Hunter, 2006; Cresswell, 2003; Grix, 2002; 
Hammersley, 2000; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Morgan, 1998; Nau, 1995; 
Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003; Yin, 1994) argued for the need to move beyond the 
paradigm wars, because both approaches are important and useful (Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004: 14). More than this, mixed methods offer the opportunity to 
develop a more complete picture in that the data produced by the different methods 
can be complementary (Denscombe, 2007). They can provide different perspectives, 
or different angles from which the object of study can be observed (Grix, 2002). As a 
result, the fifth point in the rationale for a mixed methods approach is the potential 
for triangulation of the data across the different methods used. Denzin (1978: 303) 
identified four principles of methodological triangulation: 
 
 The nature of the research problem and its relevance to a particular method 
should be assessed and, where necessary, the method tailored to the problem 
at hand 
 Methods should be combined with a ‘checks and balances’ approach so that 
threats to internal and external validity are reduced as much as possible; i.e.: 
the particular weakness of one method is compensated for by the particular 
strength of another 
 The theoretical relevance of each method must be considered as well as the 
implications of combining methods which at first may appear contradictory 
Figure 3.3 Classification of approaches to mixed methods research (source: Morgan, 1998) 
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 Researchers should continually reflect on their methods, being ready to 
develop or alter them in the light of developments in the field and emerging 
data. 
 
Thus, combining mixed methods enables the researcher to ‘observe an object of 
study from different angles’ (Grix, 2002: 137) and as a result the findings are likely to 
be more convincing and more accurate (Yin, 1994). There was a clear and compelling 
case for the use of facilitative mixed methods approach, in line with the M4 type 
presented by Morgan (1998). This approach brought together complementary 
methods that generated a broad range of specific data regarding CSP operation, 
followed by a deeper analysis of social reality from the perspective of CSPs which 
could not be captured via quantitative means (Silverman, 2000). Importantly, the 
way in which the methods were used aligned with the ontological and 
epistemological assumptions that underpin the study, and the original phenomenon 
under investigation remained consistent regardless of the method being used, 
although clearly the specific questions varied from method to method. 
 
Reliability and validity 
Reliability and validity provide the researcher with a range of methodical 
considerations which will be used by the reader to establish and assess the overall 
quality of the research (Bryman, 2008).  Thus, given the critical realist position of 
this study, the reliability and validity considerations of the quantitative and 
qualitative methods was addressed separately. 
 
With regards to the quantitative method, the term ‘reliability’ is primarily concerned 
with the consistency of the measure being used (ibid, 2008).  More specifically, 
consistency relates to stability, inter-observer reliability, and internal reliability. 
Stability relates to whether the measure is stable over time (commonly known as 
test-re-test), inter-observer reliability assesses the extent to which different 
individuals would give similar scores to the same phenomenon, and internal 
reliability is concerned with consistency across questions that are aimed at 
measuring the same phenomenon (Bryman, 2008). Given the paradigmatic nature of 
the study, and in particular the consideration of the relationship between the 
strategic actor and strategic context, the issue of stability and inter observer 
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reliability were irrelevant. The study findings were bound by the context in which the 
research participant resides, and this context is likely to change over time and to 
differ from area to area. Therefore, the issue of consistency of response over time and 
between different respondents did not directly affect the reliability of the research as 
the research did not aim to meet these particular conditions. The internal reliability 
of the quantitative method is highly relevant to the research and this was tested via a 
Cronbach’s Alpha test. This statistical test calculates the average of all possible split-
half reliability coefficients (ibid, 2008). Authors vary in their opinions of an 
acceptable level of reliability (where 1 = perfect internal reliability), ranging between 
0.60 (ibid, 2008) and 0.80 (Berthoud, 2000). This study followed the mid-point in 
line with the advice of Nunnally (1978) and used an alpha coefficient of 0.70. The 
results from the Cronbach’s Alpha test are discussed in the questionnaire section 
below. 
 
Validity in quantitative terms is primarily concerned with whether a research 
instrument accurately measures what it purports to measure (Bryman, 2008). This 
can be measured via face, concurrent, predictive, construct or convergent validity 
(ibid, 2008). For this study, face validity was considered an appropriate test. This 
involved a total of 10 academic and sports sector representatives to test the clarity of 
the questions and ensure that the measure was accurate in addressing the concept 
which was the focus of attention. 
 
Bryman (2008) and Maxwell (1992) both identified the problematic relationship 
between reliability and validity and qualitative research, particularly in relation to 
the positivist nature of reliability and validity. To address this, Yin (2003) advocated 
mixed methods approaches, arguing that, given the tradition of qualitative 
approaches, multiple sources of evidence can help to validate research findings. 
Mason (1996) argued that reliability and validity are achieved according to the 
conventions of specific methodologies. In a substantial shift away from the positivist 
nature of reliability and validity, Lincoln & Guba (1985) argued the need for different 
criteria to judge and evaluate qualitative research. They proposed that naturalistic 
enquiry should be judged based on two key tenets—trustworthiness and authenticity 
(ibid, 1985). Trustworthiness provides parallel reliability and validity criteria for 
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qualitative research, whereas authenticity raises wider issues regarding the potential 
impact of the research (Bryman, 2008). 
 
Trustworthiness consists of four criteria: credibility parallel to internal validity, 
transferability parallel to external validity, dependability equal to reliability, and 
confirmability, which can be seen as objectivity (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985). With regards to credibility, this research has involved mixed methods 
and triangulation of data from a range of sources including questionnaires, 
interviews, and official documentation. Respondent validation was also undertaken 
through a summary discussion at the end of each interview—recapping and 
confirming the details of the discussion, as well as sending each research participant 
a full copy of the transcript, and a clear process to identify any concerns or issues 
with the transcript.  The notion of transferability was addressed using the 
development of thick description (Geertz, 1973), where rich accounts of context are 
provided, offering the opportunity for others to judge the transferability to other 
environs (Bryman, 2008). The dependability of the data relies on the availability of a 
clear audit trail throughout the research process. In this regard, thorough records of 
each stage of the research process were maintained, including information relating to 
the initial identification of the research aim and key questions, the process of 
categorising quantitative responses, details of the non-probability, purposive sample, 
transcripts and full details of the coding exercise. These documents were maintained 
in a clearly labelled document library and are available to third parties for cross-
checking and re-analysis. Confirmability recognises the impossibility of complete 
objectivity in social research (ibid, 2008) and is more concerned that the researcher 
has acted in good faith, is self aware and cognisant of both his position and 
relationship to the research. In this respect, the researcher was committed to the 
principle of good faith. Evidence of this good faith is available through the 
aforementioned document library which offers the findings in their original form. 
The relationship between researcher and research is an issue addressed in further 
detail below. 
 
The relationship between researcher and the research 
This section seeks to clarify the level of detachment or involvement of the researcher 
in the overall research process, as well as recognise the self-awareness of the 
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researcher in relation to his position in, and influence over the research exercise. 
This is an important consideration in terms of being objective, particularly as social 
science research is not value-free (Sparkes, 1992). Patton (2001) reinforced the need 
for objectivity, encouraging the researcher to clarify the values that he brings to the 
study, as well as being clear about how he may affect data collection and analysis. 
The values directing this study, with regard to the research paradigm, strategic-
relational view of structure and agency, and the choice of research strategy are 
discussed above. In addition, it is important to briefly highlight the motives 
underpinning the study, discuss the relationship between the researcher and the 
research participants, and summarise the researcher’s stance towards the research 
process and participants.  
 
The study was driven by a combination of personal and academic motives. It 
provided the opportunity to investigate an area of personal interest (the delivery of 
community sport) in an area of the social sciences to which the researcher is 
professionally bound and personally committed (sport) and in a specific field of 
study (policy process and power) where there are innumerable challenges and a 
genuine need for further investigation in order to contribute to knowledge and 
develop potential solutions to address the current challenges (Blaikie, 2010).  
 
As mentioned above, there is a need to discuss briefly the implications of the 
relationship between the researcher and the individuals and organisations that are 
research participants. It is necessary to acknowledge CSPs and NGBs as socially 
constructed entities. That is, CSPs and NGBs are institutions that are made up of a 
range of individuals who, within certain parameters, shape what the organisation is 
and does. The individuals include core personnel (paid staff), volunteers, and 
partnership representatives who work primarily with, or as part of the CSP, to 
develop various strategies and deliver specific interventions. The researcher was an 
outside agent, external to this partnership and it was recognised that this could have 
influenced the research participant’s response as well as researcher’s interpretation 
of this response. Indeed, the critical realist tradition accepts that there is a 
relationship between researcher and the researched, viewing the researcher as a part 
of the social world under investigation. However, it is important to set out clear 
parameters, in that critical realism does not extend substantial import to individual 
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meaning as within interpretivism. The researcher therefore strived for an objective 
study that aimed to develop a better understanding of the significance of the 
relationship between CSPs and NGBs in the community sport policy process, in 
contrast to the local and national context within which the CSP finds itself. Whilst 
the research accepts as inevitable that the relationship between the researcher and 
CSPs and NGBs will, to some extent, influence the research, this relation should not 
substantially alter the research or its findings. Nor should it extend to an 
interpretivist account where significant privilege is given to individual interpretation 
of their position in specific relation to the research, or generally regarding their place 
in the world. 
 
Reinforcing the summary above, Blaikie (2010: 163) argued that it is impossible to 
produce any data without researchers having had an influence on it. However, 
researchers can be transparent in their approach and objective in their execution of 
the research. Part of this process involves clarity regarding the researcher’s stance to 
the research and the research participants. In this regard, I adopted an empathetic-
observer stance (ibid, 2010: 51). Maintaining objectivity is a central tenet, although 
the empathetic observer approach encourages the researcher to put himself in the 
shoes of social actors and develop real insight, what Weber (1964) referred to as 
Verstehen. In this way, researchers can grasp the full meaning that social actors 
attach to specific phenomena and thus begin to understand their actions (Blaikie, 
2010). 
 
Research methods 
This section examines the specific research methods used in this study. Three data 
collection methods were used: questionnaires, interviews, and documentary analysis. 
These methods were directed by a case study framework. The two-phase research 
design used a mixed methods approach with questionnaires being the primary 
method used in Phase One and interviews the primary method used in Phase Two. 
Documentary analysis was used to underpin and triangulate the data collected in 
Phase One and Two. The following sections provide further details of each method—
including specific details of how they were employed in this study.   
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Phase One: Questionnaire 
A questionnaire is simply a list of questions, usually sent to specific individuals who 
then respond (Grix, 2002), and is one of the main instruments for gathering data in 
social science research (Bryman, 2001). Questionnaires are usually developed in one 
of two ways, either via a self-completion questionnaire or a structured interview-
based questionnaire using a range of closed questions, led by an interviewer 
(Bryman, 2008). This study used self-completion questionnaires as they are an 
efficient means of gathering a wide range of relatively simple data (Denscombe, 
2007) and a useful aid to the development of a sample for interviews (Bryman, 
2008). Grix (2002: 129) advised that self-completion questionnaires can be 
particularly ‘effective when used alongside other methods such as interviews’. The 
purpose of using a self-completion questionnaire in this study was twofold: (i) to 
gather a range of data relating to the structure, strategy and perceptions relating to 
relationships and the policy process of the 49 CSPs and 44 NGBs7 across England, 
something that would not be possible, given the scope of this study, via other 
methods, and (ii) to aid in the selection of CSP-based cases for the second phase of 
the research. Given that the use of the questionnaire in this study was part of a mixed 
methods approach, many of the disadvantages of questionnaires (i.e. not permitting 
prompting or probing, little opportunity for gathering additional data, and 
respondent fatigue; Denscombe, 2007) were minimised by using other methods with 
different strengths (Bryman, 2008). 
 
In the area of questionnaire design, advice was taken from Bryman (2008), who 
suggested that questionnaires should mainly include closed questions, have easy-to-
follow designs, and generally be shorter in order to reduce the likelihood of 
respondent fatigue. In addition, Bryman (2008) pointed to the need for clear 
instructions as well as suggesting that an attractive presentation is likely to enhance 
response rates. Ultimately, the quality of the questionnaire rests on whether the 
questions are clear, unambiguous and easy to understand (Kumar, 1999: 110). The 
questionnaire design generally followed this guidance, with a specific number of 
questions, the majority of which were closed. The questions were piloted with a total 
of 10 representatives (researchers, CSP employees and NGB representatives) prior to 
                                                          
7 The NGBs included in this study were restricted to the NGBs in receipt of 2009-2013 Whole Sport Plan funding. 
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distribution to check the clarity of the questions, minimise the potential for 
ambiguity, and to check the average time taken to complete the questionnaire. As 
detailed in the reliability section above, a Cronbach’s Alpha test was used to test the 
internal reliability of the questionnaire. In line with Nunally’s (1978) advice, any 
questions with a coefficient below 0.70 were deleted from the questionnaire. A copy 
of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix 2. The Cronbach’s Alpha test results 
can be found in Appendix 3. 
 
As the entire English CSP (n=49) and Whole Sport Plan NGBs (n=44) populations 
were included in the study, there was no need to develop a sampling frame. The 
online questionnaire was developed using the Bristol Online Survey tool and were 
distributed electronically to the 49 CSPs and 44 NGBs, addressed to the Director or 
Chief Executive Officer of the CSP, and the Chief Executive or Development Director 
of the NGB (see Table 3.2 below). According to a range of methodological literature 
(Babbie, 2010; Bryman, 2008; Bryman & Bell, 2007; Check & Schutt, 2012; 
Denscombe, 2007; Lohr, 2009; Mangione, 1995; Oppenheim, 1992), the response 
rates were good with 47 CSPs (96%), and 27 NGBs (61%) responding.  This was 
primarily a result of pursing a personal approach with CSP and NGB representatives 
including the identification of key contacts, the offer of a summary report being 
provided to all respondents, and one follow-up email and one follow-up telephone 
call to request completion. 
 
Given the role of the Phase One CSP research in informing the selection of cases for 
Phase Two, a number of statistical tests were completed to test the hypotheses 
presented below. Specifically, these tests were conducted to identify any discernible 
patterns or statistically significant differences between CSPs. Advice was taken from 
Gill & Johnson (2002) regarding context and diversity and two distinct predictor 
(independent) variables were identified to best reflect the diversity of CSP operations 
and the context within which they operate, namely: (i) whether CSPs are hosted by 
another organisation (e.g. local government or Higher Education) or whether they 
were non-hosted and independent; and (ii) the financial context of each CSP, 
specifically their annual turnover. In this respect, some CSPs rely on Sport England 
core funding (< £1 million), some have a variety of revenue sources (>£2 million), 
and others sit in between (£1-2 million). 
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Particular attention was given to hosting arrangements as these vary among CSPs. Of 
the 47 CSPs completing the questionnaire, 33 were hosted by a third-party (24 local 
authorities, seven higher education institutions, and two by charitable trusts). In 
addition, the 14 non-hosted CSPs all had independent Company Limited by 
Guarantee status, with nine of these also having Charitable Status. Thus, it is logical 
to explore whether these different organisational contexts produce distinct strategic 
and/or operational differences and/or lead to differing views and perceptions 
towards CSP-NGB relations and the community sport policy process. Turnover was 
also included as a predictor variable due to the fact that some CSPs were more reliant 
upon Sport England core funding than others, and an assumption that those CSPs 
were more likely to feel obligated to meet Sport England requirements, feel more 
dependent rather than autonomous and view NGB relations and the community 
sport policy process in a more positive light due to the aforementioned sense of 
dependence, together with a lack of resources and/or choice to pursue other areas of 
work. 
 
Alongside these predictor variables, two outcome variables were considered 
important in relation to the research aim and objectives, namely: (i) CSP perceptions 
toward the NGB-CSP relationship, and (ii) CSP perceptions toward the community 
sport policy process. Given the combination of outcome and predictor variables, the 
following non-directional hypotheses will be tested: (hypothesis 1, H1) that there will 
be a difference between hosted and non-hosted CSPs in attitudes toward the CSP-
NGB relationship; (hypothesis 2, H2) that there will be a difference between CSPs by 
turnover in attitudes toward the CSP-NGB relationship; (hypothesis 3, H3) that there 
will be a difference between hosted and non-hosted CSPs in attitudes toward the 
community sport policy process; and (hypothesis 4, H4) that there will be a 
difference between CSPs by turnover in attitudes toward the community sport policy 
process. It is important to note that the same statistical tests were not undertaken on 
the first phase NGB data as this was not used to identify cases. Instead, NGBs were 
selected as embedded units, along with local authorities, within each CSP case study. 
However, an overview of the descriptive results from the Phase One NGB 
questionnaire is provided alongside the CSP results to provide insight into the NGB 
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structure, strategy structure, and perceptions of the CSP-NGB relationship and the 
community sport policy process. 
 
The statistical procedures were completed using the IBM Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences, version 18. The data were analysed using two non-parametric tests. 
The Mann-Whitney test was used to compare CSPs by hosting arrangement as this 
consisted of two independent samples (hosted and non-hosted). A Kruskall-Wallis 
test was required to compare CSPs by turnover as this was involved more than two 
groups (<£1M, £1-2M, and >£2M). Non-parametric tests were employed as 
assumptions for normality could not be satisfied. Specifically, the data is not 
normally distributed. Further, the first-phase analysis is primarily based on ordinal 
data and therefore requires an analysis of median rather than mean data. Due to the 
methodological implications of selecting cases for Phase Two, it is necessary to 
mention briefly that no significant differences were found by hosting arrangement or 
CSP turnover where significance = <0.01. Whilst the quantitative data provides a 
range of important context for both CSPs and NGBs, the primary reason for 
undertaking this research was to select a range of different CSP types as determined 
by the statistically significant differences of their responses to certain questions 
pertaining to CSP-NGB relations and/or the community sport policy process. 
Conversely, this process also demonstrated that such differences do not exist and 
therefore supported an alternative approach to selecting CSP cases. As no significant 
differences were found, the results of the quantitative research have been organised 
and presented in Appendix 4. Important quantitative findings will be used to support 
the data presented in each case. A more detailed discussion of the methodological 
implications for selecting cases and how these were managed follows. 
 
Case Studies 
Phase Two of the research involved interviews embedded within three CSP-based 
case studies. The cases were selected using data from the CSP completed 
questionnaires in Phase One, above. This will be explained in more detail following a 
brief critique of case-based methodology. 
 
The case-based methodology offers a framework of enquiry which investigates 
phenomena within a realist context (Yin, 2003); in other words, examining 
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experience or action without separating this from the context in which it occurred. 
This is supported by Robson (2002, 178) who defined case studies as ‘a strategy for 
doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular 
contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of 
evidence’. Whilst not a data collection method in themselves, Hakim (2000) noted 
the value of case studies, especially their ability to examine what might normally be 
considered insignificant issues, and to reveal explanatory value of behaviour or 
action. Bryman (2008: 53) focused on the analytical insight offered via an ‘intensive, 
detailed examination of a case, where ‘the aim is the illuminate the general by 
looking at the particular’ (Denscombe, 2007: 36).  Further, case studies can be used 
with a range of data collection methods and are useful in situations where there are a 
small number of cases and large number of variables (de Vaus, 2001). However, 
Bryman (2008: 54) does warn the researcher to think carefully about the unit of 
analysis to ensure that it reflects the nature of a case study (i.e. developing a specific 
example of a case that can then be used to reflect and discuss others). This study has 
a particularly clear unit of analysis (CSPs), and the research paradigm, strategic-
relational view of structure and agency, the empathetic-observer stance, and the 
selected methods alongside the issues presented above all contributed to the 
justification of a case-based method being highly relevant for this particular study. 
 
The case study method offers a range of applications, which can best be summarised 
as the critical, the unique, the typical and revelatory and the longitudinal (cf. Yin, 
2003 for a more detailed overview). The type adopted for this study most closely 
resembles the typical, or what Bryman (2008: 56) prefers to label as the 
‘exemplifying case’. These cases are not selected for their uniqueness, but rather their 
ability to represent a broader category to which they belong (ibid, 2008), something 
which only becomes apparent once the research has begun (Bryman, 2001). In this 
instance, the first phase of research categorised CSPs into types, and the second 
phase of research involved the identification of specific cases representing each CSP 
type. The overall objective of the exemplifying case is ‘to capture the circumstances 
and conditions of an everyday or commonplace situation’ (Yin, 2003: 41). 
 
With regards to the selection of cases, Yin (2003) identifies four different types based 
on the number of cases (single or multiple cases) and the sources of evidence to be 
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used in each case (holistic or embedded design features). Whilst single cases are a 
common feature in social research (Hakim, 2000; Yin, 2003) they are criticised due 
to a lack of internal or external validity (Bryman, 2008; Yin, 2003). As an alternative, 
Yin (2003) advocated the use of multiple cases based on the logic of replication 
where multiple cases allow for comparison across cases, and are more likely to 
provide compelling findings and more meaningful insight than is possible through a 
single case (de Vaus, 2001). For these reasons, a multiple design method was 
utilised. When using multiple cases, Yin (2003) advised that methods are designed 
using literal replication, where similar findings are expected, or theoretical 
replication, where the theoretical logic is used to explain the differences in findings. 
Bryman (2008) criticised the narrow focus of replication and pointed to the 
difficulties associated with the process. He recommended the comparative design as 
an alternative for multiple cases as the logic of comparison requires a consistent 
approach to data collection, ensuring that information is collected on the same 
variables across the units of analysis (ibid, 2008). Given the primary focus of this 
research, and the importance of comparing across CSP types, the comparative design 
provides the most appropriate approach, ensuring the collection of information 
against a consistent set of variables across different cases. 
 
As mentioned above, the focus on CSP types led to the statistical analysis of Phase 
One data to identify patterns or differences between hosted and non-hosted CSPs 
and/or CSPs more or less dependent on Sport England core funding. It is argued that 
this approach would enable a comparative design across CSPs. However, as noted 
above, the statistical tests revealed no significant differences. Consequently, a 
pragmatic approach to identifying cases was developed based on a number of core 
criteria to ensure that the cases best reflected the diversity of CSP operations and the 
geographical, infrastructural and resource-based contexts within which they exist 
(Gill & Johnson, 2002). This approach maintains a commitment to Bryman’s (2008) 
principle of comparative design. In addition to the predictor variables above (hosting 
arrangements and turnover), the area served by the CSP was viewed as an important 
distinguishing feature of CSPs given such diverse geographical contexts as rural 
Cornwall, Suffolk and Northumberland and inner-city Birmingham, Manchester, and 
London. It was viewed as sensible to explore the possibility of differences arising 
from such population and demography, not to mention infrastructural differences, 
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particularly between urban and rural communities. In addition, location is an 
important predictor of sports participation, inasmuch as local situations vary 
significantly and these local variations heavily influence sports participation rates 
(Mindshare, 2010). Whilst a key limitation is an inability to represent all 
geographical contexts, an attempt has been made to use CSP cases in each of the 
three geographical settings (urban, rural and mixed). These classifications were 
based on the self-report return from the research participant. 
 
Based on the discussion above, the following conditions were developed for 
identifying CSP-based cases: 
 
 At least one hosted and one non-hosted CSP; 
 At least one CSP with a turnover less than £1 million and one CSP with a 
turnover greater than £1 million; 
 One case each from urban, rural and mixed populations; 
 The CSP Director and Chair had been in post for at least the past 2 years; 
 The CSP Director, Chair and NGB-Lead Officer all agreed to fully cooperate and 
take part in the research. 
 
Given the time and financial resources available for this study, it was important to 
take a pragmatic approach, with priority given to those CSPs that were the first to 
respond and meet the conditions listed above. Clearly, this pragmatic approach was 
not without its limitations. These will be considered in more detail later in this 
chapter and be taken into account when drawing conclusions. Further, whilst the 
positivist requirement for generalization does not fit with the research philosophy 
nor the more general goals associated with this research, it can be argued that, so 
long as differences in context and organisational culture are considered, that some 
transferability of findings to others [CSPs in this case], is possible (Bryman, 2008). 
Three CSP-based cases were identified for further study. These are summarised in 
Table 3.1 below. 
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Table 3.1 Selection of CSP cases 
Criteria CSP 1  CSP 2 CSP 3 
Hosting 
arrangements 
Independent Company 
Limited by Guarantee 
Independent charity Hosted by local authority 
 
Turnover 
 
£1,000,000 
 
£700,000 
 
£1,300,000 
 
Area type & 
population8 
Urban 
1,100,000 
Mixed 
635,000 
Rural 
700,000 
 
After selecting cases, it was necessary to decide whether the case studies should be 
holistic or embedded. The holistic case study involves one unit of analysis for each 
case. The major criticism of holistic cases is the inability to triangulate information 
from different sources, which can feed scepticism in relation to the reliability and 
validity of the findings (Yin, 2003). In contrast, embedded cases are divided into 
multiple sub-units (Yin, 2003), and each sub-unit relates to a specific part of the 
entity being studied. This could include other organisations that work alongside the 
CSP, for example, NGBs, local authorities and County Sports Associations. As a 
result, embedded cases are largely seen as a more robust approach, as evidence can 
be triangulated from a range of sources, providing the potential to corroborate or 
contradict specific inferences across the subunits. For this reason, embedded cases 
were selected for this study. Further details regarding the specific units included in 
each case study are detailed below in the interview section (see Table 3.2 and Table 
3.3). 
 
The final issue with regards to the case studies is data analysis. This is an issue which 
numerous researchers highlighted as problematic due to a lack of universal rules that 
govern the analysis of qualitative data (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Patton, 2001; Yin, 
2003). Whilst this has led to criticism regarding subjectivity and validity of the case 
study design, Yin argued that this can be prevented through the development of a 
clear analytic framework which would enable the researcher to ‘…treat the evidence 
fairly, produce compelling analytical conclusions, and rule out alternative 
interpretations (2003: 111). Further, to support the researcher, Yin (2003) presented 
four techniques that can be used in analysing data for the preparation of case studies, 
and as a result improve the validity of the research, namely pattern-matching, 
                                                          
8 The population figures have been taken from the ONS annual population survey for 2009 
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explanation building, time-series analysis and programme-logic modelling. Given the 
explanatory focus of this study, the technique of explanation building was considered 
the most relevant. Explanation building is considered an iterative process, in line 
with the retroductive process, enabling the researcher to use the empirical research 
to refine theoretical propositions. In particular, the technique was reported as having 
value in facilitating cross-case analysis (ibid, 2003). As an iterative process, the 
following steps for the analysis of the case studies were developed: 
 
(i) Completed initial analysis of data from a single CSP case using the theoretical 
concepts presented above 
(ii) Compared this initial evidence with the theoretical concepts to check for 
relevance prior to further analysis of data in other CSP cases 
(iii) Reviewed and, if necessary, revised initial understanding of the use of the 
theoretical concepts 
(iv) Completed analysis of all data in the single CSP case, applying the revised 
understanding of theoretical concepts 
(v) Reviewed the entire empirical evidence from one case alongside theoretical 
propositions and undertook final revisions in understanding theoretical 
concepts 
(vi) Completed revised analysis of final two CSP cases 
(vii) Reviewed and reconsidered entire evidence alongside theoretical concepts 
with the aim of refining theoretical propositions. 
 
Importantly, Yin (2003) warned researchers that the iterative nature of explanation 
building can be distracting and lead to the researcher drifting away from the original 
focus of the research, and that constant reference to the research aims and questions 
is necessary in order to manage this problem. Detailed information regarding the 
primary methods used to populate the case study framework follows. 
 
Phase Two: Interviews 
Qualitative interviews were a highly relevant method for this study as they allow the 
researcher to get close to ‘…the social actors’ meanings and interpretations, to their 
accounts of the social interaction in which they have been involved’ (Blaikie, 2010). 
Further, this method provides the opportunity to analyse actor perceptions toward 
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events and relationships, and also considers the context within which these events 
and relationships take place (Bryman, 2008; May, 2001). Interviews were also 
selected as they provide a complementary method to the case study framework by 
providing a range of rich and detailed data to support the development of each case 
study (Yin, 2003). 
 
Bryman (2008) identified four main types of qualitative interview: structured, semi-
structured, unstructured, and group. Structured interviews involve ‘tight control over 
the format of questions and answers’ (Denscombe, 2007: 175). At the other end of 
the spectrum, unstructured interviews involve no pre-set questions and no 
recognised order (Bryman, 2008). Both of these options lack flexibility and were 
considered a poor epistemological fit, being favoured by positivists and 
interpretivists, respectively. Semi-structured interviews, in contrast, combine 
structure with standardised open-ended questions (Bryman, 2008). Thus, semi-
structured interviews were seen as a more appropriate balance between openness 
which aids discussion and structure which aids comparison of responses and analysis 
(Oppenheim, 1992). A major problem of such an approach is the potential to steer 
agents’ responses toward specific codes and themes. A number of strategies were 
used to mitigate this risk. First, the study only included actors responsible for 
strategic-level decision making at the sub-regional level, where I anticipated a 
greater diversity of perspectives due to the heterogeneity of local context and the role 
this plays in shaping actor beliefs and perspectives (Lewis, 2002). Second, the 
questions were designed in such a way as to create an open dialogue without leading 
the interviewee to certain ideas or specifying particular characteristics that might 
generate a particular opinion (Bryman, 2008). This included follow-up probing 
questions used to unpack points of particular interest. This was useful in focusing the 
discussion on the agents’ perspective rather than the question (May, 2001), and gave 
each interviewee the freedom to explore issues that were particularly pertinent to 
their context, rather than being constrained by a very narrow series of questions. The 
schedule of interview questions is included in appendix 5. 
 
As detailed above, the specific cases were identified using the data from the Phase 
One research using a non-probability, purposive sample. Equally important was the 
selection of the embedded units across the county area, specifically NGB 
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representatives, local authorities, and county sport associations. To support the 
purposive sampling process, selection criteria identified by Denscombe (2007) was 
used, with particular attention given to the suitability and pragmatic criteria relating 
specifically to the embedded units. The rationale for the suitability of each 
interviewee is detailed in Table 3.2 below. The pragmatic issues included 
consideration of the prospective interviewee’s willingness to participate, and the 
intrinsic interest of the prospective interviewee (in the context of the overall case 
study). Table 3.2 sets out how many individuals, per institution, were invited to 
participate and the total number that declined, and highlights the intrinsic interest of 
the interviewee.  
 
Following Gill & Johnson (2002), a number of core criteria were identified to ensure 
the diversity of NGBs and local authorities represented within the study. It is 
necessary to briefly expand on the criteria used to select NGBs, specifically the sports 
that were selected as either team or individual sports and those sports deemed large, 
medium and small according to annual turnover (see table 3.3 for selection criteria 
for NGBs). On the issue of turnover, this was used rather than other measures of size 
(i.e. number of clubs, number of affiliated clubs or number of staff) primarily 
because it was possible to access relevant data relating to all NGBs whereas it was not 
possible to obtain accurate data relating to number of clubs. In addition, turnover is 
argued to be a highly relevant measure as it gives a strong indication of revenue. 
Thus, larger NGBs are likely to have greater resources to develop appropriate 
infrastructure to grow and govern their sport as they choose. As a result it is plausible 
to consider that these NGBs may have slightly different perceptions toward national 
strategy, relationships with CSPs, and their role in this, as opposed to smaller NGBs 
that are more reliant upon funding provision from Sport England. 
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Table 3.2 Selection of interviewees 
Descriptor CSP representatives NGBs LA representatives 
Case Study 1 
Positions/organisations 
involved in research 
Chief Executive 
NGB Lead 
Officer/Commissioning 
Officer 
Chairperson 
CDO, Football 
CDO, Cricket 
CDO, Tennis 
CDO, Netball 
CDO, Athletics 
RDM, Swimming 
RDM, Basketball 
RDM, Golf 
Head of Community 
Services, MBC 
 
Principal Sport & 
Recreation Manager, 
MBC 
 
Community 
Development Manager, 
MBC 
No. invited to take part  3 8 3 
No. declined 0 0 0 
Case Study 2 
Positions/organisations 
involved in research 
Chief Executive 
NGB Lead Officer 
NGB Lead – Board 
Member 
CDO, Football 
CDO, Cricket 
CDO, Tennis 
CDO, Netball 
CDO, Athletics 
RDM, Swimming 
RDM, Basketball 
RDM, Golf 
Head of Community 
Services, City Council 
 
Sport Development 
Manager, County 
Council 
 
Head of Community 
Services, District 
Council 
No. invited to take part  3 8 3 
No. declined 0 0 0 
Case Study 3 
Positions/organisations 
involved in research 
Director 
NGB Lead Officer 
Chairperson 
CDO, Football 
CDO, Cricket 
CDO, Tennis 
CDO, Netball 
CDO, Athletics 
RDM, Swimming 
RDM, Basketball 
RDM, Golf 
Head of Cultural 
Services, County 
Council 
 
Sport Development 
Manager, Borough 
Council 
 
Cultural Services 
Manager, District 
Council 
No. invited to take part  3 8 3 
No. declined 0 0 0 
General comments 
Suitability of inclusion 
in research 
CSPs are the primary 
focus of the research 
Community sport 
policy is led by 46 
NGBs. 
Strong tradition of 
local level sports 
development work. 
Many LAs work 
alongside CSP (via CSN 
or CSPAN) with 
regards to community 
sport 
Intrinsic interest 
 
3 CSPs selected 
according to criteria 
detailed above 
Balance of 
team/individual, and 
small, medium and 
large sports 
Mix of upper and lower 
tier authorities plus a 
balance of sport and 
non sport positions 
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Local authorities were primarily selected based on type (metropolitan, city, borough, 
district), existence of a sport development function, and willingness to participate in 
the study. 
 
Table 3.3 Selection of NGBs 
 Large NGB     
(by turnover) 
Medium NGB 
(by turnover) 
Small NGB 
(by turnover) 
Team sports 
(n=4) 
Cricket 
Football 
Netball Basketball 
 
Individual sports 
(n=4) 
 
Tennis 
 
Athletics 
Swimming 
 
Golf 
 
The study involved 38 interviews which in turn generated voluminous data, thereby 
representing what Miles (1979) referred to as the ‘attractive nuisance’ associated with 
qualitative research. To address the challenge of qualitative research, Bryman (2008) 
offers two notable strategies: analytic induction and grounded theory. Analytic 
induction seeks ‘universal explanations of phenomena by pursing the collection of 
data until no cases that are inconsistent with a hypothetical explanation of a 
phenomena are found’ (Bryman, 2008: 539). The researcher is constantly 
reformulating or redefining the hypothesis. Grounded theory is an iterative process, 
which allows theory to be derived from data which has been systematically gathered 
and analysed (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Whilst both approaches are viewed as 
methodically sound, analytic induction can require constant reanalysis and 
reorganisation of data and does not provide guidance regarding the number of cases 
to be explored before deciding on the absence of negative cases, nor does it 
sufficiently explain the validity of the hypothetical explanation (Bryman, 2008). 
Grounded theory, on the other hand, does not require the rejection of a hypothetical 
explanation—it focuses on the data and categorises these into component parts, so 
the ‘researcher’s interpretation of data shape his or her emergent codes’ [or themes] 
(Charmaz, 2000: 515). The grounded theory approach also enables the researcher to 
consider action in relation to context (Bryman, 2008).  
 
Whilst this study does not follow all conventions of the grounded theory approach, 
principles have been taken from the data analysis aspect of grounded theory and 
applied to this study. Coding is a central feature within grounded theory, allowing the 
researcher to label, separate and compile data (Charmaz, 2000). The data are seen as 
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‘potential indicators’ of meaning and concepts (Bryman, 2008). As a result, the 
coding exercise is iterative or fluid and in a frequent state of revision in order to 
identify clear and compelling themes as well as identify relationships between them 
(Strauss, 1987). Strauss & Corbin (1990) distinguish between the three types of 
complementary coding practice that can be used in the grounded theory approach. 
First, the data are exposed to open coding, which involves the ‘breaking-down, 
examining, comparing, conceptualising and categorising data’ (Strauss & Corbin, 
1990: 61). In open coding the focus is the creation of concepts (Bryman, 2008). 
Second, axial coding makes connections between codes and contexts, and also 
considers the relationship between codes, consequences, patterns of interaction and 
causes (Bryman, 2008). Third, selective coding is ‘the procedure for selecting a core 
category’ (Strauss & Corbin, 1990: 116). This can be seen as the ‘central issue or 
feature around which all other categories are integrated’ (Bryman, 2008: 543). This 
approach aligns with the retroductive research strategy (going back and forth 
between literature and empirical findings) and fits neatly with the research aim and 
objectives and the requirement to understand the significance of the CSP-NGB 
relationship in to community sport, and the importance of the strategic 
consideration of context. 
 
Clearly, as with almost all qualitative data analysis techniques, the quality of the 
analysis initially rests on the accuracy of the researcher’s interpretation of the 
interview. As detailed within the reliability and validity section above, all interviews 
ended with a summary of key points, and all interviewees received a full copy of the 
transcript to ensure this was a true and accurate record of the event. In addition to 
this, once the open coding exercise was completed, data were shared with another 
researcher and the interviewee’s with the aim of checking and challenging the 
interpretation of the data (Devine, 1995). Despite these attempts to develop a robust 
and reliable piece of research, it is acknowledged that all research methods have 
weaknesses. Further discussion of the limitations of the interview method is 
provided below. 
 
Documentary analysis 
Documentary analysis can provide both descriptive factual information and 
illuminate the processes through which the documents themselves were formed 
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(Scott, 1990). Similarly, certain documents, particularly policy documents, are likely 
to reflect one of the key mediums through which social power is communicated to 
others (May, 2001). Parsons (1995) referred to this as a ‘deep approach’, whereby 
state-related documents can be seen to underline the power relations between 
different agencies. Scott (1990) distinguished two broad categories of 
documentation, personal and official, sub-dividing the latter into state and private 
documents.  The majority of documents used in this study fall into the official state 
category (see Table 3.4).  
 
In addition, four criteria were used in this study to assess the quality of documents, 
namely authenticity, credibility, representativeness, and meaning (Scott, 1990). With 
regard to authenticity, the documents used in this study have been checked to ensure 
that they are genuine and of unquestionable origin. Credibility considers the sincerity 
of the authors and the particular interests they were serving in writing the document 
(ibid, 1990). Whilst we should not unnecessarily doubt the sincerity of the authors, 
there is a need to remain aware of who the document was written for, and for what 
specific purpose (Bryman, 2008; Yin, 2003). Throughout the process of reading and 
re-reading documents, the analysis has been undertaken to identify relevant content, 
ensuring that it is set against context as well as triangulated with evidence from the 
other methods. Given their nature and authors, the documents included in Table 3.4 
were seen to meet Scott’s (1990) representative criteria, where a document is 
considered typical of its genre. The final criterion relates to meaning. Scott (1990) 
identified three clear meanings of documents: (i) the meaning from the author, (ii) 
the meaning from the reader, and (iii) an internal meaning. This latter issue is 
concerned with understanding the wider context within which the document was 
conceived, specifically the unstated values, ideas and theories that all contributed in 
some way to the development of the final product (Scott, 1990). The analysis of 
documents therefore involved ‘relat[ing] the literal meaning of the document to the 
contexts in which they were produced’ in order to develop a broader appreciation of 
their significance (Scott, 1990: 30). This context will be provided via both the 
theoretical framework and the data from the questionnaire and interviews. 
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Table 3.4 Key documents used in the study 
Name Author Type of document Year 
Creating a Sporting Habit for Life DCMS National strategy 2012 
The Conservative Plan for Sport DCMS National strategy 2010 
Before During After: 2012 Games Legacy Plan DCMS National strategy 2008 
Plans for the Legacy from the 2012 Games DCMS National strategy 2010 
Playing to Win DCMS National strategy 2008 
Sport England Strategy 2012-2017 Sport England National strategy 2012 
CSP core funding specification updated version Sport England Policy document 2012 
CSPs working with NGBs – spreadsheet Sport England Working document 2012 
CSP profiles Sport England Working document 2010 
Local sport profiles Sport England Working document 2010 
Sport England Strategy 2008-2012 Sport England National strategy 2008 
National Game Strategy 2011-2015 FA National strategy 2011 
Club Development Strategy ECB National strategy 2012 
Blueprint: Progress Update LTA National strategy 2010 
ASA National Strategy ASA National strategy 2009 
EA Fulfilling Our Promises England Athletics National strategy 2011 
Vision & Strategic Goals England Netball Webpages 2012 
Aims & Objectives England Basketball Webpages 2012 
Growing the Game England Golf National strategy 2009 
CSP strategies x 3 CSPs x 3 County strategy Various 
Local Authority strategies (sport, community, etc) LAs x 9 Local strategy Various 
 
Summary of procedure 
Yin (2003) underlined the need for a clear research protocol in the implementation 
of the research methods. Table 3.5 below aims to provide an overview of the 
sequence of stages involved in executing the methods involved in this study. This is 
further supported by details of key phases and the timeline of the study presented in 
Appendix 6. 
 
Table 3.5 Summary of methodological procedures  
Stages Summary 
Stage 1  
Quantitative survey of CSPs 
& NGBs 
The questionnaire was piloted with 10 individuals (academics, CSP and 
NGB representatives). The final questionnaire was developed and 
disseminated electronically to 49 CSP Directors/CEOs and 44 NGB 
CEOs or Development Directors. An iterative process of emailing and 
calling potential respondents helped to achieve a good response rate. 
Data was transferred from Bristol Online Survey into the IMB 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) to enable a one-way 
analysis of variance between the predictor variables (CSP hosting 
arrangements and CSP turnover) and the outcome variable (perception 
of NGB-CSP relations and perception of community sport policy 
process.   
 
Stage 2 
Documentary analysis 
 
 
This stage involved the start of documentary analysis, specifically the 
evaluation of the national strategies and documents detailed above. 
Key summary notes relating to each document were prepared to 
compare and contrast with data from the primary research. 
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Stage 3 
Identification of cases 
This stage involved the identification of cases based on the results of 
the statistical analysis Phase One CSP results. However, there were no 
significant differences by hosting arrangement and/or CSP turnover; 
therefore, pragmatic criteria were selected reflecting the diversity of 
and different contexts faced by CSPs. These conditions have been 
discussed in more detail above. Once identified, CSPs, via the CSP 
Chief Executive Officer or Director, were asked for their consent to take 
part in the research. Where a Chief Executive or Director either refused 
to take part or did not respond to requests to participate in the 
research, an alternative was sought with a view to maintaining the 
contextual diversity previously mentioned. In this regard, one mixed 
non-hosted CSP refused to take part and one urban hosted CSP did not 
respond to requests to take part in the research prior to agreeing the 
three CSP-based cases being selected in accordance with the criteria set 
out in Table 3.1 above. 
 
Stage 4 
Interviews 
Stage 4 focused on the interviews with CSP, NGB and local authority 
representatives. All interviews (except two) were completed in an 
individual, one-to-one setting and followed the ethical considerations 
of informed consent, right to privacy and protection from harm. The 
interviews with CSP representatives in Case Study 1 and Case Study 2 
were completed in a group setting with all three CSP representatives 
present in one interview. Questions were presented individually and 
specifically to each individual representative. However, this slightly 
different methodological approach is likely to have had implications, 
primarily with regards to idea sharing, thought provocation, and 
debate that we associate with focus group methodology (cf. Silverman, 
2009). All interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed to 
facilitate analysis, and to enable each interviewee to confirm the 
accuracy of the data upon which the results were based. As detailed 
above, the names of the CSPs and the representatives from each CSP 
were substituted with alphanumeric codes to preserve the anonymity of 
the data. See appendix 7 for an extract from one of the interview 
transcripts. 
 
Stage 5 
Coding and analysing of the 
qualitative data 
This stage involved coding and analysing the transcripts. This followed 
the coding protocol set out above. In addition, the documentary 
analysis was re-visited to compare and contrast the content with the 
categories and codes that emanated from the empirical research.  
 
Stage 6 
Re-analysis of the 
qualitative data and 
synthesis with literature 
Stage six of the research process involved re-analysis of transcripts and 
key documents to ensure that all key themes had been identified. Key 
concepts that emerged from the theoretical review were synthesised 
with the data for two reasons: first, to provide a framework with which 
the key findings can be compared with a view to using the framework 
to help identify and illuminate issues that may have otherwise gone 
undetected and, second, in relation to the research objectives, to reflect 
upon the explanatory value of the meso-level policy analysis 
frameworks as they relate to the implementation of community sport 
policy. 
 
 
Limitations 
Whilst a mixed-method approach can help to minimize some of the problems of a 
single-method approach, no research methodology is without its problems (Sale, et 
al., 2002). The purpose of this section is to pinpoint briefly the problems and 
potential problems posed by the methodology outlined above. 
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First, there is a common concern regarding the lack of scientific generalisation 
permitted by case studies (Bryman, 2008). However, Yin argued that when 
researchers utilise the logic of replication applied to multiple cases, as detailed above, 
then ‘case studies, like experiments, are generalisable to theoretical propositions’ 
(1994: 10). That said, as Blaikie (2010) stated, individual perceptions of reality vary, 
so it is important to make clear that the researcher understands that the analysis of 
transcripts is subject to differing perceptions or interpretations and therefore any 
attempt to generalise should be made with caution. 
 
The second issue, linked to the first, concerns a lack of rigor or, more specifically, 
eliciting the potential for bias to influence the analysis (Yin, 1994), or seeking 
responses that are desirable rather than an accurate representation of the findings 
(Fielding & Thomas, 2001). Silverman (2000) advised that qualitative approaches 
such as case studies are equally credible as alternative methods, if undertaken 
appropriately. He insisted that credible qualitative analysis focuses on all of the data 
collected, compares and contrasts data with other sources, and searches for data that 
does not correspond with initial conclusions (ibid, 2000).  Yin saw one of the major 
problems of case study research as being reliability, arguing that much of this can be 
managed by a researcher who ensures that the data is organised and dependable with 
a clear audit trail of evidence (as detailed in the validity section above). All of these 
techniques have been employed in this study. The researcher also provided 
interviewees with the opportunity to check and clarify the key points taken from the 
transcript.  
 
Third, whilst the research attempted to identify significant differences or distinct 
patterns in CSP type, the statistical tests did not identify any such differences or 
patterns. Therefore, it was necessary to create a number of criteria in order to select 
CSP-based cases that reflected both their diversity and strategic context. This 
approach is not without its problems. The first relates to the selection of CSP cases; 
whilst not arbitrary, it is not based upon any statistically supported difference across 
CSP types. Second, the three CSPs selected are not likely to reflect the internal range 
and diversity of all 49 CSPs. Third, the external or strategic context—specifically, the 
range of local-level partners, distinct local challenges, commitment to sport 
development in the area, existing participation rates, multiple deprivation, club 
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infrastructure, facility infrastructure and so on—is relatively unique to each CSP. 
Whilst there will undoubtedly be common themes and issues, it is important to 
recognise that no two CSPs bedded in their local context are the same. This is an 
issue which is related to the philosophical underpinnings of the study insomuch as its 
central concern of is not to reveal generalisable knowledge and facts about CSPs and 
NGBs. Rather, the study is concerned with understanding and explaining focal 
phenomena of the cases under investigation, revealing the specific, very real issues 
that directly impact and shape CSP-NGB relations at the local level. That said, 
further understanding and more generally applied knowledge of CSP-NGB relations 
can be developed by triangulating methods and comparing the data with other 
research. This is particularly relevant in this research where the first phase of 
research received a strong response from both the CSP and NGB populations. 
Therefore, the research could have value in illuminating CSP-NGB relations more 
generally, particularly any common or consistent themes that emerge across CSPs, 
NGBs and local authorities, especially those supported by the other methods or 
previous research. So, whilst the findings may be generalised, this should be done 
with caution, particularly when considering the distinctive nature of strategic context 
and its dialectical relationship with agency. 
 
Conclusions 
This section summarises the study’s research strategy, giving brief attention to the 
interrelationship of the key components used therein. This is not to suggest a 
mechanistic or rigid association between components; rather, it stresses the close, 
directional relationship that should exist between ontology, epistemology, 
methodology, methods and sources (Grix, 2002, 2010b; Green, 2003). 
 
The research strategy followed advice from a range of experienced researchers 
(Blaikie, 2010; Bryman, 2008; Grix, 2002, 2010; Hay, 2002; Sparkes, 1992) in an 
attempt to present a logical flow in the methodological decision making process, 
from the ontological assumptions underpinning the study through to the techniques 
that were used to gather data. The critical realist ontological assumptions that 
directed the research influenced the post-positivist epistemological position of the 
study, which in turn set the boundaries for the particular methods used, which are 
‘inextricably linked to the research questions posed and to the sources of data 
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collected’ (Grix, 2002: 179). It is important to acknowledge that despite depicting a 
logical, directional relationship between components, this is not to argue that one 
component determines another. In other words, the selection of a particular 
ontological position does not presuppose a particular epistemological position (Grix, 
2002, 2010b). Therefore, whilst this study adopts a critical realist ontology which 
acknowledges the ‘real world’, it also recognises that not all ‘phenomena are directly 
observable, structures exist that cannot be observed and those that can may not 
present the social and political world as it actually is’ (Grix, 2002: 183). This 
assumption directs the epistemological position of the study where actors are 
considered alongside the broader structural context that facilitates or constrains 
their action. Further, the imperfect nature of our knowledge of the world adds weight 
to the post-positivist epistemology guiding the study. Here, we need to both 
understand the external ‘reality’ and the social construction of that ‘reality’ if we are 
to explain the relationship between social/political phenomena (Marsh & Furlong, 
2002 in Green , 2003). The research strategy and specifically the methodology and 
selection of quantitative and qualitative methods embedded within a case-based 
approach were based upon these philosophical positions.  The post-positivist 
epistemological position also directed attention to the strategic-relational view of  the 
structure and agency problem where the role of the strategic actor is examined 
against the social context within which the actor operates primarily as it is this which 
facilitates or constrains the beliefs, values and actions of actors.  
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Chapter 4 
The Government policy context  
 
Introduction 
As a policy sector, community sport does not enjoy the same recognition or 
prominence as its elite counterpart. This is evident in the range of literature 
focussing on elite sport as compared to the sparse literature devoted to community 
sport. As discussed in the introductory chapter, this might be explained by the lack of 
definitional stability for community sport—it has been and remains a pendulum-like 
feature in government sport policy, oscillating between young people and adults, 
physical activity and sport, and the frequent changes in motives between the purist 
notion of sport for sport and instrumentalism, or sport for good (cf. Coalter, 2007, 
Collins, 2010; Houlihan, 2011; Houlihan & White, 2002). More recently, central 
government and Sport England have suggested that the latter point is a non-issue in 
that community sport can do both: it can be fun, stimulating, challenging and 
personally rewarding whilst also delivering positive outcomes on a range of 
important social policy issues such as education, health and community safety 
(DCMS, 2012; Sport England, 2012a). Alternatively, elite sport’s attraction could be 
explained by the glamour, celebrity, and nationalism with which it is closely 
associated. 
 
This chapter aims to explore these issues in more detail and provide insight into the 
context and processes that directly shape contemporary community sport policy and 
is divided into two parts. The first reviews the development of community sport as a 
policy concern. This involves a brief review of community sport up to the late 1990s. 
Whilst historical perspectives of policy development have an important sensitising 
role (Green, 2003), this section is deliberately brief as the parameters and focus of 
community sport as a policy concern have changed dramatically over the past 40 
years. Furthermore, while it is acknowledged that the historical development 
influences contemporary policy this is an area of research that has been covered in 
some detail elsewhere and consequently will not be rehearsed in this chapter (see for 
example Bloyce & Smith, 2010; Coalter, 2007; Collins, 2010; Green, 2003; Houlihan 
& Green, 2011; Houlihan & White, 2002; Hylton & Totten, 2013; King, 2009). 
Following the historical review of the sport policy context, a more detailed analysis of 
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the emergence of community sport from the early 2000s onwards will be provided. 
The second part of the chapter concerns the efforts of successive governments to 
modernise public services. In particular, this section will review the relatively recent 
notions of modernisation and partnership, the strategies that result from these new 
ways of governing and the implications they carry for community sport. 
 
Community sport up to 2005 
From the 19th century through to the post-war period of the 20th century, government 
intervention in sport in England has been ‘haphazard and ad hoc’ (Coghlan, 1990; 
Green, 2003; Houlihan, 1991; 1997; Roche, 1993). The persistent themes of 
‘paternalism, defence of privilege, fitness of the nation’s youth, social control and 
international prestige’ underscored the sport-politics relation during this time 
(Green, 2003: 120). The prevailing social democratic consensus of the 1960s is 
generally viewed as the era where sport was first considered a ‘legitimate government 
responsibility’ (Houlihan, 1991: 27) as political interest was more apparent and 
government approaches to sport policy more organised and proactive than in 
previous years (Hargreaves, 1985). Much of this attention was provoked by the 57 
recommendations of Wolfenden committee Sport and the Community paper (CCPR, 
1961). Whilst not referred to as community sport per se, many of the 
recommendations remain pertinent issues within the community sport policy 
discourse today. For example, many focussed on the promotion and development of 
sport for its own sake, with a particular emphasis on developing the facility base, 
increasing participation in sport, and reducing the number of young people who drop 
out of sport once compulsory education is complete (CCPR, 1961). The initial 
response from the Conservative government in the early 1960s was indifferent, but 
the Labour government elected in 1964 was more concerned by Wolfenden’s 
recommendations (Houlihan & White, 2002). As a result, the Wilson government 
created an Advisory Sports Council (ASC) in 1965, a decision seen to be driven by the 
government’s enthusiasm to extend the welfare state to include a range of 
community services (ibid, 2002; Bloyce & Smith, 2010). The work of the Council 
centred on two priorities, namely the development of community sport facilities and 
investment in NGBs for talent and elite development (Coghlan, 1990). Despite this 
dual focus, Walter Winterbottom, the Director of the ASC, noted that ‘we were into 
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excellence … initially a lot of funds went into elite sport’ (quoted in Coalter, 1988), a 
theme which has pervaded sport policy discourse ever since. 
 
1970s 
The increasing professionalisation of the state’s approach to sport development 
continued in 1972 when the ASC was granted executive powers under Royal Charter 
and was renamed the Great Britain Sports Council (GBSC). At the time, the 
organisational emphasis and general consensus was that more needed to be done to 
promote sports participation and increase the number of sports facilities available for 
community use (Coghlan, 1990; Houlihan & White, 2002). These priorities 
stimulated the creation of the GBSC’s Sport for All campaign which followed the 
government’s endorsement of the Council of Europe’s Sport for All policy in 1966 
(see Table 4.1). Whilst the campaign pre-empted a key finding from the Cobham 
Report (published in 1973), which argued for a ‘more concerted policy towards mass 
sport’ participation (Green, 2003: 122), others have argued that in reality ‘Sport for 
All’ was a misleading slogan (Henry, 1993) and a more accurate strapline would have 
been ‘sport for the disadvantaged’ or ‘sport for inner city youth’ (Houlihan, 1991: 99). 
Furthermore, the 1975 government White Paper directed the Sports Council (and the 
subsidiary Regional Councils for Sport and Recreation (RCSR)) to support the 
government’s urban programme and prioritise deprived areas for grant-aid of 
recreational projects in support of the ideals of social democracy, in particular to 
widen the welfare system and rebalance economic inequities (Coalter, 1988; Henry, 
1993). The most notable development in community sport during this period was the 
rapid and extensive development of public sector leisure facilities (Houlihan & 
White, 2002). This supported the government’s intent to widen the welfare system 
(Henry, 1993) and responded to the demands of the new leisure age (Blackie et al., 
1979; Sillotoe, 1969; Veal, 1982). Leisure facility development was made possible by 
the combination of Sports Council grants and local government reorganisation, 
which led to the abolition of many small authorities, some of which used their 
remaining capital to build sport facilities, and the creation of larger local authorities 
with greater spending power (Bloyce & Smith, 2010; Houlihan & White, 2002). 
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Table 4.1 Key political/policy landmarks in relation to community sport, 1970s 
Key 
political/policy 
event 
 Organisational and 
administrative 
implications 
 Funding 
implications 
 Implications for 
community 
sport 
1972, GB Sports 
Council established 
 
 Strategic/coordinating role 
between government and 
NGBs/voluntary organisations. 
Key objective was increased 
participation 
 Grant aid to NGBs rose 
significantly from £3.6M 
in ’72 to £15.2M in ‘79 
 Despite the Sport for All 
slogan, critics 
condemned funding of 
NGBs as elitist 
1973, House of Lords 
Report, Sport & 
Leisure (Cobham 
Report) 
 Set direction for future debates 
regarding role of sport in social 
policy issues 
 Funding should be 
aligned more to latent 
demand rather than 
identified demand 
 Emphasised broader 
conception of 
recreation over and 
beyond sport 
1975, White Paper, 
Sport and Recreation 
 
 Confirmed sport and recreation 
as a legitimate part of the welfare 
state; policies targeted at 
marginalised groups 
 Funding increasing 
diverted to areas of 
deprivation, primarily 
inner city areas 
 Use of sport to address 
broader social 
problems, targeted 
delivery of projects  
1977, White Paper: A 
Policy for Inner Cities 
 
 Increasing economic decline and 
rising unemployment results in 
sport being used as a social policy 
instrument 
 Growing congruence 
between government 
and Sports Council 
policies (e.g. Urban 
Programme) 
 Sport projects created 
to meet requirements of 
social issues rather than 
meeting needs of sport  
1979, “New Right” 
Conservative party 
elected with Margaret 
Thatcher as Prime 
Minister 
 Government demanded greater 
degree of accountability and 
corporate planning from 
organisations such as the Sports 
Council 
 Sports Council 
increasingly directed by 
government to account 
for NGB funding 
 Increased pressure to 
demonstrate how NGB 
support impacted on 
sports social role 
Source: Adapted from Green (2003); Houlihan & White ( 2002) 
 
1980-1997 
The 1980s were characterised by the promotion of participation amongst target 
groups, specifically those that were perceived to ‘constitute social problems’; a 
‘conventional policy response’ to the urban riots of 1981, including such initiatives as 
Action Sport (Houlihan & White, 2002: 34-35). Action Sport was a targeted, 
interventionist community development scheme that sought to improve accessibility 
by reaching out into local communities, employing leaders with appropriate skills 
and delivering a broad range of mainstream and alternative sports activities, thereby 
offering a different approach to the range of public sector leisure facilities that had 
been developed; this according to Coalter (2007) was clearly the catalyst for today’s 
community sport development. 
 
Whilst the rhetoric of sport as a welfare instrument and tool to engage the 
disengaged may have been potentially attractive the sector ‘remained politically weak 
and relatively marginal to core public policy developments’ (Coalter, 2007: 11). This 
is despite schemes targeting social and recreational deprivation being a central 
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feature of Sport in the Community: The next 10 years, the GB Sports Council’s 
strategic document for the 1980s (see Table 4.2) (Glyptis, 1993; Sports Council, 
1982). Further evidence of the marginal position of sport as welfare included the 
funding strategy of the Sports Council at the time, in which the largest single sum 
was allocated to elite sport (Coalter, 1988). The degree of UK government interest 
was variable in the 1980s depending on the Minister of Sport and his/her particular 
enthusiasm for sport. Margaret Thatcher generally had little time for sport (Bloyce & 
Smith, 2010), and the government’s involvement in what it considered a marginal 
policy matter did not fit well with the neo-liberal politics of Thatcherism. In addition, 
inter-agency tensions, particularly between the Sports Council and the CCPR added 
to the instability, with a growing perception that sport was poorly organised, divided 
and ‘bedevilled by the lack of a coherent voice’ (Green & Houlihan, 2005: 54). To this 
end Roche asserted that: 
 
…the effort to produce positive national community benefits by 
means of sport has been undertaken by one of the most divided, 
confused and conflictive policy communities [if indeed it can be 
referred to as such] in British politics (1993: 144). 
 
In slight contrast to Bloyce & Smith’s (2010) assertion of limited government interest 
in sport, Roche pointed to the division and lack of coherence as a corollary of 
government interference in sport: 
 
Like the other great cultural policy quangos of the 1960s and 1970s 
…, the Sports Council was supposed to be independent and 
answerable to the fixed terms of its charter, rather than to the 
changing policies of governments. It was intended to operate at 
arm’s length from the state rather than simply as an arm of the state 
(1993: 146). 
 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the Sports Council produced Sport in the Community: 
into the 90s which maintained the twin focus of community and elite sport, with the 
focus on the former fixed on improving access to and increasing participation in 
sport amongst target groups (women and young people, in particular). However, the 
extent to which the aspirations of the strategy were realised was hindered by ‘the 
major gaps between … sport policy rhetoric and the historical and social realities’ of 
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low sports participation rates (Roche, 1993: 148); and by broader political and 
ideological change which militated against policy continuity. 
 
Table 4.2 Key political/policy landmarks in relation to community sport, 1980-1997 
Key 
political/policy 
event 
 Organisational and 
administrative 
implications 
 Funding 
implications 
 Implications for 
community sport 
1982, GB Sports 
Council strategy, Sport 
in the Community: The 
Next Ten Years 
 Broad strategy reflecting changes 
of last ‘70s towards increased 
accountability, specific target 
groups and increasing links with 
government policy 
 Acknowledged that, 
despite growing trend 
toward welfarism, grant-
in-aid had been 
weighted toward elitism 
 Focus on quality of sport 
experience and specific 
services required for 
participation and elite 
1986, Rossi Committee 
Report 
 
 Examined the basis of, and 
justification for, the GB Sports 
Council existence 
 Considerable debate 
regarding how grant 
monies were distributed 
 Recommendations to more 
clearly differentiate efforts 
between Sports Council, 
CCPR and BOA  
1988, Sports Council 
strategy, Sport in the 
Community: Into the 
90s 
 Focus on women and young 
people as target groups 
 Greater funding 
allocated to target group 
projects; continued 
discussion re: funding of 
NGBs  
 Continued emphasis on 
target groups; limited 
response from NGBs  
1988, Creation of first 
conceptualisation of 
sport development 
continuum  
 Widely used by organisations to 
illustrate the interdependent 
nature of sport development 
 Help to delineate the 
four primary parts of 
sports development—all 
requiring resources  
 Gave coherence to sport 
development, underlined 
importance of participation 
1990, Major appointed 
leader of Conservative 
Party and PM 
 Major’s appointment heralded a 
change in the government’s 
approach to sport; application of 
private sector principles to public 
sector sport (CCT) 
 Major began process of 
ring-fencing more 
funding for school and 
elite sport 
 Greater emphasis on cost 
recovery and user pays re: 
facilities, local sports 
developments not directly 
impacted by CCT  
1992, Department of 
National Heritage 
established 
 Reflected personal commitment 
of Major; attempted to bring 
together a fragmented policy area 
 Twinned with above, 
brought about greater 
centralised control of 
funding for sport 
 Increased profile of sport 
(particularly school and 
elite sport) at cabinet level 
1994, National Lottery 
created 
 Crucial impact on sport and 
recreation, largely for capital 
projects in early years 
 Major a driving force 
behind lottery and sport 
as good cause; 
additional £250M for 
sport by 1999 
 Arguably single most 
important factor in 
development of community 
sport 
1995, Conservative 
Government policy 
statement, Sport 
Raising the Game 
 Focused on two areas: youth sport 
development programmes and the 
creation of elite sport training 
facilities/programmes 
 Significant funding 
invested into school and 
elite programmes via the 
Lottery Sports Fund 
 Significant support for 
school and elite sport, spill 
over benefits for 
community sport (e.g. 
TOPs, Champion Coaching 
Source: Adapted from Green (2003); Houlihan & White ( 2002) 
Following the 1987 election Coalter observed that ‘sport occupied an uneasy place 
between the ideologies of the market and welfare’, with policies being modified to 
reflect the government’s political ideology and the economic reality of the time’ 
(1988: 188). A striking example of the tension between market and welfare ideologies 
was the introduction of Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT). This directly 
affected the provision and management of public sector leisure facilities, but failed to 
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alter the objectives of community sport development to the extent initially expected 
(cf. Sports Council, 1994). Despite the uncertainty brought about by CCT, the Sports 
Council focussed efforts on the new continuum approach to sports development (see 
Figure 4.1). This approach served to bring a ‘conceptual coherence’ to sports 
development (Houlihan & White, 2002: 41), showing the logic of a joined up 
approach where mass participation (i.e. community sport) fed and benefited elite 
sport and elite sport—via role models—benefited mass participation. In addition, the 
Sports Council provided grant aid to approximately one third of local authorities for 
the purpose of supporting local authority employed sport development officers 
(Houlihan & White, 2002).  
 
Despite the focus on local government and an attempt to align more closely with the 
equity concerns of local government, central government generally maintained a 
distance, a general neglect and lack of interest, more a reflection of general 
indifference than the fact that the majority of local councils were controlled by a 
Labour administration (Houlihan & White, 2002). However, this was set to change 
fairly radically after John Major replaced Margaret Thatcher as the Conservative 
leader and led the party to victory at the 1992 general elections. Major’s approach to 
sport, in stark contrast to Thatcher, was generally enthusiastic, a result of his 
personal interest in sport and the values associated with school and elite sport 
reflecting his ‘more traditional view of Conservatism’ (Coalter, 2007: 14).  
 
During Major’s leadership, the government were involved in three significant 
initiatives which brought about a period of sustained investment and more active 
government involvement in sport (Bloyce & Smith, 2010). The first of these was the 
creation of the Department of National Heritage (DNH) in 1992. This was followed 
by the reorganisation of the Sports Council, with the formation of an English Sports 
Council (alongside similar Home Country Sports Councils in Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland), and a UK Sports Council responsible for elite sports development 
(Houlihan & White, 2002).  
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Figure 4.1 The pyramid sports development continuum, (source: English Sports Council, 1990) 
 
The second major development, and a catalyst for more direct government 
involvement in sport, was the establishment of the National Lottery in 1994. This 
‘masterstroke of leisure policy’ (Henry, 2001: 92) enabled the government to leverage 
greater financial opportunity for good causes such as sport, art and heritage without 
any increase in tax-related subsidy. Following the launch of the lottery and the 
apparent growing government interest in sport, the Conservative party published the 
second government sports strategy: Sport: Raising the Game (Department of 
National Heritage, 1995). The traditional focus of one-nation Conservatism 
prioritised school and elite sport, primarily for their intrinsic benefits, their ability to 
harness the true competitive nature of sport, and their capacity to harness Major’s 
one nation ideology (Coalter, 2007; Houlihan & White, 2002). The strategy all but 
ignored local community sport, in particular the impetus that had grown around 
sports equity and recognition of the critical role of local authorities, not only as 
sports facility providers, but also as the employers of a growing network of 
professional sports development officers. Furthermore, comments from Iain Sproat, 
the Minister with responsibility for sport at the time, underscored the priority status 
given to school and elite sport at the expense of community sport: 
 
The new body will withdraw from the promotion of mass 
participation, informal recreation and leisure pursuits and from 
health promotion. Those are laudable aims, but they are secondary 
to the pursuit of high standards of sporting achievement (Sproat, 
1994). 
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Thus, the ‘one nation’ Conservative ideology put to an end its ‘dangerous liaison with 
community, replacing it with the more comfortable world of sport’ (Lentell, 1993: 
147). However, despite the Ministerial pronouncements and strategy rhetoric, local 
government continued to recruit SDOs and YSDOs in order to create, develop and 
manage local community sport development programmes. Importantly, for many 
authorities this was achieved with financial support from the Sports Council 
specifically for the recruitment of SDOs and/or YSDOs on fixed-term contracts, 
primarily financed by pump-prime funding from the Sports Council in order to 
continue to support the integrated notion of the sports development continuum. 
Whilst these funded posts were required to deliver against specific programmes 
detailed in Sport: Raising the Game, it would be naive to think that this was their 
sole focus. Indeed, many local authorities were astute in using the Sports Council 
funding to deliver aspects of Sport: Raising the Game (the National Junior Sports 
programme, for example) whilst at the same time supporting initiatives that had 
been created in response to local community sport needs and justifying this on the 
basis of the important role they played in the participation element of the sports 
development continuum. This approach by local authorities illustrated well the 
sizeable gap that existed between the ‘storylines’ (Fischer, 2003: 88) that represent 
national sport policy (as read in national strategies and as taken from Ministerial 
speeches) and the realities of national sport policy as played out by the key players 
involved in the policy community (Roche, 1993). 
 
1997-2004 
A new Labour government was elected in 1997 and its particular approach to sport 
ushered in a raft of changes which were to bring community sport to the fore as well 
as underline the importance of equality of access and using sport as a developmental 
tool to tackle multiple deprivation (as measured by the Index of Multiple 
Deprivation). Led by a new Third Way ideology and a commitment to reform and 
modernise the machinery of government, this new politics was reported as ‘a 
modernised version of social democracy’ and a progressive means to modernise 
government, strengthen civil society and address issues of social exclusion, 
particularly when compared to the left-right positions of traditional politics (Coalter, 
2007: 15). In this respect the Third Way is positioned between the opposing 
commitments to heavy state intervention and anti-individualism, and the 
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‘Thatcherite neoliberal, free-market policies and extreme individualism’ (ibid, 2007: 
15). 
 
The new Labour government immediately replaced the DNH with the Department 
for Culture, Media and Sport. The English Sports Council (branded Sport England) 
responded quickly and used the opportunity to develop a package of programmes, 
referred to commonly as the ‘Big Picture’ (see Figure 4.2) with community sport, 
predominantly a ‘development through sport’ model, forming a central part of the 
package. Specifically, the Big Picture involved four interconnected programme areas: 
Active Schools, Active Communities, Active Sports and World Class, and the 
initiatives developed within each area were shaped by the key tenets broadly 
associated with the Third Way politics of the new government and the party’s 
manifesto for sport, produced in 1996 (Bloyce & Smith, 2010). Important in the 
context of this study is the ‘Active Sport’ element of the Big Picture, in particular the 
establishment of primarily county-based Active Sports Partnerships. These 
partnerships were responsible for the sub-regional coordination of sport 
development pathways working across local authority sport development teams, 
NGBs, county sports associations and local voluntary-run sports clubs. These 
partnerships were the forerunner to County Sports Partnerships discussed in more 
detail below. 
 
Figure 4.2 The Big Picture (source: English Sports Council, 1998) 
 
 
During the latter part of the 1990s, central government were directly involved in 
sport, pursuing a range of innovations that moved sport from the margins of 
government policy to the centre stage (Houlihan & White, 2002) (see Table 4.3) in 
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addition to modernizing Sport England ‘to ensure a more strategic role with 
meaningful, outcome driven targets against which performance could be measured’ 
(cf. Houlihan & Green, 2009: 6). This differed from previous government approaches 
insomuch as they tended to delegate responsibility to quangos, whereas the DCMS 
were more visible, clearly involved in leading specific policies, strategies and 
programmes that would shape the growth of sports development. During this period 
the Cabinet’s strategy office also led the Quinquennial Review of the Sports Council. 
These developments were brought together under the new government’s sports 
strategy, A Sporting Future for All (DCMS, 2000). This emphasised school and elite 
sport, and endorsed local authorities as both facility provider and enabler of 
community sports development (Green, 2008). Indeed, local authorities were 
identified as lead agencies in the quest to break down barriers and work toward fair 
access in sports participation (DCMS, 2000). However, the aspirations of A Sporting 
Future for All were short-lived, as the DCMS and the government’s Strategy Unit 
published Game Plan: A Strategy for Delivering Government’s Sport and Physical 
Activity Objectives in 2002 (DCMS, 2002). This detailed document provided the 
government rationale for investing in sport and focussed on physical activity with the 
objective of encouraging 70 percent of the population to be ‘reasonably active’ by 
2020 (DCMS, 2002). According to the authors the strategy presented a more 
balanced approach to community sport (mass participation) and elite performance 
than those in Australia, USA and Finland, which the DCMS argued were either more 
laissez-faire or one-dimensional (see Figure 4.3). 
 
Figure 4.3 International Sport and Physical Activity Philosophies (source: DCMS, 2002) 
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The range of innovations that emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s represented 
a fundamental shift from the welfare approach of developing sport in communities to 
the development of communities through sport (Houlihan & White, 2002; Coalter, 
2007). This reflected Tony Blair’s passion for sport (Houlihan & Green, 2009) and 
more generally, New Labour’s view of sport and, in particular, their view of its value 
in promoting active citizenship, or what Coalter refers to as the ‘systematic attempt 
to use sport as an economy of remedies to a variety of social problems’ (2007: 18). 
However, whilst the government’s approach to community sport, as enshrined in A 
Sporting Future for All and Game Plan, gave it greater prominence, many of the 
government’s aspirations were not realised; a genuine case of overly-eager Ministers 
over-promising and under-delivering. 
 
Table 4.3 Key political/policy landmarks in relation to community sport, 1997-2003 
Key 
political/policy 
event 
 Organisational and 
administrative 
implications 
 Funding 
implications 
 Implications for 
community sport 
1997, New Labour 
administration elected 
 
 Replaced CCT with Best Value in 
attempt to modernise local 
government services, including 
sport; social inclusion becomes 
key policy direction; DNH 
renamed DCMS 
 Increased rhetoric 
regarding sports 
potential in addressing 
social exclusion 
 Transitioning from 
school-link and youth 
sport development 
work to more social 
inclusion type project 
work 
1999, Sport England, 
Lottery Sport Fund 
Strategy (1999-2009) 
 
 Two priorities consistent through 
all funding—community awards 
and projects to enhance medal 
winning chances at international 
level 
 Two strands: 
Community Projects 
Fund (150M) and World 
Class Fund (50M); Later 
evolved into Big Picture 
concept, Active Schools, 
Active Comm’s, Active 
Sports and World Class 
 Significant funding 
committed for facilities 
and sport for 
development projects 
(e.g. SAZ, ACDF) 
1999, Government 
National strategy for 
neighbourhood 
renewal (PAT 10) 
report: the 
contribution of sport 
and the arts 
 
 Framework provided detailed 
discussion and some evidence of 
the role of sport and the arts in 
neighbourhood renewal 
 More direct funding 
channelled into sport for 
development, specifically 
social inclusion-related 
objectives; Report useful 
as advocacy document 
for sport to leverage 
support from 
regeneration projects 
(New Deal for Comm’s, 
EAZ, HAZ, etc.) 
 Greater awareness and 
general acceptance of 
view of sport as a 
valuable tool to support 
neighbourhood renewal 
2000, Labour 
government policy 
statement, A Sporting 
Future for All 
 Reiterated much of rhetoric in 
Sport: Raising the Game, linked 
to Best Value objectives, creation 
of new Specialist Sports Colleges 
 NGB funding directly 
linked to performance 
targets 
 Very vague aspirations 
regarding participation, 
preventing sale of 
playing fields and 
developing more 
facilities 
2002 Game Plan: A 
Strategy for Delivering 
Governments Sport 
and Physical Activity 
Objectives 
 Major government review of all 
levels, structures and financing of 
sport; links between sport, health, 
education and inclusion all 
emphasised 
 Recommendations 
would later lead to 
‘simplifying the 
fragmented funding 
arrangements for sport’ 
 Specific targets for 
increased participation, 
criticism re: poor data, 
fragmented 
organisation 
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2004/5, Development 
of CSP network and 
single system for 
community sport  
 As a result of Game Plan, a new 
single system for sport was 
created, with 45 (later 49) CSPs 
developed as key coordinating 
structure linking the national 
level (Sport England, NGBs) with 
the local (local authorities, clubs) 
– see Figure 4.5 below 
 Core funding and 
programmatic funding 
increasingly challenged 
through infrastructure 
and networks e.g. School 
Sport Partnerships, 
CSPs, and NGBs 
 A recognised delivery 
system for sport 
responsible for 
delivering community 
sport elements of Game 
Plan and the 
subsequent National 
Framework for Sport 
Source: Adapted from Green (2003); Houlihan & White ( 2002) 
 
Galvanising community sport policy, 2005 onwards 
2005-2010 
The 2004 publication of Sport England’s National Framework for Sport: A Vision 
For 2020 set the tone—both in terms of the aspirations and enormity of the 
challenge—for community sport in England. The strategy included a conceptual 
framework directing the outcomes associated with change (see Figure 4.4). This was 
arguably the first concrete manifestation of the oft quoted evidence-based approach 
to community sport. 
 
Alongside the framework, a series of other developments significantly influenced 
community sport between 2004 and 2010. The first of these was the 
DCMS/Treasury—commissioned Carter Review. The review was established to 
modernise the sport infrastructure through the establishment of a more efficient, 
performance-motivated and business-like Sport England (Carter, 2005). Carter 
identified five priority areas for action: (i) the development of robust measurement 
and monitoring systems; (ii) the promotion of the personal benefits of sport and 
physical activity; (iii) the improvement of the delivery of sport; (iv) the creation of a 
single access point and brand for sport in England; and (v) the provision of targeted 
incentives for commercial investors via a new National Sports Foundation (ibid, 
2005).  
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Figure 4.4 Conceptual framework for community sport (source: Sport England, 2004) 
 
Although county partnerships were first mooted in Game Plan in 2002 (p10 and 
p188), Sport England responded almost immediately to Carter’s recommendations 
by transitioning the former Active Sport partnerships9 (the majority of which were 
county-based) to CSPs which formed a key part of the single system, or the delivery 
system for sport, as it was later called. The delivery system for sport sought to clearly 
coordinate and align responsibilities between national, regional, sub-regional and 
local agents involved in planning, delivering and evaluating sport— clarifying who 
does what and galvanising a collective approach to increasing participation in PE, 
sport, and active recreation—right down to the people behind the people (parents, 
coaches, volunteers) and the people taking part (see Figure 4.5). The work of CSPs 
within this structure was initially guided by three core responsibilities established by 
the major funder, Sport England: (i) the strategic sub-regional coordination of sport 
                                                          
9 The Active Sport Partnership was a Sport England funded development programme that aimed to 
bring together local-level agencies under the umbrella of a county partnership in order to develop a 
coordinated pathway for young people to pursue sport from foundation level to excellence. 
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and active recreation, (ii) measurement and evaluation of performance in relation to 
sports participation and a range of proxy measures, and (iii) coordination of 
marketing and communication for sport across the sub-region (Sport England, 
2008a). In theoretical terms, the CSP was the lead agency for community sport at the 
sub-regional level, responsible for strategically coordinating sport; bringing together 
the disparate initiatives of local authorities, NGBs, county sport associations, and 
sports clubs into a structured and complementary programme of community sport 
opportunities. This role was not without its challenges and for many, the reality of 
community sport sat separately from the policy rhetoric (cf. Grix, 2010a). 
Coordinating sport at the sub-regional level was bedevilled by the policy and politics 
of county sport associations and local government (McDonald, 1995), some of which 
reflected the national picture, some of which contradicted or even opposed it. This 
was a situation exacerbated by the autonomy and diversity of the complex network of 
agents involved in community sport (Bloyce & Smith, 2010), the fluctuating tensions 
between sport and physical activity (cf. Keech, 2011), not to mention the unrealistic 
aspiration to drive participation rates so that 70% of the population regularly 
participate in sport (Collins, 2010). Although the delivery system did succeed in 
illustrating a clear, linear model of delivery, it did little to articulate the complexity, 
specifically the range and depth of issues that directly shaped relations between 
CSPs, NGBs, county sport associations and local government. 
 
Figure 4.5 The delivery system for sport (source: Sport England, 2005) 
 
Another significant theme permeating community sport in recent years has been the 
‘fragmentation, fractiousness and perceived ineffectiveness’ of the key agents 
involved in the policy area (Houlihan & Green, 2009: 2). Thus, community sport 
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formed part of the suite of public services that New Labour pledged to modernise and 
reform—primarily through pressure exerted on and through Sport England as well as 
a range of performance-based initiatives rolled out across local government (Harris, 
2012). Examples included audit and inspection regimes applied to local authorities 
(Best Value and Comprehensive Performance Assessment) and incentivised targets 
aligned to specific national priorities and agreed with NDPBs and local authorities 
(Public Service Agreements and Local Area Agreements (LAAs)). Importantly, these 
were not simply improvement programmes, but were more symptomatic of a new 
culture focusing on the enhancement of organisational efficiency and effectiveness 
(Tomkinson, 2007). Moreover, the Labour government went beyond the 
modernisation of organisations through the LAAs and Comprehensive Area 
Assessment (CAA) programmes, which were predominantly aimed at ‘place shaping’, 
in other words regenerating and improving local areas. The result of these changes 
for community sport was continued financial pressure, with efficiency savings being 
achieved through different operating mechanisms (leisure trusts) or through 
reductions in sport development budgets. In addition, resources were being used for 
continuous improvement processes, for example the employment of performance 
and improvement officers and independent consultants to oversee specific 
improvement projects, shifting more resource into internal restructuring and away 
from frontline service delivery (Harris, 2012). Notable during this period was the 
arrival of a new evidence-based orthodoxy that required all public services to develop 
strategies and services based upon robust evidence relating to end-user needs. In 
sport this was visible in major research projects such as Sport England’s Driving Up 
Participation series as well as the Active People survey, the Taking Part Survey and 
the Experian-based Sport Market Segmentation tool. Finally, it is important to note 
the growing tension during this period relating to the use of performance 
management techniques, the focus on broader physical activity promotion up to 
2008 and the significant shift to ‘pure sport’ from 2008 onwards (discussed further 
below). This tension was also a result of a growing realisation of nationally-driven 
targets being pushed down through mechanisms such as the Comprehensive 
Performance Assessment (CPA), Public Service Agreements (PSA) and Local Area 
Agreements (LAA), and the desire for local areas to focus attention on local needs 
and priorities. An example of this in community sport was the government’s primary 
concern with increasing mass participation in sport, as compared to a number of 
 
 
-145- 
 
local authorities whose core priorities emphasised either equality (widening rather 
than increasing participation) or the instrumental value of community sport. 
 
The most dramatic shift in community sports policy during this period followed the 
Prime Ministerial change from Blair to Brown in 2007, and the subsequent Cabinet 
reshuffle in June 2007. In taking up his new appointment as Secretary of State for 
Culture, Media and Sport, James Purnell repositioned the DCMS so that it would 
focus on ‘pure sport’ and ‘sport for its own sake’, as opposed to the instrumental use 
of sport (DCMS, 2008). This change was partially driven by Purnell’s apparent desire 
to separate the vision for his department from the priorities of other government 
departments or cross-government objectives. He stated that the DCMS would fund 
the creation of a world-leading sports development system, involving high-quality PE 
and school sport, high levels of community sports participation, and enhanced elite 
performances with record medal wins at major events (Purnell, 2008). In contrast, 
he stated that the ‘spill-over benefits’, the wider education, crime reduction or health 
promotion-related benefits attributed to sport would require funding from other 
government departments (ibid, 2007). Purnell also promoted NGBs as the leading 
agency of community sport, with their whole sport plans providing a clear focus for 
the more detailed translation of community sport policy into sport-specific plans 
detailing how increased participation in sport will be achieved: 
 
We are announcing the start of this process with a review of Sport 
England’s strategy to focus the delivery of an excellent sporting 
infrastructure from the grass roots up. That means creating 
excellent national governing bodies, clubs, coaches and volunteers, 
supported by the investment we've already made in facilities. And 
the sporting bodies in our country will be critical. My offer to them 
is clear. We want to create whole sports plans, with a single funding 
pot. We will free them up from the bureaucracy and bidding that 
they complain about today. But, in return, they will need to commit 
to clear goals to improve participation, coaching and the club 
structure (Purnell, 2008). 
 
Whilst Purnell’s tenure within the DCMS was short-lived, his influence was seen in 
the new central leadership role in community sport given to NGBs, the DCMS 
strategy Playing to Win, the resignation of Derek Mapp, the Chairman of Sport 
England (cf. Keech, 2011), the subsequent “pure sport” focus of the Sport England 
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strategy 2009-13 (Collins, 2010), and the response to both Carter and Jowell’s 
criticism of sporting structures as being ‘unfathomably complex’ and a ‘nightmare’ 
(Carter, 2005; Jowell, 2004). The Landscape for Sport was created promptly (see 
Figure 4.6), illustrating a simplified structure of sport which sought to ‘improve focus 
at every level of sport policy (school, community and elite), and better knit the three 
delivery bodies (Youth Sport Trust, Sport England, and UK Sport) together; (DCMS, 
2008: 6).  
 
In addition, during Purnell’s leadership of the DCMS, Sport England’s target of 
increasing participation in community sport by one million participants by 2012 
formed a central part of the government’s Legacy strategy and was also ratified as 
both a national level PSA between government and Sport England, as well as being 
included as a national indicator (NI8) within the suite of performance indicators that 
local authorities could select from for their LAA (Harris, 2012). Securing approval for 
this to be included within the national indicator set was a major symbolic 
achievement for both the DCMS and Sport England. More importantly, it provided 
leverage for Sport England and CSPs to utilise ‘evidence’ such as Active People 
statistics and Market Segmentation profiles and encourage local authorities to 
include NI8 within their LAA. This was crucial for Sport England and CSPs as it was 
seen as a way in which local authority attention and delivery could be harnessed, 
bringing local authorities back into a central role in the delivery of community sport. 
This was perhaps a response to the perception amongst some in Sport England that 
the balance had shifted too far toward NGBs, further alienating relations with local 
authorities, as well as a growing acceptance that a modernised local government 
infrastructure did not necessarily include any direct provision for sport development 
or community sport. 
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     Figure 4.6 The landscape for sport (source: DCMS, 2008) 
 
Enter the Coalition Government - 2010 onwards 
The political change resulting from the UK General Election in May 2010 brought 
stability to some areas of sport policy, and considerable change to others. The 
Conservative party vision for sport was clearly articulated in the party’s policy 
document published in 2009 and was the dominant position adopted by the 
Conservative Liberal coalition in 2010, hardly surprising given the dominance of 
Tory ministers in the DCMS. The Party’s vision emphasised a balanced approach, 
viewing ‘sport as both an end in itself and a means to achieve a better society’ 
(Conservative Party, 2009: 4). Whilst it was possible to observe some level of 
continuity in the government’s policy objectives for sport, particularly in relation to 
the community and elite sport policy systems, there was considerable change in 
school sport policy with the abandonment of School Sport Partnerships, made 
particularly conspicuous by the way in which policy was changed, and the 
contradiction between the changes made and the stated intentions or policies of 
government departments (Grix, 2010a). With regards to this study, it is important to 
draw attention to four significant developments that impacted and, in many cases, 
continue to impact community sport policy. 
 
First, under the direction of Minister for Sport, Hugh Robertson, the DCMS 
published their new sports strategy, Creating a Sporting Habit for Life, which 
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reinforced the government’s commitment to an NGB-led delivery system for 
community sport as well as redirecting attention away from the now well-publicised 
Legacy target of one million new regular adult participants in sport (DCMS, 2012). 
This shift was not particularly surprising given the poor performance of the majority 
of NGBs in receipt of WSP funding to increase adult participation in sport, the profile 
of the participation target as part of the 2012 Games Legacy, the government’s 
promise to reverse what they viewed as New Labour’s obsession with performance 
targets, and the view of the then Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, 
Jeremy Hunt, that the community sport target was wholly unrealistic (Hunt quoted 
in Gibson, 2012). The government replaced it with a new 5-point plan to increase 
sports participation amongst 14 to 25-year-olds, focussing on (i) a network of sports 
competitions amongst schools, (ii) enhanced links between schools and clubs via 
Doorstep clubs, (iii) NGB whole sport plans to develop a primary focus on youth 
sport to encourage young people to play and continue playing sport, (iv) funding 
programmes to support sport facility developments, and (v) an average of £10 
million pounds a year to support local government and community and voluntary 
sports organisations (DCMS, 2012). For some, the headlines within the new strategy 
may be viewed as nothing more than an attempt to replace challenging participation 
targets (sports participation based on three occasions per week) for something a little 
more attainable (sports participation based on one occasion per week) (Gibson, 
2012), to refocus attention on a slightly more accessible and attractive (to NGBs, at 
least) youth market, to repackage existing programmes and ideas, and to portray 
relatively minor funding for local government and community organisations as being 
wide-ranging and significant10 (cf. DCMS, 2012). 
 
Second, underlining the prominence of the new DCMS strategy and the close 
involvement of Sport England CEO, Jennie Price, in its development (personal 
communication, 2012), Sport England produced a conspicuously brief two-page 
Strategy Outline, detailing the principles underpinning investment into NGBs, 
pinpointing how £1 billion will be invested into community sport, and illustrating 
how programmes would combine to bring about increased sports participation, 
                                                          
10  This relates specifically to £50 million investment (over 5 years, £10 million per year) into local government, 
and voluntary and community organisations. 
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reduce the numbers of people dropping out of sport, as well as giving specific 
attention to disability sport (Sport England, 2012a). Of particular note to this study, 
the strategy outlines Sport England’s expectations of CSPs and NGBs: 
 
National governing bodies will continue to play a pivotal role [in 
community sport] as the stewards of their sport. County sport 
partnerships will support NGBs, foster local links, and help 
transition young people into clubs (Sport England, 2012a: 1).  
 
The third issue relates directly to the above point, specifically the role of CSPs as a 
support agency for the delivery of NGB interventions. Whilst this has been the case 
since 2008, it has in recent years received more direct attention, most recently and 
prescriptively in the Sport England CSP core specification 2012-13 (Sport England, 
2012c). This set out the secondary, supporting role of CSPs in relation to NGB 
priorities (discussed further in partnerships section, below). Importantly, the core 
specification underscores the top-down reality of CSP-NGB relations whereby the 
NGB develops the plans and agrees the priorities, and the CSP is responsible for 
assisting the NGB in delivering their plan. This position has received opposition from 
a number of sources, including former Sports Minister Richard Caborn, who has 
argued that the NGB-led strategy is seriously flawed as NGBs simply do not have the 
capacity or infrastructure in place to extend into local communities and deliver mass 
participation (Walker, 2011). Furthermore, the majority of NGBs are primarily 
motivated by elite success (Allison, 2001, Green, 2003, 2008; Green & Houlihan, 
2005), with community sport playing a distant, secondary role (Collins, 2010). 
Finally, given the overview of power discourse, above, it remains to be seen to what 
extent one organisational structure (the CSP) will defer to another—particularly 
given the broader social context within which CSPs and NGBs operate. 
 
Fourth, local government and its ability to continue committing to community sport 
has been compromised in a number of ways. The most notable is the public sector 
austerity measures introduced by central government, particularly the substantially 
reduced financial settlements received by local government (LGA, 2012), and the 
considerable challenge this poses to the sustained funding of any non-statutory 
service such as sport (King, 2013). Indeed, the LGA have developed a preliminary 
model of spending up to the year 2020 which suggests that local authorities will be 
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unable to commit any budgetary provision to discretionary services such as sport 
(LGA, 2012). This presents daunting implications for both the continued provision of 
local-level infrastructure (facilities and staffing) as well as important support services 
such as local grant programmes and advice and support for voluntary sport clubs 
(May et al., 2012). One of the first changes the coalition government made upon 
entry to office was to scrap the LAA. Whilst this may not be perceived to be as 
problematic as the austerity measures, it would be easy to underestimate the 
implications for sport. The LAA process helped to secure community sport a place on 
the political agenda at local level, with over 70% of local authorities in England 
selecting NI8 (Sport England, 2010). As a result, local authorities were ring-fencing 
specific resources, developing infrastructure, delivery plans and local-needs based 
interventions in order to meet their agreed target for NI8. Whilst it can be argued 
that removing the requirement for local authorities to deliver these targets has 
reduced a considerable bureaucratic burden (Cameron, 2010), it could also be argued 
that the attention and resources allocated to community sport are likely to suffer as a 
result. The final issue affecting local government is part 5 of the Localism Act, 2011, 
specifically the distribution of new powers to local communities, such as community 
asset transfer and right to buy. This is one of many processes developed by the 
government to shift power from Whitehall to local communities (Cameron, 2009), 
provide local opportunities for citizens to participate in civil society (Cabinet Office, 
2011), and to continue what Thatcher started in driving the wholesale modernisation 
of public services with the aim of substituting perceived public sector ineptitude for 
private sector efficiency. Modernisation, and in particular the modernisation 
programme of the coalition government, is discussed further below. This includes 
reference to broader government-led issues which tend to dictate the policy 
environment, specifically governance arrangements and the promotion of 
partnerships as an antidote to the conventional Westminster model. 
 
The modernisation of public services and the impact of the coalition 
government 
 
Modernisation is a relatively recent political phenomenon which has evolved from 
the economic and managerialist legacy of Thatcher, the repositioning of Labour Party 
socialism under Blair, and a view of success as the ‘progressive expansion of the 
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sphere of individual responsibility’ (Leadbetter, in Finlayson, 1999: 273) rather than 
the expansion of the public sector (Houlihan & Green, 2009). 
 
The general view of modernisation appears divided. The government typically point 
to a shift of power from Whitehall to local communities and a collection of new 
programmes aimed at improving service efficiency and effectiveness, whereas 
political scientists tend to underline modernisation as a ‘rhetorical discourse which is 
less concerned with describing or prescribing a particular set of practices and more 
concerned with persuasion and motivation’ (Finlayson, in Houlihan & Green, 2009: 
3). Indeed, Finlayson underlined modernisation as being commonly associated with 
‘exciting, progressive and positive’ ideals (2003: 63). That said, Houlihan & Green 
(2009) offered a more balanced view, highlighting the lack of precision relating to 
the concept of modernisation, noting that narratives, programmes, and specific 
techniques help to create a more tangible concept of modernisation. 
 
Since the election of the coalition government in 2010, there has been a subtle shift 
in the narrative relating to modernisation. Prior to this, the zeitgeist of New Labour 
ideology was characterised by a relentless commitment to public sector 
modernisation which included wide-ranging targets, inspection programmes, Beacon 
Authorities and similar initiatives aimed at improving the efficiency and effectiveness 
of service delivery. For New Labour, modernisation represented the need to ensure 
that policy was joined-up and strategic, that public services were provided based on 
public need, and public services were high quality and efficient Cabinet Office, (1999: 
6-7). Whilst the coalition government claimed to support the same efficiency goals, 
they criticised New Labour’s programme as having been flawed and highly unlikely 
to deliver greater efficiency (Cameron, 2010). Moreover, the Conservative (and 
Liberal Democrat) leadership underscored the need for public sector reform in order 
to address inequality and to improve public services by decentralising power and 
giving local citizens more control over the management and delivery of public 
services (Cabinet Office, 2011). The coalition government’s modernisation 
programme reflects a neo-liberal lineage in that it aims to pursue alternative models 
of delivery (from those that are traditionally state-led), remove targets and 
inspection regimes, give choice to end users, encourage greater competition amongst 
suppliers, and pay by results (Cameron, 2010).  
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Two distinct manifestations of the coalition government’s modernisation 
programme—the focus on empowering local communities and citizen-centeredness—
are considered below in a discussion of the government’s approach to governance 
and the continued commitment to partnerships. Whilst these developments are 
broader than community sport itself, they impact community sport and, in some 
cases (but certainly not all) directly shape the way in which community sport policy 
is formulated, implemented and evaluated. The following sub-sections will consider 
these two manifestations in more detail, specifically the key theoretical 
considerations related to each as well as the issues and implications of each for the 
community sport policy sector. 
 
Governing and governance 
Given the variety of literature on governing and governance, it is useful to define its 
meaning for the purposes of this study. Governing is taken to mean ‘the activities of 
social, political and administrative actors that can be seen as purposeful efforts to 
guide, steer, control or manage sectors of society’ (Kooiman, 1993: 2). Governing, 
then, is an interactive process as no single actor has the power or resource capacity to 
act unilaterally (Stoker, 1998). As a result, governing is shaped by a persistent 
tension between the need for authoritative action and a reliance on the compliance 
and action of others (Rhodes, 1996). In contrast, whilst governance has a variety of 
meanings (Rhodes, 1996; Stoker, 1998), there is general agreement within the realms 
of public policy that it refers to the development of governing styles in which 
boundaries between and within public and private sectors are blurred (Stoker, 1998).  
 
For many years, governance has been viewed as an integral part of the language of 
modernisation, a ‘vogue word for reforming the public services’ (Rhodes, 1996 in 
Kjaer, 2004). Indeed, a quick look at the modernisation programmes of the past two 
governments reveals little change. Governance continues to be popularised by 
governments who eagerly promote their variety of community empowerment. The 
governance narrative is represented by a rich literature concerning the shift in 
British politics from the Westminster model associated with a unitary state, strong 
cabinet government, parliamentary sovereignty, and hierarchical control over policy 
to the overloaded, hollowed out, and congested state (Skelcher, 2000 in Goodwin & 
Grix, 2011), where power is devolved through arms length agencies, networks, and 
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partnerships. The governance narrative according to Grix (2010: 161) highlights the 
‘erosion of central government power and, with it, the state’s ability to determine and 
deliver policy’. It also brings into sharp relief the problems of the traditional top-
down policy system and represents a new model of governing, where power is 
distributed horizontally through a series of networks representing a range of 
interests (Kooiman, 1993; Marsh & Rhodes, 1992). Indeed, Marsh & Rhodes’ (1992) 
‘hollowing out’ thesis contended that governance is all about self-reliant, self-
organising networks made up of mutually resource-dependent actors, where the state 
holds no position of privilege beyond that of any other stakeholder (Goodwin & Grix, 
2011; Rhodes, 1996).  
 
The means by which government can empower people and simultaneously reduce 
the size of government played an important role in the 2010 general election as well 
as the subsequent modernisation programme of the coalition government. Whilst the 
election itself was primarily fought on the issue of the recession and the public 
borrowing deficit—and a largely unanimous agreement across parties about the need 
to reduce public borrowing—it did reveal ‘fundamental differences over the role of 
the state and the relationship between the state and the market’ (Smith, 2010: 818). 
According to Boyle (2011) Labour’s response was reliance on the Keynesian and 
social democratic model, whereas Cameron’s neo-liberal commitment was to 
significantly reduce the size of the state primarily through the realisation of a ‘big 
society’ and to decentralise public services so that these would be co-produced with 
local citizens. The latter appears to be an anchor to which the coalition government’s 
localism and big society ideology is firmly fixed. 
 
The Localism Act itself is a central player in the coalition government’s 
modernisation plans. It, in theory at least, provides for a new model of governance, 
one which seeks to give local government greater autonomy, borrowing elements 
from Popper’s (1945) ‘open society’ and Ostrom’s (1973) notion of co-production—
the idea of democratic governance beyond mere consultation or representation, in 
particular. The Localism Act provides community groups and citizens with the 
opportunity to manage parks, sports centres, or youth play programmes; more 
importantly, it gives them the right to use their skills and knowledge to manage and 
deliver such services. This trend toward co-creation and co-production is not simply 
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about greater efficiency in public service delivery, but is more about re-defining the 
nature, culture and way in which public services are designed and delivered. 
 
If we can re-define public service clients as assets who have skills 
that are vital to the delivery of services, then we have a way that 
public services can genuinely start to rebuild the neighbourhoods 
around them. The point is that there are some services, like 
friendship, which neighbours provide very much better than 
professionals. Co-production is about broadening public services so 
that these human needs can be met (Boyle, 2011:10). 
 
That said, the normative view presented by the governance narrative and contained 
within the rhetoric of legislation or government inspired programmes has been 
heavily criticised in recent years by the growing literature on the decentred approach 
to governance (Bevir & Rhodes, 2003, 2006; Bevir & Richards, 2009) as well as 
other authors who have criticised the overly rational, normative assumptions 
associated with the governance narrative (cf. Jessop, 2002; Kooiman, 2000; 
Newman, 2005; Skelcher, 2000, 2008). The criticisms are twofold: first, at the 
ontological and epistemological level, whereby individual accounts are considered 
less relevant than the agentless, technocratic accounts included in previous work 
(Goodwin & Grix, 2011). Second, the governance narrative assumes the state to be a 
neutral or equal player alongside other network stakeholders, largely ignoring the 
likelihood of government exercising coercive forms of power (Newman, 2005: 8), 
particularly in times when networks and local actors desire a different path than that 
preferred by government representatives. In other words, it fails to recognise the 
significance of the state in ‘metagovernance’, ‘setting the rules of the game within 
which networks operate and steering the overall process of coordination’ (Jessop, 
2002; Kooiman, 2000 in Newman, 2005: 8). Skelcher rejects the notion of networks 
as self-organised, autonomous groups, emphasising their dependence on 
government support (2000). Indeed, the majority of local sport-related networks 
(CSPs, CSNs, sport-specific fora) are, in large part, created and sustained by 
government through the provision of financial resources. Thus, the governance 
narrative fails to recognise the attempt of government to reassert control, albeit 
through different means (Skelcher, 2000).  
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In examining these issues further, Goodwin & Grix (2011) applied the decentred 
perspective specifically to community sport. They advanced an epistemologically 
modified perspective incorporating structures and institutions and ‘acknowledging 
the role of these on actors, their beliefs and their actions’ to develop insight into the 
governance of community sport policy (2011: 546). Their research identified the 
governance paradox at work in sport, where the rhetoric of devolved power through a 
diverse range of networks (e.g. government departments, non-departmental 
government bodies, NGBs, schools, local authorities, CSPs, CSNs, etc.) and more 
freedom and control (DCMS, 2008: 21) contradicts the empirical evidence of an 
overly resource-dependent relationship where the government dictate the strategic 
direction of sport (Houlihan & Green, 2009) and maintain, albeit via Sport England 
and NGBs, tight control on the policy process (Goodwin & Grix, 2011; Grix, 2010a). 
This is a theme reinforced elsewhere in that government dictate the specific nature of 
community sport policy and strategy, but more importantly frequently change the 
parameters and require local agents such as CSPs to align themselves with the 
change, regardless of how this may impact their existing priorities, structure or other 
local contextual issues (Mackintosh, 2011). 
 
Interestingly, and in subtle contrast to the community sport strategies of the 
previous CSR cycle (2008-2011) referred to in the studies detailed above, the DCMS 
vision proffered a more nuanced version of their approach to strategic matters: 
 
Our vision is to help create the conditions for growth ....Where we 
judge there is a need for a particular intervention, we will provide 
real support and set strategy and direction. But we want our sectors 
and industries to drive their own agenda (DCMS, 2011: 1). 
 
In a similar show of inconsistency (or ambiguity) identified by Goodwin & Grix 
(2011), the document also asserted that the department ‘will no longer hold onto 
power, over regulate, or spend as much money on administration’ (DCMS, 2011: 4). 
In addition, the department’s most recent sports strategy asserted that the DCMS 
would 
 
… bring a sharper sense of direction and purpose across the entire 
sporting family through payment-by-results: a collective discipline 
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of building on what works, and discarding what doesn’t. The most 
successful organisations will be rewarded; and those which don’t 
deliver will see their funding reduced or removed (DCMS, 2012: 2). 
 
The issue here is not about the extent to which government retain a strategic 
involvement in policy, but more the language that is used to create the illusion of an 
empowered and autonomous community, when in fact the balance of power is 
retained centrally and freedoms are only granted within relatively narrow parameters 
set by government. A brief, alternative explanation can be derived from Foucault’s 
work on governmentality, specifically the idea that the power possessed by the state 
‘is not used to govern society per se, but to promote individual and institutional 
conduct that is consistent with government objectives’ (Raco & Imrie, 2000: 2191). 
From this perspective, government is involved in governing at a distance, allowing 
increased local responsibility and at the same time ensuring increased central control 
(MacKinnon, 2000). This form of governance relies upon a complex and interwoven 
system comprising political narrative, programmatic development, and specific 
technologies (Lindsey, 2010) in order to progress the conflicting notions of increased 
local responsibility and, increased central control simultaneously. 
 
A final issue is the seemingly disjointed response of government departments to the 
call for greater power in the sub-regions (Hethrington, 2011). Whilst it is possible to 
identify a clear narrative, and in some cases, trace elements of power being shifted to 
the local level in departmental areas such as Communities and Local Government, 
Education, and Health, the same cannot be said of the increasingly centralist DCMS. 
This is evidenced by a range of recent developments, including for example, the 
centralisation of Sport England, the departmental (as opposed to Sport England) 
ownership of the national strategy for community sport, the continued focus on 
centralist NGB Whole Sport Plans, and the primary focus of those aspects of sport 
policy that aid economic development (in particular, hosting major events and 
supporting elite development). In sum, it is arguably the range and sum of the issues 
presented above that have led to the characterisation of community sport as a 
‘deviant case’ to the traditional governance narrative, one which requires a fuller 
examination of structures and institutions alongside the ideas, culture and beliefs of 
actors (Goodwin & Grix, 2011: 1). 
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Partnerships in community sport 
Partnerships and partnership working are terms which are synonymous with sport in 
England and have been since the formative years of ‘outreach and interventionist’ 
sport development in the early 1980s. Theoretically, partnerships have been viewed 
as a reflection of ‘both market- and state-led forms of governance’, while in the 
policy-related narrative, they are depicted as being ‘resource-efficient, outcome-
effective, and an inclusive-progressive form of policy delivery’ (McDonald, 2005: 
579).  
 
In community sport, the formalisation of partnerships occurred in the mid-1990s as 
a result of the government’s new enthusiasm for sport (Houlihan & White, 2002), 
and in particular, the creation of multi-agency programmes such as Top Play, Top 
Sport and Champion Coaching. Sport England and the National Coaching 
Foundation (NCF – now known as Sports Coach UK) funded county sport 
development officers and county sports development fora with the aim of bringing 
together a range of multi-agency partners, particularly from local authority sport 
development, local education authorities, schools, NGBs, county sport associations, 
the Youth Sport Trust and Sport England in order to ensure the ‘joined-up’ design, 
delivery and evaluation of the programmes. This formalisation of partnerships 
continued with the election of New Labour in 1997 (Houlihan & Lindsey, 2008) and 
the development of the Active England programme (Active Schools, Active 
Communities and Active Sports). This focus on bringing a relatively similar range of 
organisations together over a sustained period to design, deliver and evaluate specific 
programmes has been viewed as important by governments and Sport England, not 
only in terms of creating a more coherent, readily identifiable network of policy 
implementers, but also in terms of bringing together the lead agencies to ensure that 
pathways were understood, joined-up and working as expected.  
 
Indeed, the requirement for actors to commit to work in partnership with each other 
is one that has remained stable within the policy field, more so than the actual 
policies they were initially expected to deliver. Recent examples include School Sport 
Partnerships, School Games Networks, Community Sport Networks, CSPs and the 
partnership between CSPs and NGBs. Bloyce and colleagues (2008) underscore the 
unintended consequences of the ongoing commitment to partnership work within 
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community sport, in particular the added complexity of partnership work and the 
implications of the complexity of attempting to address policy problems. In short, the 
complexity of enforced CSP-NGB cooperation may actually add to the range of policy 
problems rather than address them. The complexity of the CSP-NGB relationship is 
not solely a result of the differences in the range of goals traditionally associated with 
each organisational type (Collins, 2010), but also the nature and culture of each 
network, and their respective resource power, positional power (Bloyce et al., 2008) 
and the social context within which each operates (Grix, 2010a). In practical terms, 
NGBs have been primarily concerned with the development of their sport and in 
particular growth in the talent pool, with an emphasis on young people and the 
development of elite performers (Collins, 2008; Houlihan & White, 2002). In 
contrast, CSPs have been more focused on working with the community at the local 
level, in particular local authorities and the PCT, in order to increase the number of 
people engaged in regular physical activity (including sport) (Collins, 2010; 
Mackintosh, 2011; Robson, 2008). Another important consideration in the 
relationship between CSPs and NGBs is the sheer diversity in the size, shape and 
structure in each group of organisations. Space and the heterogeneity of types 
preclude a detailed examination; the following merely serves to illustrate the 
complexity of partnerships between CSPs and NGBs. 
 
Generally speaking, the NGBs formally involved in the community sport policy 
process in England are traditionally non-profit organisations (Katwala, 2000). 
Enforcing rules, selecting international teams and organising competitions are 
amongst their primary interests (Hindley, 2002). Although, more recently, one could 
add corporatisation and commercialisation (Taylor & O’Sullivan, 2009). The 
majority of NGBs have a core national team with responsibility for policy and 
strategy including the development of the NGB’s whole sport plan and the agreement 
of the NGB’s plans regarding community sport. The regional infrastructure of NGBs 
tends to be highly variable, usually directed by the wealth of the sport, which is 
directly related to its commercial attractiveness, the grant from the whole sport plan 
budget and the NGB’s strategic priorities. At the sub-regional level, many sports have 
a network of long-standing county sport associations with differing models of 
governance used to guide the NGB-county sport association relationship (Taylor & 
O’Sullivan, 2009). At the local or neighbourhood level, almost all NGBs rely on the 
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network of predominantly voluntarily managed sports clubs (some of which are 
affiliated to the NGB) and/or school sport programmes to provide recreational and 
competitive opportunities. 
 
In contrast, the 49 CSPs are a more recent introduction to the sporting landscape in 
England. They are perhaps best understood as an umbrella organisation for sport in 
each county (Grix, 2010a: 458) in that they were initially introduced to address the 
perennial problem of fragmentation in sports delivery, in particular fragmentation 
between local authorities (districts/boroughs, cities, and counties), NGBs, schools 
and clubs (Charlton, 2010). Since their arrival in the community sport policy sector, 
CSPs have been challenged by the whim of government ministers and the subsequent 
re-writing of policy. Most recently, in return for annual core funding of £240,000 
from Sport England, CSPs have been given four key business objectives, as set out in 
the CSP Core Specification for 2012-2013 (Sport England, 2012c): 
 
 to deliver cross sport services to meet NGB priorities, 
 to develop and maintain the strategic alliances and local networks NGBs and 
SE need to drive, deliver and secure resources, 
 to deliver cross-sport coaching services to meet local need, and 
 to manage and operate the CSP and ensure sound governance. 
 
Following the CSP Core Specification, it is important to briefly clarify the structure 
and meaning placed on the term CSP, particularly as the study analyses partnerships 
between agencies which themselves are based on partnerships (e.g. the CSP). Indeed, 
the structure of CSPs has created some confusion (cf. Mackintosh, 2011), and can be 
simplified by defining the meaning or representation of the partnership at three 
distinct levels: 
 
(i) the core team (a team of professionals e.g. CSP Director, NGB Lead Officer, 
who are employed by the CSP to develop and deliver against the CSPs strategy 
and Core Specification); 
(ii) the board (selected representatives or individuals), whose primary role is to 
advise the CSP core team, provide guidance and make decisions on matters of 
strategic importance; and, 
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(iii) the broader partnership (a network of organisations that have an association 
with the area served by the CSP, usually involving, but not limited to, local 
authorities, NGBs, clubs, the schools games networks and the primary care 
trust).  
 
While this articulation of CSPs is relatively consistent, the structure, size and 
representation of each vary from CSP to CSP. Another distinct although not 
unproblematic feature of CSPs, is the apparent struggle for autonomy, and at the 
same time, a reliance on funding from Sport England (Phillpots et al., 2010). Whilst 
the clear majority of CSPs are hosted (e.g. by a local authority or University), 14 have 
independent status as a limited company or charitable trust. Regardless, all CSPs are 
autonomous insofar as their legal status, employment terms and conditions, number 
of staff, budgetary process etc. are agreed by the CSP Director and the CSP board and 
are independent of government departments or Sport England. This is a problematic 
issue due to the original conceptualisation of the CSP as a Sport England agency 
(Grix, 2010a), the ability of some CSPs to source significant sums of funding from 
outside Sport England, the development of a network of high calibre CSP directors 
and chair people, and the implications of frequent changes in the policy landscape, 
not least the uncertainty of long-term funding for CSPs (Keech, 2011). At their 
extremes the resultant power relations have seen Sport England grappling for greater 
control (Phillpots et al., 2010) and CSPs emphasising their independence (CSP 
Network, 2012). As a result, a number of new public management techniques, 
including core specifications, interpretation guides and performance measurement 
frameworks have been developed in order to more clearly define the relationship 
between Sport England and CSPs and work towards greater consistency across the 
49 CSPs (Sport England, 2012c).  
 
As previously mentioned, the above summary of CSPs and NGBs is not intended as a 
definitive or even partial explanation of the diversity of NGB or CSP types. It simply 
illustrates the complexity that pervades the interaction within and across networks, 
which could harm rather than harness attempts to achieve government goals for 
community sport (Bloyce et al., 2008). 
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Conclusions 
Most important in this chapter are four themes that are particularly noteworthy for 
the way in which they characterise community sport and/or the implications they 
hold for it. 
 
The first theme relates to the process that underpins community sport. This has 
evolved from the passive provision of facilities (i.e. provide the facility and wait for 
users) to the interventionist role of contemporary agents where, in theory, the focus 
is taking sport to new markets and working at the micro-level to help individuals 
change behaviour. This change in strategy has been accompanied by a shift in the 
approach of local agents. In the 1970s strategy largely consisted of direct provision, 
where providers such as local government directly provided services to citizens. In 
the 1980s/1990s, this evolved to an enabling role, where agents worked through 
others either by virtue of regulation (e.g. Facilities subject to CCT or Best Value) or 
by choice (e.g. sport development via local clubs/associations). More recently, the 
neo-liberal ideology of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government, and 
in particular the rhetoric of Big Society and small government, emphasise the need to 
engage the grass roots, to work-through civic society associations to build local 
interest and empower local communities. This raises empirical questions about the 
policy process and the efforts made to secure participatory consensus with such 
associations. 
 
The second theme concerns fragmentation. The community sport policy sector is 
conflictive, disorganised (Roche, 1993) and ‘fragmented, fractious, and ineffective’ 
(Houlihan & Green, 2009: 2). This can perhaps partially be explained by the 
‘fuzziness’ or lack of precision applied to community sport (Houlihan, 2011). The 
very meaning of community sport is ambiguous and has, at different times, included 
young people/adults, sport/physical activity, sport for sport/sport for development. 
This differs from elite sport in that elite sport has a universal definition that extends 
beyond the nation. There are pre-arranged parameters (training and preparation for 
major events) and, for most sports, a clearly defined output (performance at the 
event) which is outside the reach of governments. In contrast, community sport is a 
domestic concern. Politicians, civil servants, the senior management of Sport 
England, NGBs and others debate and ultimately agree what it is and what it is not. 
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However, whilst the notion of fragmentation commonly precedes any explanation of 
community sport, a more precise understanding of the community sport policy 
process and, in particular, the extent to which coalitions exist in advocating 
community sport remains an empirical question. 
 
The problem of perennial change is the third theme. This includes changes in policy 
and the associated strategies, structures and programmes. Examples include the shift 
in policy from youth sport development in the early/mid 1990s, to a more 
pronounced focus on sport for development in the late 1990s/early 2000s, to a vague 
aim to increase participation in the mid-2000s, to a tighter, more specific goal of 
increasing adult participation from 2008 onwards. The frequent and hasty nature of 
change in policy has had severe implications for community sport. First, it projects 
an image of a failing policy sector, one that requires continual attention and frequent 
change (Collins, 2010). Second, it gives those working in the policy sector limited 
time to make an impact or achieve policy aspirations (Coalter, 2007). Third, the 
instability and uncertainty that comes from frequent change constrains cooperation 
and promotes competition (Adam & Kriesi, 2007). It is important to note the rapid 
changes in the policy system, and the way in which this past behaviour is likely to 
shape current relations between different organisational actors, particularly in 
relation to two fundamental principles of partnership working—trust and respect. If 
nothing else, we have come to realise that the community sport policy field is one 
where change is fairly certain, partially a result of its free form and its ability to be 
domestically defined, but also a result of deeper structures of power. Thus, it is 
critically important, given these theoretical and practical considerations, not to 
ascribe too much significance to the normative representation of partnership 
(Houlihan and Lindsey, 2008), specifically when applied to the community sport 
policy sector. 
 
 
More broadly, the implication of the government’s wider policies pertaining to public 
sector modernisation and governance through local partnerships requires further 
investigation. Examples of reform such as the abandonment of public sector 
modernisation policies including the Comprehensive Area Assessment and the Local 
Area Agreements indicate, on the one hand, a desire to lessen bureaucratic burdens 
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and reduce the number of targets for which the public sector are responsible. 
Similarly, the creation of legislation such as the Localism Act shows that the 
government are seriously considering a number of options that more directly involve 
local citizens in the front-line delivery of public services. On the other hand, these 
changes underscore a populist, ideological shift aimed at differentiating this 
administration from the previous one. The extent to which these overarching 
changes in policy--particularly the removal of performance targets and shifted power 
from the centre to local communities--have impacted community sport will be 
examined as part of the empirical exercise. 
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Chapter 5 
Case Study 1: CSP 1 
 
Introduction 
This chapter narrows the focus of analysis to the first of three CSP cases. As detailed 
in the research methods chapter, the three cases represent CSPs working in different 
geographical, organisational and financial contexts. Each case consists of three CSP 
representatives (Director, Chairperson and NGB Lead Officer) and embedded units 
comprising National Governing Bodies and local authorities. These units included 
county or regional level representation from eight NGBs and three representatives 
from local authorities (either sport, culture or community services according to each 
authority’s structure). The rationale for selecting these embedded units is detailed in 
the methods chapter above. The case studies presented in chapters 5-7 draw on 
empirical data from interviews with key actors and are supplemented with data from 
the annual reports, strategies and/or action plans of Sport England, CSPs, NGBs and 
local authorities. 
 
Each case is organised around the following four parts. The first focuses on the 
administrative context, organisational structure and the strategic priorities of each 
CSP. This includes geographical and demographic context as well as a comparative 
analysis of sports participation trends11. Given the importance of the CSP-NGB 
relationship to the implementation of community sport policy, the second part of the 
chapter discusses the CSP-NGB relationship. This includes a brief overview of the 
way in which partnership arrangements between the CSP and NGBs are managed 
and the factors that positively or negatively affect the creation of effective 
partnerships. This section will be set against the implementation and partnership 
literature. The third section is concerned with the role of CSPs and NGBs in policy 
making and implementation at the national and the local-level and draws on theory 
from Chapter 2. The fourth section takes a broader view of the community sport 
policy process, presenting the experiences and attitudes of key actors. A coding 
                                                          
11 The 2006-2012 timeline aligns with Sport England’s Active People survey which is the method used to measure 
community sport policy. The analysis compares sports participation in CSP 1 against sports participation 
nationally in England. 
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framework illustrating the key themes arising from the three cases is included in 
Appendix 8. 
 
Organisation, administration and strategic priorities 
Geographic and demographic context 
CSP 1 covers a large metropolitan area totalling 356 square kilometres and forming 
part of the largest conurbation outside London. It is made up of 25 towns, three large 
urban centres and a city. Each area has developed into a strong community with 
distinctive characteristics, often based on a particular manufacturing specialism. 
Whilst these towns have now largely coalesced into a continuous urban area, local 
identities and loyalties remain important (Local Enterprise Partnership, 2011). The 
population of the area is 1.1 million with 48.7% of the population male and 51.3% 
female (ONS, 2012). It is a comparatively diverse population with 18.9% of people 
from Black, Minority and Ethnic (BME) origins as compared to the national England 
average of 12.1% (ibid, 2012). In terms of age, there is a higher proportion of young 
(14-24) and old people (65+ years) than the national population (see Table 5.1). 
 
                    Table 5.1 2012 Population by gender, age (14+) and ethnicity, (source: ONS, 2012) 
Group CSP Population  
‘000 
% England population 
‘000 
% 
Male 427.6 48.7 20,644.8 49.0 
Female 449.9 51.3 21,509.3 51.0 
14-15 29.8 3.2 1,291.4 2.9 
16-19 54.9 6.3 2,528.6 6.0 
20-24 80.1 9.1 3,588.0 8.5 
25-34 152.6 17.4 7,079.0 16.8 
35-49 213.5 24.3 11,097.9 26.3 
50-64 176.0 20.1 9,431.9 22.4 
65+ 200.4 22.8 8,428.6 20.0 
White 703.3 80.1 36,866.8 87.5 
Non white 165.9 18.9 5,101.3 12.1 
 
The sub-region faces a number a socioeconomic challenges. It is dominated by low 
priced private housing and large areas of social rented housing with 5.1% of total 
dwellings classified as being unfit (Local Enterprise Partnership, 2011). Furthermore, 
20% of the sub region’s super output areas (SOAs12) are in the 10% most deprived in 
                                                          
12 Super Output Areas were introduced by the Office of National Statistics as a new geographic classification 
system for collecting, aggregating and reporting statistics at the local level. They were specifically introduced to 
help develop the Indices of Multiple Deprivation. Unlike wards, the boundaries to SOAs rarely change thus 
allowing the monitoring of data over time. 
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the country (CLG, 2007) and only 15.0% of the population are in social groups A and 
B compared to the national average of 22.0%. Further, with regards to deprivation, 
three of the four upper tier authorities in the sub region are ranked within the 20% 
most deprived nationally. More specifically, three authorities are ranked 2, 4, 5 most 
deprived in the region (from 39 authorities) and 12, 21, 30 most deprived nationally 
(from 353 authorities). The remaining (fourth) authority is ranked 8 in the region 
and 104 nationally. 
 
Over the past 30 years the local economy has been underperforming with an 
estimated £2.6 billion output gap (based on Gross Value Added), a result of low 
employment rates, low skills, and low business birth rates (Sub-Regional 
Regeneration Agency, 2006). This is exacerbated by worklessness in the sub region 
which has reportedly increased from 15.1% in 2005 to 17.4% in 2011, compared 
national figures of 11.4% in 2005 and 11.9% in 2011 (DWP, 2011).  
 
The health profile for the sub-region reinforces the impression that the area requires 
considerable post-industrial regeneration. When compared to national averages, 
obesity levels are higher, life expectancy for males and females is lower and health 
costs of physical inactivity are calculated to be significantly higher in all five disease 
categories. More specifically, 27.9% of the sub-regional adult population are obese 
compared to 24.2% of the national population. A similar picture is painted by 
childhood obesity levels with 23.6% of the sub-regional child population classified as 
obese compared to 19.0% nationally. Life expectancy for males in the sub-region is 
76.8 years compared to 78.6 years nationally. The gap between sub-regional and 
national life expectancy for females is narrower with a mean of 81.5 years for the sub-
region compared to 82.6 years nationally. In addition, the data for the projected 
costs of physical activity are projected to be substantially higher in the sub-region 
than the regional or national averages (see Table 5.2). 
 
                              Table 5.2 Health care costs of physical inactivity (source: Sport England. 2013) 
Geography Total cost Cost per 100,000 pop. 
Sub-region £23,304.830 £2,120,023 
Region £106,379,927 £1,937,438 
England £944,289,723 £1,817,285 
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Local government: boundaries and resources 
The area consists of four local authorities: three Metropolitan Borough Councils and 
one City Council. The political picture has been a relatively stable one, with the sub-
region being a Labour stronghold. At the time of research, three of the four 
authorities were Labour controlled, with no overall control in the remaining 
authority. As large, upper tier authorities, all four Councils have a strong traditional 
commitment to sport development. Despite the public sector austerity measures, all 
four authorities have retained relatively large sport development teams (three to 12+ 
officers), with two authorities outsourcing the development function to a leisure trust 
and the remaining two housing sports development internally. In budgetary terms, 
the four local authorities allocated a combined budget of £15 million for sport in 
2010/11 (CLG, 2011, 2012). This fell sharply to £12,199,000 in 2011/12 primarily due 
to one authority reducing its budget by £2.5 million. In contrast, the city council 
increased their budget by 19.1%, the result of selling off formerly owned council land 
for retail development and reallocating revenue budgets to develop a new community 
sport strategy (see Table 5.3). 
 
Table 5.3 Budget for sport by local authorities in the CSP 1 area (source: CLG, 2011, 2012) 
 
 
CSP structure, organisation and strategic priorities 
The CSP is registered as a company limited by guarantee and housed within the sub-
regional Local Enterprise Partnership (LEP). According to the CSP’s strategy, ‘the 
partnership represents all the main stakeholders in PE, sport and physical activity 
including local authorities, NGBs, PCTs, further education, University, and the 
voluntary and community sector, private sector, leisure trusts and the LEP’ (CSP 1 
Strategy 2013). Underpinning this, the three strategic priorities for CSP 1 for the 
period 2012-2015 are (i) increasing adult participation in sport and physical activity, 
 
 
-168- 
 
(ii) increasing youth participation in sport and physical activity, and (iii) increasing 
the quantity and quality of the sport workforce across the partnership area. With 
regards to organisational governance, the CSP board hold ultimate accountability for 
the partnership’s work. The board is a voluntary, representative board whereby 
individuals receive no fee or remuneration, and are elected to represent a particular 
sector. In total there are 13 board members representing NGBs (three 
representatives), local authorities (two representatives), the workforce and skills 
forum, the LEP, a local leisure trust, public health, further/higher education, the 
commercial sector, community sport networks and the director of the CSP. In theory, 
the board discuss and agree the CSPs strategy and direct the work of the CSP sport 
team (otherwise known as the core team). The core team consists of 10 FTE members 
of staff with a variety of positions and responsibilities as detailed in Figure 5.1. As is 
the case with all 49 CSPs, Sport England provides the CSP with annual core funding 
of £240,000 (based on the 2011/12 allocation). In addition, the highest performing 
CSPs have the opportunity to secure a share of £80,00013. In return for this the CSP 
is required to meet the conditions of the CSP core specification as detailed in Chapter 
4. The CSP also receives contributions and grants from local authorities, the PCT and 
the LEP. These contributions together with Sport England funding and programme-
related income gave the CSP a turnover of £1,000,000 for the 2011/12 financial year. 
 
Figure 5.1 Structure of core team, CSP 1 
 
                                                          
13 At the time of writing, no decision had been made regarding the allocation of the additional £80,000 
investment. 
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Sports participation trends 
Sports participation in CSP 1 has been significantly lower than national and regional 
averages (see Table 5.4). However, participation rates in the area have increased by 
1.2% over the six year period between 2005/6 and 2011/12, although the gap between 
national and regional averages, and CSP 1 has widened from 5.5% to 6.1% (national) 
and 3.2% to 3.6% (regional) over the same period. These differences arguably reflect 
the range of negative correlates of participation that exist within the area, when 
compared to the national data. For example, in comparison to the national and 
regional picture, CSP 1 has a larger 65+ population, higher numbers of people 
working in lowly paid employment, more worklessness and greater unemployed and 
higher levels of multiple deprivation. Given this context, a 1.2% increase in sports 
participation over a 6-year period could be viewed as positive. 
 
Table 5.4 Adult (16+) Participation in Sport (at least once a week *) (source: Sport England, 2013) 
 
 
The data reveal a relatively consistent variation between the area and the regional 
and national levels when analysing sports participation by demographic group. The 
area has lower participation in almost all demographic groups with the exception of 
socioeconomic group 4 (NS SEC 4) and the non-white population. That said, 
participation in most demographic groups has increased in the area between the 
baseline year of 2005/6 and 2011/12 with notable gains (≥1.0%) in the following 
populations: male, non white, 26-34 age group, NS SEC 1-2, NS SEC 4. Nevertheless, 
there appears to be little change in participation amongst groups more commonly 
reported as being excluded (Collins & Kay, 2004), including: females, minority 
ethnic groups, and the 55+ (see Table 5.5). 
 
 
CSP 1     Region    England 
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Table 5.5 Adult (16+) Participation in Sport (at least once a week *) by demographic group (source: 
Sport England, 2013) 
 
 
Estimates suggest that the growth potential for adult participation in sport in the 
CSP 1 area is 52.8%, or 463,500 people (Sport England, 2013). In other words, more 
than half of the local population have expressed interest in wanting to do more sport. 
This compares to 55.1% and 55.4% at regional and national levels, respectively. The 
three sports with the highest growth potential in the area are reported as swimming 
(87,200/9.9%), cycling (61,400/7.0%) and football (29,300/3.3%) (Sport England, 
2013). Other sport-related indicators such as volunteering in sport, club 
membership, coaching, and competitive sport present a similar picture to that above 
insomuch as the local area generally has lower levels of participation in formal sport 
compared to regional and national means (see Table 5.6). In contrast to the data 
above, all of the indicators have decreased with the exception of sport volunteering. 
This, combined with the increase in once a week participation noted above, and the 
decrease in formal sports noted below, leads one to deduce that the increase in sports 
participation is primarily a result of non-traditional or informal sports participation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            CSP 1                              Region       England 
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Table 5.6 Other Sport Indicators: Volunteering and formal sports participation (source: Sport 
England, 2013) 
 
 
The CSP-NGB relationship 
The initial, quantitative phase of the research explored the CSP-NGB relationship 
from the perspective of both the CSP and NGBs. A statistical analysis of results 
revealed no significant difference in the views toward the CSP-NGB relationship 
when analysing by situational factors such as CSP hosting arrangement or CSP 
turnover, and no significant difference in the view of NGBs when analysed by NGB 
size (see Appendix 4). Of greater import was the attitude and experience of the 
research participant (in most cases the CSP Director or the NGB National 
Development Manager). Here, the follow-up qualitative phase of research explored 
agent attitudes and experiences in relation to three aspects that are of integral 
importance to the CSP-NGB relationship: (i) the CSP leadership of NGB relations, 
(ii) the factors that have positively influenced CSP-NGB relationships; and (iii) the 
problems and challenges that have adversely affected the CSP-NGB relationship. 
 
The CSP leadership of NGB relations 
Whilst the CSP-NGB relationship is primarily the result of an enforced partnership, 
insofar as all CSPs are required to develop and manage relationships with NGBs, the 
way in which relationships are managed varies from CSP to CSP. At the board level, 
CSP 1 could be described as unidirectional and informational. In other words the 
board appeared to take a very hands-off approach with regards to strategic matters, 
including strategic relations with partners such as NGBs, leaving these matters to the 
CSP core team under the leadership of the CSP Director, the Commissioning 
Manager, and the Sports Manager. As one representative put it ‘...at the board level 
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there is far too much programme specific talk, an update about Sportivate or 
SportMakers or the Youth Games, but not enough engagement of the big strategic 
issues for sport in the area’ (Interview: Principal Sport & Recreation Manager, 
Metropolitan Borough Council; 6 June 2012). Indeed, the evidence outside the CSP 
suggests that partners view the CSP board leadership as playing a more informal 
role, maintaining a ‘watching brief’, one where they predominantly listen to 
operational updates, financial reports and details of new programmes, led by 
members of the core team, Sport England and other agents. 
 
With regards to the core team, Figure 5.1 above illustrates how CSP 1 manages 
partnership arrangements with NGBs. This is primarily led by the Sports Manager 
with strategic support for partnership development provided by the CSP Director. 
This approach to partnership development had initially been established as the CSP 1 
senior management team viewed it as the most effective approach in developing deep 
and trusting relationships with NGBs: 
 
You need trust, open communication and bloody good people. I 
think very often the relationship develops depending on the 
experience of the people involved in it ... If we coordinate 
everything through the one lead officer, then we can easily track 
progress, identify problems and be confident about the service we 
are offering NGBs (Interview: Director, CSP 1; 25 May 2012). 
 
Nonetheless, this approach to managing partnership arrangements with the CSP had 
a number of problems. First, the vast workload involved in managing relations with 
up to 44 NGBs stretched the capacity of the Sports Manager. Second, the CSP was 
keen to enhance its offer and wanted to provide NGBs with support from officers 
with some sport-specific expertise. In this regard, the sport-specific expertise of the 
Sport Manager across a range of sports did not nearly match that offered by the sum 
of the core team. In response to these challenges CSP 1 were, at the time of research, 
developing a new system of prioritising support for different NGBs/sports as well as 
transitioning to a new approach to NGB partnership management. 
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The prioritisation of sports involved the CSP developing a three-tiered system of 
support, with NGBs being categorised as Gold, Silver or Bronze sports14. The way in 
which sports are categorised depends on each NGB and the degree to which they 
consider the sub-region a priority and/or whether the sport has local significance 
(i.e. it forms part of the sport legacy programme delivered by the CSP). The Gold 
sports are those that the CSP view as being the highest priority and where the CSP 
would endeavour to work more closely with these NGBs on a day-to-day basis. Those 
sports who have not identified the sub-region and are not a local priority will be 
allocated in the Bronze category. These NGBs will receive standard support in line 
with the core specification. The NGBs that have elected to work across the whole of 
England, and have not identified the sub region as a priority would be categorised as 
a Silver sport. The CSPs would spend a little more time and provide more support 
and resources for these NGBs than that required by the core specification, but not to 
the same extent as Gold sports. The CSP feel compelled to take this approach ‘to 
ensure that all sports receive the bare minimum in line with the core specification ... 
as well as targeting our resources accordingly’ (Interview: Sports Manager, CSP 1; 
25 May 2012). 
 
With regards to the new approach to leading partnership work with NGBs, the plan 
was for the CSP Director to maintain responsibility for strategic-level partnership 
development, the Sport Manager to maintain responsibility for overseeing all NGB 
liaisons, but responsibility for day-to-day support being delegated across the CSP. 
This would appease capacity issues through a more equal distribution of NGB work 
across a larger number of people in the CSP. It would also serve the purpose of 
enhancing the legitimacy of the CSP by supporting NGBs with CSP representatives 
who are knowledgeable and interested in the sport. This would be achieved by 
matching NGB lead responsibilities in the CSP with officer’s background, interests 
and knowledge.  
 
I think it is important that we can relate to the NGB ... part of this is 
demonstrating some knowledge about the sport in question, rather 
than just knowledge about the NGB. So, we are starting to share 
                                                          
14 At the time of the writing the distribution of sports across Gold, Silver and Bronze categories had not been 
decided. 
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NGB liaison responsibilities across the office. It’s a real challenge to 
cover all the sports ... but it’s about utilising the skills and 
knowledge that we have [within the CSP] more effectively 
(Interview: Sports Manager, CSP 1; 25 May, 2012). 
 
That said, for the NGB the legitimacy of the CSP emanates from the knowledge, local 
understanding and network of local contacts that the CSP holds. Whilst sports-
specific knowledge may well be a desirable feature, the core requirement is that the 
‘CSP provides the local context’ (Interview: Regional Development Manager, Lawn 
Tennis Association; 29 May 2012 ), ‘holds a clear and common understanding of the 
local issues’ (Interview: County Director, England & Wales Cricket Board; 25 May 
2012), and ‘[has] the local knowledge needed to identify the most effective way of 
delivering [the NGB’s] products (Interview: Regional Development Manager, 
England Netball; 6 June 2012). Indeed, the need for local expertise and 
understanding appears to be clearly understood by the CSP and, whilst they may aim 
for enhanced legitimacy through the added value of its representatives having sport-
specific expertise, this is not at the expense of their knowledge or expertise about the 
local area. 
 
Every area is unique, there are nuances and there are certain ways 
to approach things ... we have considerable data on the [CSP 1 
area]. NGBs can come and meet with us and we can help them to 
develop a greater local understanding of the area, the issues, who to 
approach, who not to approach, that sort of thing (Interview: 
Director, CSP 1; 25 May, 2012). 
 
In short, both area-based and sport-specific knowledge were reported as important 
factors in the CSP’s leadership of CSP-NGB relations. In particular, the frequent 
reference to data and/or knowledge supports the relatively new evidence-based 
orthodoxy permeating community sport policy. Moreover, CSP 1 does not solely 
collate and utilise data to enhance practice, it also promotes itself as an organisation 
that can broker and facilitate the use of data, knowledge and intelligence. Thus, it 
helps other organisations, particularly NGBs, to develop an evidence-based approach 
to increasing sports participation. This serves the dual purpose of aiding the CSP-
NGB relationship and enhancing the legitimacy of the CSP. This latter point aligns 
with Parrish’s (2003) more general view of the sports development profession as 
having gained legitimacy and influence primarily due to its technical expertise 
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relating to policy, programmes and funding initiatives. It could be argued that the 
more expertise the CSP accumulates and publically demonstrates, the more 
legitimate and influential they believe themselves to be. More importantly, the other 
agents involved in community sport are likely to develop a general perception of the 
CSP as a highly professional, legitimate organisation, although this will likely also be 
shaped by other mediating factors that are important in the context of CSP-NGB 
relations, including those presented in the following sub-section.  
 
Factors that have positively influenced the CSP-NGB relationship 
To recap, NGBs are the lead organisation in community sport policy. In total, 44 
NGBs were selected to receive resources for the development and implementation of 
a whole sport plan for 2013-17. These plans set out targets for adult participation, 
youth drop-off and talent development for each sport and, more importantly, detail 
how these targets will be achieved. Underpinning this, each of the 49 CSPs receive 
core funding from Sport England. In return for funding, CSPs are required to deliver 
cross-sport services to meet NGB priorities, and to develop and maintain the 
strategic alliances and local networks that NGBs and Sport England need to drive, 
deliver and secure resources (Sport England, 2012c: 1-4). Thus, the interaction of 
CSP and NGB networks are critical in the implementation of community sport policy.  
 
An obvious but important starting point in studying the interaction of CSP-NGB 
relations, regardless of the CSP’s prioritisation of NGBs, is the recognition that it 
represents neither a singular nor consistent arrangement. The very notion of the 
CSP-NGB relationship is dependent on a range of individual actors and institutions 
(primarily the CSP core team, NGB regional or sub-regional team or county sport 
association, and sometimes the local authority) and is multifaceted in that it can 
involve relations between numerous individuals within the CSP core team and 
between a range of individuals in each NGB, across a total of 44 NGBs. General 
attitudes toward the CSP-NGB relationship reflect the variation experienced both by 
the CSP and by sports: 
 
There are clearly a wide range of different CSP-NGB relations. Some 
work well, others not so well. In some areas they speak as and when 
they have to, in other areas they have a far more well-developed 
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partnership (Interview: County Director, England & Wales Cricket 
Board; 25 May, 2012). 
 
The phase 1 data presented a similar theme where attitudes toward the relationship 
tended to vary depending both on the CSP and/or the sport and, more specifically, 
the quality of the personnel employed. 
 
In some instances the NGBs are great to work with and innovative, 
very often it is personality driven rather than anything to do with 
systems or performance management (Online survey: Non-hosted 
CSP). 
 
CSPs are all very different--some are exceptionally good to work 
with, others are difficult to work with. The best explanation for this 
is the type of staff, their attitudes, experiences and ability to work 
hard to develop positive relationships. Some CSP staff are excellent, 
others do not have the time of day for us (Online survey: Small 
NGB). 
 
The evidence from the case suggests that individuals are the most important 
correlate of effective CSP-NGB relations: ‘...the people are what really matter, having 
the right people with the right skills and the right attitude. ‘If you have that then 
everything else tends to fall into place’ (Interview: County representative, England 
Athletics; 6 June 2012); ‘ultimately it is about personal relationships and strong 
working partnerships, this comes down to speaking with people, getting along, 
having empathy toward one another and understanding each other’s position’ 
(Interview: County Director, England & Wales Cricket Board; ). This was a theme 
addressed by almost all representatives involved in the case. In exploring the notion 
of having the right people, the data infers a combination of style and substance. 
“Style” refers to a set of characteristics that are generally perceived as positive, such 
as being open, adaptable, professional, friendly, and passionate about sport. 
“Substance” is the competencies, skills and behaviours that individual actors possess. 
Most importantly, this idea of having the “right people working in the system” 
(Interview: Director, CSP 1; 25 May, 2013) appears, initially at least, to be an 
individual judgement of other professionals involved in the policy community, 
specifically a judgement of their character and ability to the job. Whether these 
perceptions are objective and based on firm evidence, or subjective and based on 
 
 
-177- 
 
common narratives or storylines is of little concern to this study. What is important 
is the way in which these views of individual character or ability alter actor behaviour 
and belief systems (Sabatier & Weible, 2007) and ultimately influence the nature of 
the CSP-NGB relationship and any subsequent efforts to implement policy.  
 
The process of developing partnerships also received considerable attention. Four 
principles were identified as being critical in establishing and developing effective 
working relations between CSPs and NGBs: (i) mutual respect, (ii) trust between 
CSPs and NGBs, (iii) engagement and (iv) resources. Scheberle’s (2004) typology of 
working relationships highlights trust and involvement as key factors that underpin 
highly effective working relations. Indeed, the case supports Scheberle’s assertion 
that the most effective partnerships are those with high levels of mutual trust, 
support, goal consensus and a clear commitment to action. 
 
The CSP Chair viewed mutual respect as an important pre-requisite of effective 
partnership working in the sub-region. He underlined the importance of both CSPs 
and NGBs understanding and respecting the different positions and priorities of the 
other, putting the largely resource-fuelled disputes behind them, and focusing on 
areas of common interest. A number of NGBs emphasised the importance of mutual 
respect: ‘you need to respect each other’s direction and purpose and work out where 
there is common ground’ (Interview: County representative, England Athletics; 6 
June 2012); ‘...it’s all about communication and respect, open communication builds 
respect and trust, and at the end of the day, the relationships where we have respect 
and trust are the ones where we reap the benefits (Interview: Regional Development 
Manager, England Golf Partnership; 24 May 2012). Unsurprisingly, trust was 
identified by a number of CSP and NGB representatives as being important in the 
context of effective CSP-NGB relationships. More importantly, whilst there were high 
levels of awareness regarding the need for trust, there was relatively limited evidence 
of a high-trust relationship between the CSP and NGBs. Instead, the reality of the 
CSP-NGB relationship is more reasonably reflected as one that functions with 
variable levels of trust. 
 
Predictably, engagement was a critical issue for all partners. ‘Being committed and 
involved’ was commonly viewed as a correlate of effective partnership working in the 
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CSP. To be clear, relationships were viewed to be highly effective where there was 
clear and consistent involvement of partners, a commitment to following up on 
actions, and a high level of trust between partners, regardless of the overall outcome 
of the partnership (i.e. its effect on increasing participation of sport), supporting the 
argument that partnerships had, in some respects, become an end in themselves. The 
CSP Sport Manager suggested that they have or are close to developing this type of 
‘high quality’ relationship with eight sports, namely: athletics, badminton, basketball, 
cricket, football, golf, netball and swimming. Moreover, the level of engagement, 
commitment to action and making the partnership work was ultimately seen to be 
directed by the individuals involved in the partnership. Having the right people with 
the right skills is identified as the key prerequisite to effective partnership work 
within the CSP. It is reasonable to assume, that over time as the partnership 
solidifies and strengthens, working relations of this type will cultivate higher levels of 
trust and respect amongst individual agents. Conversely, it is important to note that 
higher levels of engagement also present a higher level of risk in terms of a ‘shock 
event’ or situation adversely affecting the respect and trust that underpins the 
relationship over time. Interestingly but perhaps not wholly surprising given the 
complex and interdependent figuration of potential relations, a more common theme 
in the CSP related to a lack of engagement and the problems that this created for the 
partnership from the perspective of the CSP, local authorities and NGBs. These 
issues will be examined further in the following sub-section. 
 
The final factor that partners reported as important was other institutional resources 
such as programmes and finances. Given the previous criticisms of programme 
overload or ‘initiativitis’ (Collins & Kay, 2002), the identification of pre-packaged 
programmes was surprising. Indeed, the implications of nationally-developed 
programmes does not sit well in the context of literature pointing to the tension in 
community sport between traditional top-down approaches (cf. Harris et al., 2009, 
May et al., 2012) and the deep power structures that underpin community sport. A 
closer examination of the data shows that the desire for programmes comes solely 
from the CSP and some of the key NGBs with which the CSP works, specifically 
badminton, football, golf and netball. Local authorities stressed that the potential of 
convenient recreational pursuits such as running/jogging and cycling was greater 
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than that of NGB products, which all three local authorities viewed as traditional 
sport development interventions focusing on player, coach and club development. 
 
In contrast, the CSP and NGB comments associated national programmes with 
effective CSP-NGB relationships, crediting them with giving the relationship a 
tangible focal point to direct discussion and efforts. The CSP Sports Manager pointed 
out that the relationship can be quickly focused on programme delivery rather than 
spending weeks or months agreeing what, if anything, the partners should do and 
how they should go about doing it. The positive effect of national programmes for the 
CSP was dampened by the issue of funding. Indeed, cost and price were attached to 
the issue of national programmes in two ways. First, the CSP urged NGBs to develop 
programmes and products with participation as the primary goal. They pinpointed 
certain sports that they viewed as developing sensible programmes and products 
which were affordable, adaptable and generally positive and helpful to the 
partnership. However, NGBs such as cycling were charging £30,000 per annum per 
local authority (£120,000 for the sub region) for their national programme—a 
strategy which the CSP and the local authorities viewed as having more to do with 
commercial opportunism than increasing participation in sport. Second, the CSP 
argued that there is a need for low-price programmes. This was something that it 
considered exceptionally important, mainly based on the high levels of poverty and 
multiple deprivation reported in the sub-region. The CSP reported strong working 
relations with NGBs and leisure operators that understood and were prepared to 
adapt to this context (see sports listed above). In short, NGB national programmes 
that are appropriately priced and packaged for the local socio-economic environment 
are seen as a resource that can galvanise partners and aid the development of an 
effective partnership between the CSP and NGB. On the other hand, prescriptive 
national programmes that cannot be adapted to local needs or are cost-prohibitive 
may generate tension and jeopardise the CSP-NGB relationship. 
 
The problems that have adversely affected the CSP-NGB relationship 
The problems that have adversely affected the CSP-NGB relationship in the CSP 1 
case have been grouped together into three categories: (i) lack of engagement, (ii) 
diversity of priorities, and (iii) process over people. Before exploring each of these 
issues, it is interesting to note the comments of three NGB representatives who 
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stressed the need for greater honesty and openness, particularly with regard to 
problems concerning the CSP-NGB relationship. For one NGB the issue was about 
being honest with CSPs when the relationship was not working: 
 
We have to be honest about what is working and what is not. We 
tend to want to say what others want to hear. I think we are still 
caught up in trying to please everybody. I think we should just stop 
and focus on working with those CSPs where it’s working well 
(Interview: Regional Development Manager, England Basketball; 
29 May 2012). 
 
This sentiment was echoed by another NGB representative: 
 
We like to present this idea that everything is rosy, everything is 
wonderful. We have to be more prepared to discuss the problems 
and the things that are not working as much as we do those things 
that are working well (Interview: County Director, England & 
Wales Cricket Board; 25 May 2012). 
 
The first of the three major problem areas detailed above was engagement. The term 
“engagement” on its own does not fully represent the range or depth of this issue. 
Here, it refers to a true, genuine cooperation where there is respect, trust, a clear goal 
consensus, commitment to actions and a deep commitment to the relationship. The 
partnership literature notes difficulties with engagement, in particular the high 
desire for collaborative capacity on the one hand, but the practical difficulties 
associated with realising it on the other (cf. Beckley et al., 2008; Chaskin, 2001; 
Hudson et al., 1999; Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002). Huxham & Vangen (2005) noted 
that collaborative capacity was unlikely to be achieved in ‘contractual relationships’ 
where partnerships are enforced or required. Such partnerships tend to lack the 
conditions required for sustained cooperation (Axelrod, 1984). Whilst the CSP 1 case 
does not provide unequivocal evidence to support the lack of collaborative capacity—
there are some sports with which the CSP has a positive and constructive 
relationship—the evidence does suggest that this is a significant issue which 
challenges both the philosophical position of the CSP as well as the nature of the 
community sport policy system, which essentially rests upon its ability to work 
collaboratively. The following paragraphs will address the former issue, whilst the 
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latter will be addressed in the final section of this chapter, which focuses on attitudes 
toward the community sport policy process. 
 
The problem of engagement can be seen in three distinct areas: the broader 
conception of the CSP, specifically the CSP’s role in the strategic leadership of sport 
across the area; the NGB whole sport planning process; and the involvement of NGBs 
in the CSP. If we go back to the creation of CSPs in the early 2000s, one of the core 
functions of each CSP was to provide leadership and coordination for sport across its 
area. CSPs were conceived as broader partnerships, umbrella organisations that 
would represent local authorities, county sport associations and others involved in 
sport. The CSP would be the voice for sport for the area, the lead agency responsible 
for enhancing communication and coordinating efforts to grow sports participation 
and enhance talent. Whilst this broader conception of the partnership remains a 
feature of CSPs, to do this effectively, two conditions must be met. First, the CSP 
must develop and pursue a strategic role. Second, it must be viewed and sanctioned 
as the strategic lead for sport by these agencies. This case is a prime example of the 
CSP assuming the former without the latter having taken place. The CSP 1 senior 
management team view themselves as the strategic lead for sport in the sub region: 
‘first and foremost we are a strategic agency’ (Interview: Director, CSP 1; 25 May 
2012); ‘we have got to be seen in our area as taking the lead, we manage programmes 
and utilise local authorities and community networks to deliver’ (Interview: Sports 
Manager, CSP 1; 25 May 2012). In contrast, NGB and local authority partners reveal 
a range of perspectives, which underscore their independence and resistance to 
leadership from an outside source. All three local authorities involved in the case 
study highlight the constant challenge of leadership and ownership of sport in the 
area. Rather than representing a collective approach in which the CSP and local 
authorities work hand-in-hand, the local authority perspectives illuminate a more 
complex and, at times, divisive relationship where they feel that the CSP are 
attempting to take a lead role or dictate strategic and operational matters, where the 
local authority felt better placed to do so: 
 
The CSP talks about being the strategic lead, strategic lead this, 
strategic lead that...but actually, strategic leadership comes at the 
local level...there is an argument that there is no need for CSPs. If 
NGBs worked more effectively with local authorities there would be 
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more resources available to coordinate programmes in order to 
sustain and grow participation (Interview: Principal Sports & 
Recreation Manager, Metropolitan Borough Council; 6 June 
2012). 
 
Adding to this, the Community Development Manager of the City Council stressed 
the unique nature of the sub-region, the size of the four authorities and their 
traditional involvement in sport development going back 30 years as the potential 
causes of the tension created by the notion of a sport partnership. More importantly, 
she pointed to Local Authorities as being better placed to implement policy due to 
their local links and local knowledge: 
 
I don’t think we actually need the CSP...we could do the work 
ourselves if we had the funding. I would argue that we are better 
placed because we have the local links to make these things 
sustainable, we have the local knowledge and understanding to 
make sure it is needs-based and being delivered where it should be 
delivered, and to make sure that it is clearly coordinated with other 
services and programmes (Interview: Community Development 
Manager, City Council; 25 May 2012).  
 
While the CSP may represent a partnership in name, the original broad conception of 
the partnership to provide a strategic lead and a voice for sport for the sub-region 
encompassing local authorities, county sport associations and others has not yet 
transpired. Thus, rather than aiding policy implementation, the deep structures of 
power underpinning the partnership will more likely make the exercise of achieving 
government goals more challenging (Bloyce et al., 2008). Further, according to the 
Principal Sports & Recreation Manager at one of the three Metropolitan Borough 
Councils, the inability of the CSP to work strategically across the sub-region creates 
major problems and frustrations for NGBs. He cited the lost opportunities of working 
strategically with NGBs on planning for and securing a number of sports-specific 
posts like those in neighbouring CSPs. He also suggested that the area had proved to 
be frustrating because of the lack of consensus across the CSP and the four local 
authorities, arguing that NGBs were more likely to go and work in the larger CSPs 
nearby. 
 
 
 
-183- 
 
The second issue relating to engagement concerns the NGB whole sport planning 
process. As this issue relates directly to roles within policy making and policy 
implementation, it will be discussed more fully in the next section. However, the 
CSP, local authorities and one NGB representative stressed the need for greater 
partner involvement and engagement in the whole sport plan process. The lack of 
engagement in the process was seen to adversely affect the CSP-NGB relationship in 
three specific ways: first, it reinforces the notion of hierarchy and a top-down 
approach, not to mention the ‘privileged position’ of the NGB, particularly where the 
CSP is required to deliver specific programmes and activities on behalf of the NGB, 
yet the same conditions are not applied to NGBs. Second, the CSP and local 
authorities are less likely to commit to a plan where they have no involvement, 
particularly if the plan carries implications for them. Third, both the CSP and the 
local authorities believe that they are best placed to advise on the development of 
plans and strategies for the area:  
 
Very often there is a lack of understanding between the people who 
put the plans together in NGBs and what is actually going on on the 
ground. NGBs should be more open and more willing to speak to 
people who have a better understanding of what is actually 
happening on the ground (Interview: Community Development 
Manager, City Council; 25 May 2012).  
 
Thus, from the viewpoint of CSP and local authorities, NGBs neither need nor choose 
to engage partners in the development of their whole sport plans. They believe this 
leads to a plan which is either not detailed enough (i.e. does not translate specific 
actions/priorities for the sub-region) or is not based on the best intelligence. 
Consequently, NGBs are seen to selectively pursue their own interests and exclude 
others. 
 
The final issue relating to engagement concerns the lack of NGB involvement in the 
CSP. This is not an issue from the CSP perspective: the NGB excludes itself from the 
CSP and/or determines that other partners or methods are a higher priority: ‘If I’m 
honest I don’t spend a lot of hours with them through the year, it’s not a priority, my 
priorities are schools and clubs, and places to play’ (Interview: Regional 
Development Manager, Lawn Tennis Association; 29 May 2012), ‘while I’m mindful 
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of the core funding that CSPs receive, it is difficult to drill down to clearly see what 
value and support the CSP can offer’ (Interview: Regional Development Manager, 
Amateur Swimming Association; 24 May 2012). This reinforces the evidence from 
local authorities concerning the lack of consensus regarding the place of the CSP as 
the strategic lead for sport for the sub-region and underscores the pervasive nature of 
power and the way in which this intersects with seemingly rational and positive 
attempts to create strategic leadership for sport at the sub-regional level: 
 
[A] lot of it is about the CSP wanting to be seen as the gatekeeper of 
sport in the area, but they’re not necessarily seen as this. I mean we 
would rather do the work ourselves than rely on a gatekeeper 
(Interview: County Director, England & Wales Cricket Board; 25 
May 2012). 
 
The swimming representative discussed how hard they worked to push the CSP and 
agree specific areas of work, stating that not doing this ‘would result in little more 
than a cosmetic relationship’ between the CSP and the NGB (Interview: County 
Director, England & Wales Cricket Board; 25 May 2012). This also underlines the 
diverse nature of interactions between the CSP and NGBs. 
 
The second problem area that was commonly reported as adversely affecting the 
CSP-NGB relationship is the historic and, to some extent, embedded organisational 
priorities associated with the CSP and NGBs. Here, the highest priority of CSP 1 is to 
increase the number of people in the sub–region who regularly engage in physical 
activity, with sport included as one of many physical activities. In contrast, NGBs 
may take a slightly different geographical view (and not include the sub-region as a 
priority) with the majority focussing squarely on increasing participation, enhancing 
talent, and supporting high performance and elite athletes. The particular issue here 
is not that of differing priorities, but more the implications of this in relation to the 
design and development of interventions and, in particular, the brokering and 
sustained development of partnerships between the CSP and NGBs. First, the CSP 
and NGBs are primarily directed by activities and programmes that will enable them 
to achieve their goals. So the CSP works on activities that will help to promote 
engagement in sport and physical activity, while the NGB is more concerned with 
working on activities that will increase participation in its particular sport, as well as 
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pursuing strategies that will support player, coach, club, volunteer, competition, and 
event development.  
 
One of the major challenges is that we are all in different places ... 
NGBs want more people playing their sport, but also, of course, 
they want to make sure that they are investing in and developing 
talent. The CSP is more concerned with getting people active, so 
more closely matched to what the local authorities and the PCT are 
doing. But, we have to work with NGBs, even though our agendas 
do not match so closely, that is a key part of the agreement with 
Sport England (Interview: Chairman, CSP 1; 25 May 2012). 
 
One implication of these diverse organisational priorities is a relatively small overlap 
of priorities between the agencies. More important is the range of competing 
priorities that sit outside of this which divert the attention and resources of the CSP 
and NGBs to a different group of partners that are viewed as being close allies and 
critical partners in supporting each to achieve their priorities. In this way the CSP 
can be seen closely allied with the sub-regional development corporation and the 
four sub-regional PCTs (up to March 31, 2013; transitioning to four Clinical 
Commissioning Groups from April, 1, 2013). In contrast, many regional level NGBs 
tend to more closely associate with schools, clubs and coaches. The point here is not 
about whether either agency should or should not have a set of wider priorities or a 
wider group of relations with which realisation of these priorities may be achieved. It 
is merely to demonstrate that this carries implications for the CSP-NGB relationship 
and for the implementation of community sport policy. 
 
The final problem area that adversely affects the CSP-NGB relationship concerned 
the weight given to new performance management techniques, what has been termed 
‘process over people’. This involves an overt emphasis on processes such as the core 
specification, the annual CSP performance management process, and the quarterly 
trend analysis of participation statistics provided through the Active People survey. 
While a relatively small number of agents highlighted the benefits of performance 
management techniques, particularly with regard to ‘being more focused and more 
target driven’ (Interview: Regional Development Manager, England Golf 
Partnership; 24 May 2012), the majority underlined a more critical view of such 
techniques, revealing a tension whereby performance management is seen to 
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replicate the form-filling and bureaucracy associated with an outdated public sector, 
stifling the softer skills and attention needed to broker and enhance partnerships and 
partnership interactions: 
 
Sport England has all those documents like the core specification 
that we as a CSP have to use, but they are just pieces of paper. What 
is more interesting for us is the people behind the plan. The papers 
sit on the shelf, it’s about getting beyond that to actually make it 
happen (Interview: Sports Manager, CSP 1; 25 May 2012). 
 
The emphasis on performance management techniques had more striking 
implications for one local authority representative who had worked in sport 
development for over 10 years. She stated that the skills of the workforce are being 
adversely affected as their attention is focussed on process-related issues such as 
structures, datasets, and the core specification at the expense of acquiring softer 
skills required for maintaining effective partnership working: 
 
...we all have lots on knowledge on the system and the structures 
and things like Active People and Market Segmentation and that 
sort of thing, but we are all a little wet behind the ears when it 
comes to partnership working and understanding how to go about 
initiating and managing good working relations (Interview: 
Community Development Manager, City Council; 25 May 2012). 
 
Whilst this point was directed at the existing workforce, the representative also 
extended the criticism to the future workforce, explaining that her experience of 
recent graduates was similar in that they had reasonable knowledge of policy and the 
relevant structures and agencies, but very little understanding of the softer skills 
required to broker and maintain effective working relationships. This point resonates 
with literature on collaborative capacity, in particular the assumption that the people 
involved in the collaboration have the skills and competencies to maintain the 
wellbeing of the partnership and get the best out of the collaboration (Chaskin, 
2001). Further, it reinforces the skills and leadership deficit that Allison (2012) 
viewed as adversely affecting the ability of the community sport sector to realise the 
2012 legacy goals. 
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The role of the CSP-NGBs in policy making and implementation 
This sub-section is primarily concerned with the role of the CSP-NGB relationship in 
policy making and policy implementation at the national and local levels. The 
literature presented in Chapter 2 will be used to analyse the empirical findings and 
discuss how these realities relate to the rhetoric of national and local policy. First, to 
provide context for the ensuing discussion, a summary of the policy making process 
for community sport is provided. 
 
To recap from Chapter 4, the community sport policy making process has five stages: 
(1) national agencies (the DCMS and Sport England) debate and agree the policy 
objective; (2) NGBs prepare a whole sport plan for a 3-year period, detailing how 
they will achieve targets for participation, youth drop-off, and talent development; 
(3) Sport England reviews the NGBs’ plan and makes a grant award, primarily 
sourced from the Lottery Sports Fund; (4) NGBs work with other partners, including 
CSPs, to implement aspects of the plan, and (5) Sport England evaluates progress 
against agreed targets and takes remedial action as necessary (May et al., 2012). This 
section is particularly concerned with reviewing the role of the CSP and NGBs in 
national and local level policymaking for community sport, the role of the CSP and 
NGBs in the preparation of the whole sport plan, and the relationship between the 
CSP and NGBs in the implementation of community sport policy. 
 
The role of the CSP and NGBs in national and local policy making  
The case clearly supports a top-down approach to community sport policy, consistent 
with Kay’s (1996) view of sport policy in the 1990s. There was clear agreement from 
all CSP and local authority representatives that, whilst they may form part of the 
subsystem which influences local policy relevant to sport, they are not part of the 
system responsible for initiating, formalising and selecting national-level policy 
objectives for community sport; for example: ‘we don’t really get involved in the 
national stuff, it’s really just something between the DCMS and Sport England’ 
(Interview: Community Services Manager, City Council; 25 May 2012); ‘nationally, 
we have a very limited role, it’s not really our job’ (Interview: Director, CSP 1; 25 
May 2012). This is the role that the CSP noted may change with the formalisation of 
the national CSP network, although the CSP Director noted that it was ‘still very early 
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days and difficult to say what impact the CSP Network will have in the longer term’ 
(Interview: Director, CSP 1; 25 May 2012). 
 
In contrast, a number of NGBs indicated that they were involved in discussions 
regarding the formalisation of national policy objectives for sport through their Chief 
Officer, for example: ‘David [Sparkes] is our Chief Executive and at the national level 
I think he is very effective at influencing and lobbying for the sport’ (Interview: 
Regional Development Manager, Amateur Swimming Association; 24 May 2012); 
‘I tend to not get too involved at my level, but I know that my Director and Chief 
Executive are heavily involved in discussions with Sport England and the DCMS’ 
(Interview: Regional Development Manager, Football Association; 24 May 2012). 
Within the discussion concerning policymaking for community sport, it became clear 
that regional and county-level NGB representatives view their whole sport plan as 
the de facto policy for community sport for the NGB. Four of the NGB 
representatives referred to a broad and open process, developed to ensure that the 
whole sport plan involved staff across the NGB (at regional and sub regional levels), 
not solely those at national level. This was particularly the case in netball and cricket, 
both of whom highlighted the work that goes into creating an inclusive whole sport 
plan in which a number of personnel in the NGB are involved. Similarly, football and 
cricket representatives pointed to the advantages of the National Frameworks that 
have emanated from the whole sport plan process. These frameworks detail the 
strategic priorities of the sport nationally. Priorities and desired actions at the local-
level are then determined and allocated to the appropriate national priority, thus 
enabling an operation similar to Elmore’s (1982, 1985) ‘forward and backward 
mapping’15.  
 
On reflection, the national policymaking process for community sport is viewed by 
the agents involved in the CSP to be driven by a limited coalition made up of 
representatives from the DCMS and Sport England, with some external influence, 
particularly from the medium/large NGBs. Outside the formal policymaking 
                                                          
15 For example, the FA has developed the seven pillars framework. This is built around four goals: 
growth and retention, raising standards, better players and running the game, and three enablers: 
workforce, facilities and marketing. At the local level, the county association, football development 
partnership (involving the local authorities, CSP, clubs, etc) and other key agents will discuss and 
agree actions for the county for each of the strategic priorities. 
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environment, the representatives of some NGBs feel connected to the formalisation 
of community sport policy through the NGB’s whole sport plan process. It is 
important to stress that this is not something which is unanimous across all NGBs in 
the case, with four (from eight) NGB representatives stating that they felt involved in 
the development of the NGB’s whole sport plan. 
 
With regards to local policy, unsurprisingly, all local authorities in the case revealed a 
compelling self-belief in their role in initiating and formalising sport-related policy at 
the local-level, as the following assertion serves to illustrate: ‘this is what I do, what I 
am about ... I play a very direct role in shaping local sport policy ... I think it is one of 
the strengths of my role’ (Interview: Community Development Manager, City 
Council; 25 May 2012). This was a point that was reinforced by the senior 
management team of the CSP: 
 
Locally, we work very closely with the four local authorities, 
advocating and influencing local policy issues that relate to sport, 
for example planning policies, in particular on section 106 monies 
to ensure reinvestment back into sport, anti-social behaviour and 
using sport to address problems in certain areas, and local health 
promotion strategies. We’ve led a number of strategic or policy 
issues across the area, including the facilities strategy work, the 
Sportivate programme as well as a number of regeneration projects 
(Interview: Director, CSP 1; 25 May 2012). 
 
This also serves to illustrate the commitment of both local authorities and the CSP to 
development through sport objectives. In fact, the local authorities involved in the 
case are frequently involved in demonstrating and advocating the role of sport in a 
range of local policy areas. This is partly driven by the survival instinct, whereby local 
authorities understand the need to anchor sport to major priority issues such as 
community safety, health and wellbeing or economic development in order to secure 
resources, preserve their status, and sustain their future against the backdrop of 
increasingly aggressive public sector austerity measures, particularly as the service 
remains a discretionary function of local government. It is also driven by a deep 
philosophical belief regarding sport’s wider social value. For example: 
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For us sport is a tool ... we are more concerned with things like 
promoting active lifestyles, community development, economic 
development and projects that engage young people, sport has the 
ability to tackle some of these agendas (Interview: Community 
Development Manager, City Council; 25 May 2012). 
 
This local-level commitment to sport for development may stem from the long-
standing tradition of programmes such as Action Sport, Active Communities and 
Positive Futures, or the existing evidence base for sport and its role in addressing 
wide-ranging societal problems, or a more parochially-driven concern for the overly 
normative value of sport. Whatever the basis of commitment, the local authorities in 
the case can be seen to harness policies and programmes regarding the instrumental 
use of sport, thus blurring the homogeneity of community sport policy and creating 
added complexity in the coordination and implementation of different programmes 
to achieve differing national and local priorities: 
 
...certainly the last national policy objective [for community sport] 
was driven by sport for sports sake, and you know, all the 
investment going to NGBs. But it’s the local outcome frameworks 
that partners like local authorities are really interested in, looking at 
things like economic regeneration, particularly in an area like [...]. 
So we are in the middle of it all really. We have to work with NGBs 
to support and plan for the sport for sport focus, but at the same 
time make sure that we do not lose focus on the wider role of sport, 
you know the things that our local partners are focused on 
(Interview: Commissioning Manager, CSP 1; 25 May 2012). 
 
Thus, the multifarious nature of community sport in the CSP 1 case was seen to 
create added complexity, particularly when considered alongside the socioeconomic 
context of the area. The Director of the CSP provided an interesting insight into this 
reality of community sport, clarifying that the two aims were not mutually beneficial 
insomuch as they required a completely different strategy: 
 
The debate about sport for sport’s sake and sport for development is 
huge. Some people say that it doesn’t matter, they both ultimately 
lead to the same thing. But I disagree. They are fundamentally 
different. They lead you to work in a completely different way. One 
is about the broader impact of sport, the other is simply about 
getting as many people as active as possible. You cannot play the 
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numbers game when you are involved in sport for development. 
This is a huge issue in an area like ours (Interview: Director, CSP 1; 
25 May 2012). 
 
Not only does this underscore the reality of the community sport policy making 
process and how these may differ at national and local levels, it also, more subtly, 
takes issue with statements from the Minister of Sport and the Sport England CEO 
regarding the broad interpretation of community sport policy as being concerned 
with both intrinsic and instrumental goals. 
 
The role of the CSP and NGBs in the preparation of whole sport plans  
As mentioned above, the whole sport plan represents a sport-specific community 
sport policy. This emphasises the importance of the plan and the process used to 
prepare and develop the plan. When reviewing the evidence, it is useful to return to 
the quantitative data from the first phase of research. This revealed some notable 
differences between CSPs and NGBs, particularly with regards to the whole sport 
plan process. The majority of CSPs suggested that there was a need for greater clarity 
in how national plans will be implemented locally. The majority of NGBs involved in 
the first phase research did not agree (see Appendix 4). Interestingly, in the first 
phase of research, CSP 1 was neutral, neither agreeing nor disagreeing with the need 
for greater clarity in how national plans will be implemented. However, in the 
qualitative phase of the research the CSP senior management team had a different 
view asserting that there was a need for greater clarity in how national plans will be 
implemented. Not only does this highlight the potentially inconsistent results of 
differing methodologies, it also underscores the need for caution when attempting to 
draw distinct or absolute conclusions from the data. 
  
With regards to the NGB whole sport plans, the CSP Director suggested that the CSP-
NGB relationship required maturity, openness, transparency and shared goals, “a lot 
more like a marriage than a partnership”. He underlined the insular nature of the 
whole sport planning process and the need for greater involvement of partners 
outside the NGB: “One of the big problems is that the NGBs devise their own plans 
and programmes and become very attached to them without involving local 
partners”. “This is just not going to work ... they don’t have the necessary buy-in to 
make it happen” (Interview: Director, CSP 1; 25 May 2012). That said, the CSP 
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Director and Sports Manager did refer to Sport England’s attempt to facilitate greater 
cross-agency dialogue ahead of the 2013-17 whole sport planning process through 
the organisation of a series of regional workshops targeting CSPs, NGBs and local 
authorities. However, whilst the CSP suggested that this was an interesting and 
worthwhile initiative, the lack of engagement and action following the workshop led 
the CSP to view the exercise as one designed to create the illusion of involvement 
rather than actually realising it. 
 
The overall criticism of the NGB whole sport planning process is more problematic 
when viewed using V. Ostrom’s (1973) notion of co-production. This requires the 
selection and inclusion of certain interests to help co-produce strategies and 
programmes, whilst other interests are excluded (intentionally or otherwise). The 
CSP viewed engagement in the NGB whole sport plan process as being highly 
selective, essentially involving only those groups or interests that provide grant aid 
(DCMS and Sport England) and/or represent shared norms, values and beliefs 
(national, regional and some county levels of the NGB). Thus, the general approach 
of NGBs is generally viewed by the CSP as one which prioritises the traditional, 
Weberian approach (Cantelon & Ingram, 2002) over the ideals of democratic 
governance promoted in strategies such as Creating a Sporting Habit. The whole 
sport planning process utilised by the majority of NGBs fails to secure participatory 
consensus amongst grassroots implementers, a prerequisite of successful policy 
implementation according to van Meter & van Horn (1975). It also assumes the 
rationality of grassroots implementers in following NGB strategy and underlines the 
more general problem of centrally conceived policy initiatives and how these tend to 
be poorly adapted to local conditions (Berman, 1978; Hjern & Porter, 1981). 
 
The role of the CSP and NGBs in policy implementation  
Three key themes were noted in the role of the CSP and NGBs in policy 
implementation: first, the dichotomous position of the CSP as a strategic sub-
regional agency or local-level deliverer; second, the shift from local authorities to 
CSPs as the lead implementing agent at the local level; and third, the lack of capacity 
to implement community sport policy at the local level. 
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The role of the CSP in policy implementation has been blurred by changes in policy 
since 2002. When CSPs were created in the early 2000s, there was far more certainty 
regarding their role in policy implementation; their core function was to provide 
strategic coordination for sport across the sub-region. However, since NGBs assumed 
leadership of the community sport policy process in 2008, increasingly more delivery 
funding has flowed from Sport England to CSPs for the delivery of specific 
programmes such as Sportivate, Sport Makers, and the School Games. Further, the 
NGB leadership of community sport has driven a more diverse set of requirements, 
with some NGBs requiring the CSP to play a strategic role, some wanting more 
support with direct delivery and others wanting a combination of the two. This has 
created a rather muddled situation where there is limited agreement on the CSP’s 
role in policy implementation. This may be partially due to the highly dynamic 
nature of the relationship, on the one hand, which frequently requires change as a 
result of Sport England funding agreements and NGB requirements. On the other 
hand, perceptions of the CSP’s role in policy implementation are entrenched in the 
recent historical context, where perhaps the CSP has been more involved in 
coordinating strategic matters such as a sub-regional facility strategy or advocating 
the place of sport in the Local Area Agreements. In short, the role of the CSP in policy 
implementation appears to be subject to a range of differing opinion, with different 
actors holding different views. 
 
The CSP 1 senior management team clearly viewed the CSP as a strategic agency: 
‘first and foremost we are a strategic agency. We have to be responsible for strategic 
coordination’ (Interview: Director, CSP 1; 25 May 2012); ‘we don’t deliver anything, 
we commission and contract’ (Interview: Sports Manager, CSP 1; 25 May 2012); ‘we 
manage programmes and utilise our community networks and local authorities as 
the delivery agent’ (Interview: Commissioning Manager, CSP 1; 25 May 2012). In 
contrast, the local authorities emphasised a different reality:  
 
[T]he CSP certainly likes to view itself as being more strategic than 
it actually is ... they have the potential to get a lot more involved in 
strategic work like advocacy, advice, facility planning, influencing 
local strategy and policy but in reality their staff tend to get sucked 
into delivery programmes (Interview: Community Development 
Manager, City Council; 25 May 2012). 
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[T]hey are supposed to work on a strategic basis ... our partnership 
talks about being the strategic lead, but I tend to think that the 
strategic leadership comes at the local level, [the area] has four 
strong local authorities who have a history of looking after their 
own patch ... the CSP say they are going to strategically drive things, 
like for example sub regional facilities strategy, but it typically ends 
up falling apart, just like the strategy did (Interview: Principal 
Sports & Recreation Manager, Metropolitan Borough Council; 6 
June 2012).  
 
In contrast, the NGB perspective of the role of CSPs in policy implementation was 
more varied. Small NGBs (golf and basketball) and one of the three medium-sized 
NGBs (athletics) stressed the need for support with delivery. For example, ‘what is 
important to us is delivery and we need more help, more support with that ... the 
more involved they are in delivery the better’ (Interview: County representative, 
England Athletics; 6 June 2012); ‘I think it is for the NGB to play the strategic role ... 
the CSP in my view should be there to support the delivery of our strategy’ 
(Interview: Regional Development Manager, England Golf Partnership; 24 May 
2012). Alternatively, the large (football, tennis, cricket) and two of three medium-
sized NGBs (swimming and netball) stressed the importance of strategic level 
support, particularly assistance with issues such as local authority advocacy, 
investment into sport, and facility planning. The Regional Development Manager for 
the Amateur Swimming Association summed up the problem regarding the CSP and 
the role the NGB would like them to play across the sub-region: 
 
We need more support in working strategically with the four local 
authorities in the area, particularly with regard to facilities and 
programming issues. But the CSP don’t really have a strong 
relationship or strong tradition of working with the four authorities. 
It has been a difficult partnership from day one ... I’m not quite sure 
how we can be strategic with the CSP across the four authorities, 
when the authorities don’t buy into the CSP in the first place. 
(Interview: Regional Development Manager, Amateur Swimming 
Association; 24 May 2012).  
 
A final observation made by both local authorities and NGBs related to the CSPs’ 
resource dependency and how this has, in recent years, directed more attention 
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toward the management of delivery programmes such as Sportivate and the School 
Games as indicated by the County Development Director of the England & Wales 
Cricket Board: ‘I think it’s a case of the piper calling the tune ... Sport England have 
the funding and they require CSPs to get more involved in project delivery’. Indeed, 
the practical challenge confronting the CSP in emphasising the strategic or delivery 
orientation of the CSP is one which is an issue reinforced by the Chair of the CSP: 
 
I want the CSP to be more strategic, to be more of a leader for sport 
in the sub-region. But we have to be realistic, we need funding to 
survive and most of the funding is attached to the delivery of 
programmes. So, it’s making sure that we have the structure to be 
able to manage the deliverables and then it is about getting the 
board and the management team working strategically (Interview: 
Chair, CSP 1; 25 May 2012).  
 
Another factor which has arguably shifted CSPs away from strategic leadership and 
closer to the direct line of project delivery is the changing nature of traditional local-
level implementers, in particular the replacement of local authorities with the CSP as 
the local-lead agency for community sport, a view particularly strongly held by some 
NGBs. The County Director for the England & Wales Cricket Board supported this 
point: ‘Nowadays the CSP is the closest thing that [Sport England] have to a reliable 
delivery network’. On the one hand this change in the place of local authorities in 
local level implementation could be a result of the creation and continued 
commitment to CSPs as well as the significant reduction in infrastructural-related 
funding provided to local government. However, the local authorities involved in the 
case rejected any notion of being ‘squeezed out’ of community sport. They did not 
view their role in community sport as being determined by other agents such as 
Sport England or the CSP. In fact, all three local authorities reinforced their claim to 
autonomy, their duty to focus on the needs of their local community, their power to 
act on wider social issues such as wellbeing and inclusion, and the continued 
pressure to reduce expenditure in non-statutory areas of provision.  
 
The final theme relating to the role of NGBs and the CSP in policy implementation 
was the lack of capacity to implement community sport policy. This supports the 
quantitative data, which found that 72% of CSPs disagreed or strongly disagreed that 
there was sufficient capacity to implement community sport policy. The view of 
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NGBs was mildly more conservative, with 52% of those taking part in the study 
disagreeing with the statement. Thus, regardless of the explicit or agreed roles of the 
CSP or NGBs, the majority of agents involved in the policy process agree that there is 
not sufficient capacity to achieve the policy aspirations for community sport. The 
evidence from the case suggests that this perceived lack of capacity is primarily 
attributable to two factors. The first is related to the funding decisions of key agents. 
NGBs in particular were seen to utilise resources to develop their infrastructure at a 
national or regional level, with limited resources flowing down to street-level. This 
was a view held not only a by the CSP and local authorities, but also by some NGB 
representatives: 
 
The structure from national to local level is not ideal. There are a 
number of developments at national and regional level, but it seems 
that the county has been sidelined (Interview: County 
representative, England Athletics; 6 June 2012).  
 
We have gone through quite a number of organisational changes 
and I think we have tried to trim some of the administration, but at 
the end of the day everything happens out on the ground, not in the 
central office, I think there needs to be more of a balance, we 
definitely need more foot soldiers ... more people out on the ground 
delivering (Interview: Regional Development Manager, Amateur 
Swimming Association; 24 May 2012).  
 
Infrastructure wise it’s all there for NGBs from regional up to 
national level. The problem is that regional officers haven’t got a 
budget to deliver. Everyone looks at everyone else for delivery 
money (Interview: Principal Sports & Recreation Manager, 
Metropolitan Borough Council; 6 June 2012). 
 
The second issue is one which has received considerable attention in community 
sport in recent years (cf. Harris et al., 2009; May et al., 2012; Nichols & James, 
2008; Taylor et al., 2007), namely the dependence on the voluntary workforce and 
the assumption that, because clubs coordinate sport for its members at the local 
level, they would want to play a direct role in increasing the numbers of people 
playing their sport. As one NGB representative remarked, ‘the biggest challenge, as 
with all sport, is the volunteer network because we need more volunteers ... we rely 
on them so heavily’ (Interview: Regional Development Manager, England Golf 
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Partnership; 24 May 2012). Reliance on volunteers and not having enough 
volunteers were cited by all NGBs involved in the case, with the exception of the FA. 
The Regional Development Manager for the FA actually stressed ‘the sheer numbers 
of volunteers out there’, and suggested that ‘the sport needs to do more to support 
these volunteers’. The Chair of the CSP noted the challenge associated with voluntary 
sport clubs, not least the range of clubs from those that deeply resist change and 
involvement in community work to those that are proactive and want to grow: 
 
We need more volunteers and also the right kind of volunteers. I 
mean we need them and cannot do what we need to do without 
them. But there is a lot of resistance to change, particularly with 
things like club accreditation, junior club development and getting 
involved in community schemes. A lot of them just want to be left 
alone. But there are also a bunch of proactive clubs, you know the 
ones that want to change, want to grow and develop (Interview: 
Chair, CSP 1; 25 May 2012). 
 
The Community Development Manager at the City Council argued the need for more 
realistic expectations regarding the role of volunteers in community sport policy 
implementation: 
 
It’s the whole Big Society thing, expecting people to do more for 
themselves, I understand where this is coming from but it’s 
completely detached from reality. We struggle for volunteers as it is, 
to try and get them to take on more responsibility and deliver 
services on our behalf is just not going to happen (Interview: 
Community Development Manager, City Council; 25 May 2012). 
 
In short, the evidence reinforces previous research, in particular the heavy reliance of 
the professional workforce on the voluntary workforce, and more importantly, the 
assumption that the voluntary sector is willing and able to play a role in community 
sport policy implementation without fully considering the diverse dispositions of 
voluntary sport clubs, their awareness of policy or their direction and intensity of 
response to it (Harris, 2012; May et al., 2013; van Meter & van Horn, 1975).  
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Agents’ beliefs, attitudes and experiences in regard to the community 
sport policy process  
 
This final section takes a broader view of policy, examining the beliefs, attitudes and 
experiences of agents in the community sport policy process. The quantitative phase 
of the research revealed no significant differences in the attitudes of CSPs toward the 
community sport policy process based on CSP hosting arrangements or turnover (see 
Appendix 4). As previously mentioned, more notable were the particular beliefs, 
attitudes and experiences of the CSP Director completing the questionnaire. Using 
the National Audit Office/Audit Commission assessment of policy delivery chains, 
the CSP rated the overall community sport system at zero out of a possible maximum 
of +12 and a minimum of -12. This compared to the mean of +4 based on the scores 
from 47 CSPs. In short, this signifies that the CSP believes that the community sport 
delivery chain requires significant improvement.  
 
The qualitative phase of research was used to explore the reality of the community 
sport policy process. These data reinforced some aspects identified in the 
quantitative research, in particular issues regarding performance management and 
collaboration (as discussed above). The qualitative data also revealed agents’ 
attitudes and experiences in relation to three specific aspects of the community sport 
policy process, namely: (i) the nature of the policy process; (ii) the extent to which 
agents believe they are part of a collective system, and (iii) agents’ belief in their 
ability to achieve community sport policy outcomes.  
 
The nature of the policy process 
The dominant view of the community sport process was that it was a top-down policy 
system whereby the DCMS and Sport England discuss and agree the policy objective; 
provide funding to NGBs (whole sport plan funding), CSPs (core funding and 
programme-specific funding) and other agencies (open-grant fund) to develop 
strategies and programmes; and evaluate progress using the annual Active People 
survey. Particularly notable was the suggestion that national level agencies do not 
adequately think through the system of local implementation, commonly assuming 
that this will organically grow through traditional routes such as the county sport 
associations and affiliated clubs of NGBs. There appears to be a distinct lack of 
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engagement and a complete lack of understanding of sport at the frontline, as one 
local authority representative remarked: 
 
We have a very heavy top-down system ... that is all well and good, 
but if you don’t know what is going on at the local level, who has 
agreed to do what, what is working and what is not, you’re not likely 
to be very successful (Interview: Principal Sports & Recreation 
Manager, Metropolitan Borough Council; 6 June 2012). 
 
Adding to this, the County Director for the ECB noted that:  
 
There has to be more two-way communication, more transparent, 
open channels of discussion where we can discuss needs, 
differences, challenges and problems without feeling that these will 
somehow adversely affect how the centre see us. There has to be a 
move away from the one size fits all approach ... a move to a more 
intelligent approach where we acknowledge and embrace individual 
differences (Interview: County Director, England & Wales Cricket 
Board; 25 May 2012). 
 
In sum, the case characterised the community sport policy process as being top-
down, with the majority of dialogue and resource being invested at the national and 
regional level and a weak or limited association with the range of street-level agents. 
The case also reinforced criticism of the sport policy sector as one which is subject to 
‘the whim and caprice of governments’ (Houlihan & White, 2002: 206). In particular, 
community sport was seen to be subject to relatively frequent change in definition, 
focus, resource allocation and an imposed and diverse set of national programmes, 
creating a sense of initiative-overload or ‘initiativitess’ (Collins, 2010; Collins & Kay, 
2002). The evidence from local authorities and NGBs in the case also suggests 
significant duplication across the system. The County Director for the ECB 
commented on the duplication between CSP-led programmes and the programmes 
that cricket were developing nationally and locally, although he admitted that this 
was likely to be a problem that was limited to larger NGBs: 
 
I think in lots of cases there is duplication. For example, we are 
employing a range of cricket activators. It’s basically sport makers—
but specifically for cricket. We see things that are happening in the 
game and try to address these and of course you get overlap with 
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some of the national initiatives that have been developed. I think 
this probably works differently for the smaller sports as they do not 
necessarily have the resources to do their own thing, whereas we do 
(Interview: County Director, England & Wales Cricket Board; 25 
May 2012). 
 
The issue of duplication also relates to a previous point regarding the strategic 
leadership of sport where the head of service at one of the Metropolitan Borough 
Councils inferred that the existence of the CSP itself was duplicating the traditional 
role of local authorities in the sub-region. Unlike the comment about duplication of 
initiatives, which concerns improved coordination and communication in order to 
bring about improved efficiency, this remark regarding the role of the CSP has 
fundamental implications as it suggests that CSPs are unnecessary and that the 
community sport system would be more efficient and effective if NGBs worked 
directly with local authorities. 
 
The final point regarding the nature of the community sport policy process relates to 
Smith’s (1966; 1759) original conception of consequentialism or, more recently, 
Merton’s (1936) concept of unintended consequences. The evidence in the case 
suggests that the predominant focus on numerical goals in community sport is 
driving a set of perverse behaviours that are not in the broader interests of 
community sport policy. Examples of these behaviours include (i) ‘focusing on the 
low hanging fruit’ (Interview: Director, CSP 1; 25 May 2012), in other words, 
focusing efforts on the demographic groups that are easier to reach and more 
amenable to change; (ii) open competition between NGBs, whereby sports attempt to 
target and recruit participants from other sports in order to boost the numbers of 
people playing ‘their’ sport (Interview: County Director, England & Wales Cricket 
Board; 25 May 2012); and (iii) the pressure to effect change in the participation 
numbers by any means possible, for example focusing on the social and economic 
regeneration of the sub region as this will change the demographic profile of the area 
and will likely increase the SEC 1-416 population, which will in turn increase 
participation in sport as the SEC 1-4 population tend to be more actively engaged in 
sport.  
                                                          
16 SEC is a classification system for socio-economic status developed by the Office of National Statistics. 
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If we look at the Sport England segmentation, we need more 
knowledge workers and those types if we are going to increase 
participation in sport. So, we need more housing development, 
more four and five bedroom houses, then we will attract more of the 
right people that we need to drive up participation (Interview: 
Director, CSP 1; 25 May 2012). 
 
This behaviour could be argued to be an exemplar of Deming’s (2000) seminal work 
on the effect of management by objectives (MBOs). Deming viewed numerical targets 
and evaluation of performance as one of seven deadly diseases of management, 
arguing that they drive undesirable behaviours which may help to achieve desirable 
outcomes but fail to address or change the processes of operation, and thus fail to 
tackle the root of the problem. 
 
The extent to which agents believe that they are part of a collective system 
In short, the evidence from the case suggests that what appears to be absent is the 
collective whole sport system concept first articulated in the Carter report (2005). 
Despite the recommendations and the subsequent creation of the single system for 
sport (Sport England, 2005) and the sporting landscape (Sport England, 2008b), the 
CSP, local authorities and NGBs revealed views and attitudes which emphasised the 
enforced nature of relations between CSPs and NGBs, rather than a relationship 
resulting from a genuine interest or mutual benefit. Furthermore, attitudes tended to 
underline the competitive and parochial nature of the policy community, particularly 
in relation to resource allocation. Here, each agent tended to view itself as being best 
placed to lead community sport policy. CSPs and local authorities were critical of the 
leadership role delegated to NGBs, local authorities viewed the resources given to 
CSPs as being potentially wasteful, and NGBs felt that the scale of investment into 
CSPs was excessive given that their focus was to provide a support service to NGBs. 
Each agent reinforced the importance of its own priorities, its own survival and 
growth and there was a distinct lack of evidence of a collective community sport 
system. Exacerbating this issue was a general lack of consensus regarding priority 
issues. Whilst the overall focus on increasing participation in sport was a concern for 
all partners, the differing values and culture of the various institutions meant that the 
motives behind various strategies and programmes, and the processes used to 
achieve increased participation varied considerably. The lack of collective values and 
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objectives led one local authority representative to describe the community sport 
sector as ‘a number of mini sectors within one sector’ (Interview: Principal Sports & 
Recreation Manager, Metropolitan Borough Council; 6 June 2012), supporting the 
idea that the community sport system is more a title than a representation of a 
network of organisations that work interdependently to achieve mutually important 
goals. In short, the evidence from the case supports the view that collaborative 
capacity is difficult to achieve in enforced partnerships (Huxham & Vangen, 2005). 
 
Agents’ belief in their ability to achieve community sport outcomes 
The final line of enquiry regarding the community sport policy process related to 
agents and their belief that they would be able to achieve increased participation in 
sport. The majority of NGBs in the case felt that they did have the ability to bring 
about growth in participation in their sport. Despite this, the most notable challenges 
from an NGB perspective were (i) a lack of good quality and affordable facilities and 
expectations that this would become increasingly challenging due to public sector 
cuts, (ii) having sufficiently qualified local capacity, particularly coaches and suitably 
skilled volunteers, and (iii) having trust within the NGB to empower regions and 
counties: ‘you know you have got to trust the counties to make the right decision, 
rather than setting things in stone down in London’ (Interview: County Director, 
England & Wales Cricket Board; 25 May 2012). The CSP and local authorities all 
stressed the enormity of the community sport challenge, as did one smaller NGB 
(golf). When discussing the nature of the challenge, CSP agents focused on four 
factors: (i) the notion that progress required a longer period of time in order to 
successfully bring about sustained behaviour change at the micro level, (ii) that the 
workforce required the appropriate skills and resources to provide this support, and 
(iii) more investment in delivery, particularly in the delivery of programmes and 
support for the professional and volunteer workforce. In short, CSP agents argued 
that the role of CSPs and NGBs in implementing community sport was 
fundamentally flawed as neither had the skills, resources or capacity to bring about 
the scale of change required, particularly in the context of a policy system which has 
been subject to considerable change in a relatively short period of time. In contrast, 
NGB representatives provided a more optimistic account of their ability to 
implement policy, although they identified (i) a lack of high quality facilities, (ii) trust 
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within the NGB, and (iii) insufficient capacity at the local level as barriers to effective 
implementation. 
 
Conclusions 
Much of the evidence presented above is consistent across all three cases and/or 
reinforces the existing literature on community sport. This will be discussed further 
in the conclusion to case 3. 
 
Despite the consistency of certain themes across the three CSP cases, the evidence 
reflects the unique geographical structure of case 1. The CSP is not bound by 
traditional county or metropolitan boundaries. Instead, it is formalised around what 
was traditionally an industrial sub-region and nowadays is more commonly referred 
to as a Local Enterprise Partnership. As a result, the community sport agents within 
the sub-region have not had the same level of experience in working cooperatively 
with one another. Furthermore, all four local authorities in the sub-region are large 
Metropolitan Boroughs with a strong, traditional commitment to sports 
development. The combination of these factors together with the autocratic approach 
of the CSP senior management team has resulted in a more guarded environment 
where agents appear more prepared for competition than cooperation.  
 
The issue of diversity was also stressed throughout the case, both in terms of the 
inconsistency of CSP structure and strategy, the differences in NGB needs and the 
problems these cause for implementation. The evidence from NGB agents points to 
an informal evaluation of CSPs based on their experience of the relationship with the 
CSP, in particular its ability to galvanise local efforts, provide strategic leadership 
and to follow through on agreed actions. NGBs were clear about the difficulties facing 
the CSP and cautious about their ability to galvanise a collaborative effort across 
local authorities. In contrast, it was interesting to note the CSP’s view of the 
impossibility of managing relationships with over 40 sports. To manage this 
complexity more efficiently the CSP had embarked on a prioritisation process where 
sports would be ranked based primarily on their local relevance. This is a noteworthy 
point as it illustrates the mechanisms being utilised by CSPs to cope with the 
complexity of myriad partnerships. It also gives a slightly more sophisticated insight 
into the nature of asymmetrical power relations between CSPs and NGBs. While 
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NGBs receive considerably more funding and hold more direct power through the 
development of their whole sport plan, CSPs retain operational freedoms, albeit 
within the parameters of Sport England performance framework, to strategise and 
prioritise in accordance with local conditions. This is not to argue that CSPs have 
complete freedom to pursue their interests, but it does stress the nuance and 
ubiquitous nature of power, particularly the potential of the CSP to determine 
operational priorities and thus manipulate policy. 
 
The final point of interest relates more generally to the nature of the policy process, 
in particular the ‘window dressing’, which appears to be a common feature of 
community sport. This is a criticism that applies to all agents—Sport England, NGBs 
and CSPs, where the desire to present oneself in the best possible light prevails over 
honesty—a behaviour which can be attributed to the resource dependency of all three 
types of organisation (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Some agents commented on the 
opportunity to start building a more genuine policy environment, one which 
encourages the sharing of experience (good, bad or otherwise). Favouring honesty 
over the illusion of world-class performance would also help in creating a more open, 
cooperative policy environment where agents did not fear failure but actually sought 
to share experiences, minimising the chances of future failure and optimising 
effective practice (Axelrod, 1984). 
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Chapter 6 
Case 2: CSP 2 
 
Introduction 
This chapter is organised around the same principal themes as Chapter 5: (i) the 
organisational, administration and strategic priorities of each CSP; (ii) the CSP-NGB 
relationship; (iii) The role of the CSP and NGBs in policy making and 
implementation; and (iv) CSP and NGB beliefs, attitudes and experiences regarding 
the community sport policy process. 
 
Organisation, administration and strategic priorities 
Geographic and demographic context 
The CSP is a large non-metropolitan area covering 3,389 square kilometres. The area 
was described by the CSP Director as mixed urban and rural, consisting of three 
cities and 13 market towns. The population of the area is just over 635,000, with 
49.8% of the population male and 50.2% female (ONS, 2012). The non-white 
population is 8.4%, lower than the national average of 12.1% (ibid, 2012). With 
regards to age, the area very closely mirrors the England average, although there is a 
comparatively higher percentage of people aged 14-19 and a slightly lower percentage 
of the population aged 65+ (see Table 6.1). 
 
                     Table 6.1 2012 Population by gender, age (14+) and ethnicity, (ONS, 2012) 
Group CSP Population  
‘000 
% England population 
‘000 
% 
Male 315.8 49.8 20,644.8 49.0 
Female 319.4 50.2 21,509.3 51.0 
14-15 19.3 4.9 1,291.4 2.9 
16-19 38.8 6.1 2,528.6 6.0 
20-24 53.3 8.4 3,588.0 8.5 
25-34 107.4 16.9 7,079.0 16.8 
35-49 171.2 27.0 11,097.9 26.3 
50-64 141.7 22.3 9,431.9 22.4 
65+ 122.7 19.3 8,428.6 20.0 
White 578.7 91.1 36,866.8 87.5 
Non white 53.6 8.4 5,101.3 12.1 
 
In deprivation terms the sub-region has only three super output areas within the 
20% most deprived nationally. In short, it does not face widespread deprivation, 
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however, it does face the challenge posed by small pockets of deprivation, 
particularly in the inner city wards and the outlaying rural areas located in the north 
of the sub-region. The local economy is reported to be performing well. Based on 
2012 data, the total GVA (Gross Value Added) per capita was 22.0, compared to 19.7 
nationally. This is supported by relatively low levels of unemployment, with 
unemployment as a proportion of those economically active set at 7.3% compared to 
8.1% nationally (ONS, 2012). 
 
The health profile for the CSP area also reveals a relatively positive picture when 
compared to national averages, obesity levels are lower, life expectancy for males and 
females is higher, and the health costs associated with of physical inactivity are 
predicted to be considerably lower. In particular, 21.9% of the adult population are 
obese, compared to 24.2% nationally. With regards to childhood obesity, the rate is 
17.5%, compared to the national average of 19.0%. Life expectancy for males and 
females is 79.6 and 83.2 years compared to 78.6 and 82.6 years. The data for the 
health care costs of physical inactivity for the sub-region exceed £1.66 million per 
100,000 people. Whilst significant, this is lower than regional and national averages 
(see Table 6.2). 
 
                         Table 6.2 Health care costs of physical inactivity (Sport England, 2013) 
Geography Total cost Cost per 100,000 pop. 
Sub-region £12,711,959 £1,662,119 
Region £103,548,774 £1,776,768 
England £944,289,723 £1,817,285 
 
Local government: boundaries and resources 
The area has a complex figuration of local government authorities with a two-tier 
(county/district) structure and a relatively small area (349 square kilometres) in the 
north-west of the area overseen by a single-tier unitary. The two-tier structure 
involves a county council which oversees the majority of the sub-region (3,046 
square kilometres), with four district councils and one city council. Until recently, the 
political make up of the county council has been relatively stable with the 
Conservative party maintaining overall control. However, this changed after the 2013 
election with no party having overall control. All four districts and the unitary remain 
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under Conservative control. In contrast, the Liberal Democrat party have controlled 
the city council since 2000. 
 
Whilst not as substantial as the four authorities in the first case, the financial 
commitment to sport made by six of the seven authorities is significant. Indeed, the 
budgetary allocation can be viewed as reflecting the authority type (primarily district 
councils) and the relatively low population density. That said, the unitary authority, 
the city council and two of the four district councils have a local reputation for being 
committed to sport, a legacy from their commitment to the numerous sport 
development programmes created in the 1990s and early 2000s. Overall, the six local 
authorities allocated a combined budget of £7,059,000 for sport in 2011/12 (CLG, 
2011, 2012). This represents an overall reduction of 6.1% when compared to the 
previous financial year. However, it is important to note that a reduction in local 
authority sport-related budgets was not constant across all local authorities in the 
area (see Table 6.3). 
 
        Table 6.3 Budget for sport by local authorities in CSP 2 (source: CLG, 2011, 2012) 
 
 
CSP structure, organisation and strategic priorities 
CSP 2 is an independent (non-hosted) partnership. It was officially formed in 2006, 
taking over the responsibilities of the County Active Sport Partnership. It is 
registered as a company limited by guarantee and attained charitable status in 2007. 
The CSP has its own offices in a central location to the rest of the sub-region, a 
feature reported by the CSP Director to be of considerable importance.  
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According to the CSP 2 strategic plan 2011-2015, the overall vision of the partnership 
is ‘active and healthy communities where everyone can play, achieve and enjoy’. The 
CSP state that this will be delivered by: 
 
Engaging with key local strategic priorities and partners and 
promot[ing] the importance and value of sport, and highlighting the 
benefits it can bring to local communities. Through supporting 
sports clubs, organisations, and the sporting workforce, we will help 
to improve the quality and quantity of sport delivered in the area 
(CSP 2, 2011). 
 
The CSP have developed four specific priority areas that underpin this vision: 
participation, partnership development, people development and information 
management, with each having a specific strategic objective (see Table 6.4). 
 
        Table 6.4 CSP 2 Priority areas and strategic objectives (source: CSP 2 Strategic Plan, 2011) 
 
 
The charitable trust is overseen by a board of trustees which is accountable for the 
partnership’s work. The board is voluntary and skills-based, so individuals receive no 
fee or remuneration, and are elected based on their skills, experience and 
competencies. In total, there are 15 board members; seven of the representatives 
come from a business/commerce background, two work at a senior level within 
NGBs, three work for local authorities, two work in education, and the final 
representative is the CSP Director. The board discuss and agree the CSP’s strategy 
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and direct the work of the CSP sport team (otherwise referred to as the core team), 
and are responsible for the financial status of the partnership. The core team consists 
of 12 full time staff with a variety of positions and responsibilities as detailed in 
Figure 6.1. Sport England provides the CSP with annual core funding of £240,000 
(based on the 2011/12 allocation). The highest performing CSPs have the opportunity 
to secure of a share of £80,00017. In return the CSP is required to meet the 
conditions of the CSP core specification as detailed in Chapter 4. The CSP have also 
received a grant from the BIG lottery fund (for one full-time post) plus relatively 
minor contributions from local authorities and the former PCT. The annual turnover 
for the 2011/12 financial year was £700,000. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Structure of CSP 2 core team 
 
Sports participation trends 
Sports participation rates in the CSP 2 area have been relatively high since the start 
of the Active People survey in 2005/6. The area has consistently recorded annual 
participation rates higher than regional and national averages, with the exception of 
2009/10, when participation rates were 0.1% lower than the national average (see 
Table 6.5). Participation rates appear to have fluctuated through the years with a 
2.1% increase between 2005/6-2008/9 and a 2.6% decrease between 2008/9 and 
2009/10. Still, there has been an overall increase of 1.6% in sports participation 
when comparing the latest full-year figure of 37.3% to the original benchmark 35.7%. 
The positive trend in participation rates reflects the range of positive correlations of 
                                                          
17 At the time of writing, no decision had been made regarding the allocation of the additional £80,000 
investment. 
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participation such as relatively low levels of multiple deprivation, high employment, 
a buoyant local economy, and a relatively positive health profile. 
 
 Table 6.5 Adult (16+) Participation in Sport (at least once a week) (source: Sport England, 2013) 
 
 
The positive trend is consistent in most demographic groups, although there are one 
or two exceptions. Table 6.6 reveals increased participation in all demographic 
groups in CSP 2 between 2005/6 and 2011/12. In particular, the differences in means 
for 55+ age group (+4.0%) and the NS SEC 3 classification (+5.5%) between 2005/6 
and 2011/12 were noteworthy, although it is important to consider the smaller 
population for these groups and thus the higher confidence interval applied to these 
data. In terms of decreases within the area, there were two notable reductions in 
participation—amongst the 16-25 year old age group (-1.2%) and the 26-34 year old 
age group (-4.0%). That said, the same logic regarding reduced population and an 
increased confidence level also applies to these data. 
 
As mentioned, the data reveal a relatively consistent variation between the area and 
regional and national level when analysing sports participation by demographic 
group. In short, when applying the latest participation data from Active People 
2011/12, the area has higher participation rates than the national average in almost 
all demographic groups with a marginally lower rate for males, people with a limited 
disability, the 16-34 age group and NS SEC 4, whereas participation for almost all 
other demographic groups is higher in the sub-region, reflecting the socio-economic 
profile of the area. Interestingly, many of the populations who are commonly cited as 
being excluded (i.e. women, non-white, elderly and socioeconomic groups 5-8) have 
significantly higher participation in the sub region than is reported regionally or 
nationally (see Table 6.6). 
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Table 6.6 Adult (16+) Participation in Sport (at least once a week *), by demographic group (source: 
Sport England, 2013) 
 
 
Estimates suggest that the growth potential for adult participation in sport in the 
CSP 2 area is 55.1% (273,000 people) compared to 54.5% regionally and 55.4% 
nationally. The three sports with the highest growth potential in the area are cycling 
(56,500/11.4%), swimming (51,600/10.4%), and gym-based activity (i.e. 
weights/cardio workout) (43,800/8.8%) (Sport England, 2013). 
 
Other sport-related indicators such as volunteering in sport, club membership, 
coaching, and competitive sport present an inconsistent picture when compared to 
regional and national data (see Table 6.7). For example, volunteering in sport has 
increased in the area, but not as sharply as it has regionally or nationally. In contrast, 
participation in organised sport (club membership, coaching, and/or competition) 
appears to be a significant growth area in CSP 2 despite notable decreases in regional 
and national averages.  
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Table 6.7 Other Sport Indicators: Volunteering and formal sports participation (source: Sport 
England, 2013) 
 
 
The CSP-NGB relationship 
This section provides an overview of CSP leadership, with specific reference to the 
way in which the CSP manages relations with NGBs. It will also illuminate the 
attitudes and experiences of CSP, NGB and local authority agents in relation to the 
range of factors that have positively influenced CSP-NGB relations in case 2 as well 
as the problems that have adversely affected the relationship.  
 
The CSP leadership of NGB relations 
The CSP is led by the Chair and board of Trustees together with the CEO. The board 
is made up of 14 representatives and the CEO. The Chair and board of trustees have 
all served on the board for at least three years. The Chair, deputy Chair and six other 
members of the board have been trustees since the Trust’s inception in 2007. Thus, 
‘insight and continuity’ are two of the board’s cited strengths (Interview: 
Governance Chair, Trustee, CSP 2/National Director, ECB; 21 May 2012). In 
addition, the board is viewed externally as being ‘full of experience’ (Interview: 
Leisure Development Officer, District Council; 21 May 2012). Comments such as 
these refer to the board’s representatives, locally known and very successful 
businesspeople; an NGB Chief Executive and an NGB Director who both started their 
early sport development careers in the area and still reside in the area; and chief 
officers and members of local government.  
 
The board is generally regarded as being proactive in the work of the CSP. They are 
forthright in setting the vision, mission and objectives of the partnership and play a 
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critical role in the ‘ongoing improvement and oversight’ (Interview: Chief Executive 
Officer, CSP 2; 7 June 2012). The board’s function is primarily achieved through a 
structure of sub-committees focusing on remuneration, risk and governance, finance, 
and a community interest company (necessary for any profit making activities, as 
part of Charitable Trust status). Sounding boards are also created, as and when 
necessary. These involve appropriate board members and core team members and 
focus on discussing specific issues and agreeing recommendations for full board. 
Whilst the board make an active and engaged contribution to the work of the CSP, 
this work is primarily strategic in nature. Both the CSP CEO and the Board 
representative clarified the importance of the core team having autonomy in 
operational, day-to-day matters, such as managing NGB relations.  
 
The CSP core team have had a number of changes to the way in which they manage 
relations with NGBs. Up to December 2011, the responsibility for initiating, 
managing and developing NGB relations fell to a single member of the core team, the 
NGB lead officer. Whilst this led to positive and productive work with some NGBs, 
the implications of the approach were problematic as other members of the core 
team were isolated from the growing and increasingly central NGB-related work. 
Also, the CSP echoed the concerns raised in the first case about the capacity of the 
NGB lead to manage a growing portfolio of work with over 40 sports. A new 
approach was advanced in 2012 whereby NGB lead and liaison responsibilities were 
delegated to individual members of the core team. The CEO reflected on this as an 
interesting project, noting, ‘there was some great work, some excellent projects and 
some really strong relationships’ but they were generally limited to the sports that 
aligned with the personal interests of the core team. This realisation led the board to 
discuss a new approach which involved the prioritisation of sports as well as the CEO 
developing new structural arrangements for the management of NGB relations. 
 
The prioritisation process developed by the CSP centred on four factors. This 
included, first and foremost, (i) those NGBs that had identified the CSP as a priority, 
then (ii) the priority sports as identified by local authority partners, (iii) the latent 
demand for participation in different sports in the area (via Active People), and (iv) 
the professional judgement of core team/board members regarding the local capacity 
and capability of NGBs. This process led to a prioritisation of 10 sports: cycling, 
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athletics, netball, football, badminton, hockey, golf, tennis, equestrian, and 
swimming. 
 
In terms of structural arrangements, the CSP have decided to try a third way of 
managing relations with NGBs. This approach was being developed at the time of 
research and was slated to coincide with the official start of the 2013-17 whole sport 
plans. The CEO felt that a new structure was required in order to respond to the 
expectations for the new whole sport plan funding: 
 
We’re moving into the new [whole sport plan] period where, in 
theory, NGBs are expected to have far more local delivery activity in 
their WSP. Alongside this, Sport England has facilitated a number 
of regional engagement days to press the NGBs into looking at local 
engagement with CSPs. These are opportunities for us to get 
focused and get things right from day one (Interview: Chief 
Executive Officer, CSP 2; 7 June 2012). 
 
The new structure will involve two lead officers for all 46 NGBs with a small number 
(two to three) of high priority sports being allocated to each core member of the CSP 
team (referred to as their sport liaison role). The NGB lead officers will work closely 
with other members of the core team and the NGB in developing ‘action plans’ for 
high priority sports. These plans will be developed over a series of CSP-NGB 
workshops, to achieve what the CSP’s NGB lead referred to as ‘a coming together of 
ideas’, not to mention the opportunity to get to know the representatives across the 
two organisations. The intended outcome of the workshop is a smaller, area-specific 
version of the NGB’s whole sport plan, identifying priorities, detailing specific actions 
as well as clarifying roles and responsibilities. On a day-to-day basis the CSP’s sport 
liaison representative will be responsible for working with the NGB to ensure that 
roles are fulfilled and that the plan is implemented. The plan will be routinely 
evaluated with the CSP’s NGB lead, sport liaison representative and NGB 
representatives as part of the CSP quarterly performance management process. The 
CEO stated that the ‘relationship with non-priority sports will be managed by the two 
lead officers to ensure that the requirements of the Sport England core specification 
are met’.  
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The CSP’s motive for making these changes stems from a desire to focus more on 
meeting targets: ‘We have to get far more focussed on delivering our targets. We were 
guilty of process managing rather than focussing on targets, building nice 
relationships and talking in generalities rather than specific delivery’ (Interview: 
Chief Executive Officer, CSP 2; 7 June 2012). As previously mentioned, this 
management behaviour corresponds with Deming’s (2000) deadly disease of 
management specifically the overemphasis of numerical targets at the expense of 
attention to the critical processes of operation. It is reasonable to assume that this 
behaviour is driven by Sport England’s performance management process, including 
the increasing emphasis on payment-by-results and the opportunity to ‘secure more 
funding by securing more greens’18. Interestingly, this renewed focus on numerical 
targets contradicts evidence elsewhere within the case which suggests that 
performance management can stifle the CSP-NGB relationship and that there is a 
greater need to focus on process, in particular the process of creating and managing 
effective relations. This theme will be explored in greater detail in the section titled 
The problems that adversely affect the CSP-NGB relationship, below. 
 
A final point of contextual interest relating to the CSP leadership of NGB relations 
concerned the CSP-NGB dynamic across the sub-region: 
 
In this area you could argue that it is the CSP driving the NGBs 
rather than the other way around ... I think you have this positional 
imbalance whereby CSP staff, particularly at the senior level, are 
older and more experienced. You compare that to most of the NGB 
staff at the county level and most are at the junior level. They may 
have a little bit of experience, but most of the positions are kind of 
entry level. So you have this reverse dynamic where the key 
decisions are taken by the CSP, rather than being led by NGBs 
(Interview: Governance Chair, Trustee, CSP 2/: National Director, 
ECB; 21 May 2012). 
 
 
 
                                                          
18 The CSP performance management system is based on a traffic light system. Green is awarded for good 
performance, amber for performance requiring remedial action, and red requires urgent attention. The payment 
by results system has led Sport England to offer enhanced financial incentives for CSPs who achieve more results 
coded green. 
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Factors that have positively influenced the CSP-NGB relationship 
As in the first case, this case reinforced individuals and principles as being key 
factors that positively influence the CSP-NGB relationship. In addition, the evidence 
suggests that clarity of purpose, structures and the culture of the workforce in the 
area are all significant factors that positively shape CSP-NGB relations. 
 
Unsurprisingly, given the weight of evidence from the first case, individuals were 
viewed as a ‘critical part of the community sport jigsaw’ (Interview: County Sport 
Development Manager, County Council; 21 May 2012); ‘when I think of the good 
relationships that we have with CSPs, it’s largely due to the people and personalities 
involved’ (Interview: Regional Development Manager, England Golf Partnership; 
30 May 2012); ‘the final thing is the personal relationship, you know to be able to 
pick up the phone or sit across the table from someone and have a discussion where 
you can understand each other and buy into the idea of working together’ 
(Interview: Chief Executive Officer, County FA; 23 May 2012); ‘the quality of the 
relationship tends to depend upon the people involved...in my experience, the most 
effective relationships are with CSPs where I have a rapport with the CSP lead or 
another member of the team’ (Interview: Regional Development Manager, England 
Basketball; 29 May 2012); ‘I suppose it comes down to the personnel...are they 
thinking on the same lines? Do they get on? Can they work together?’ (Interview: 
Head of Arts & Recreation, City Council; 29 May 2012): ‘If I reflect on the 
relationship with CSPs across the region, the key thing is the difference between the 
people involved in the different CSPs, it’s ultimately about good people’ (Interview: 
Regional Development Manager, LTA; 7 June 2012); ‘the really effective 
partnerships that I have been involved in are perceived as effective because they 
deliver, they deliver because of the people involved, their desire and their 
commitment to make it work’ (Interview: County Sport Development Manager, 
County Council; 21 May 2012). 
 
Again in line with the first case, there were several comments regarding the 
importance of certain principles in fostering effective working relations. Themes 
were largely consistent with those mentioned in the first case, in particular mutual 
respect and trust and the critical role these play in shaping the opinion and 
perspective of agents towards other community sport partners. Here it is also 
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important to consider the ‘conditions of action’ (Betts, 1986); in other words, the 
broader structure within which agents operate. In particular, agents’ views of others 
will be directly shaped by their past experience of working with the partner. Thus, 
where the experience has generally been positive, there is more likely to be high trust 
and respect—important for implementing partnerships (Scheberle, 2004) and of 
course for policy implementation itself. This point could also be mediated by two 
further considerations. First, there is Axelrod’s (1984) notion of indirect reciprocity, 
where cooperation between agents is shaped by a reliable history being projected 
from past agents to future agents. Second, and related to the first, past experience 
shapes institutional paradigms, which influence agents’ beliefs and directly affect 
levels of trust and respect towards partner agencies (Christensen, 2003). 
 
In addition to trust and respect, the notion of effective leadership was also commonly 
cited, in particular comments about leadership style. With regards to the CSP, the 
evidence highlighted three key issues: the ability of the CSP to understand and 
articulate the diverse needs of the area, to develop a democratic approach enabling 
all partners to feel part of the broader partnership, and to create and pursue a clear 
vision which did not solely represent the core team but the broader partnership. In 
short, the ‘collaborative leadership’ (Chrislip & Larson, 1994; Feyerherm, 1994) of 
the CSP was something that local authority representatives commended. However, 
the view of NGBs varied. Here it is possible that institutional paradigms play a more 
critical role in shaping the view of NGBs toward the CSP, an issue which will be 
discussed further below. Comments about NGB leadership were more directly 
associated with issues of engagement and clarity of purpose. Engagement was also 
viewed to be critical, particularly with VSCs at the local-level. A small number of 
NGBs (netball and cricket) were held up as doing good work to involve the grass-
roots deliverers in the design stage of plans and programmes. This was seen as being 
a somewhat unique yet important development in that it aligns with the principles of 
co-creation and co-production (Ostrom, V. 1973), it involves and empowers 
community-level agents, it provides the strategic apex of the NGB with a feedback 
loop about what is and is not likely to work, it is more likely to secure local-level 
commitment, and more likely to be seen as positive and proactive leadership.  
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Clarity of purpose related to both internal and external dimensions. Externally, CSPs, 
local authorities and a small number of NGBs referred to the importance of the 
NGBs’ whole sport plan being clearly articulated so that the sports priorities were 
known by all and were clearly understood at the local level. Similarly, NGBs 
emphasised the importance of understanding the CSP, in particular its priorities, 
structures and the way in which it could support growth in sports participation 
across the sub-region. The Chief Executive of the County FA underlined the 
importance of attitude and communication as mechanisms that facilitate external 
clarity of purpose: 
 
I think the most important thing is having the genuine interest, the 
willingness to work in partnership. Underpinning this there has to 
be clear and open channels of communication, a sharing and 
clarification of vision, goals, priorities and roles and responsibilities 
between the key agencies ... it’s also important that these are kept as 
simple and straightforward as possible (Interview: Chief Executive 
Officer, County FA; 23 May 2012). 
 
This was a point reinforced by the chairperson of the county athletics association: 
 
The thinkers and doers need to be speaking with each other, making 
sure that the plans and priorities are agreed and clearly coordinated 
and everyone is clear about their role. I think we saw more evidence 
of this within school sport, I think we still have a long way to go in 
community sport (Interview: Chairman, County Athletics 
Association; 7 June 2012). 
 
Further, with regard to consistency, representatives of the CSP made reference to the 
notable issue of internal consistency regarding clarity of purpose across NGBs, in 
other words, the extent to which there was constructive alignment of purpose within 
each NGB from national to local level. This was viewed as being communicated well 
in some sports such as football and cricket, but not so evident in others sports where 
there were seen to be mixed messages: 
 
Consistency of message is proving to be a major challenge for both 
CSPs and NGBs. Within NGBs, NGBs locally may have a different 
message to the national NGB. And across CSPs I think consistency 
of message is also a problem ... For example, the CSP may get a clear 
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message from the CSP Network that this is what sports are going to 
do, that these are their priorities, and that this is what they require 
from CSPs. That should remain consistent at the local level so that 
local NGB representatives reflect what has been said nationally. 
Where it works well, this happens. But very often that is not the 
case, there are some sports where the local officers are just not on 
the same page (Interview: Governance Chair, Trustee, CSP 
2/National Director, ECB; 21 May 2012). 
 
Similarly, NGBs commented on the lack of consistency and clarity of purpose across 
CSPs, an issue which will be discussed further in the section below. 
 
Structural issues were also mentioned as being important in influencing positive 
working relations between the CSP and NGBs. NGBs mentioned structures as did 
one CSP representative. In particular, agents argued that having appropriate 
structural arrangements was important as it provided the capacity and intelligence to 
support CSP-NGB partnership work as well as extending this to the local level 
through appropriate support for clubs and coaches. Here, appropriate structural 
arrangements related to networks and/or individuals whose primary responsibility 
was to work at the local-level. For example, football, swimming and golf all 
mentioned their sport-specific county networks; cricket mentioned their focus club 
structures; and netball and golf mentioned the hosting arrangements that they had 
negotiated for their sport-specific officers whereby NGB officers were hosted by the 
CSP, an arrangement that was seen to work particularly well in brokering a sound 
CSP-NGB relationship and securing opportunities to get the sport more involved in 
local level projects than otherwise might have been the case. 
 
I would say that one of the most important things for us has been 
the close relationship that our development officer has with the 
CSP. It’s one of our best counties nationally, mainly because of her 
skills and the type of person she is, but also because anything that 
pops up, ‘Get Back Into’ or ‘Fit for Work’, she is there, she is one of 
the first people they speak to, and we want to be engaged and 
involved in these types of projects (Interview: Regional 
Development Manager, England Golf Partnership; 30 May 2012). 
 
This view reinforces the benefits that network reciprocity can have for cooperation, 
in particular where geographical or social factors drive an increase in network 
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interaction (Axelrod, 1984). Here, the location of the NGB officer relative to the CSP 
can be important in developing closer cooperation between the CSP and NGBs as it 
provides the potential for closer co-working and enables the CSP and NGB to develop 
a more similar understanding of the local context. 
 
The culture of the sub-regional workforce was the final factor the data showed to 
have positively influenced the CSP-NGB relationship. There appeared to be five 
micro-level factors that resulted in a strong task and social cohesiveness across the 
CSP, NGBs and local authorities. The first of these was the length of service of 
officers working in community sport across the sub-region, particularly those in 
leadership positions such as the Head of Arts & Recreation at the City Council, the 
County Sport Development Manager at the County Council, the Head of Community 
Services at the Unitary authority, the Chief Executive Officer of the CSP, plus two or 
three NGB officers who had all started their careers in the sub-region. This not only 
benefited the partnership in terms of the understanding of the major issues and 
changes in the area, but also brought a sense of unity as many of the key agents felt 
this was a journey they had made together, rather than one taken individually with 
different people joining along the way. The second factor is that a number of officers 
working in the sub-region have worked in different capacities and different positions 
across the area. This has resulted in CSP staff now working in NGBs and vice-versa. 
This had led to the third factor, the creation of a group that have empathy for each 
other, making it easier for agents to understand the context and challenges that 
confront partner agencies. The fourth factor relates to knowledge and understanding 
insomuch as agents tend to report high levels of role clarity; they generally appear to 
be aware of who does what and the agreed roles and responsibilities of different 
agencies across the sub-region. The final factor is attitude—CSP, local authority and 
the majority of NGB partners seem to want to make the relationship work and the 
evidence reveals a commitment to the partnership ideal, helping one another out, 
and doing what it takes to get the job done. Clearly, there are problems that challenge 
this ideal, which are discussed further below. However, the overriding sense is that 
agencies have, over time and through experience, gained advantage through 
collaboration rather than the bureaucracy and inertia sometimes associated with 
partnerships (Bloyce et al., 2008; Huxham & Vangen, 2005). 
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In [area 2] we all work very closely together ... everybody knows one 
another, everyone works with each other. We have a lot of very 
good, close relationships. You can pick up the phone to 99% of the 
people, you know, you know what you are doing, who you are 
talking to, what they are doing. Maybe it’s because so many of us 
have been around for so long ... Part of it is the CSP, they have 
definitely had a hand in the process, they work hard to bring us 
altogether and keep us together (Interview: County Director, ECB; 
31 May 2012). 
 
The problems that have adversely affected the CSP-NGB relationship 
Given the nature of the factors that positively influence CSP-NGB relations in the 
case, more problems were identified in this case than in the first case. This could be 
the result of the social context affecting each case, the nature of the problems, the 
variations in the researcher relationship from organisation to organisation, which 
could play a role in eliciting a broader or more explicit range of data, and linked to 
this, the extent to which research participants are open and honest about the 
problems affecting the relationship.  
 
The range of problems that adversely affect the CSP-NGB relationship in case 2 have 
been grouped into five categories: a lack of engagement, diversity of priorities, 
process over people, the complexity of inconsistency, and a lack of empathy. The first 
three of these categories reflect the issues identified in case 1, the latter two issues are 
unique to case 2. 
 
Notably, with regards to the first category, a lack of engagement, the evidence in this 
case focuses on the same three sub-categories as those in the first case, namely: (i) 
the CSP-local authority relationship, (ii) the NGB whole sport plan process, and (iii) 
the NGB’s engagement with the CSP. That said, the CSP-local authority relationship 
in this case did not appear to face the same issues with regards to the strategic 
leadership of sport. Some local authorities indicated that the relationship took time 
to evolve: ‘CSPs were initially viewed as a threat, taking over work that they had 
previously led on. But others really embraced it and saw it as an opportunity to 
further their commissioning role’ (Interview: County Sport Development Manager, 
County Council; 21 May 2012). For other local authorities, the relatively new focus 
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on CSPs and NGBs might make fiscal sense, given the cuts in public sector budgets, 
but could result in a lack of local contextual intelligence: 
 
I think that there is a lot of local information, local knowledge, and 
opportunities to engage local people being lost because there is no 
one playing that really local role anymore—local authorities are no 
longer a key part of the system. In my opinion they should be, but 
they no longer are. It’s now all about NGBs and the CSP ... anyway, 
local authorities just do not have the manpower anymore 
(Interview: Leisure Development Officer, District Council). 
 
The final concern from a local authority perspective was the potential for duplication 
and, as a result, the need for open and clear channels of communication between 
agencies.  
 
I think sometimes there is a little bit of duplication which can lead 
to animosity or frustration. For example, [the CSP] have started 
working on this disability sport bid, why are they doing that? I’ve 
been leading disability sport in the county for years. You wonder 
what is behind this? Where do I fit into it? (Interview: County 
Sport Development Manager, County Council). 
 
Indeed, failure on the part of the CSP to communicate and engage partners in such 
developments can be seen as a flagrant exercise of power insomuch as agendas are 
developed without the input of agents who have a traditional involvement in related 
issues. This can be seen to mirror Lukes (1974) second dimension of power and is 
likely, if perceived to be a constant and consistent behaviour, to alienate traditional 
partners such as the County Sport Development Manager. The City Council 
representative also talked about the importance of transparency and open 
communication, for example making sure that key documents, strategies, minutes, 
board decisions and so on were posted on the CSP website so that partners could 
access these as required. She felt that the issue was not just about being able to 
access the documentation, but also ‘about the message this sends to partners about 
the CSP being transparent, you know, not a closed shop’ (Interview: Head of Arts & 
Recreation, City Council; 21 May 2012). 
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With regards to the NGB whole sport plan process, the CSP, local authorities and 
even some NGBs in the case noted the relatively limited engagement of wider 
partners (outside the NGB) in the development of whole sport plans. As in the first 
case, this led to a range of problems, including a lack of awareness of the NGBs 
priorities and a lack of consent or commitment to priorities that are perceived as 
being owned by another organisation. The former issue was viewed as particularly 
important by CSPs as they are required ‘to provide a support service to NGBs and 
this is difficult to achieve if you are not clear of their priorities’ (Interview: Projects 
Manager, CSP 2; 7 June 2012). The latter issue was seen to be critical for two 
reasons. First, it is critical in terms of the opportunity to dovetail NGB priorities with 
CSP-led programmes such as Sportivate, Back To projects, and other locally run 
initiatives. Secondly, it is important in engaging street-level operators such as club 
representatives and sport coaches in the formalisation of the NGB’s local priorities 
both to (i) make sure that they are aware of these priorities and (ii) to secure mutual 
consent and commitment: 
 
I guess there may be an assumption that clubs will do the delivery 
bit, but very few professionals working in the system are aware of 
the whole sport plan details, so how on earth can we expect 
volunteers to know the details? (Interview: Chief Executive Officer, 
CSP 2; 7 June 2012). 
 
Ultimately, the extent to which NGBs appear to be autonomous, despite large 
amounts of public funding, is an issue that agents, particularly local authorities, 
underlined. In short, the idiosyncrasies of the community sport policy process, in 
particular the way in which different organisations appear to be faced with different 
conditions of operation, give a prevailing sense that NGBs are privileged and receive 
special exceptions that are not extended to other funded agencies in community 
sport: 
 
NGBs seem to get away with things that CSPs and local authorities 
would never get away with. For example, the completely ludicrous 
growth targets which they set because they knew they could lever in 
more funding. I think it is important to hold NGBs to account, 
ultimately it will lead to more of them taking the work seriously and 
thinking twice about their growth targets and the logic behind them 
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(Interview: Head of Arts & Recreation, City Council; 21 May 
2012). 
 
As in the first case, NGBs revealed differing levels of commitment to working 
alongside the CSP, with some of the smaller and moderately sized sports suggesting 
that the CSP play a crucial role in supporting the NGB (golf, swimming, athletics, and 
netball) whereas other, particularly the larger NGBs, appear to reveal a more casual 
attitude (tennis, football and cricket), and even an indifference toward the role of the 
CSP: 
 
The nature of the relationship can sometimes feel a little bit 
artificial. There is no doubt that some are just going through the 
motions. I think a lot of it is down to the people—their experience 
and their personality. Some of it comes from the sport though, you 
can see that some sports are really keen and want to work with us, 
whereas others, it just feels like they do it because they have to be 
seen to be doing it (Interview: Projects Manager, CSP 2; 7 June 
2012). 
 
A lot of the stuff is not hugely relevant to us. We pick and choose 
what we go to and what we need. A lot of the time the messages 
across CSPs are pretty similar, because they are dealing with 
national structures and objectives. So if you go to one, you have 
pretty much got it covered because it’s things like Sportivate, 
Schools Games and all that. So all those things are replicated. So 
yeah, we pick and choose a little bit which CSP we engage with. The 
last year or so we’ve not really been involved with [CSP 2], mainly 
since the [last NGB lead] left ... But I need to meet [the new NGB 
lead] and just have a chat with her as to how tennis can better 
engage with the CSP (Interview: Regional Development Manager, 
LTA; 7 June 2012). 
 
The second problem that adversely affects the CSP-NGB relationship is the diversity 
of priorities within community sport, echoing many of the points detailed in the first 
case. In particular, the philosophical differences of key agents: ‘our priority is our 
local community and raising levels of physical activity, the CSP has to deliver on its 
agreement with Sport England, and NGBs’ number one priority is international 
success’ (Interview: Head of Arts & Recreation, City Council; 21 May 2012). The 
County Sport Development Manager reinforced this view: 
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We [the County Council] are involved in sport because our 
members believe it can bring communities closer together, it’s a 
community development tool. However, sports are involved 
because they want to grow their sport, get more talented individuals 
playing their sport, and win more medals. There’s such intense 
media interest, pressure and expectation now on international 
success, NGBs have to deliver this, they have no choice, it’s their 
bread and butter (Interview: County Sport Development Manager, 
County Council; 21 May 2012). 
 
Furthermore, the implications of these differences were emphasised, particularly the 
point that NGBs as the agencies leading the community sport system also lead the 
delivery of high-performance and elite sport; very much seen as the number one 
priority for NGBs. In contrast, the CSP tended to lead on PCT-funded projects 
focusing on active lifestyles, obesity and health issues. This was seen as being 
problematic for the CSP-NGB relationship: 
 
We are all involved in overlapping areas but many of these require 
very different approaches ... different types of work, different 
programmes, different target audiences, marketing strategies and 
so on (Interview: Leisure Development Officer, District Council; 21 
May 2012). 
 
Whilst these diverse priorities do not make the community sport aspirations 
impossible, they extend the range of interest and blur the focal point of each agency’s 
primary concern. Moreover, as in the first case, the deeper problem of diverse 
priorities lies in the implication for the way in which budgets and resources are 
allocated, the specialist skills required for the different priorities and how each 
agency goes about addressing these. Attention to these issues affects the capacity and 
desire of the CSP and NGBs to work collaboratively toward community sport goals.  
 
The third category of problems that adversely affect the CSP-NGB relationship was 
the perceived prioritisation of performance management processes over people. The 
evidence was of three types: first, the superficiality of the core specification and the 
way in which this tends to inhibit deeper or more genuine partnership work.  
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I guess the final thing to say is about the target mentality that we all 
work in now. On the one hand it’s fine, we need direction, we need 
it to help prioritise ... The core specification is a little like that, okay, 
this is what I need to do, what I need to offer to be seen in a good 
light. But partnership working needs to be more genuine, it needs 
to go beyond this, it requires a more open conversation about 
vision, priorities and roles and responsibilities (Interview: 
Governance Chair, Trustee, CSP 2/National Director, ECB; 21 
May 2012). 
 
Reinforcing this view, the Regional Development Manager for the England Golf 
Partnership conceded that ‘the core specification is a bit of a tick box exercise for us, 
if we’re really honest’. The second type of evidence related more specifically to a lack 
of time or focus given to the development of the partnership: ‘very often the problem 
is that partnerships are not given the time to develop. We do not spend enough time 
cultivating the relationship’ (Interview: Head of Arts & Recreation, City Council; 21 
May 2012). Supporting this, the Projects Manager for the CSP argued that ‘we need 
to give CSPs and NGBs the time and space to create and sustain positive working 
relations’. The CSP’s Governance Committee Chair (also a National Director of the 
ECB) underlined the third type of evidence linked to this point, namely the 
development of appropriate skills to support collaborative working and community 
sport more generally, particularly skills that pertain directly to collaborative working 
such as communication, brokering, negotiation, and conflict resolution skills. 
 
The final two categories of problems that adversely affect the CSP-NGB relationship 
were the complexity of inconsistency and a lack of empathy. Neither of these issues 
was identified in the first case. The phrase complexity of inconsistency has been used 
to represent the difficulties that agents face within the community sport system, 
which has such a complex web of actors and institutions. This resembles the 
unintended consequence noted by Bloyce et al. (2008: 376) where ‘the increasingly 
complex interweaving of the actions of many different groups’ adds unnecessary and 
undesirable complexity, thus making it more difficult for agents to achieve policy 
goals. The CSP referred to the inconsistency of NGBs and local authorities: ‘we have 
local authorities who want to play the strategic role in their patch, others who want 
us to do it. The same thing with NGBs, some want us to play a strategic role, others 
want more delivery support’ (Interview: Projects Manager, CSP 2; 7 June 2012). 
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The local authority perspective addressed a theme mentioned in the previous section 
in relation to inconsistency within NGBs: ‘there appears to me to be a tension 
between what governing bodies do at the national level and what they do at the local 
level. Often the two can seem awfully remote from one another’ (Interview: Head of 
Arts & Recreation, City Council; 21 May 2012). The view from NGBs highlighted the 
difficulties of inconsistency in the CSP approach: ‘I think one of the major problems 
is that they all work so differently from one to the other. Some really seem to get it 
and want to work with the NGB, whereas others are not very forthcoming’ 
(Interview: Regional Development Manager, England Basketball; 29 May 2012). 
The point about the inconsistency of CSP structure and practice is something which 
the CSP’s Chief Executive addressed in a passing comment about Sport England and 
NGB expectations: 
 
I understand the idea of a consistent service, a consistent offer, but 
I think it is unrealistic to expect 49 organisations to be the same. 
It’s all quite laughable ... we’re expected to be the same, but the 46 
NGBs are not. It seems a little unfair or biased. 
 
The noteworthy inference from the data is that the key issue relates more to the 
nature of the work and the perception that community sport lacks uniformity or 
consistency of approach across the same types of organisations (in particular: CSPs, 
NGBs and local authorities), rather than it being solely about the myriad 
organisations that occupy the community sport landscape. Each agent criticises the 
need to understand how other partner agents work in order to work effectively, 
instead pointing to the efficient model that could be offered by universal CSPs or 
uniformity across NGBs. Yet each agent argues for flexibility to ensure that policy fits 
appropriately with its own local socio-economic and/or organisational context. Thus, 
it seems that the need for autonomy and individuality is understood and respected 
when applied to one’s own institution, yet viewed as complex or inconvenient when 
applied to others. 
 
A point which directly relates to this paradoxical situation is a lack of empathy, 
particularly in relation to the broader context and challenges which confront other 
agencies. Whilst there was relatively limited data concerning this point, it was a 
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noteworthy issue that underpins other problems such as the frustration at the 
inconsistency of other organisational types, whether real or perceived. This relates to 
expectations; as one NGB representative put it, ‘I think there is sometimes a fairly 
large difference in expectations and reality, you know I expect the CSP to do this or 
provide that, the reality is often different’ (Interview: County Director, ECB; 31 May 
2012). The CSP’s CEO provided a more detailed overview of what he saw as a key 
problem underpinning CSP-NGB relations: 
 
One of the biggest problems is a lack of understanding, a lack of 
communication and misconceptions about each other’s priorities. 
We need to spend less time judging and making assumptions about 
each other and, as we are trying to do, spend more time on the 
relationship, more time communicating, working out how we can 
work together to achieve our goals (Interview: Chief Executive 
Officer, CSP 2; 7 June 2012). 
 
This view was based on his 13+ years working in the sub-region, first as the Active 
Sport Officer, then as the NGB lead officer for the CSP and more recently as the CEO. 
What he saw as being of utmost importance, based on his experience, was the need to 
look at things from the perspective of partner agencies, to raise one’s own 
understanding and awareness of the context in which partners are working. His view 
emphasised the importance of empathy and understanding in areas of work that 
require collaboration, insofar as they help to promote genuine collaborative capacity 
where community sport targets are met through collective effort and shared 
responsibility. 
 
The role of the CSP-NGBs in policy making and implementation 
As in the first case, this section focuses on three specific issues: firstly, the role of the 
CSP and NGBs in national and local level policymaking for community sport; 
secondly, the role of the CSP and NGBs in the preparation of the whole sport plan; 
and thirdly the relationship between the CSP and NGBs in the implementation of 
community sport policy. 
 
The role of the CSP and NGBs in national and local policy making  
This case reinforced many of the comments in case 1. There was a relatively 
consistent view that community sport policy objectives are discussed and agreed by 
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the DCMS and Sport England with little or no influence from outside agencies, 
although in line with the first case, both the FA and ASA mentioned close liaison with 
Sport England and the DCMS on policy related matters at the national level. Notably, 
the tone of the evidence reflected a pragmatic attitude toward the top-down reality of 
community sport policy: ‘from what I have seen, there is not a great deal of influence 
from CSPs or NGBs. Policy is pretty much dictated by the DCMS and Sport England’ 
(Interview: Governance Chair, Trustee, CSP 2/National Director, ECB; 21 May 
2012); ‘nationally we do not play any role in policy, I think that is the problem that 
sport has always had, or local authorities have always had, we have traditionally been 
weak in influencing policy’ (Interview: Leisure Development Officer, District 
Council; 21 May 2012). A deeper insight came from the City Council representative 
who referred to potential opportunities to influence national sport policy albeit, 
limited to organised consultation: 
 
...at the national level our ability to influence is limited to 
consultations and things of that sort. I willingly take part in these 
sorts of things. I don’t know how much impact this has, but I think 
it is important to take up the opportunity and highlight your 
experiences and opinions (Interview: Head of Arts & Recreation, 
City Council; 21 May 2012). 
 
This is something that other agents criticised as a façade that presents the illusion of 
inclusion and engagement. The Chief Executive of the CSP reiterated this view, 
stating that: ‘we really lack lobbying power, community sport is not an active group 
or coalition, the agenda is set by DCMS and Sport England and we get on with 
whatever is agreed. There are consultation periods and you do have the opportunity 
to contribute views through workshops and meetings, but I am not naive enough to 
think that any of this really influences national policy’ (Interview: Chief Executive 
Officer, CSP 2; 7 June 2012). In short, the evidence suggests that the coalition 
responsible for establishing policy goals is exceptionally narrow and consists of 
national groups with homogenous interests, an environment which allows groups to 
promote their own interests and exclude those groups that may have different views 
or interests (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). 
 
 
 
-230- 
 
The majority of NGB representatives viewed the whole sport plan as the de facto 
policy and did not as much as acknowledge the CSPs strategy. Indeed, their 
involvement in the whole sport plan process is viewed as the primary way in which 
they may influence policy and thus influenced their perception of their role in 
national policy making. That said, for many NGBs, involvement in the development 
of the whole sport plan was limited to consultation. For some, however, the whole 
sport plan itself was driven nationally with little or no involvement from regional or 
sub-regional representatives: 
 
There is a lack of consultation and a lack of involvement, maybe 
even a lack of interest. It’s just a case of this is what we need you to 
do and this is what we will give you to do it. I guess it just makes 
you a little cynical, you tend to feel isolated, not really involved in 
the decisions, even though you have a better grasp of what is going 
on in local communities than the people making the decisions 
(Interview: County Director, ECB; 31 May 2012). 
 
That said, the ECB County Director did remark that she felt that the 2013-17 whole 
sport process represented progress, primarily due to the development of a national 
framework: ‘despite my earlier criticisms of [the NGB], I do buy into the 4Ps—
people, places, policy and playing. It’s a sensible framework and allows for national 
and local priorities to be addressed’. This was a point echoed by the Chief Executive 
of the County FA regarding their approach to developing the national whole sport 
plan for football: 
 
We have a framework approach, this is agreed nationally and every 
county delivers within the seven pillars of the framework. This 
approach works really well in balancing national and local 
priorities. It ensures a level of consistency across the country on 
seven broad themes, but at the same time gives every county the 
opportunity to focus on the things that are most important to them. 
The four goals are growth and retention, raising standards, better 
players and raising the game and the three enablers are workforce, 
facilities and marketing (Interview: Chief Executive Officer, County 
FA; 23 May 2012). 
 
These framework approaches developed by the FA and ECB appear, from the 
perspective of NGB representatives, to provide a more balanced approach to policy 
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making, whereby national priority areas can be agreed with a level of a commitment 
from across the organisation and with local priorities being incorporated within this, 
thereby providing regional and sub-regional representatives with a direct role in 
policy making as well as addressing issues which are perceived to be important 
locally. 
 
The CSP’s Chief Executive reiterated the above points from a CSP perspective, 
emphasising the passive role of the CSP in national policy making. Despite this, he 
simultaneously talked at length about how the CSPs are now viewed as the ‘arm of 
Sport England for the sub-region’. He clarified this as a delegation of responsibilities, 
where the CSP is charged with certain responsibilities and given very specific 
guidance from Sport England nationally, but underlined the fact that these 
responsibilities did not in any way extend into discussions or opportunities to shape 
national policy. However, he did not view CSPs as completely powerless in the 
policymaking arena; he saw it more of a case of observing how developments unfold, 
in particular what he referred to as the ‘potential of the national CSP Network’. He 
viewed this as ‘the strongest and best route for CSPs to influence policy’—through the 
collective power and influence of 49 CSPs, rather than relying on each partnership to 
do this individually. At the time of research he conceded that it was too early to 
comment on how fully the national CSP network will play this particular role and 
that to a large extent it would depend on how well CSPs could work together to 
coordinate efforts and ‘speak with one voice’ or indeed how other, traditionally 
powerful agencies would respond, in particular Sport England, the DCMS and 
perhaps the Sport and Recreation Alliance (the national representative body for 
NGBs). 
 
In line with the first case, the three local authority representatives underlined their 
employer’s leadership of local-level policy and thus their direct role in contributing to 
the development of sport-related policy: ‘I develop the county strategy for sport 
which is the County Council’s policy for sport, members approve it, I then oversee its 
delivery and report back to Council ... so I am very involved in the local policy 
making for sport in the county’. The city council representative highlighted her 
team’s central role in local policy as well as the importance of engaging the wider 
community in policy formulation: 
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Locally, I think we are a key player in formulating policy for sport. 
Me and my team make recommendations to local members about 
sport, about our strategy and about how sport can contribute to the 
Council’s priorities. Members then approve or reject these 
recommendations. If they approve them, they become policy. I 
think it is really important to engage the local community in this 
process and give them the opportunity to talk about what is 
important to them. We can then make sure that policy is based on 
local issues and is more likely to be owned and driven by the local 
community (Interview: Head of Arts & Recreation, City Council; 
21 May 2012). 
 
Local authority representatives referred to the ‘broader’ local policy landscape where 
it is critical to demonstrate how sport can contribute to the Council’s values or 
corporate priorities rather than promoting local policy solely concerned with ‘sport 
for sport motives’. All three representatives identified issues such as housing growth, 
the local economy, low levels of crime, health and wellbeing and quality of life as 
important agendas. Thus, influencing local-level policy for sport requires strategies 
and programmes that clearly impact these agendas. Failure to do so would 
undoubtedly result in a reallocation of resource to other, high-priority public 
services. In short, whilst there is a clear overlap relating to participation between the 
national policy for community sport and local-level policies, the motives 
underpinning these policies are distinct and quite different, which carries significant 
implications for the way in which they are implemented which can then adversely 
affect relations in the community sport policy sector, as discussed above. 
 
The CSP admitted that they were not as involved in local policy formulation as they 
would like to be, hindered somewhat by the CSPs preoccupation with project 
management and delivery: 
 
I think in terms of policy we have been in a bit of a vacuum in many 
ways, a policy vacuum. Now is the time. Probably the opportunity is 
there for us to challenge ourselves or even test ourselves ... You 
know when local authorities are writing new strategies we need to 
be there saying, well have you considered this ... we need to be 
advocating and representing the best interests for community sport 
in the area (Interview: Project Manager, CSP 2; 7 June 2012) 
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The role of the CSP and NGBs in the preparation of whole sport plans  
The three prominent issues in the first case also proved to be highly visible in the 
data in this case. The first concerns the lack of clarity regarding the whole sport plan, 
the priorities detailed in the plan and how these translate to the sub-region. This was 
a point made by all representatives of the CSP; as the board representative and ECB 
Director asserted: 
 
The major challenge concerns the NGBs and them being clear about 
the whole sport plan and how this translates to the local level. This 
time around [the next WSP process, 2013-17] NGBs must be clearer 
about the specific targets for local areas, what is expected of the CSP 
and being sure that these messages are consistent from national 
level to county level (Interview: Governance Chair, Trustee, CSP 
2/National Director, ECB; 21 May 2012). 
 
Similarly, the CSP viewed the whole sport plan process as being a wasted 
opportunity. The inference here is that the planning process is an opportunity to 
secure participatory consensus (van Meter & van Horn, 1975), build mutual trust and 
respect (Scheberle, 2004) as well as ensure that proposed plans are well-suited to 
local conditions (Hjern & Porter, 1981). However, the majority of NGBs choose to 
pursue an independent path where they create and develop their plan with limited 
external involvement. Consequently, the CSP’s NGB Lead Officer is left questioning 
the nature of the relationship, whether it is a balanced and fair relationship, and in 
some cases, viewing ‘the relationship as being artificial ... a case of just going through 
the motions because that is what is required in order to secure the funding’ 
(Interview: Projects Manager, CSP 2; 7 June 2012).  
 
Whilst the majority of NGBs cited a number of opportunities where they had the 
opportunity to influence their sport’s whole sport plan, representatives from cricket 
and athletics criticised the whole sport plan process. Both representatives are based 
within county structures and both criticised the top-down approach to the whole 
sport plan process, citing a complete ‘lack of engagement and involvement in the 
process’ (Interview: County Director, ECB; 31 May 2012). This was seen to be 
particularly problematic from the county representative perspective due to the 
‘message’ it sends, reconfirming the notion of them and us, and the ‘ivory tower’ 
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where privileged people with little or no understanding of field conditions set out 
plans for those in the field without involving them in the process. 
 
The traditional top-down leadership of sport, as represented in the whole sport plan 
process, is seen as being divisive in some sports further exacerbating the division 
between the national and local levels of the sport and resulting in alienating the 
grass-roots operators from the national level strategists. Whilst this dynamic is 
certainly not representative of all sports, sport is reportedly challenged in ‘securing 
consensus’ or developing a ‘truly collective approach’ from national to local level. A 
part of this could be attributed to the historical divide between NGBs and county 
associations of sport, in particular the power and resource that the centre are seen to 
possess versus the voluntary hours committed and local level knowledge generated at 
the local level. It could also be seen to relate to an intentional lack of engagement in 
order to avoid conflict (Matland, 1995) a result of too much power being held by a 
relatively small number of people. As one NGB representative put it, ‘even in the bad 
old days there was more democratic decision making, more sense of ownership of the 
sport than there is today. The problem is that too much influence is concentrated on 
too few people’ (Interview: Chairman, County Athletics Association; 7 June 2012). 
The Chairman of the County Association, who has been involved in athletics in the 
county for over 20 years, talked about the pressure that the voluntary-run clubs face. 
In particular, he noted the tension between the aspirations of the whole sport plan to 
grow participation in sport, and the strain that many clubs feel in terms of having 
enough coaches and volunteers to look after these people. Thus, he views the NGB’s 
paradigm as the major problem, whereby NGB policy is driven by Sport England and 
not by the NGB’s membership: 
 
We have lost sight of what we are supposed to be about. The 
priority or focus now tends to be looking toward meeting the 
requirements of Sport England, whereas the sport needs to look 
outwards to the clubs to make sure it is thinking about how it can 
help clubs and support clubs in developing the sport (Interview: 
Chairman, County Athletics Association; 7 June 2012). 
 
Whilst the specific issue of having a narrowed focus is not one cited by other NGB 
representatives, the general issue of relations between the NGB and VSCs was 
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commented on by all representatives. This is an issue that will receive further 
attention in the following sub-section. 
 
The role of the CSP and NGBs in policy implementation  
Almost all of the evidence relating to the role of the CSP and NGBs in policy 
implementation in this case fall under the same three themes identified in the first 
case, namely: (i) the strategic or delivery focus of the CSP; (ii) the changing role of 
local authorities in community sport policy implementation, and (iii) the lack of 
capacity to implement community sport policy. 
 
The CSP’s NGB lead officer talked briefly about the blurred distinction between the 
CSP’s role as a strategic lead agency for sport and physical activity versus its most 
recent role in the management of specific community sport projects.  
 
The strategy-delivery issue is one where there are clashes, I think it 
is developing into a major tension. We think we should be doing 
one thing, but actually we end up doing something entirely 
different, primarily because of funding and because Sport England 
say so (Interview: Projects Manager, CSP 2; 7 June 2012). 
 
The implications that flow from this are what concern the CSP most, particularly the 
issue of having a strategic lead for sport, somebody taking the overview, advocating 
for sport and ensuring that the ‘community sport offer’ is joined up: ‘if there is no 
overview, there is the potential for duplication, missed opportunities and short-
termism rather than long-term, coordinated work which really can deliver sustained 
change’ (Interview: Chief Executive Officer, CSP 2; 7 June 2012). As a result the 
NGB Lead Officer felt it important that the CSP do not assume a one-size-fits-all 
approach, but rather position themselves according to programmes and partner 
agencies: ‘for some programmes and areas of work we take the strategic lead, for 
example Sportivate or Disability Sport. But more generally we have to position 
ourselves according to what the local authorities want and what kind of support 
NGBs want’ (Interview: Projects Manager, CSP 2; 7 June 2012). 
 
As in the first case, the NGB perspective of the role of CSPs varied. The larger sports 
(tennis, football, and cricket) and one medium sport (swimming) stressed the need 
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for greater coordination and, in particular, more advocacy work with local 
government to ensure that community sport was embedded within local policy 
frameworks. All four sports were concerned about the ageing facility stock and the 
potential for new facilities to be developed as part of plans for major residential 
development for the sub-region. In contrast, three of the four remaining sports 
(netball, athletics, basketball) underlined support with delivery as being the priority, 
particularly the development and delivery of programmes that helped to ‘land their 
sport in local communities and provide opportunities for growth in new or lapsed 
participants’ (Interview: Regional Development Manager, England Basketball; 29 
May 2012); ‘the partnership plays a critical role in delivering things like Sportivate 
and the School Games, if they don’t do it, who else will?’ (Interview: County 
Development Manager, England Netball; 21 May 2012). The Regional Development 
Manager for the England Golf Partnership highlighted the need for a more balanced 
approach: ‘the ideal is having a bit of both [strategic and delivery], to have some 
strategic coordination and advocacy and some delivery support’. All three local 
authority representatives highlighted the same view, that the CSP needed to retain 
both strategic and delivery roles. Most importantly, the local authority 
representatives underlined the need for the CSP to ‘recognise the work of existing 
providers and develop an approach which complements and strengthens existing 
provision (Interview: County Sport Development Manager, County Council; 21 
May 2012) and to develop an approach which is best suited to the needs of the 
county: 
 
I think the problem is expecting a one-size-fits-all-approach—you 
are either this or that. You are never going to get that, nor should 
you expect it. All counties are different, all CSPs are different and it 
is important for partnerships to work out what is best for their 
patch (Interview: Head of Arts & Recreation, City Council; 21 May 
2012). 
 
Again reinforcing the findings in the first case, both NGBs and local authorities 
recognised the challenge facing the CSP insomuch as it aspires to respond to the 
needs of the county but also needs funding in order to survive. This funding 
predominantly comes from Sport England and usually requires the CSP to project 
manage the delivery of specific programmes without considering how they fit with 
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the local context. This was a point the CSP clearly recognised: ‘what it comes down to 
is funding and you don’t get any money for being strategic’ (Interview: Governance 
Chair, Trustee, CSP 2/National Director, ECB; 21 May 2012); ‘we want to play a 
more strategic role, but the funding from Sport England means that we have to get 
more involved in delivery’ (Interview: Projects Manager, CSP 2; 7 June 2012); ‘we 
need to develop a sustainable future for [the CSP], so as long as Sport England give 
us funding, we’ll be happy to receive it and to make sure that we deliver against their 
specification’ (Interview: Chief Executive Officer, CSP 2; 7 June 2012).  
 
It is a difficult situation for the CSP. We want to be entirely 
autonomous, to be separate from Sport England, but the reality is 
that we rely on funding from Sport England, without this we would 
not be in business (Interview: Governance Chair, Trustee, CSP 
2/National Director, ECB; 21 May 2012) 
 
Evidence of this type opens up a slightly different debate about the nature of the 
CSP’s priorities in that it suggests that the focus is really about funding and ensuring 
that the CSP can sustain its own future, despite claims about the CSP’s autonomy; 
the CSP is anything that the funder wants it to be. 
 
The shifting focus of local authorities is another causal factor which has resulted in 
CSPs taking a more delivery-orientated approach. Local authorities in the case 
explain that this change has been brought about by a number of factors, including: 
‘local authority members taking the decision to de-prioritise sport mainly due to the 
need to reprioritise budgets’, a decision that was made easier due to ‘the creation of 
CSPs and the lesser attention that Sport England give Councils’ (Interview: County 
Sport Development Manager, County Council; 21 May 2012), or the perception that 
‘local authorities are no longer needed or no longer seen as important to Sport 
England (Interview: Leisure Development Officer, District Council, 21 May 2012). 
The result of these forces has given local authorities ‘the space and opportunity to 
focus on our own priorities without much interference from external agencies’ 
(Interview: Head of Arts & Recreation, City Council; 21 May 2012). This has led to 
the majority of authorities maintaining a service focused on broader community 
development outcomes associated with health and wellbeing, community safety and 
community cohesion. At the same time, the majority of authorities are pursuing the 
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neo-liberal ideals associated with the Localism Bill and the Big Society and are 
commissioning community-based and third-sector organisations to deliver public 
services, including sport. Indeed, this approach is impacting the role of the CSP 
insofar as some local authorities view the CSP as a delivery mechanism that it can 
commission to deliver services at a fraction of the cost it could manage itself:  
 
... the [local authority] relies on [the CSP] to deliver what it used to 
do itself ... it has actually reduced the council-led role in sport and 
outsourced it to the CSP. By doing this, members can say that they 
still provide a sport service to the local community ... they can do 
this without employing any staff and therefore do it for a fraction of 
the cost (Interview: Leisure Development Officer, District Council; 
21 May 2012).  
 
The final theme relating to the role of NGBs and the CSP in policy implementation 
was the lack of capacity to implement community sport policy. The range and depth 
of data relating to this issue suggests that it is significant. The majority of evidence 
underscores a perception that there is a lack of capacity at street-level: ‘we need more 
people delivering sport’ (Interview: Projects Manager, CSP 2; 7 June 2012); ‘we 
need more coaches at the local level’ (Interview: County Development Manager, 
England Netball; 21 May 2012); ‘we need more volunteers at the coalface, so to 
speak’ (Interview: Regional Development Manager, LTA; 7 June 2012); and ‘with 
regards to delivery we have the constant challenge of volunteers, particularly a lack of 
proactive volunteers’ (Interview: Chief Executive Officer, County FA; 23 May 2012).  
 
The lack of capacity was principally attributed to funding; in particular the evidence 
suggested that agents perceive an imbalance in resource allocation: ‘what actually 
happens with the whole sport plan money is that we invest in the sports themselves, 
in the sport infrastructure. This may be good for the sport, it may help the sport to be 
more organised and professional, but it does little for the man on the street’ 
(Interview: Leisure Development Officer, District Council; 21 May 2012); ‘I think 
the problem is pretty obvious, there is not enough resource getting down the chain, 
down to local community level’ (Interview: Chief Executive Officer, CSP 2; 7 June 
2012).  
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It’s quite simple really, if we want to bring about a change at the 
local level we need more support, we need more capacity at the local 
level. Most of the NGB resource tends to get sucked up at the 
national or regional level. I understand why, but we need to 
challenge ourselves more to get the funding committed at the 
grassroots level, this is where the money is needed and where it will 
make the most difference (Interview: Chairman, County Athletics 
Association; 7 June 2012). 
 
More optimistically, the CSP’s NGB Lead Officer talked about recent developments 
where sports are now starting to look more critically at their own infrastructure to 
determine whether it is fit for the purpose of growing participation in sport: 
 
NGBs do not allocate enough funding to delivery, but it is changing. 
Previously, the majority of the whole sport funding was committed 
to NGB infrastructure, but now I think a few sports are starting to 
think about how they can get more resources for delivery 
(Interview: Projects Manager, CSP 2; 7 June 2012). 
 
Adding to the optimistic tone of this commitment, the CSP’s Chief Executive 
mentioned the opportunity of the NGB’s adapted games, citing examples such as No 
Strings Badminton, Rush Hockey, Back to Netball, Running Networks and Last Man 
Standing (cricket). Whilst these programmes are another example of top-down policy 
their flexible design allows for local adaptation and innovation without putting more 
pressure on the traditional sports volunteer network: 
 
I think there is a tremendous opportunity with the new version of 
the game. They are easy to set up, do not require excessive amounts 
of time and financial commitment and they do not rely on 
traditional club networks. I think they offer a real opportunity for 
growth (Interview: CSP Director, CSP 2; 7 June 2012). 
 
Still, the evidence clearly highlighted an overreliance on volunteers as a method to 
deliver community sport policy, although this was a view far more prevalent amongst 
the CSP and local authority representatives than it was NGBs: ‘it’s the same old 
thing, we rely on clubs and volunteers, this is where sport happens, so if we want to 
get more participants it automatically falls to those already providing sport’ 
(Interview: Leisure Development Officer, District Council; 21 May 2012). The 
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County Sport Development Officer viewed this as being a ‘major assumption’ and a 
significant problem in terms of delivery because the majority of clubs were more 
concerned with ‘playing their sport and keeping their members happy’, a point 
reiterated by the CSP’s NGB Lead Officer: ‘most clubs, particularly the smaller clubs, 
just want to play the game, they don’t want to be told that they have to meet this, 
change this, or do this ... it’s not why they do what they do’ (Interview: Projects 
Manager, CSP 2; 7 June 2012). This is a problem that resonates with the evidence 
from the first case as well as previous research (cf. Allison, 2001; Taylor et al., 2007). 
The majority of NGB representatives referred more to the operational aspects 
associated with working with volunteers, for example needing more volunteers, 
volunteer development, the need for more volunteer leaders and more coaches, 
rather than referring to fundamental principles such as the professional-volunteer 
dynamic which underpins the NGB-VSC relationship. That said, the chair of the 
County Athletics Association offered a unique bottom-up view of the NGB, its 
understanding of its membership, and the place of community sport across its 
members: 
 
The connection between the clubs and the NGBs is not well formed. 
There is a clear disconnect between national folk and local clubs. 
Their focus is on a centralised strategy, they do not understand the 
practical implications of delivering the sport, the ins and outs of 
running the club and where something like growth or sustaining 
participation may feature within this. The people centrally do not 
understand the culture of the sport, they are not close enough to it 
on a daily basis to really get it (Interview: Chairman, County 
Athletics Association; 7 June 2012). 
 
Here, the reference to ‘the culture of the sport’ implies that this is something distinct 
and not understood by professional administrators. Similarly, the comment about 
where growth may feature suggests a general lack of awareness on the part of the 
NGB in not understanding that these issues are not important to volunteer-run 
athletics clubs. Whilst specific perspectives such as this were not common amongst 
NGB representatives involved in case 2, it does link with an earlier point about the 
lack of consistency across sport from national to local level. It also reveals a 
somewhat unique perspective of the NGB from the viewpoint of the County 
Association, one which could be partially explained by the predominantly voluntary 
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nature of the County Athletics Association, the longstanding ‘amateur’ tradition with 
which athletics is associated, and, in particular, the resentment and apathy of the 
Chairmen toward the ongoing assumption that clubs will play an active role in policy 
implementation. 
 
Agents’ beliefs, attitudes and experiences in regard to the community 
sport policy process  
 
The following section will highlight agents’ attitudes and experiences regarding three 
aspects of the community sport policy process: the nature of the policy process; the 
extent to which agents believe they are part of a collective system; and agents’ belief 
in their ability to achieve community sport policy outcomes. 
 
The nature of the policy process 
The data revealed four key themes that pertain to agents’ views of the nature of the 
community sport policy process: a top-down system with a lack of participatory 
consensus, duplication across the system, more assertive oversight, and the 
unintended consequences associated with community sport. 
 
As presented in the sections above, agents emphasised a view of community sport as 
a top-down policy system, with limited engagement, involvement or consensus 
across the system, particularly at the point of implementation. In some instances 
there was confusion or ‘a lack of clarity regarding who would be doing what and 
when’ for different sports (Interview: CSP Projects Manager, CSP 2; 7 June 2012), 
and in others’ complete bewilderment regarding the lack of involvement of street-
level operators:  
 
..unless you have a structure which involves the people that are 
supposedly going to do it, you are forever going to be in conflict, 
either that or kidding yourself that people are or will do things that 
they have no intention of doing (Interview: Chairman, County 
Athletics Association; 7 June 2012). 
 
In short, the evidence echoed that presented in the first case, in particular the 
characterisation of the community sport policy process as being top-down with a lack 
of participatory consensus from street-level operators. This is problematic as it has 
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an implied bias towards the bounded rationality of hierarchical, government 
leadership (Cline, 2000), it fails to take account of the ‘interests, objectives, 
perceptions, and strategies of other actors and the institutional context in which they 
function (Kickert et al., 1997: 184), and simply fails to secure the participatory 
consensus of street-level operators (Barrett & Fudge, 1981; de Leon & de Leon, 2002; 
Dunleavy, 1991; van Meter & van Horn, 1975).  
 
Agents also noted inefficiencies in the system, in particular areas of duplication, 
‘which leads to animosity and considerable frustration ... you know, treading on each 
others’ toes’ (Interview: County Sport Development Manager, County Council; 21 
May 2012). This was seen to be a particular issue between the CSP and NGBs: ‘there 
is quite a bit of duplication between what the CSP is trying to do and what the NGB 
does, for example, child protection, school-club links, club development and support. 
It’s a huge challenge, we have this dual set up for community sport but no real clarity 
on who is doing what’ (Interview: Chairman, County Athletics Association; 7 June 
2012). The NGB Lead reported the same problem, although she viewed it more as a 
tension regarding the leadership in certain work areas:  
 
There is a tension around who leads what, say for example club 
development. Some NGBs see this as their key role, some local 
authorities also do it, and obviously we have a club development 
officer. So there is a need for us to work through this and be clearer 
about who does what (Interview: Projects Manager, CSP 2; 7 June 
2012). 
 
The final points regarding the nature of the community sport policy process relate to 
the more assertive oversight of the community sport policy process and the 
unintended consequences of policy. The first issue relates to the range of data in the 
case that referred to the ‘more assertive role of Sport England’ (Interview: Chief 
Executive Officer, CSP 2; 7 June 2012), where they are viewed as being ‘more 
demanding’ (Interview: County Director, ECB; 31 May 2012); and ‘a lot more 
professional and doing a lot more thinking, a lot more analysis, and a lot more 
questioning’ (Interview: Governance Chair, Trustee, CSP 2/National Director, ECB; 
21 May 2012), leading NGB representatives to state that ‘we are now very clear about 
the implications of not hitting targets’ (Interview: Regional Development Manager, 
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England Basketball; 29 May 2012). This view seems to be driven by a number of 
factors, including the exacting focus on numbers and targets, the actual follow-
through with recouping investment, the change in leadership and the way in which 
this has affected the political perception of Sport England: 
 
I think the change has come with the new leadership. You know, 
Sport England is a lot stronger now. They have very clear targets 
and very clear systems of evaluating whether the targets have been 
hit. NGBs know that they have to take them seriously, whereas in 
the past maybe there was a little bit of lip service ... NGBs now 
realise that they have to take them serious or risk losing their 
funding (Interview: Projects Manager, CSP 2; 7 June 2012). 
 
If you look at it, Jennie Price has done a brilliant job ... I think she is 
a very sharp political operator. I think that five years ago if we had 
seen Sport England in the position it is in we would all be amazed. I 
mean, it wasn’t that long ago that the now Minister [Hugh 
Robinson] was calling for Sport England to be scrapped (Interview: 
Chief Executive Officer, CSP 2; 7 June 2012). 
 
With regards to unintended consequences, two specific issues emerged in the data. 
The first of these concerns the definition and division of community sport, pointing 
to the specific age range of community sport policy and how this fails to align to the 
practical realties of implementing sport policy: ‘... the way in which policy is set 
makes no sense, the focus on 16+, or this age group or that, it’s just not how it works 
in the real world’ (Interview: Governance Chair, Trustee, CSP 2/National Director, 
ECB; 21 May 2012); ‘we don’t tend to work in ages, we want to work with young 
people now to get them involved and keep them involved’ (Interview: Regional 
Development Manager, LTA; 7 June 2012); ‘having separate policies, strategies and 
networks for youth sport and adult sport makes absolutely no sense; (Interview: 
County Sport Development Manager, County Council; 21 May 2012). This view of 
sport being artificially divided for the purpose of policy was a common theme in the 
case and something about which CSP, local authority and NGB representatives 
generally agreed.  
 
The second issue is a result of the overemphasis on indicators, targets and ‘hitting 
the numbers’ which has in turn transformed the fundamental nature of community 
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sport from being focused on ‘personal, community and social development, to a 
situation where I need to get 100 people attending this project, how and where do I 
get them? We have become obsessed with numbers, bean counters to an extent’ 
(Interview: Chairman, County Athletics Association; 7 June 2012). This was a view 
shared by a number of representatives in the case, particularly the County Sport 
Development Manager, the CSP’s Chief Executive and the City Council’s Head of Arts 
and Recreation, who all noted the preoccupation with numbers, which they viewed as 
being useful for focusing the mind, but at the same time saw this detracting from the 
deeper and more meaningful aspects of sport. 
 
The extent to which agents believe that they are part of a collective system 
The two predominant themes in this case highlight agents’ general lack of belief 
regarding community sport being a collective system. The first related to a sense that 
competition was a more prominent characteristic than cooperation, primarily driven 
by resource dependency. The second relates to a lack of consensus regarding 
priorities. Agents highlighted an emphasises on competition over cooperation, 
particularly open competition between sports ‘ultimately, there are only so many 
people that want to play sport ... you end up finding that you are competing with 
other sports for the same people’ (Interview: Regional Development Manager, 
Amateur Swimming Association; 8 June 2012); ‘every sport is so keen to promote its 
own sport, we need a greater focus on cooperation across sports, rather than 
competing against each other as has been the case for the past three years’ 
(Interview: Chief Executive Officer, CSP B3; 7 June 2012); ‘there is generally a lack 
of collaboration across sports. Fractures appear when we work in isolation, we end 
up competing against one another and one party does not know what the other is 
doing’ (Interview: Chief Executive Officer, FA; 23 May 2012). Other representatives 
viewed the system as being more competitive than cooperative, a situation which is 
created by the resource dependency of the majority of agents involved in community 
sport: ‘...there is an element of fighting for survival, you know, we have all been at 
this for some time now ... local authorities, NGBs, CSPs ... whilst we all get on, we’re 
all chasing funding, trying to demonstrate our value or justify our position’ 
(Interview: Chief Executive Officer, CSP 2; 7 June 2012); ‘there are common 
accusations that we chase pots of funding, but you have to remember Sport England 
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could decide to stop funding at any time ... we have to find ways to sustain ourselves’ 
(Interview: Project Manager, CSP 2; 7 June 2012). 
 
The second issue was a lack of consensus regarding priorities. The main point here is 
that the key agents involved in community sport share overlapping yet distinct 
priorities and at the same time each is fully aware of the broader range of interests of 
their partners. Part of this awareness comes through experience—in particular the 
different experience of actors who may well have worked within a local authority, 
CSP, NGB and possibly even Sport England—and part through storylines and 
narratives. Thus, a truly collective system is difficult, if not impossible to achieve. As 
the County Sport Development Manager put it, ‘a truly collective system would have 
all parts working toward the same end goal, and we know that is not the case in 
[community] sport’. Whilst the key actors in community sport may share the 
common goal of increasing participation in 14+ sport, they also have their own very 
distinct interests and priorities. These are a significant hurdle when attempting to 
create a collective system particularly when one considers the number of NGB, local 
authority, VSC (and other) agents involved in each sub-regional system. Given the 
range and diversity of agencies involved in community sport it is of no surprise to 
find that they do not feel part of a collective community sport system. 
 
Agents’ belief in their ability to achieve community sport outcomes 
Local authority and CSP agents generally viewed the outcomes to be exceptionally 
challenging, particularly against the backdrop of more stringent public sector budget 
reductions, which would likely not only affect the workforce but also the facilities 
infrastructure. This would inevitably lead to new models of delivery or finding 
different ways to do things and ultimately the ability ‘to do more with less’ 
(Interview: Head of Arts & Recreation, City Council; 21 May 2012). Further, CSP 
and local authority representatives underlined the need for greater consensus across 
sports from national to local level, including clarity regarding NGB priorities and 
how these priorities would be delivered. Within this, agents emphasised the need for 
a clearer delivery chain for each sport, including more investment into delivery as 
well as promoting the need for more non-traditional delivery methods to be 
explored. The issue of intelligence and being clearer about what works was also 
highlighted: ‘we need to be a little sharper in terms of understanding latent demand, 
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and understanding exactly what is needed and where it is needed (Interview: 
Governance Chair, Trustee, CSP 2/National Director, ECB; 21 May 2012). More 
fundamentally, the CSP Chief Executive identified the ‘alien sport culture’ as one that 
needs to be addressed. By this, he meant the ‘organised, structured, elitist’ view of 
sport as something that you have to be good at to do. He felt that this was a major 
problem and a significant challenge in achieving the policy outcome, not just for his 
sub-region but for the entire country. 
 
NGBs, on the other hand, generally appeared to be more positive about their ability 
to achieve community sport outcomes, maybe because they directly own or are 
responsible for the outcomes. That said, three specific barriers were identified across 
sports: (i) the lack of a captive audience: ‘adult participation is really hard, the 
biggest difficulty is accessing adults ... if you are working with children you have got 
schools, you’ve got a captive audience, but with adults, when you promote Get Back 
Into, you have not really got an audience as such, you need to go and find one’ 
(Interview: County Director, ECB; 31 May 2012); (ii) for the majority of sports, the 
ongoing provision of public sector facilities was seen to be a priority issue, and was a 
particular concern for a number of NGBs due to the common perception that 
facilities were ageing, in need of repair or at risk of closure due to budget reductions; 
and (iii) reduced opportunities for schools as a result of the decision to stop funding 
School Sport Partnerships. The major concern in relation to school sport was the 
impact this would have on adult sports participation over the longer term. 
 
Conclusions 
In contrast to the first case, one of the more distinctive findings in case 2 was the 
evidence of effective collaboration. This appeared to be driven by the stability of the 
local-level sport development infrastructure and the CSP’s leadership of community 
sport. On the former issue, a number of senior officers involved in sport at the sub-
regional level remain in position. This has benefitted the partnership as the local 
context is clearly and commonly understood. It has also created a sense of unity in 
the network as many of the same officers were involved in the creation of the 
partnership. These key actors share an experience of co-creating the CSP and thus 
feel more invested in it than might otherwise be the case. Both the CSP board and 
senior management team are respected as experienced professionals. Their initial 
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role in co-creating the CSP together with high levels of trust amongst local 
authorities creates an environment that is more conducive to cooperation. First, local 
authorities are more accepting of the strategic leadership role of the CSP. Second, 
this secures greater credibility and legitimacy with NGBs. In this way, local 
authorities could be viewed as a gatekeeper to the CSP-NGB relationship insofar as 
good quality CSP-local authority relations are more likely to facilitate good quality 
CSP-NGB relations.  
 
Although the environment is generally more cooperative than case 1, both the CSP 
and local authority indicated the tension with NGBs, especially the privileged 
position of NGBs within the policy process. This view was driven by a perception that 
NGBs operate under a different set of externally imposed rules than the CSP or local 
authorities. In particular, the conditions that govern the preparation of NGB whole 
sport plans, performance management requirements and the overall implementation 
of their strategy were viewed as being lax especially when compared to the conditions 
attached to CSP funding. However, it is important here to include the caveat that 
whilst NGBs may be afforded certain freedoms in the initial stages of the policy 
process, their failure to achieve targets (or to get reasonably close to them) is likely to 
result in funding being severely reduced as seen in a number of sports toward the 
end of the 2009-13 cycle. 
 
Another notable observation in this case which relates to both the issue of CSP 
leadership and power at the local level is the individual relationship between CSP 
and NGB representatives, specifically the imbalance between the CSP Director and 
NGB local-level personnel. In this case, the Director is a sport development 
professional and leader with considerable experience, knowledge and an extensive 
network of professional contacts. In contrast, the NGB infrastructure at the local-
level usually consists of junior officers, many of whom are recent graduates. The 
primary observation here is not the inexperience of the NGB officers at the local 
level, although this is not an insignificant observation in the implications it carries 
for community sport, but another nuance in the power relationship between CSP and 
NGBs at the local level. 
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Similar to the call for a more genuine policy community in case 1, case 2 underlined 
an additional emotive requirement: the need for greater empathy within the policy 
process. This would require agents to ‘wear the shoes of others’ and more clearly 
understand the context and conditions that influence their actions. Whilst both the 
CSP and NGBs robustly defend the need to respond to their own local contexts, both 
could do more to recognise and respect the contexts that influence the other. In 
addition, over the longer term such behaviour is likely to build reciprocity across the 
network, thereby forming a more reliable foundation upon which cooperation could 
be sustained (Axelrod, 1984). 
 
A final observation from the case concerned sport more broadly particularly the place 
of sport within national identity. The point being made was a general observation, an 
anecdotal remark that participation was not as prevalent or as important as being a 
fan—it does not form a part of the national culture. In fact, the argument being made 
was that for the majority of the population, sport is part of an alien culture, 
something in which they have no interest and no desire to get involved. The reason 
for mentioning this here is to underline the potential forces at play. We have a policy 
field of actors—where it is reasonable to assume that the majority are involved and 
deeply passionate about sport—providing for a population, the majority of which do 
not share the same interests. This dynamic requires further examination. This could 
consider how well policy agents are able to cater for a group with a very different 
relationship to sport and what strategies are more likely to be successful with such 
populations. Whilst such work has been explored in the broader field of physical 
activity, no such work has been undertaken in community sport. 
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Chapter 7 
Case 3: CSP 3 
 
Introduction 
The structure of this chapter will mirror that of Chapters 5 and 6, focusing on the 
following sections: (i) the organisational, administrative and strategic priorities of 
each CSP; (ii) the CSP-NGB relationship; (iii) The role of the CSP and NGBs in policy 
making and implementation; and (iv) CSP and NGB beliefs, attitudes and 
experiences regarding the community sport policy process. 
 
Organisation, administration and strategic priorities 
Geographic and demographic context 
CSP 3 is non-metropolitan and has a largely rural character. It has no cities, three 
major towns, 25 smaller towns, and covers an area of 3,798 square kilometres. The 
population is just over 730,000 with 49.0% of the population male and 51.0% female 
(ONS, 2012) (see Table 7.1). 
 
                     Table 7.1 2012 Population by gender, age (14+) and ethnicity, (ONS, 2012) 
Group CSP Population  
‘000 
% England population 
‘000 
% 
Male 284.2 49.0 20,644.8 49.0 
Female 296.1 51.0 21,509.3 51.0 
14-15 17.8 2.9 1,291.4 2.9 
16-19 32.0 5.5 2,528.6 6.0 
20-24 35.9 6.2 3,588.0 8.5 
25-34 82.0 14.1 7,079.0 16.8 
35-49 146.8 25.3 11,097.9 26.3 
50-64 142.4 24.5 9,431.9 22.4 
65+ 141.1 24.3 8,428.6 20.0 
White 559.7 96.5 36,866.8 87.5 
Non white 20.0 3.4 5,101.3 12.1 
 
CSP 3 faces relatively low levels of deprivation. Based on a categorisation of local 
authorities into quintiles none of the seven local authorities are ranked in the 20% 
most deprived, two authorities are ranked in the second worst 20%, four authorities 
are ranked in the second least deprived, and one authority is ranked in the least 
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deprived 20%. However, the Rural Development Commission (2008) argued that 
standard deprivation measures underestimate rural deprivation as they do not fully 
consider low pay and intermittent employment, problems of accessing public 
services due to distance and poor transportation links, and that deprivation in rural 
areas is usually clustered in exceptionally small areas not appropriately identified 
within the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD). The economic output per capita for 
the area is £17,735 (as measured by Gross Value Added) compared to the England 
average of £21,103, whereas unemployment as a proportion of those economically 
active is relatively low, with the county reporting 7.3% against a national average of 
8.1% (ONS, 2012). These comparative data generally support the point being made in 
the study regarding the dominance of low-skilled work and low-pay sectors within 
the county (County Council, 2011).  
 
The health profile presents an inconsistent picture when compared to regional and 
national averages. Obesity levels in the county are higher than the regional average 
and in line with the national average. However, life expectancy for both males and 
females is marginally higher than regional and national averages. The obesity rate is 
24.3%, compared to 24.2% nationally. The childhood obesity rate is 17.5%, lower 
than both the regional (17.7%) and national averages (19.0%). The health care costs 
of physical inactivity for the sub-region exceed £1.88 million per 100,000 people, 
significantly higher than the regional average of 1.78 million and marginally higher 
than the national average of £1.82 million (see Table 7.2). 
 
                               Table 7.2 Health care costs of physical inactivity (Sport England, 2013) 
Geography Total cost Cost per 100,000 pop. 
Sub-region £14, 457,460 £1,880,156 
Region £103,548,774 £1,776,768 
England £944,289,723 £1,817,285 
 
Local government: boundaries and resources 
The administrative structure of the sub-region consists of a traditional two-tier 
system with seven local authority districts and a county council. The Conservative 
party have maintained overall control of the County Council since 2005, taking 
leadership after a period of no majority between the years 1993-2005. Furthermore, 
five of the seven districts are controlled by a Conservative administration, with one 
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with no majority and the Labour party maintaining overall control of the remaining 
authority. 
 
The seven districts allocated a total budget of £7.0 million to sport and recreation. 
This allocation fell slightly in 2011/12 to £6.6 million, although this reduction was 
primarily the result of one district reducing its commitment to sport and recreation 
by £583,000 (representing a 87.0% reduction in the district’s budget). Whilst the 
reduction for this one authority was substantial, the budget reduction across other 
authorities were less substantial, ranging between 7.7% and 16.9%. Despite the 
increasing pressure to find savings in the public sector, three authorities increased 
their annual budget allocation for sport and recreation between 2010/11 and 2011/12 
with budgetary increases ranging from 4.7% (£63,000 in real terms) to 34.1% 
(£140,000 in real terms) (see Table 7.3). Despite this, the County Council’s Head of 
Culture and Sport19 referred to the problems of decreasing expertise in local 
authorities, a result of increasing financial pressures: 
 
The reality is that there has been a big loss of expertise in the local 
government sector … There’s a hope that the third sector and 
private sector fills that space … The shift is definitely to downsize 
[sport in local authorities], it’s a struggle unless you’re in a really 
strong sporting area and region in the country and got really strong 
political leadership behind it (Interview: Head of Culture and 
Sport, County Council; 1 June 2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 The Head of Culture & Sport for the County Council was, at the time of research, also the Chairman of the 
national Chief Culture and Leisure Officers (CCLOA) group. 
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Table 7.3 Budget for sport by local authorities in CSP 3 (source: CLG, 2011, 2012) 
 
 
CSP structure, organisation and strategic priorities 
The partnership has been in existence as a formal body since 1996, initially serving as 
a network forum for sport development within the county before evolving into the 
Active Sport Partnership in 2000 and then the County Sport Partnership in 2005/6. 
The official organisational status of the CSP is hosted, meaning that all staff are 
employed by the host organisation, all budgets are contained within the host’s 
budgetary system, and the place of work (office, facilities, etc) is provided by the host 
organisation. At the time of writing, the host organisation was one of the District 
Councils (District 6 in Table 7.3). The senior management team and board have 
investigated the implications and financial benefits attached to independent status 
(specifically Company limited by guarantee and Charitable Status), but, after review 
they agreed that maintaining the status quo as a hosted organisation was in the best 
interests of the partnership. 
 
The vision for the CSP is ‘to make the county a physically active and successful 
sporting county through the provision of high quality opportunities for everyone’ 
(CSP Business Plan, 2012). The priorities underpinning this vision are (i) increasing 
participation in sport and physical activity, (ii) strategic coordination of sport and 
physical activity across the county; (iii) NGB support, and (iv) workforce 
development. A board of nine voluntary representatives, the CSP Director and a 
Sport England representative oversee the work of the CSP. Board members are 
appointed by Sport England together with existing board members and the CSP 
Director based on skills, experience and competencies rather than on the basis of the 
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representation of certain sectors or organisations. Individuals receive no fee or 
remuneration. A range of skills are represented including many that address the 
CSP’s priority work areas, including marketing and promotion, funding, strategic 
planning, governance and performance management, club development, as well as 
particular interests such as young people, workforce and the community. Of the nine 
board members; four currently work in business/commerce, one in a senior 
management position in local government (this representative is also chair of the 
Chief Culture and Leisure Officers Association ((CCLOA), another as the CEO for a 
local not-for-profit health promotion agency, one is an elected member of the County 
Council, one is the CEO of a local leisure trust, and the Chair is a Professor of Sport 
Studies at a local higher education institution. 
 
The board are ultimately responsible for the governance of the CSP. This includes 
agreeing the CSP’s strategy, reviewing performance and monitoring the financial 
health of the partnership. The core team consists of 14 full-time staff who fulfil a 
variety of positions and responsibilities as detailed in Figure 7.1. Sport England 
provides the CSP with annual core funding of £240,000 (based on the 2011/12 
allocation). The highest performing CSPs have the opportunity to secure a share of 
£80,00020. In return the CSP is required to meet the conditions of the CSP core 
specification as detailed in Chapter 4. The annual turnover for the 2011/12 financial 
year was £1,300,000. 
                                                          
20 At the time of writing, no decision had been made regarding the allocation of the additional £80,000 
investment. 
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Figure 7.1 Structure of CSP 3 core team` 
 
Sports participation trends 
Sports participation rates in the partnership area have been inconsistent over the 
2005/6–2011/12 period. Whilst participation rates increased steadily between 
2005/6 and 2009/10 with an overall gain of 3.8%, this was followed in 2010/11 by a 
sharp decrease of 3.9%. The most recent participation statistics (2011/12) from 
Active People reveal a rate of 33.9%, a 2.1% increase when compared to the 2005/6 
benchmark of 31.8% (see Table 7.4). When compared to regional and national 
averages, participation rates in the county have been consistently lower, with the 
exception of 2009/10 when participation rates were reportedly 0.7% higher in the 
county than the regional average and 0.3% higher than the national average. In 
2011/12 participation was 2.1% lower than both the regional and national average. 
 
Table 7.4 Adult (16+) Participation in Sport (at least once pw), by year (source: Sport England, 2013) 
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The growth in participation between 2005/6 and 2011/12 is notable in most 
demographic groups, specifically female (+4.3%), white (+2.5%), 26-34 years 
(+5.6%) and 55+ (+3.5%) populations (see Table 7.5). Despite this growth, there 
were populations where participation rates reportedly decreased; in particular, the 
non-white population (-4.6%), NS SEC 3 (-1.2%), NS SEC 4 (-0.4%), and NS SEC 5-8 
(-0.8%). 
 
Table 7.5 Adult (16+) Participation in Sport (at least once a week *), by demographic group (source: 
Sport England, 2013) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Estimates suggest that the growth potential for adult participation in sport in the 
CSP 3 area is 49.9%, considerably lower than the regional (55.1%) and national 
averages (55.4%). That said, this represents a total of 289,300 people in the county 
who have expressed interest in doing more sport. The three sports with the highest 
growth potential in the area are swimming (57,300/9.9%), cycling (43,100/7.4%) 
and athletics (16,900/2.9%) (Sport England, 2013).  
 
The sub-region appears to be performing well in other sport indicators. Between 
2008/9 and 2011/12 there were significant gains in volunteering (+2.9%), club 
membership (+7.2%), receiving coaching (21.2%), and participating in competitive 
sport (+4.7%) (see Table 7.6). Further, the increases show that the sub-region has 
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more people volunteering in sport and participating in organised sport (receiving 
coaching, club membership, and competition) than the regional and national 
averages. 
 
Table 7.6 Other Sport Indicators: Volunteering and formal sports participation (source: Sport 
England, 2013) 
 
 
The CSP-NGB relationship 
This section will present agents’ attitudes and experiences in relation to three aspects 
that are of integral importance to the CSP-NGB relationship: (i) the CSP leadership 
of NGB relations, (ii) the factors that have positively influenced CSP-NGB 
relationships; and (iii) the problems and challenges that have adversely affected the 
CSP-NGB relationship. 
 
The CSP leadership of NGB relations 
The board reportedly operated at a strategic level and left the day-to-day 
management of the CSP to the core team. The board primarily served an important 
function in the governance of the CSP, particularly in terms of updating the strategy 
and approving the financial reports. It was also seen as a useful forum for debating 
operational issues and identifying appropriate solutions to problems. What was seen 
to be particularly helpful in this regard was the ‘rich skill set’ across the board’s 
membership. Operational matters such as the strategic leadership of relations with 
NGBs and the identification of priority sports were delegated to the CSP Director and 
core team. 
 
Partnership arrangements with NGBs are solely led by the Operations Manager, a 
role that has been held by the same person since the creation of the Active Sport 
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Partnership in July 2000. The exception to this arrangement is cycling for which the 
CSP has a full-time, sport-specific development officer. In addition, half of the time 
of one the sport development officer is devoted to basketball. The Operations 
Manager reflected on the strengths and challenges associated with this approach, 
noting that: 
 
...it’s a lot of work but I think it works well. It allows us to build up 
trust and strike a relationship and to keep things in check ... you 
soon get to know where it is working and where it’s not ... we have 
thought about sharing the responsibilities across the team a little 
bit more, and we have started to do that with some of the project 
stuff, [but] I think the positives [of this approach] outweigh the 
negatives (Interview: Operations Manager, CSP 3; 22 May 2012). 
 
The role of the Operations Manager was to agree to an action plan for each sport in 
the county, to decide the priorities and key actions over the whole sport plan period, 
and then delegate this to the appropriate development officer to manage on a day-to-
day basis. Routine planning meetings were arranged with these sports in order to 
monitor progress against proposed actions and to agree actions for the forthcoming 
period. The Operations Manager was clear that this approach has not worked with all 
sports, ‘but it worked well with those sports where we have well developed relations’ 
(Interview: Operations Manager, CSP 3; 22 May 2012). 
 
This approach appears to have primarily evolved from the ‘positional power’ that the 
Operations Manager has consolidated, having been in post since 2000. It is clear 
from the research that the Director would like to review the arrangements. This 
would address the sole reliance on the Operations Manager and also involve other 
members of the team more directly in an NGB liaison role, resulting in greater 
efficiency as well as the personal development of the relatively junior members of the 
sport development team.  
 
One of the CSP’s more recent initiatives was the creation of priority sports. This is 
similar to processes presented in cases 1 and 2 whereby sports are prioritised and 
given an enhanced service beyond that required by the core specification. Sports 
were rated on a number of criteria, including: NGB relationship potential, Sport 
England strategy priority, NGB track record of delivery in the county, fit with 
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dominant market segments, fit of target audience with NGB products, and facility 
accessibility. This exercise identified 12 priority sports: angling, athletics, badminton, 
basketball, cricket, cycling, football, golf, netball, swimming, rugby, tennis. The CSP 
aims to work more closely with these sports in order to grow participation in the 
county. This will include enhanced partnership services beyond the core 
specification, in order to ‘work in a focused way with those sports that were more 
likely to deliver growth’ as well as ‘enabling [the CSP] to develop softer interpersonal 
relationship which is more effective than the tick box approach’ (Interview: Director, 
CSP 3; 22 May 2012). 
 
Factors that have positively influenced the CSP-NGB relationship 
The case revealed three prominent factors that are seen to positively influence 
relations between the CSP and NGBs, factors that were also identified in cases 1 and 
2. 
 
The first factor identified in the evidence related to individuals. A number of agents 
viewed individuals—their personality, character and approach to their work—as 
being critical in developing positive working relations between the CSP and NGBs. A 
number of representatives mentioned the importance of personal relations; for the 
County Netball Development Officer this was the key issue in the CSP-NGB: ‘for me, 
it’s about personalities; you have to be able to get on with the people you work with’ 
(Interview: County Netball Development Officer, England Netball; 21 May 2013). 
The Borough Council’s Sport Development Manager echoed this view, suggesting 
that although it takes time to develop relations, it tends to lead to more effective 
outcomes: ‘ultimately, it comes down to people, I’ve always seen better results 
through investment of my time initially to build relationships with people’ 
(Interview: Borough Council Sport Development Manager; 1 June 2012). The CSP 
Director, a former Director of Leisure Services of the borough council within the 
county, also stressed the importance of personal relations, in particular the need for 
strong personal relations to deal with challenging or adverse circumstances: 
 
I would still go back to my actual point about the individuals 
involved in the process and making sure the time is spent building 
up the relationship between individuals ... if we continue to do that 
and do it well, we can work through all the other issues and address 
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the other challenges that affect our work (Interview: Director, CSP 
3; 22 May 2012). 
 
Unlike case 1 and case 2, there were two specific comments that questioned the 
significance of individuals and personalities for positive CSP-NGB relations: ‘we are 
first and foremost professionals, paid to do a particular job ... personalities and 
personal relations should not come into it’ (Interview: Community & Cultural 
Services Manager, District Council; 22 May 2012). Interestingly, the other challenge 
came from the CSP’s Operations Manager. Whilst he did view individuals and 
personal relations as somewhat important, he emphasised follow-through and the 
trust this builds rather than simply viewing personal relations as important: 
 
All of the personal, people stuff is important, but you can have a 
great relationship and great fun with somebody and get on very well 
with them, but afterwards you think, hang on, nothing has 
happened. Whereas, you can endear yourself to somebody who 
actually says, we’ll have that done or we’ll get back to you, and they 
follow through ... that builds trust and that is what is really 
important (Interview: Operations Manager, CSP 3; 22 May 2012). 
 
This view leads onto a range of evidence in the case relating to the second factor, the 
principles that underpin the CSP-NGB relationship, in particular the fundamental 
importance of trust between partner agencies. The evidence suggested that the issue 
of trust related specifically to action, in particular ‘trusting them to deliver and follow 
up on the things that they said they would do ... if you don’t have this, things fall to 
pieces’ (Interview: County Development Manager, County FA; 1 June, 2012). 
Linked to this point, the evidence relating to trust also highlights the importance of 
trusting partners to share responsibility and to take the work and agreed actions 
seriously. Where the CSP-NGB relationship works well, it is due to ‘a shared 
responsibility between the two of us ... we both take the work seriously, we follow up 
on what we agreed and we make sure that our plans become reality’ (Interview: 
Operations Manager, CSP 3; 22 May 2012). In relationships such as this you get this 
‘instinct or gut feeling that the NGB respects your position, takes you serious[ly] and 
that there is a mutual commitment to the work ... not just spinning the wheels 
because this is what they are expected to do’ (Interview: Operations Manager, CSP 
3; 22 May 2012). This view reinforces the notion of reciprocity, where stakeholders 
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see each other as being equally committed to the partnership, which forms a 
foundation for cooperation (Axelrod, 1984). 
 
The second issue relates to agents’ attitudes toward the partnership, in particular 
their willingness and commitment to the partnership. This directly correlates to the 
level of trust that agents have toward the partnership (Huxham & Vangen, 2005; 
Scheberle, 2004). Here, the data suggest that the CSP has developed a more serious, 
more professional approach to working with the NGB. This is no longer something 
which is viewed as being ‘nice to do’; rather, the CSP now works more proactively. 
The CSP Chairman articulated this as ‘taking greater responsibility and taking a more 
professional approach’:  
 
I think we now feel a greater responsibility to make the partnership 
work than we perhaps did in the past. So where the relationship 
wasn’t particularly effective or didn’t exist, I think in the past we 
would probably have taken the view—there’s the core specification, 
we are more than happy to work with you, but it is up to you to 
come knock on our door and tell us what you want. Whereas now, I 
would say that we recognise that we need to take a more proactive 
approach to managing the relationship and saying to [NGBs] not 
only is it here, we want to meet with you, we want to talk with you 
about your interventions in the county, and we want to help you 
deliver (Interview: Chairman, CSP 3; 22 May 2012). 
 
This change is attributed in part to the overly ‘generic and vague nature of the core 
specification’ (Interview: Director, CSP 3; 22 May 2012). More substantially, it is an 
attitude that has been facilitated by the clarity and focus provided by Sport England’s 
relatively new performance management measures, specifically the new CSP 
quarterly reporting system, the NGB feedback process (in which NGBs evaluate the 
CSP support service), the incentives and penalties associated with performance—
particularly the opportunity for high performing CSPs to obtain additional funding—
as well as the ongoing issue of longer term funding and therefore the longer-term 
future of the CSP. As the CSP’s Director noted: 
 
There has been a shift in the way CSPs are viewed by Sport 
England. There is definitely a greater expectation on CSPs ... the 
whole process of relationship management is something which is 
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going to be far more carefully evaluated (Interview: Director, CSP 
3; 22 May 2012). 
 
Although the change in attitude may ultimately be positive for CSP-NGB relations, 
the process that led to this change may have as much to do with short-term financial 
incentives and potential for longer-term sustained funding as it does mutual trust. If 
this is the case and CSP-NGB relations are predicated on financial incentives, the 
medium to long term success of the strategy is highly questionable (Rummery, 
2002). 
 
Alongside trust and attitude, clarity of purpose was identified as an important 
principle underpinning effective partnership work across the sub-region: ‘I think we 
work well together, we have really clear goals and clear roles, so we know what needs 
to be done and who is responsible for what’ (Interview: County Development 
Manager, England Netball; 21 May 2012); ‘I think it works well, mainly because we 
are clear about who is doing what’ (Interview: Chair, County Lawn Tennis 
Association; 31 May 2012); ‘I think [the relationship] works well in the county ... we 
understand and respect each other’s priorities’ (Interview: County Director, 
England & Wales Cricket Board; 22 May 2012). This need for clarity of purpose is a 
point that the CSP Director highlighted: 
 
... what is important to us is that the NGB comes to us with absolute 
clarity about what sort of things we can help them to deliver ... it is 
not just about coming to us and saying, if you deliver the core 
specification for us that would be great ... it doesn’t help us at all 
and it doesn’t help us to help them. What we need is specifics, you 
know, we’ve got this programme and we’re rolling it out here, here 
and here and we need you to do x, y and z (Interview: Director, 
CSP 3; 22 May 2012). 
 
The emphasis here is clearly on the need for NGBs to provide clarity of purpose and 
specific details regarding the support they require, a point which illuminates the 
nature of the community sport policy process, specifically the NGB leadership of 
community sport policy as well as the heterogeneous nature of NGBs. 
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The final factor was the structure of each sport. This point resembled case 2 
inasmuch as the evidence supports the need for appropriate structures at the sub-
regional level. In particular, the CSP stressed a tendency for a more positive 
relationship with sports that have a well-developed infrastructure at the local level or 
where the CSP had strong relations with a particular sport at the local level 
regardless of NGB input: 
 
The other thing about infrastructure is that the effectiveness of the 
NGB often comes down to the relationship that they have and that 
we have with the local infrastructure, normally the local club 
representatives ... at the end of the day, we can have a very good 
relationship with certain sports, deliver a lot in the local community 
and not see the NGB from one day to the next (Interview: Director, 
CSP 3; 22 May 2012). 
 
That said, the most effective relationships were reportedly with sports where the 
NGB was closely connected to the local-level infrastructure, primarily as this ‘can 
help to join up national plans with local capacity ... [and] the NGB is more likely to 
understand local needs and circumstances’ (Interview: Director, CSP 3; 22 May 
2013). This was reported to be the case with netball, cycling and basketball, which 
are all sports hosted by the CSP. In most cases, the NGB employs or pays a 
significant part of the development officer’s salary and they are housed within the 
CSP’s offices and work alongside the CSP core team. This structural arrangement was 
viewed as being conducive to positive CSP-NGB relations as ‘it brings us closer 
together ... helps to build understanding between what we are trying to do and what 
the sport are trying to ... and the fact that they are on the doorstep just means that 
things like planning and communication are that little bit easier (Interview: 
Operations Manager, CSP 3; 22 May 2012); ‘I think just having the time to be 
around the CSP hot-desking or being hosted ... it makes all the difference, I think it 
really helps to bridge the gap between NGBs and CSPs, it helps bring them closer 
together and improves the understanding that we have of them and that they have of 
us’ (Interview: County Development Manager, England Netball; 21 May 2012). The 
point here is that a shared base not only provides NGBs with the opportunity to 
engage with the CSP more frequently, it also houses the NGB in the same social 
context as the CSP, so they are more likely to share similar experiences and develop a 
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respectful understanding of the local context (Axelrod, 1984) or the ‘conditions of 
action’ (Betts, 1986) that directly shapes their work. 
 
The problems that have adversely affected the CSP-NGB relationship 
The majority of problems that had adversely affected the CSP-NGB relationship fell 
into one of four groups: a lack of clarity of purpose, lack of engagement, diversity of 
priorities, and the complexity arising from inconsistency. In addition to these 
problems, the Director referred to the potential problems associated with the core 
specification. Whilst, in his opinion, this had not adversely affected the CSP-NGB 
relationship, he believed that it had the potential to promote a reductionist approach 
to the CSP-NGB relationship, which could be a ‘barrier to effective relations’. Thus, 
his view is that the relationship needs to be developed beyond the core specification 
in order to really understand one another’s priorities and the role and functions that 
each can fulfil in delivering on these priorities. 
 
The first problem relates to clarity of purpose, a factor that, when achieved, positively 
influences CSP-NGB relations. For Houlihan & Lindsey (2008), clarity of purpose is 
particularly important in a discretionary policy space such as community sport given 
that objectives tend to change frequently. Thus, a lack of clarity regarding vision or 
goals can create significant problems for partnerships at strategic or organisational 
levels (Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002). The evidence from the case shows that whilst 
some CSP-NGB relations enjoy a clear two-way understanding, others are still 
working toward it: ‘one of the biggest frustrations is just understanding each other, 
understanding our work and our priorities, we’re not there yet but we are moving in 
the right direction’ (Interview: Chair, County Tennis Association; 31 May 2012). 
There was an acknowledgement that this takes time but forms a critical part of the 
foundation of CSP-NGB relations, and without this, misconceptions or false 
expectations can arise based upon prior behaviour or reputation (Huxham & Vangen, 
2005):  
 
...it’s really important to invest time in the relationship, to develop a 
clear understanding and respect for the overall vision of the 
organisation, priorities, and roles ... otherwise I think we second 
guess, we develop our own expectations of what they should be 
doing rather than fully understanding what they do and why 
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(Interview: County Development Manager, England Netball; 21 
May 2012).  
 
This was a point supported by the Community & Cultural Services Manager of one of 
the District Councils: ‘I think sometimes we expect or assume that certain 
organisations should be doing this or that without fully understanding their 
priorities’ (Interview: Community & Cultural Services Manager, District Council; 
22 May 2012). Summing up the depth of the problem, the CSP Director viewed 
clarity of purpose as the number one priority issue requiring further attention in the 
CSP-NGB relationship: 
 
It’s clarity for me, clarity of purpose around what it is that each of 
us aspires to and how practically we go about achieving this because 
if you can get to this point we can actually start to plan it and do it, 
but for as long as you don’t have it, you move no further forward 
(Interview: Director, CSP 3; 22 May 2012). 
 
The data suggest that a part of the problem originates in organisations themselves 
when there are mixed messages or a lack of clarity about the key priorities for the 
organisation. The CSP criticised a number of NGBs for this. The CSP Operations 
Manager mentioned a lack of clarity in the original whole sport plans (2009-13), 
where sports themselves did not know their priorities, suggesting that this was a time 
for learning and would provide a sound foundation for the 2013-17 cycle: 
 
The experience of the last four years has shown that most NGB 
strategies were top-down, were focused on the national level, and 
most did not know what they wanted to do at the local level. You 
could go and sit down and have a meeting with them and they 
would not be able to articulate their priorities for [the area] or how 
they wanted us to help them ... I think those four years have been a 
learning process for NGBs. I think it will be a lot better in the next 
cycle ... it has to be (Interview: Operations Manager, CSP 3; 22 
May 2012). 
 
Another explanation for this lack of clarity is the ‘inward view’ or ‘tunnel vision’ that 
NGBs develop in pursuit of their goals, a contrary view to that presented by the Chair 
of County Athletics in case 2:  
 
 
 
-265- 
 
We are constantly looking inward at the sport, we get tunnel vision, 
caught up in our work and don’t look outward or share this with 
external agencies as well as we could ... I have to put my hand up 
and say that I still don’t really understand [the CSP] and their aims 
or their strategy. I just have so many other priorities, it’s nice to 
work alongside the partnership and get their support, but 
ultimately my focus is on cricket and working with local clubs, 
leagues and coaches’ (Interview: County Director, England & 
Wales Cricket Board; 22 May 2012).  
 
Also, a lack of broader engagement in the establishment of the NGB’s whole sport 
plan contributes to the lack of clarity regarding NGB priorities. This lack of 
engagement not only refers to engagement with external partners such as CSPs and 
local authorities, but also across the NGB structure, particularly engagement and 
dissemination of information vertically, from the national level down to sub-regional 
and local levels.  
 
Indeed, the wealth of data relating to a lack of engagement indicates that this is 
another common problem that adversely affects the CSP-NGB relationship. There 
were two specific problems relating to lack of engagement that were clearly 
identifiable in the case. The first concerned the problem of engagement between the 
CSP and local authorities. The second related more specifically to issues regarding 
engagement in the whole sport plan process. 
 
The problem of engagement between the CSP and local authorities was one that was 
unique to this case. In particular, the problem related more to funding and the 
perceived value of funding CSPs: 
 
Our leaders have recently questioned what added value we get from 
the CSP, what do we get for being part of this? Why do we have to 
pay? They do not really see the rationale or the reasons why, they 
don’t really get it. Financially, things are getting tight and difficult 
decisions need to be made. So they decided to cut the funding to the 
CSP. It’s not like it was significant funding anyway. But it’s 
symbolic. I think the CSP saw it as being unsupportive ... it was a bit 
of a blow to them. Now there is a fair amount of tension between 
senior officers and the senior management within the CSP 
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(Interview: Sport Development Manager, Borough Council; 1 June 
2012). 
 
Whilst this was by no means representative of all local authorities, the decision of 
one local authority to cease funding the CSP had broader implications across the 
county where other local authorities also started to question the value of funding the 
CSP. It also ‘created a domino effect where others are now starting to think—well if 
they don’t do it why should we’ (Interview: Sport Development Manager, Borough 
Council; 1 June 2012), given that all seven local authorities had previously funded 
the CSP the same amount annually. 
 
The issues relating to the lack of engagement in the whole sport plan process 
adversely affect the CSP-NGB relationship as the lack of engagement in the process 
creates tension, a lack of commitment and gives the impression of an autocratic NGB 
leadership style. Whilst leadership styles vary across sports, a democratic, 
consultative approach is more likely to leverage greater support and harness 
collaborative capacity than one where partners ‘get the impression that they are 
being told what to do, dictated to’ (Interview: Chair, County Athletics Association; 
29 May 2012) or ‘lack ownership or commitment because they have not been 
involved’ (Interview: Operations Manager, CSP 3; 22 May 2012). These approaches 
have proven to be particularly problematic for the CSP-NGB relationship, primarily 
as they are seen to contradict both the governance narrative (Goodwin & Grix, 2011) 
as well as openly demonstrating the power imbalance and hierarchy evident in the 
relationship (Grix & Phillpots, 2011; Houlihan & Lindsey, 2008). Furthermore, this 
behaviour perpetuates a view of NGBs as ‘elite or arrogant’, as it demonstrates that 
they are neither required nor choose to involve external partners in the development 
of their plans and priorities. This is problematic as it forms part of the feedback loop 
upon which opinions are formed, reputations created and expectations developed 
(Huxham & Vangen, 2005). Furthermore, partners’ past experiences are important 
as cooperative action is more likely to evolve where partners have a reliable history of 
past action (Axelrod, 1984).  
 
In line with cases 1 and 2, the fourth theme related to the diversity of priorities across 
the key agents involved in community sport. The CSP and local authorities 
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highlighted two issues: first, the countywide focus on increasing levels of physical 
activity and second, the ‘sport for sport’ and ‘sport for good’ debate. The importance 
of the first priority is borne out by the county’s vision to be the most physically active 
county in the country by 2020, a priority which has CEO and leader commitment 
from all seven local authorities, as well as the County Council, and the two clinical 
commissioning groups in the county. As the Head of Culture and Sport for the 
County Council enthused: ‘we have an energised consensus [...] commitment at the 
highest level, across a range of partners toward making this goal a reality’. Again, 
whilst sport can contribute to this overall goal, the vision is driven by a set of much 
broader activities which are excluded in community sport policy terms. As a result, 
the CSP must manage this situation and ensure that it clearly contributes to both the 
national community sport priority as well as the 2020 vision for the county. Whilst 
this is not an impossible task, it arguably stretches capacity and divides the CSP’s 
attention between community sport and providing support for NGBs, and on 
physical activity and managing relations with a network pursuing ‘physical activity’ 
goals.  
 
The second issue regarding priorities relates more specifically to the ‘sport for sport’ 
and ‘sport for good’ debate (Coalter, 2008; Houlihan & White, 2002). Here, the 
philosophical difference can be seen to create institutional divisions resulting in 
three groups of actors: those such as local authorities who are more concerned with 
the instrumental value of sport; NGBs and county sport associations who are 
generally more concerned with the player, coach, club and competition development 
associated with the sport for sport ethos; and finally CSPs, who arguably, sit between 
the two:  
 
we have to be about both...we want to grow sport, work with NGBs 
to develop and improve sport, but at the same time we see the 
broader value of sport and how it can help to improve communities, 
improve health and wellbeing and all those sorts of things 
(Interview: Director, CSP 3; 22 May 2012).  
 
Whilst managing and overcoming these divisions is not impossible, 
these philosophical differences create a more challenging 
environment in which to develop and foster effective CSP-NGB 
relations: I think there is a danger of CSPs just being seen as the 
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local branch of Sport England ... you know, delivering the national 
mandate or the national agenda. But we fund the CSP too and we 
are very clear about the outcomes we expect to see (Interview: 
Head of Culture & Sport, County Council; 1 June 2012). 
 
... our priorities are not the same as the national priority [for 
community sport]. A lot of what we do is not about numbers, it’s 
actually about working with relatively small numbers, for example 
interventions for young people to prevent anti-social behaviour. It’s 
important work and can have a hugely positive impact, but it is 
never going to increase participation in sport (Interview: 
Community & Cultural Services Manager, District Council; 22 
May 2012). 
 
Recognising the diversity of priorities, in particular the local authority emphasis on 
sport for good and the NGB emphasis on traditional sport development, the CSP 
Director asserted:  
 
we do our best ... there are balancing acts that need to be achieved 
and conflicts to manage, we know we have slightly different 
priorities, so it’s just a case of being clear about our common goals 
and how we can work together to achieve them ... ultimately, our 
priorities are about participation, supporting NGBs, volunteers and 
coaches, and providing strategic leadership. Strategic leadership is 
all about joining stuff up at the local level, whether that is stuff 
coming down from national level or whether it’s working locally 
across things like health and physical activity (Interview: Director, 
CSP 3; 22 May 2012). 
 
This implies that the CSP take responsibility for managing the strategic landscape, to 
the best of their ability, to ensure that agents understand how different partnership 
projects deliver against their priority issues. This is undoubtedly a challenging area 
of work. At the time of research one authority had already withdrawn funding, citing 
a lack of added value and the CSP’s failure to deliver against its priorities, and more 
were reportedly considering withdrawing funding in the future. These issues, not to 
mention the difficulties of managing the varying priorities of NGBs, create significant 
problems in maintaining effective CSP-NGB relations. 
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The final problem pertains to inconsistency. As in case 2, agents talked about the 
complexity of the community sport system, in particular the range of institutions and 
the lack of consistency across CSPs, NGBs and local authorities: ‘one of the 
challenges is about CSPs, you know they are all a little different structure-wise but 
also things like their priorities, funding, and just their general approach and 
enthusiasm to work with us’ (Interview: Regional Development Manager, England 
Basketball; 29 May, 2012). A slightly different perspective was provided by the 
County Council’s Head of Culture and Sport, who viewed the complexity stemming 
from ‘the differing interests, slightly different priorities and the competition for 
resources’ at the different institutions involved in community sport, stating that 
these differences ‘do not provide the ideal ground for a partnership’. This is a point 
supported by Jansen et al., (2008) who found competition for resources to be one of 
the major barriers to effective partnerships between agents. 
 
Another area of inconsistency related to political inconsistencies and the different 
views of key stakeholders, in particular the differences between the districts in the 
county and the county council. All authorities were vying to protect their own 
historical boundaries and identities, largely a result of the long-term plans to change 
the two-tier local government structure to a single-tier structure with two unitary 
authorities, a plan which has since been revoked. This created difficulties for the CSP 
and for the county council as neither were seen as being representative of the more 
localised version of the new unitary authority. As mentioned above, the CSP has 
addressed this challenge by working with the County Council to develop a consistent 
vision—albeit one focussed on physical activity rather than community sport—to 
which all local government partners can commit: 
 
I think the other key challenge to the partnership is the political 
dimension. Working across a county with a different set of 
councillors, different political persuasions, and the identity that 
each district wants, it creates a lot of problems for the CSP and for 
the County Council. We’ve used sensitive leadership skills to bring 
people together ... to secure a consensus to make the county the 
most active in the country. It seems that members and senior 
officers, whatever background or political persuasion, can relate to 
it in some way (Interview: Head of Culture & Sport, County 
Council; 1 June 2012).  
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The role of the CSP and NGBs in policy making and implementation 
Looking at the role of the CSP and NGBs in policy making and implementation, this 
case exhibits many similar characteristics for those in cases 1 and 2. Therefore, case 3 
follows the same structure: the role of the CSP and NGBs in policy making, the whole 
sport plan as the NGBs policy, and the role of the CSP and NGBs in policy 
implementation. 
 
The role of the CSP and NGBs in policy making 
The CSP in case 3 largely supported the evidence from the other cases regarding the 
close resemblance of the community sport policy process to Hume’s original 
conception of political organisation as a single authority, top-down, machine-like 
system (cf. Hjern & Hull, 1982). Within the community sport system, national policy 
is seen to be debated and agreed by a tightly controlled group of actors primarily 
made up of government departments, Sport England and some of the larger, more 
powerful NGBs:  
 
one of the problems is that there is no collective voice for 
community sport ... there is no real coalition as such, ... everything 
is discussed and agreed by the DCMS, Sport England and two or 
three of the bigger sports (Interview: Director, CSP 3; 22 May 
2012). 
 
Despite this view regarding the absence of a coalition, the Director did see a 
developing role for the CSP Network as part of the community sport coalition, 
particularly if CSPs continue to enhance their credibility as an agency that can 
deliver: 
 
I think there are signs that the CSP Network has a role to play in 
shaping national policy. In terms of them being able to do that, to 
play that role, they are only as good as the CSPs that make up the 
network. I think that the fact that the CSPs have been able to deliver 
has given them the ammunition to say ‘actually, you need to 
maintain faith in CSPs’ ... We have had a change in government and 
huge cuts within local authority sport. If you look at any 
organisation working in the sport sector, CSPs were probably the 
only organisation that came out of the process with a greater remit 
and enhanced reputation and similar level of funding to what they 
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had in the past ... this is partly down to CSPs delivering on previous 
projects and also down to the network and what they were able to 
do nationally in terms of being able to convince people that it was a 
meaningful and coherent network that actually delivers stuff 
(Interview: Director, CSP 3; 22 May 2012). 
 
Local authorities and the majority of NGBs supported the view of community sport 
policy-making as hierarchical and top-down: ‘it’s very much a top-down system’ 
(Interview: Community & Cultural Services Manager, District Council; 22 May 
2012); ‘It’s all nationally led, there is no involvement of county associations or clubs’ 
(Interview: Chairman, County Athletics Association; 29 May 2012); ‘the problem is 
that the policies are developed nationally and then passed down and clubs, coaches 
and volunteers who are just expected to get on with it’ (Interview: County 
Development Manager, England Netball; 21 May 2012); ‘[policy] is driven through 
nationally, then things come down through the regions, counties and down to our 
ClubMark clubs’ (Interview: Chairman, County Tennis Association; 31 May, 2012). 
These views reflect the notion of policy being developed by a narrow group of 
interests making the alignment between policy and the dominant values of key actors 
more straightforward (Kingdon, 1995). This highlights the potential freedom and 
oppression of agents such as CSPs. On the one hand, CSPs are oppressed by the tight 
definition and bureaucracy associated with community sport, but on the other, they 
experience substantial freedom and autonomy to pursue a range of interests both 
within and outside of community sport (Lipsky, 1980). In other words, whilst the 
policy directive and outcome associated with it are carefully and tightly defined, the 
way in which implementing agents deliver activities in response to it receives far less 
direct attention.  
 
Consultation exercises were generally seen as being a superficial part of the process 
and, for some, non-existent: ‘yeah there are consultations ... but by the time we get 
the draft proposal I think DCMS and Sport England are pretty clear about what they 
want’ (Interview: Sport Development Manager, Borough Council; 1 June 2012); 
‘there is an expectation that clubs will do this and do that but there is absolutely no 
consultation ... I’ve spoken to senior people, like Chris Jones [England Athletics 
CEO] and others about it ... I got the impression that they don’t want to listen’ 
(Interview: Chairman, County Athletics Association; 29 May 2012). Indeed, these 
 
 
-272- 
 
views reflect the importance of taking analytical work beyond the surface level in 
order to extend beyond the governance narrative and reveal a deeper understanding 
of the ‘hierarchical nature of relations’ and the effect of agents’ beliefs and 
behaviours (Goodwin & Grix, 2011). The hierarchal reality of community sport was a 
notable frustration for the Head of Sport and Culture at the County Council: ‘It is so 
top heavy, policy pushed down from national level ... it completely flies in the face of 
things like localism and the community’s right to buy21’ (Interview: Head of Culture 
and Sport, County Council; 1 June 2012). This was a particular frustration as the 
community sport policy was seen to contradict the philosophical underpinnings of 
modernity that has shaped and continues to reshape local government services, not 
least the co-creation and co-production of policies in conjunction with local citizens 
(Boyle, 2011; Ostrom, V. 1973). The frustration also appears to stem from the 
publication of the new DCMS strategy: Creating a Sporting Habit: 
 
The DCMS strategy in general was shocking, its omission of local 
government altogether was unbelievable ... on the other hand it’s 
not that much of a surprise really, it’s the usual sort of shenanigans 
that we have to put up with in dealing with government 
departments. (Interview: Head of Culture and Sport, County 
Council; 1 June 2012). 
 
That said, the Head of Culture and Sport also talked about ‘the far more important 
issue of local policy’ and, in particular, ‘how we go about creating an active county ... 
that is what really matters’ (Interview: Head of Culture and Sport, County Council; 
1 June 2012). As with case 1 and 2, the issue of local policy received considerable 
attention, in particular the central role that local government play in the 
development of local policy: ‘we as a department are very close to local policy, we 
create the frameworks and present the recommendations to members for their 
decision, so I guess members ultimately decide policy, our role is to advise’ 
(Interview: Community & Cultural Services Manager, District Council; 22 May 
2012); ‘we certainly influence local policy for sport, I feel very close to that ... making 
sure that sport features within the local agenda, that is a major part of my job’ 
(Interview: Borough Council Sport Development Manager; 1 June 2012). 
                                                          
21 This term is used in reference to provisions within the Localism Act for local community groups to bid to take 
over the management of local services. 
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In short, the role of the CSP and NGBs in local policy making was limited. The CSP 
articulated a ‘strategic influence’ across the county to help galvanise and coordinate 
local policy concerns so that these reflected countywide priorities, for example the 
work that the CSP was involved in with the County Council to create the County 2020 
physical activity vision. However, outside of this, there was no evidence that the CSP 
had any influence over local policy. The situation for NGBs was similar, although 
responses fell into two groups. First, there were some NGBs who reported no 
involvement and/or stated that local policy making was not a priority issue: ‘we don’t 
really get involved, nationally or locally’ (Interview: County Development Manager, 
England Netball, 22 May 2012); ‘it’s not really a priority for us’ (Interview: Regional 
Development Manager, England Golf Partnership, 30 May 2012); ‘…it’s not 
something that we feel we need to get too involved in’ (Interview: Regional 
Development Manager, England Basketball, 29 May 2012). Second, there was a 
group of ‘larger’ NGBs that are reliant upon local authority facilities (i.e. swimming) 
or concerned about diminishing facility stock and/or standard of provision (i.e. 
tennis and football). These NGBs stressed the need to get more involved in 
discussions regarding local policy with the LTA and FA using grant funding as an 
incentive to broker discussions regarding facilities issues. In contrast, the ASA rely 
on their team of Regional Development Managers and argue the need for greater 
support from the CSP:  
 
...our biggest problem is getting pool time, we need more pools and 
more pool time in order to grow the sport and to enhance 
performance ... we have to be at the table influencing policy around 
new pool development, opening up existing pools, and discussing 
programming and cross-programming of facilities so that there is 
optimum time given to the public whilst at the same time providing 
for clubs. We need a more strategic approach to planning and 
development issues ... we need support from the CSP to work with 
local authorities and pool operators to make sure that we have the 
necessary capacity and infrastructure to grow the sport (Interview: 
Regional Development Manager, ASA; 8 June 2012). 
 
Whilst the FA and LTA have resources to support the retention and modernisation of 
public sector facilities, this is not the case with the ASA—partly due to the 
comparatively limited resources of the NGB and partly due to the costs associated 
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with facility development. That said, the ASA have created a new Asset Transfer 
department and developed Asset Transfer resources in order to work more closely 
with local authorities and pool operators. These developments create a much needed 
legitimacy that is likely to help broker closer links between local authorities and the 
ASA. Nevertheless, the financial implications associated with public pools and the 
differences in local authority and NGB philosophies of use means that local 
authorities may ignore information that challenges their beliefs (Sabatier & Weible, 
2007), in which case the local policy governing public pools is likely to remain a 
challenging area of work for the ASA. 
 
Preparation of the whole sport plan 
The NGB whole sport plan was seen to be an important part of the community sport 
policy process as the NGB are the lead community sport agency and they set out the 
NGB’s priorities and goals for a four-year cycle (2013-17). More than this, the plan, in 
particular the potential that each sport demonstrates for growing participation and 
for addressing the post 14 drop off in participation, represents the basis of Sport 
England’s investment. Thus, the plans are an important part of the overall policy 
process and provide a sport-specific translation of community sport policy for each of 
the 46 funded sports.  
 
The case reflected four distinct issues in the whole sport plan process. Three are 
issues identified in cases 1 and 2, namely: a lack of clarity regarding NGB priorities—
an issue that was also identified as one that adversely affects the CSP-NGB 
relationship; a lack of involvement in the whole sport plan process; and a lack of 
consensus from street-level agents. The fourth issue involved the increasing 
importance of participation amongst NGBs. 
 
The first two issues are closely related insomuch as one reason why there appears to 
be a lack of clarity about NGB priorities is that the plan and priorities only involve a 
small number of people, usually from the upper echelons of the NGB. This strategy of 
using a relatively homogenous group of representatives to create the NGB plan could 
be to ensure high levels of cooperation and consensus regarding the network’s 
priorities (Adam & Kriesi, 2007), ensuring that policy core beliefs correspond to the 
deeper core interests of the NGB, and that the NGB retain control of the secondary 
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beliefs, specifically infrastructure and programmes and the way in which budgets are 
allocated (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Once the plans have been agreed, these 
have either not been consistently articulated or shared with regional or county 
representatives of the NGB or with other stakeholders involved in community sport, 
leading to confusion or ‘a real lack of clarity regarding their priorities’ (Interview: 
Director, CSP 3; 22 May 2012); ‘a lack of transparency’ (Interview: Sport 
Development Manager, Borough Council; 1 June 2012); and a sense that ‘NGBs are 
not held to account in the same way that other recipients of public funds are’ 
(Interview: Community & Cultural Services Manager, District Council; 22 May 
2012). Furthermore, the lack of involvement of other parties can be seen as 
problematic as it fails to consider the norms, behaviours, values and attitudes of 
implementing agents (Lipsky, 1980); allows for confusion or ambiguity and thus the 
potential for wide variation in how national policy is implemented (Berman, 1978); 
and it can be divisive as it fails to secure the commitment or consent of external 
stakeholders (van Meter & van Horn, 1975). Further, Dunleavy (1991) suggests that 
implementation agents are far more likely to be compliant implementers if they are 
involved in the initial policy decision. Thus, the individualistic, top-down approach of 
many NGBs’ whole sport plans represents a missed opportunity; one which should be 
used to share ideas, galvanise support and start the process of building genuine 
collaborative capacity (Hudson et al., 1999). Instead, many NGBs have created a 
process that alienates partners, sending a message that their involvement or consent 
is neither warranted nor required: 
 
The problem with many NGBs is that they don’t even try ... I mean, 
why not come and talk to us? We know what is best for the local 
area; we represent it ... why don’t you talk to us about how we can 
develop this together? I don’t pretend it’s easy, but I think it comes 
down to the nature of how [community sport] policy has developed 
and the organisational culture of many NGBs ... they are not 
required to do it, so they don’t. We’ve actually had a lot of 
conversations recently from a CCLOA perspective with the NGBs, 
with regards to the whole sport plan process and the plans needing 
to be more reflective of local context. I’m sure this is just a tick box 
exercise that they will go through in order to access the funding 
(Interview: Head of Culture and Sport, County Council; 1 June 
2012). 
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This was also seen to be an issue internally across sports, particularly the lack of 
involvement and lack of consensus between the professionals who determine policy 
and the street-level operators who are expected to implement it: ‘one of the big 
problems is just getting the message down to our clubs, to support programmes and 
initiatives and to try and get more people playing tennis’ (Interview: Chairman, 
County Tennis Association; 31 May 2012). This has underlined an issue of control 
and being told what to do, and as one representative asserted, ‘nobody likes being 
told what to do’ (Interview: Sport Development Manager, Borough Council; 1 June 
2012). This was a point echoed by the Chair of the County Athletics Association, who 
emphasised leadership style as being critically important in fostering improved 
relations between professionals and volunteers: 
 
The other issue is about control ... a lot of our clubs have been 
around for years, I think many of them have the impression that 
they are being told what to do, dictated to and they don’t like it. But 
at the same time the sport does need to change, it needs to move 
with the times ... but the change needs to be made sensitively and it 
needs to be made by taking the clubs along as well rather than 
creating this divide (Interview: Chairman, County Athletics 
Association; 29 May 2012). 
 
The County Director for the ECB talked about the new approach that the NGB had 
been taking in attempting to pass power to the counties. However, in a similar vein to 
other instances presented in case 1 and 2, this is seen to be more about the NGB 
creating the illusion of delegating authority rather than actually doing it or using 
their power to promote conduct that is consistent with institutional aims (Raco & 
Imrie, 2000). The County Director acknowledges the practical challenge confronting 
the ECB: 
 
Over the past 18 months to two years the ECB, in theory, have 
relinquished some of its power and passed it down to the County 
Boards to say, look, you as the County Board know how it operates 
at the local level. You decide the strategy and how to operate it at 
the local level. But they are still saying, we’d like you to do this and 
do that, we’ll give you the funding for it. I think it’s one of those 
want their cake and eat it type situations. I think that in reality the 
danger is that if they handed complete ownership over to county 
boards, we would say, well actually this does not fit and that does 
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not fit and if every county took that view then the ECB would have 
no way of meeting their own targets, so I completely understand 
why they are doing it, I would just prefer that there wasn’t this sort 
of cover up type of thing. I would prefer them to say, okay you have 
flexibility and freedom over this and this, but we need you to do this 
and that (Interview: County Director, ECB; 22 May 2012).  
 
The growing importance of sports participation amongst NGBs is the final factor. 
This was a point made more interesting in that NGBs themselves felt the need to 
reemphasise this, particularly the three large NGBs in the case (football, tennis and 
cricket): ‘most of what we’ve done in the past has been focused on youth football, but 
we are definitely getting more involved in the adult game and developing 
programmes to keep adults playing football’ (Interview: County Development 
Manager, County FA; 1 June 2012); ‘there was a time when it was all about talent 
development; we are still focused on talent, but the importance given to participation 
and getting more people to play the game has grown’ (Interview: Chairman, County 
Tennis Association; 31 May 2012); ‘We still prioritise youth participation, but we are 
now thinking a lot more seriously about how we can retain and grow the numbers 
playing the adult game’ (Interview: County Director, ECB; 22 May 2012). The 
evidence suggests that the strategies of policy brokers such as Jennie Price, 
specifically the use of financial resources and skilful leadership (Kelman, 1984, 
Sewell, 2005, Weible, 2006), has been particularly helpful in bringing participation-
related policy into clearer focus. Nonetheless, the CSP’s Operations Manager spoke 
cautiously about the growing importance of participation amongst NGBs, suggesting 
that there is still an element of doubt regarding the priority given to participation 
within NGBs and still much work to do in terms of addressing relations between the 
NGB professionals and the club volunteers:  
 
There has been a tremendous growth in the number of products 
and programmes that NGBs have developed for community sport. 
But my fear is the motivation behind their move. Is it because they 
want to actually get serious about community sport or is it for the 
money? They’ll all say that they really want to drive participation, 
but it remains to be seen. It’ll be interesting to see how they engage 
and the effectiveness of their engagement with their volunteers on 
the ground (Interview: Operations Manager, CSP 3; 22 May 
2012).  
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The Operations Manager viewed this latter point as being particularly crucial as for 
many sports; ‘the only way that they can grow participation in a sustained manner is 
through the network of voluntary sports clubs’. At the same time, however, in many 
sports there is a division between the goals and aspirations of professionals working 
for the NGB and volunteers who freely give their time to help support the day-to-day 
running of their club. 
 
The role of the CSP and NGBs in policy implementation 
This sub-section will address three facets of the role of the CSP and NGBs in policy 
implementation: the changing role of the CSP from strategic agent to delivery agent; 
the changing focus of local authorities across the county; and the evidence regarding 
the lack of capacity to implement community sport. 
 
As in the previous cases, agents reported a change in the role of CSPs from one which 
was generally more strategic and autonomous to one which is more delivery oriented 
and focused on securing financial contracts. As Lipsky advised (1980), these changes 
are largely symptomatic of top-down policy systems where change can be introduced 
quickly by government departments and others with little consideration for the 
norms, values and attitudes of street-level operators. The tightly controlled policy 
agenda, the centralisation and greater importance of new performance management 
techniques, not to mention the resource dependency of CSPs, the perceived risk of 
public sector funding cuts that threaten the future of CSPs, and the affect on the 
CSP’s ability to respond more assertively to these changes. Thus, the patterns of 
interaction are largely controlled by resources, and performance management 
techniques and quick-fix solutions take priority over more time-consuming, 
collaborative processes (Hess & Ostrom, 2004). 
 
For some CSPs, the change in Sport England expectations about autonomy and, 
more specifically, the need for CSPs to be financially independent and secure funding 
from outside Sport England may be viewed as positive:  
 
When CSPs were first conceived there was a desire for them to be 
independent or self-sufficient, you know, generating and securing 
their own funding, not just Sport England funding ... While they 
want and expect CSPs to be independent in terms of their board, 
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and being seen to be independent by partners and the locality, 
whilst that still exists, I think there is less desire to see them 
become completely independent and autonomous organisations 
because I think the jury is out. I think there are still questions about 
the benefits and problems of company status or charitable status. I 
also think Sport England have relaxed the requirement ... [Securing 
independent status] used to be a regular item of discussion, 
nowadays you hear very little about it (Interview: Director, CSP 3; 
22 May 2012). 
 
The relationship between autonomy and funding is important to this study as it 
highlights the issue of resource dependency and the extent to which CSPs are viewed 
as part of the Sport England machinery or whether they are perceived as broader, 
more autonomous policy instruments funded by a range of partners and with a 
balance of national and sub-regional priorities. The implication from the quote above 
is that initially Sport England expected the latter, although at the time of research the 
pressure to do this had subsided. There is no legal or contractual requirement for 
CSPs to remain independent or hosted organisations; this is a matter which is 
entirely at the board’s discretion. However, the benefits, for Sport England of 
preserving the status quo as a hosted organisation are fewer distractions and greater 
potential for control from Sport England, whereas the benefit for the CSP is less 
pressure to secure other major sources of funding. Nevertheless, failing to secure a 
broader range of funding in the medium to long term preserves the CSP’s reliance on 
one primary funder, which in turn increases the risk of policy change adversely 
affecting the long-term viability of CSPs. 
 
With regards to the change in the role of the CSP from strategic agent to delivery 
agent, the CSP Director asserted that CSP 3 have attempted to steer a middle path:  
 
I think we play [strategic and delivery] roles. We have a clear 
strategic role in terms of the 2020 vision and with things like 
advocacy, particularly with local authorities, but we also deliver 
stuff. We support NGB delivery and we also deliver Sport England 
programmes. I think this role has grown because we have shown we 
can do it. We deliver against targets. As a consequence of that, 
Sport England use us as a delivery vehicle. So you’ve got things like 
the Sport Unlimited programme, the Sportivate programme, 
SportMakers ... you’ve got a whole raft of programmes that Sport 
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England wants delivered and they see us as a vehicle to do that 
because of CSPs track record. I mean, yeah, there are one or two 
that haven’t delivered, but generally speaking Sport England now 
knows that if you give CSPs a task, they deliver (Interview: 
Director, CSP 3; 22 May 2012). 
 
The local authority representatives in the case generally echoed the view that the CSP 
plays both a strategic and delivery role, depending on the purpose of the work and 
the partner agencies involved (e.g. local authorities, CCGs, NGBs etc.). As in case 1 
and 2, representatives pointed to funding and stressed the resource dependency of 
CSPs in pursuing delivery objectives: ‘I think they tailor what they do in order to 
secure funding’ (Interview: Community & Cultural Services Manager, District 
Council; 22 May 2012); ‘...a lot of the work and a lot of the focus is on sustaining [the 
CSP], making sure that they are financially viable and have a long-term future’ 
(Interview: Sport Development Manager, Borough Council; 1 June 2012). This 
accusation appeared to be a particularly sensitive one:  
 
Of course we take the issue of sustainability very seriously. We have 
to exist. Well, we don’t have to exist, but most organisations fight 
for survival, I mean we don’t want to do ourselves out of a job, so I 
think it has been important for all CSPs to secure their position ... I 
think that you have to do that. Having said that, I would say that in 
pursuing that objective I think there is a belief that CSPs have a 
contribution to make to the increasing participation agenda. I can 
only talk for us, but I don’t think we have compromised that 
aspiration in trying to maintain our existence (Interview: Director, 
CSP 3; 22 May 2012). 
 
The dual attention to strategic and delivery concerns was perceived to result in a CSP 
that was more effective in some strategic areas than it was others. In particular, it 
was seen to play an effective role in the County 2020 vision, but was reported to be 
relatively weak in terms of advocacy and was not viewed as a strategic agent by 
health-related agencies such as the PCT. These two weaknesses were areas that all 
three local authorities reported as requiring urgent attention: 
 
I think the issue is reasonably straightforward, they should first and 
foremost be a strategic agency, planning, advocacy, visioning work, 
that kind of thing ... But they are not so prominent with local 
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authorities or with the PCT as they were two or three years ago, I 
think it is probably due to funding and pressure and their efforts 
being invested elsewhere (Interview: Head of Culture & Sport, 
County Council, 1 June 2012). 
 
The evidence from NGBs regarding the role of NGBs as a strategic or delivery agent 
generally echoed that presented in cases 1 and 2. The larger sports such as football, 
tennis and cricket suggested that there was a limited need for the CSP to get involved 
in delivery, although cricket and tennis both highlighted the important role that the 
CSP play in delivering their sports as part of the Sportivate programme. All three 
larger sports and swimming agreed about the importance of the CSP’s strategic role, 
particularly with regards to facilities planning and development: ‘It would be useful 
to have a little more strategic coordination with local authorities, they are a key 
stakeholder for us, particularly from the facilities perspective, we find it difficult to 
engage them’ (Interview: County Development Manager, County FA; 1 June 2012). 
The remaining sports presented a supportive attitude toward the CSP balancing both 
strategic and delivery responsibilities: ‘I think it works quite well ... I think they have 
a good balance between strategy and delivery type work, particularly with some of 
the legacy programmes ... the most important thing is working together so that we 
work to our strengths and avoid duplicating one another’ (Interview: County 
Development Manager, England Netball; 22 May 2012). 
 
The second factor shifts attention to the changing focus of local authorities in case 2, 
a factor that was previously reported as contributing to the positioning of CSPs as a 
delivery agent. Whilst one might argue that local authorities have been squeezed out 
of the community sport policy process primarily a result of DCMS strategy and 
subsequent Sport England funding decisions over the past 10 years (Collins, 2010; 
Houlihan & Lindsey, 2011), local authorities themselves point to a range of factors 
that have led them away from a central role in the implementation of community 
sport policy. In the interest of balance, it is also important to consider the extent to 
which this wholly represents the local authority view, rather than an attempt for 
some local authorities to rationalise defeat. That said, the fallout from the Local Area 
Agreement (LAA) policy and the refocusing of attention on local government’s 
broader duty concerning the wellbeing of its local community provide a reasonably 
strong rationale to support the local authority view: ‘over the last few years, 
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particularly after the LAA, we have become more and more concerned about access 
and getting more physically active. This is not necessarily about sport but more about 
addressing health inequalities and creating a healthier, more active community’ 
(Interview: Head of Culture & Sport, County Council, 1 June 2012). The second 
factor relates to funding. From a sport perspective local authorities have, in recent 
years, been challenged with the withdrawal of Sport England funded infrastructure 
and the need to find year-on-year budget savings: ‘the big issue is the economic 
climate and the ongoing challenge to cut our budgets’ (Interview: Community & 
Cultural Services Manager, District Council; 22 May 2012); ‘NGBs and Sport 
England need to appreciate the role and priorities of local authorities, we have many 
more responsibilities than just sport and less and less resources to deliver ... we have 
to prioritise’ (Interview: Sport Development Manager, Borough Council; 1 June 
2012); Despite the general tone of this latter comment, other agents highlighted a 
very recent shift in the Sport England approach toward local authorities: ‘I think 
[Sport England] now realise how important local authorities are and that they have 
neglected them a little over recent years’ (Interview: Director, CSP 3; 22 May 2012); 
‘there is certainly a desire to work more closely with local authorities, I think [Sport 
England] want to work more closely with us now and they want to make sure that we 
are a part of the CSP’ (Interview: Sport Development Manager, Borough Council; 1 
June 2012).  
 
The third factor relates to a philosophical view of sport, whereby the majority of 
authorities value sport and consider investing in sport to achieve social objectives 
rather than aspiring to increase mass participation or contribute to sport 
development outcomes: ‘we want to develop communities, reduce crime and anti-
social behaviour, improve health ... these are important local issues and they are 
things that we think sport can help to tackle’ (Interview: Community & Cultural 
Services Manager, District Council; 22 May 2012). The fourth factor was about ‘new 
models of local leadership’: 
 
There are a range of things that have affected local government’s 
involvement in sport. The big one in my view is that local 
government is changing and will continue to change, it’s just the 
nature of the beast. Particularly when there is very little funding in 
the system and particularly when we embark on new models of local 
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leadership. You know, it was all about direct provision, enabling, 
then place shaping. Now it’s moving to being a slim, efficient 
strategic unit that can commission services and work with the third 
sector to bring about sustainable community improvement. So, we 
might not do sport directly ourselves but we may commission or 
work through others to deliver sport-related outcomes (Interview: 
Head of Culture & Sport, County Council, 1 June 2012). 
 
This comment was particularly interesting given that the CSP Director indicated that 
he is already having initial discussions with local government senior officers about 
‘economies of scale’ and a new, more efficient model of sport and physical activity 
across the county: 
 
The commissioning of the CSP to deliver sport-related services 
across the County has been an issue that has been on and off the 
agenda with various authorities over the past couple of years. I 
think it is likely to come back on the agenda, particularly with the 
scale of cuts that are on the horizon ... I think we can provide a 
more efficient model, a countywide sport service which is driven 
and supported by all authorities across the county (Interview: 
Director, CSP 3, 22 May 2012). 
 
Notwithstanding the positive nature of this comment, the CSP Director did touch on 
the negative consequences associated with such a model, including a complete 
abdication of any responsibility for sport, the loss of a network of professionals who 
provide expertise and insight into local matters, and also the potential loss of 
political leadership for sport in each of the local authorities, which he considered to 
carry the most significant implications for the continuation of public sector sport, 
including the network of local authority-owned facilities across the county.  
 
The final theme was the lack of capacity to implement community sport policy: ‘I 
think the most challenging thing is the lack of deliverers, particularly from an NGB 
perspective’ (Interview: Operations Manager, CSP 3; 22 May 2012); ‘one of the key 
things I see at the moment is where NGBs want to drive things forward from their 
whole sport plans, but they have very little funding for it, and no capacity to deliver it 
... so what I see is this dumping or attempting to dump on local deliverers, be it clubs, 
county associations or local authorities’ (Interview: Sport Development Manager, 
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Borough Council; 1 June 2012). Again, as in cases 1 and 2, this lack of capacity was 
believed to be the result of insufficient resources being committed to delivery, partly 
due to, according to the local authority, the majority of funding being used to bolster 
the national and sub-regional NGB infrastructure: ‘the criticisms of NGB investment 
over the last four years is that they have tended to invest in infrastructure and not in 
local delivery, particularly their own infrastructure, there has to be more investment 
into things like club support, club development, local authority support and joint 
projects with trusts and facility operators’ (Interview: Director, CSP 3; 22 May 
2012); ‘A lot of funding that goes into sport is still spent on bureaucracy at the top. It 
has got better, but there is still a huge difference in the money committed in NGBs at 
the national and regional level as compared to the local level. I’m sorry but it is just 
not good enough. We need more funding locally in clubs, facilities, local authorities, 
to do the work, to make it happen’ (Interview: Community & Cultural Services 
Manager, District Council; 22 May 2012); ‘we need to channel a lot more funding 
into the grassroots, particularly into clubs; (Interview: County Development 
Manager, County FA; 1 June 2012); ‘A lot of funding goes into infrastructure, 
governance, management, etcetera – you know, to improve and modernise the sport. 
The trouble is that not a lot is left over for delivery. Everyone tends to be looking at 
everyone else to fund the delivery of activities to actually increase participation in 
sport; (Interview: Sport Development Manager; Borough Council; 1 June 2012); ‘if 
we want and expect the community to do more, then we have to invest in it’ 
(Interview: Head of Culture and Sport, County Council; 1 June, 2012).  
 
The challenging NGB-VSC dynamic was viewed to exacerbate an already difficult 
situation. Many VSCs pay an annual fee to remain members of the NGB representing 
their sport. According to Harris (2008), this has created tensions in the professional-
volunteer relationship, particularly where the NGB is perceived to ‘take the money 
and run’, providing nothing in return for the VSC’s annual subscription, or where the 
NGB is viewed as autocratic and not wholly representative of the sport in that it fails 
to galvanise the voluntary membership. More specifically, the typical NGB-VSC 
relationship is characterised by top-down NGB policy and operations, a lack of 
involvement of VSCs in the NGB policy process, and a lack of consent of VSCs to 
implement NGB policy, failing to harness the potential collaborative capacity of 
sports. In many cases the assumptions, expectations and general lack of involvement 
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reconfirm the divided culture of many sports, which is likely to adversely affect the 
CSP-NGB ability to implement policy: ‘I think our problem is about our approach, we 
are getting better but many of our clubs feel like they are being dictated to by the 
county association or the ECB’ (Interview: County Director, ECB; 22 May 2012); 
‘there is very little consultation with the clubs ... but at the same time there is a 
greater emphasis on volunteers doing the ground work ... the thing is most of this 
work will not happen ... this is not what volunteers have signed up do to’ (Interview: 
Chairman, County Athletics Association, 29 May 2012).  
 
Notably, the Sport Development Manager at the Borough Council viewed the NGB-
VSC relationship as one being divided by priorities and expectations. The NGB’s 
priorities are participation and performance; their expectation is that clubs and 
coaches will deliver at the local level, ‘but in reality, how many clubs are really 
worried about this kind of stuff ... maybe some of the bigger, more established clubs, 
but most are concerned with having somewhere to play their sport and being able to 
get a team out next week’ (Interview: Sport Development Officer, Borough Council, 
1 June 2012). This comment is notable as is suggests that street-level operators lack 
the resources and/or motivation to respond appropriately. Lipsky argues that, as a 
result agents are likely to ignore policy or create ‘agency policy’—in other words, the 
‘decisions that street-level operators take, actions they perform and the devices they 
create to cope with uncertainties and work pressures merge into the public policies 
that they carry out’ (Lipksy, 2010: 221). 
 
The final factor regarding the capacity of the CSP-NGBs to implement community 
sport policy related to a lack of volunteers, a point that was mentioned by a number 
of agents. The common perception is that securing volunteers for sport in the county 
is problematic and becoming increasingly difficult. However, the Active People data 
shows a substantial increase in the number of people volunteering in sport across the 
county. This could be explained by more people being willing to do short bursts of 
volunteering for one or two hours per week (Nichols & Taylor, 2010). Conversely, it 
could be explained by the power of common narrative, rather than statistical data 
such as Active People, in determining perception. Linked to the point about the 
pressure facing volunteers and the need for more volunteers, a small number of 
NGBs (athletics, cricket, basketball, swimming) mentioned the need for volunteer 
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leaders or volunteers with the appropriate skills to lead and direct work: ‘we need 
more volunteers, but we need people with the right skills, the right knowledge, that is 
the difficult part’ (Interview; Chairman, County Athletics Association, 29 May 
2012). Other sports such as tennis, added to this, arguing that whilst the clubs have 
the capacity (i.e. the space for new members), they lack volunteers with the knowhow 
to do anything about it: 
 
I think that there is capacity in most clubs to take more numbers. 
The problem is about getting the clubs to recognise this and to do 
something about it. Knowing how to go and attract new members is 
not something that we are very good at. We need more volunteers 
who have skills in these sorts of areas, but getting volunteers to run 
things nowadays is getting more and more difficult (Interview: 
Chairman, County Tennis Association; 31 May 2012). 
 
Agents’ beliefs, attitudes and experiences in regard to the community 
sport policy process  
 
The final section presents agents’ attitudes toward three aspects of the community 
sport policy process: (i) the nature of the policy process; (ii) the extent to which 
agents believe they are part of a collective system, and (iii) agents’ belief in their 
ability to achieve community sport outcomes. 
 
The nature of the policy process 
The overriding view of the community sport policy process was that it was a top-
down policy system with national agencies such as government departments and 
Sport England setting the agenda, with limited lobbying from some of the more 
powerful NGB representatives. Furthermore, this case provided a similar view of 
sport-specific policy in the form of the whole sport plans: 
 
We know that the 09-13 plans were essentially a top down thing. 
They were developed nationally, people on the ground locally didn’t 
even know what was in them and it has taken NGBs probably 3 
years to even think about what we are actually going to deliver on 
the ground (Interview: Director, CSP 3; 22 May 2012) 
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In short, case 3 exhibited many characteristics similar to cases 1 and 2 regarding the 
nature of the policy process. It was seen as hierarchical and controlled by a narrow 
coalition. The case reiterated the problem of a lack of dialogue between national-level 
strategists, CSPs, local authorities and street-level operators, and a lack of resource 
invested specifically for implementation. As the above quote suggests, the evidence 
also showed the time required to support policy orientated learning to be an issue, in 
line with Birkland, (2005); Marsh & Smith, (2000); Sabatier & Weible, (2007). The 
CSP’s Operations Manager touched on policy learning, suggesting that the learning 
from the last round of whole sport funding should provide useful experience for 
NGBs in the 2013-17 round: ‘in the last round of funding most NGBs did not know 
what they were doing, most did not have the right sort of interventions ...they were 
learning as they were going along, so from that perspective they should be better 
placed this time round’ (Interview: Operations Manager, CSP 3; 22 May 2012). 
 
Another key point which also emerged in cases 1 and 2 is the perception that the 
community sport policy process has become more ‘business-like’, a view driven by 
the use of new performance management techniques, in particular evidence-based 
practice, new product development, and the ‘carrot and stick’ approach associated 
with incentivising high performance and penalising poor performance: ‘more than 
anything else, it sends a message that they [Sport England] are serious ... if you don’t 
perform then you will lose your funding’ (Interview: Operations Manager, CSP 3; 
22 May 2012); ‘expectations have changed, it’s far more business-like nowadays, the 
need for evidence, product development, marketing campaigns and targets. We are 
all expected to set targets that we can achieve and if we don’t achieve them, then we 
know that there is a good chance we will lose our funding (Interview: County 
Development Manager, England Netball; 21 May 2012); I think the fact that some 
sports have lost their funding has made us think more seriously about our targets 
and what we do to hit them’ (Interview: Regional Development Manager, England 
Golf Partnership; 30 May 2012). 
 
The unintended consequences of policy were also highlighted by a number of agents, 
specifically, the (i) the definition and division of community sport policy, (ii) the 
capricious nature of politics and the resultant policies that emerge from this, and (iii) 
competition across sports. The first factor echoed a similar comment in case 2 
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regarding the artificial divide in policy, particularly between school sport and 
community and how this fails to reflect reality: ‘policy starts to break down when you 
get to the practicalities ... what does it mean in terms of starting policy at 14? Who 
works that way? What NGB works in that way, let alone a local authority? Of course 
money can be allocated in that way, but it does not mean that it is being spent 
specifically in that way’ (Interview: Community & Cultural Services Manager, 
District Council; 22 May 2012). The Community and Cultural Services Manager also 
touched on the causal relationship between policies, whereby ‘school sport directly 
affects attitudes toward sport and the likelihood of continuing to play sport after 14’ 
although the extent to which community sport partners can influence the school 
sport experience is relatively limited despite the significance of the relationship. The 
second factor relates to the capricious nature of politics and the way in which this is 
seen to shape policy: ‘sometimes me and my colleagues sit here in complete 
amazement, you just think, where the hell did that one come from ... a really good 
example is the Gold Challenge22, I mean where did that come from, that really was a 
Friday afternoon job wasn’t it’ (Interview: Head of Culture and Sport, County 
Council; 1 June 2012). The primary concern in relation to this comment is the way in 
which policy is viewed as whimsical rather than the more methodical, evidence-based 
approach articulated in strategies, guidance notes and Ministerial speeches. 
According to Norstedt (2008), experiences such as this can create a cynical, even 
contemptuous perception of the policy aspirations of government.  
 
The competition amongst sports to achieve participation targets represents the final 
factor. Here, NGBs openly acknowledge that they are competing for a limited market 
and in many cases are competing with other sports for the same people:  
 
...if we want to grow participation, we have to compete with the 
other sports, particularly football. We’ve got to make sure that 
tennis is available in schools and get more kids playing in schools. 
We’ve got to improve access to clubs and generally make the game 
more attractive. If we do these sorts of things then we have a chance 
                                                          
22 As part of the 2012 Legacy Plans the Gold Challenge initiative was launched by the DCMS, BOA, Paralympics 
GB, and Sport England to inspire more people to try Olympic Sports and at the same time allow participants the 
opportunity to raise money for charity.  
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of taking some of the sporty kids away from football or cricket and 
getting them into tennis (Interview: Chairman, County Tennis 
Association; 31 May 2012). 
 
Whilst for some this competition between sports may be seen as healthy, it also 
brings to light the fact that the community sport policy process involves a 
‘competitive network of agents’ with fragmented power and a lack of cooperation 
(Adam & Kreisi, 2007). On the one hand, this may be helpful for a small number of 
sports in retaining focus on their specific targets. Still, an approach where sports see 
themselves as focusing on the same ‘sporty types’ as football is likely to stifle the 
market, unlikely to lead to the exploitation of new markets and is unlikely to yield the 
growth required to achieve the overall participation target.  
 
The extent to which agents believe that they are part of a collective system 
The evidence strongly supports that presented in cases 1 and 2, especially with 
regards to the diversity of agents involved in community sport as the resultant lack of 
a joined-up approach: ‘we need community sport to be represented by one entity, one 
voice, particularly at the local level’ (Interview: Head of Culture & Sport, County 
Council; 1 June 2012); ‘there is no collective voice for community sport’ (Interview: 
Director, CSP 3, 22 May 2012). Whilst collaboration clearly exists between agents, 
the quality and effectiveness of collaboration is directly affected by their differing 
strategies, programmes and priorities. These differences create a schism in the 
community sport system, creating problems with regards to expectations and 
behaviours, not to mention more specific operational matters such as programme 
design, delivery and evaluation. In part, these problems can be explained by the 
power imbalance in community sport (Grix & Phillpots, 2011). Here it is useful to 
refer to Parsons’ (1963: 253) note concerning ‘power as both a phenomenon of 
coercion or of consensus’. Indeed, NGBs have power to both coerce and to secure 
consensus, primarily through their privileged position as lead agents in the 
community sport system, not to mention the significant funding that they receive to 
pursue community sport outcomes. In line with Lukes’ (1974) second dimension of 
power, NGBs have the power to determine who and what is included on the agenda, 
and perhaps more importantly, who and what is kept from the agenda. This is 
primarily achieved through the NGB’s whole sport plan.  
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Furthermore, NGBs have the power to coerce and secure consensus through 
mechanisms such as the CSP core specification CSP performance review process. 
However, this one-sided version of power relations between the CSP and NGB is 
overly simplistic and fails to take account of the omnipresent nature of power and the 
way in which power permeates social relations between actors at the local level 
(Foucault, 1982). It also fails to recognise the power of the CSP to subvert, modify or 
resist the actions of NGBs (ibid, 1982). In sum, the case emphasises the exercise of 
power to support each agent in the pursuit of their own interests rather than a 
genuine attempt to exercise power for the purpose of harnessing collective action 
(Goehler, 2000). This situation is one that can be partly explained by the diversity of 
actors involved in the community sport policy process, the range of priorities and the 
competition for resources amongst these actors, and the historical experiences of key 
agents, which tends to reinforce the negative perspective of the community sport 
policy sector as being: ‘one of the most divided, confused, and conflictive policy 
communities in British politics’ (Roche, 1993: 144). 
 
Agents’ belief in their ability to achieve community sport outcomes 
The final category of data related to agents’ views and beliefs in their ability to 
achieve increased participation in sport. Local authorities and the CSP stressed five 
challenges in achieving the community sport outcomes: (i) the need for a more 
realistic period of time (20 years) in order to develop effective workforce and 
programmes to bring sustained behaviour change, (ii) the ongoing challenge of 
resources, specifically funding for sport and ‘the need to get more out of less’ 
(Interview: Sport Development Manager, Borough Council, 1 June 2012); (iii) the 
need for more informal, non-traditional routes to sport participation, which would 
have the dual effect of diversifying the range and type of sport people could access as 
well as taking pressure off volunteers; (iv) linked to (iii), the issue of capacity and 
more specifically having the appropriate workforce, with the skills and funding to 
bring about increased participation in sport, and (v) an acceptance that change will 
only be possible for some, and the majority of the population has no interest in 
playing regular sport. Therefore, as long as the focus is specifically on sport 
participation, there is a need to retain a level of realism regarding what is possible: 
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If you assumed that 25% of the population take part ... 75% don’t. 
Of these, over half are in the difficult to shift group. If you take all 
the resources that are currently in the system you wouldn’t be able 
to make those shifts across this population, they’re just not 
interested (Interview: Director, CSP 3; 22 May 2012). 
 
In addition, NGBs noted a significant challenge for local authorities in maintaining a 
high quality network of facilities, something which is clearly viewed as a direct 
responsibility of local government, despite local authorities having no statutory 
responsibility to provide. This is a major issue for community sport due to the budget 
pressures facing local authorities and the possibility of a significantly reduced budget 
for sport (LGA, 2012) not to mention the likely implications of fewer public sector 
facilities on sport-specific participation rates. This challenge underscores the 
interdependent nature of community sport and the potential for a problematic causal 
relationship where stagnant or falling participation, an NGB responsibility, is in part 
or wholly caused by a lack of public sector facilities, something which is outside the 
direct control of the NGB. 
 
The majority of NGBs felt that community sport outcomes were attainable, with only 
two challenges identified: (i) the need for a clearer link between school sport and 
community sport policy, an issue that was seen to be partially addressed through the 
change in community sport policy from 16+ to 14+; and (ii) the need for more 
resources and capacity at the local level to support the delivery of community sport. 
Interestingly, the major challenge facing NGBs from the perspective of local 
authorities and the CSP was the assumptions associated with delivering community 
sport outcomes, in particular the assumption that clubs will deliver policy, the 
assumption that people generally want to play sport, and finally, the assumption that 
those who do want to participate wish to do so in a traditional, club environment. 
 
Conclusions 
Much of the evidence presented here reinforces the existing literature on community 
sport or is consistent across all three cases. For example, the cases reinforce the 
existing literature in underlining the fragmented nature of the system (Charlton, 
2010; Houlihan & Green, 2009; Houlihan & White, 2002; McDonald, 1995; Roche, 
 
 
-292- 
 
1992), the asymmetrical power relations (Goodwin & Grix, 2011; Grix & Phillpots, 
2011; Phillpots et al., 2010), the lack of consent from implementing agents (May et 
al., 2012) and the expectation of short-term policy (Houlihan & White, 2002). The 
themes that are notable for their consistency across cases include the lack of NGB 
goal clarity at the local level; the workforce skills deficit; the implications of endemic 
resource dependency across Sport England, CSPs and NGBs; the lack of capacity to 
implement policy; the structural complexity of the community sport system; the 
insular nature of the NGB whole sport plan process; the privileged position of NGB 
strategy over CSP strategy; and the attention given to performance processes and the 
adverse implications of this for collaboration. These concerns will be discussed 
further, utilising literature from Chapter 2, in the following chapter. 
 
More specifically, the evidence in case 3 points to cooperative local-level 
environment whilst also making note of the fragmented nature of the policy system. 
This local-level situation appears to be the result of CSP and County Council led 
strategies that attempt to bind local agents, particularly local authorities, into a 
cohesive network. Some of the proactive strategies used by the CSP include regular 
local authority workshops and delegated funding for initiatives such as Sportivate, 
where funding is delegated by the CSP to local authorities. Furthermore, the 
countywide 2020 physical activity strategy also plays a key role in bringing these 
agents together. This was a strategy conceived by local authorities and the CSP with 
strong political support across the sub-region, evidence of the capacity of CSP agents 
to pursue differing interests at the local level. Another mitigating factor that likely 
influenced the positive collaboration between local authorities and the CSP was the 
CSP Director’s background. The Director has amassed considerable experience in 
leisure and sport within the county over a number of years, working most recently as 
the Director of Leisure for the county’s largest borough council. This experience gives 
him important contextual insight along with the respect that he has earned from 
partner agencies for over 20 years of service. As with case 2, the positive CSP-local 
authority relationship contributed to the quality of relations between the CSP and 
NGBs at the sub-regional level. Whilst tensions were a common theme underpinning 
relations with NGBs, this was something about which the CSP were not alarmed. In 
fact the attitude from the Director was that this is to be expected in partnership work. 
That said, relations with some NGBs were clearly stronger than others. This was 
 
 
-293- 
 
largely viewed to be the result of the people working in the system, the traditional 
relationships that have existed in the county, and the CSP hosting or providing hot-
desk facilities for NGB staff. The latter was viewed as particularly important in 
building the softer skills and contextual understanding that are required in order to 
create strong and resilient partnerships, as well as have an NGB that is more closely 
connected with local-level infrastructure. 
 
Whilst environmental conditions were largely viewed as positive or conducive to 
collaboration, a cautionary note for the partnership over the coming years is the 
ability and willingness of local authorities to financially commit to the partnership. 
The significance of the contribution is largely symbolic, and seen as a commitment to 
the work of the partnership. However, one authority decided to cut funding and this 
has carried significant implications in terms of the cooperation between the local 
authority and the CSP, not to mention the other local authorities who are now said to 
be reconsidering future funding commitments. Decisions of this type require careful 
consideration as it is not necessarily the financial change that creates the largest 
challenge, but the way in which it disrupts future collaborative efforts. 
 
Another interesting point from the case was the suggestion that local government has 
re-emerged as a Sport England priority. This was an observation of the CSP Director 
and a comment based on experience of increased co-working with Sport England 
from a Borough Council SDO. This is interesting as it suggests that Sport England 
recognise the importance of local government, despite their published strategy, and 
the decision to fund CSPs and NGBs rather than local authorities. This suggests a 
more nuanced approach, a dual Sport England strategy where on the one hand they 
must follow the political imperative of prioritising NGBs and the support role of 
CSPs, whilst on the other hand they strategically maintain (or re-establish) relations 
with local government to ensure that they remain a key community sport partner. 
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Chapter 8 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to bring much-needed attention to the community 
sport policy process. In particular, it aimed to illuminate the significance of the CSP-
NGB relationship in the implementation of community sport policy. This 
culminating chapter addresses the research objectives presented in Chapter 1. These 
are repeated below: 
 
1. To analyse the significance of the relationship between CSPs and NGBs with 
regard to the national community sport policy process 
2. To analyse the significance of the relationship between CSPs and NGBs in local-
level policy making and policy implementation 
3. To identify CSP and NGB attitudes and perceptions toward the community sport 
policy process 
4. To evaluate the explanatory value of selected meso-level theories of the policy 
process in developing a better understanding of the community sport policy 
process 
 
The first section of the chapter draws together the first and second phases of research 
and compares the empirical findings of the three cases, highlighting the similarities 
and differences across the cases. The theoretical considerations presented in Chapter 
2 will be incorporated to explicate the empirical work. The contextual background 
discussed in Chapter 4 is applied as appropriate to illuminate the broader 
environment that has shaped the policy sector and the NGB-CSP relationship. Thus, 
the first section addresses questions one to three. The second section addresses 
question four and provides an analysis of the utility of the meso-level frameworks in 
Chapter 2. The third section of this chapter provides a brief reflection on the research 
process.  
 
Empirical Findings 
 
The significance of the CSP-NGB relationship in the national community sport policy 
process 
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Four substantial findings emerged from the three cases in relation to the first 
research objective. The first finding concerns the nature of the community sport 
policy process, in particular the hierarchical, top-down order that characterises it. 
Second, with regard to the translation of national policy through the NGB whole 
sport plans, the evidence underscores their insular nature and a range of factors that 
affect the implementation of the plans. The final two findings concern the range of 
factors that positively or adversely affect the CSP-NGB relationship. These factors are 
important to this study as they reveal elements of the ‘black box’ that makes up 
‘network interactions’ and the mechanisms that can aid or hinder effective 
relationships (Charmaz, 2000). 
 
A hierarchical, top down policy process 
Adding weight to previous research (cf. Grix & Phillpots, 2011; Phillpots et al., 2010), 
a primary theme emerging from the ‘bottom-up’ view of the community sport policy 
process is that it reflects the Weberian notion of a bureaucratic, top-down policy led 
by a narrow coalition made up primarily of government departments and NDPBs 
(see Figure 8.1). With reference to national level policy the Director of CSP 3 stated, 
‘there is no real coalition for community sport outside of the DCMS and Sport 
England’ (Interview: 22 May 2012). The majority of agents involved in the three 
cases reinforced this view.  
 
The evidence underscores a policy subsystem characterised by its exclusivity, 
involving those with complementary policy-related beliefs. The reasons for this are 
twofold. First, the narrow subsystem enables government to form a coalition with 
others who share similar beliefs and exclude or discount information that challenges 
their beliefs (Sabatier & Weible, 2007). Second, the government works with Sport 
England, where the pattern of authority reflects the pattern of resource dependence 
within the subsystem. In other words, despite the quasi-autonomous status that 
comes with the Royal Charter, Sport England’s capacity and authority is heavily 
dependent on the resources it receives from the Exchequer and the National Lottery, 
which are controlled by government. Thus, it is in Sport England’s interest to 
cooperate and support government, to reflect their ideals and norms (Raco & Imrie, 
2000), rather than bargain or enter into conflict regarding the nature of community 
sport policy. It is reasonable, then, to argue that community sport policy is little more 
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than a government-conceived vision with little, if any, broader coalition involving the 
stakeholders expected to deliver it. This top-down, government-centred reality 
contradicts the notion of a hollowed out state (Rhodes, 1994) and the broader 
governance narrative (cf. Goodwin & Grix, 2011; Phillpots et al., 2010; Rhodes, 1997; 
Stoker, 2000), which points to the increasing power and enhanced role of networks 
and partnerships in policy deliberation. The implications of this top-down dynamic, 
specifically the aspirations of policy makers at the national-level and the reality of 
these aspirations at the street-level, will be explored further below.  
 
It was surprising that whilst CSPs and NGBs were quick to note the top-down reality 
of the policy system, their response more closely represented a general acceptance or 
indifference toward the top-down policy process rather than opposition or 
resistance: ‘...the agenda is set by DCMS and Sport England and we get on with 
whatever is agreed’ (Interview case 2: Chief Executive Officer, CSP 2; 7 June 2012). 
In short, for the majority of agents, it was not viewed as something that they should 
be getting involved in. CSPs articulated their role as being more about translating 
and making national policy work locally rather than actively contributing to national 
policy objectives. However, the role of the newly created national CSP Network is one 
that requires further evaluation. CSP Directors cautiously noted its potential value as 
a representative body that would carry more influence than CSPs acting individually, 
so long as individual CSPs took the Network seriously and committed appropriate 
time and expertise to it. More importantly, given the structural and administrative 
diversity of the 49 CSPs, their potential as an influential lobby group perhaps lies in 
their ability to formulate a collective and consistent set of policy core beliefs (Sabatier 
& Jenkins-Smith, 1993). 
 
The majority of NGB representatives reinforced the notion of a top-down process as 
well as supporting the view of community sport policy as being formulated solely by 
government departments and Sport England. This was somewhat surprising as the 
assumption going into the research was that NGBs’ views were represented in 
community sport policy by the Sport & Recreation Alliance (SRA). However, the 
study provided very little evidence to support this. Despite the view of the majority, a 
small number of large sports do appear to play a role in shaping community sport 
policy. Whilst they are not directly involved in the formal negotiations of the 
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community sport subsystem, the evidence indicates that sports such as football, 
cricket, and swimming have influenced the precise policy definition and the 
methodology used to measure it. This lobbying or bargaining role only appears to be 
open to large, commercial and financially autonomous sports or to those with long-
serving CEOs such as ASA CEO, David Sparkes. How such NGBs have come to 
develop this role is less clear. It is reasonable to assume that some NGBs have 
acquired a privileged position through the social networks that have evolved over 
time between sports and government. Further, the role of certain NGBs has been 
augmented by a ‘policy broker’ (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999: 122). For example, 
David Sparkes could be viewed as a policy broker insofar as he is a leader with 
political legitimacy and the ability to mediate and represent the NGB’s position 
without threatening the subsystem’s core beliefs or values (ibid, 1999). A final point 
on the privileged position of some NGBs is that the patterns of power across NGBs 
appear to bear no relation to the potential of each sport to deliver community sport 
policy. In this respect, all three sports listed above (football, cricket, swimming) 
failed to deliver against their whole sport plan targets during the 2008-2013 cycle, 
whereas other sports such as cycling, athletics and netball all exceeded their targets 
but appear to have relatively little involvement in policy formulation. 
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                 Figure 8.1 The top-down community sport policy system 
 
The insular nature of the Whole Sport Plan process 
Despite the limited role of CSPs and NGBs in the formulation of national policy, 
NGBs play a significant role in the next level down, where they translate policy for 
their sport through their whole sport plan. This sets out the ‘community sport policy’ 
for each NGB, detailing the targets and how the targets will be achieved. In this 
respect, the NGBs’ translation of national policy reflects the multi-tiered nature of 
policy subsystems (Kingdon, 1995). Here, NGBs have the opportunity to focus 
attention on their beliefs and values so long as these generally agree with the deep 
core beliefs that span the entire policy subsystem (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993), 
which are most visible in the funding criteria and conditions of grant set down by 
Sport England.  
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In developing their plans, NGBs have the opportunity to engage with stakeholders for 
a multitude of purposes including accessing new ideas, accessing resources 
(Mackintosh, 1992) and securing commitment and consent from grassroots 
implementers (van Meter & van Horn, 1975). However, the evidence from the three 
cases suggests that the majority of NGBs continue to pursue an insular approach, led 
by the upper echelons of the organisation.  This is  despite Sport England facilitating 
a series of roadshows with the aim of improving stakeholder engagement in the NGB 
whole sport planning process, an exercise which was viewed by some CSP and local 
authority representatives as being largely superficial, designed to create the illusion 
of engagement and consultation. This leaves us with a second tier policy process (i.e. 
the NGB-specific policy), which appears to emulate that of the DCMS and Sport 
England at the national level. It follows a top-down trajectory, involves a limited 
group of actors at the national level, and excludes a number of actors at the regional 
and sub-regional levels. This approach not only misses the aforementioned 
opportunities, it also perpetuates the view of the superior imposing its passions on 
its subordinate and reflects more generally the principal-agent dilemma where there 
are difficulties in motivating the agent to act in the best interest of the principle 
rather than in his or her best interests (Braun & Guston 2003). This dynamic is 
particularly notable in community sport as it runs through all levels of the process—
national, regional and local levels. This situation invites further exploration. In 
particular, it would be useful to consider the range of strategies that could be used 
within the context of the NGB whole sport plan to develop greater CSP-NGB 
cooperation. Equally, it would be helpful to have a more detailed insight into the 
organisational culture of NGBs and the various strategies that could be used to 
facilitate the organisational change process. 
 
Internally, the approach of many NGBs creates two major policy-related problems. 
First, it limits the insight of the NGB to a partial view of the important structural 
context affecting network structures, network interaction and, ultimately, policy 
outcomes (Marsh & Smith, 2000). Second, the top-down process reinforces the 
power imbalance between central HQ, the regional/county infrastructure and the 
volunteer workforce. As one NGB representative explained, making reference to the 
collapse of the British Athletics Federation and the creation of UK Athletics, ‘even in 
the bad old days there was more democratic decision making, more sense of 
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ownership of the sport than there is today’ (Interview case 2: Chairman, County 
Athletics Association, 7 June 2012). Such comments demonstrate the alienation that 
some NGB and VSC representatives experience. This, in turn, creates and 
perpetuates a ‘them and us’ culture, it can create confusion or ambiguity concerning 
goals and, at its extreme, create an apathetic or hostile environment where street-
level workers seek to modify or subvert policy because it is unclear or fails to relate to 
the local context within which they operate (Barrett & Fudge, 1981; Lipsky, 1980). In 
short, the top-down approach of a narrow coalition may offer the NGB a relatively 
quick and efficient means of developing policy, but it does little to secure the 
participatory consensus of grassroots implementers and invites the subversion of 
policy at sub-regional and local levels (van Meter & van Horn, 1975). 
 
To offer some level of balance to the discussion, two NGBs (FA and ECB) have 
developed strategic frameworks which aim to place the sub-regional context at the 
centre of their plan, albeit within a framework of national priorities. The following 
insight from the County Director of the ECB in case 3 serves to illustrate the attempt 
to disperse power and at the same time the problems associated with the NGB’s 
goals, their reliance on partner agencies, in particular: 
 
Over the past 18 months to two years the ECB, in theory, have 
relinquished some of its power and passed it down to the County 
Boards to say, look, you as the County Board know how it operates 
at the local level. You decide the strategy and how to operate it at 
the local level. But they are still saying, we’d like you to do this and 
do that, we’ll give you the funding for it. I think it’s one of those 
want their cake and eat it type situations. I think that in reality the 
danger is that if they handed complete ownership over to county 
boards, we would say, well actually this does not fit and that does 
not fit and if every county took that view then the ECB would have 
no way of meeting their own targets, so I completely understand 
why they are doing it I would just prefer that there wasn’t this sort 
of cover up type of thing. I would prefer them to say, okay you have 
flexibility and freedom over this and this, but we need you to do this 
and that (Interview: 22 May 2012).  
 
The above comment underscores the county representative’s awareness of the 
paradox in which the NGB finds itself. On the one hand, they may wish to pass power 
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down to the counties. However, an entire shift of power to the counties would leave 
the NGB with limited authority and, more importantly, would severely affect their 
ability to pursue their own goals and targets. Thus, power must be exercised 
sensitively, creating over the longer term an environment where national agents 
harness cooperative forms of power, respect the power and structural context 
constraining the work of their colleagues (Hindness, 1996; Marsh & Smith, 2000), 
and as a result, foster a more genuine form of collaborative capacity where the 
collective ability of the NGB and the county associations can be brought together to 
raise awareness of problems, solve problems and work collectively toward the 
realisation of certain outcomes (Beckley et al., 2008; Chaskin, 2001; Hudson et al., 
1999; Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002). 
 
Externally, CSPs and local authorities were unanimous in their criticism of the NGB 
whole sport plan process. The evidence was consistent in all three cases across two 
connected concerns the first of which is a lack of clarity regarding the priorities of the 
whole sport plan, a point underlined by the majority of CSPs in the quantitative 
phase of research. One of the major issues here is that CSPs are required to support 
NGBs with the implementation of their whole sport plans. This is a contractual 
requirement in return for the core funding supplied by Sport England. However, 
CSPs have not been able to provide appropriate support to some sports as the NGB 
has not been able to clearly articulate its priorities. As the CSP Operations Manager 
in case 3 in stated ‘you could go and sit down and have a meeting with them and they 
would not be able to articulate their priorities for [the area] or how they wanted us to 
help them’ (Interview: 22 May 2012). It is this ambiguity that is argued to be one of 
the principal causes of ineffective CSP-NGB relations. 
 
The problem of ambiguity can be viewed as partially a result of the second concern 
which relates to the NGB’s leadership of the whole sport plan process and the 
decision to control this internally with limited engagement of external actors: ‘one of 
the big problems is that NGBs devise their own plans and programmes and become 
very attached to them without involving local partners’ (Interview case 1: Director, 
CSP 1; 25 May 2012); ‘the problem with many NGBs is that they don’t even try ... I 
mean why not come and talk to us? We know what is best for the local area, we 
represent it’; (Interview case 3: Head of Culture & Sport, County Council; 1 June 
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2012). While this is notable in itself, of greater interest here is the consistency of this 
finding across the three cases and thus its implications. The consequences of this 
largely insular approach include goal ambiguity (Berman, 1978), a failure to consider 
social context or local conditions (Hjern & Porter, 1981; Marsh & Smith, 2000), and 
a lack of participatory consensus from policy implementers (Dunleavy, 1991; van 
Meter & van Horn, 1975). In short, the NGB process favours hierarchical order over 
democratic governance (Cantleton & Ingram, 2002), and so doing loses the potential 
‘positive-sum’ gains associated with co-production (Ostrom, V. 1973) and 
collaborative capacity (Beckley et al., 2008; Chaskin, 2001; Hudson et al., 1999; 
Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002). However, the extreme alternative of local determination 
would likely lead to inconsistent and haphazard policy. The solution perhaps lies in 
more transformative policy leadership which sets clear and transparent policy goals 
and fully engages implementing agents in the process in order to secure consensus 
amongst implementing agents. 
 
NGBs clearly pursue a top-down strategy of formulating policy with limited 
involvement of other agents. A large part of the frustration with this approach comes 
from the nature of the policy process. Community sport policy requires joint effort 
and collaboration. No single agent has the capacity to deliver the targets single-
handedly. Thus, it is incumbent upon the NGB as the lead agency to galvanise 
support for its strategy and to adopt a collaborative approach in implementing it. In 
this respect it would be useful for NGBs to cultivate more collaborative leaders 
(Chrislip & Larson, 1994; Feyerherm, 1994) who have the ability to lead through 
complexity, promote broader good amongst competing interests and ultimately 
leverage the partnership’s potential in achieving a series of joint goals (Bleak & 
Fulmer, 2009).  
 
Another frustration appeared to be fuelled by the perceived hypocrisy of some 
community sport policy actors, where NGBs appear to operate with limited 
interference and under different conditions to other agents: ‘NGBs seem to get away 
with things that CSPs and local authorities would never get away with. For example, 
‘the completely ludicrous growth targets which they set because they knew they could 
lever in more funding’ (Interview case 2: Head of Arts and Recreation, City Council; 
21 May 2012). Further, NGBs’ centralist policies appear to contradict the principle of 
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broader government policy concerning localism and ignore the need for bottom-up 
approaches that are embedded within the numerous modernisation programmes in 
the public sector. Thus, some agents are resentful of the operational flexibilities 
afforded to the NGB (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973) and justify their apathetic 
attitude toward policy by pointing to the problems they associate with it. However, 
this point can be more generally applied to all three groups of agents involved in the 
study. In particular, agents appear to stress the need for their own operational 
flexibility, but lack empathy when it comes to operational flexibility for other agents. 
This carries significant implications for the policy environment and for CSP-NGB 
interactions. This also relates to reciprocity and the way in which it becomes the 
thing to do (Axelrod, 1984). In other words, the more that actors are able to treat 
others as they themselves would like to be treated, the more likely they are to see this 
reciprocated. In this way reciprocation is viewed as a basis for developing mutual 
cooperation (ibid, 2004). 
 
The whole sport plan process brings to the fore the enforced nature of the CSP-NGB 
relationship. Despite fundamental cultural, strategic and operational differences 
(Phillpots et al., 2010), CSPs and NGBs are required to work together and 
demonstrate effective partnership working. However, this highlights another 
perceived double-standard for CSPs as they are required to support NGBs and their 
performance is evaluated accordingly, whereas no reciprocal arrangement is in place 
to direct the NGB’s interaction with CSPs. In this way the Sport England contract 
with CSPs and NGBs differs. On the one hand, it requires the CSP to develop effective 
working relationships with NGBs, but does not require the same of NGBs. Not only 
does this bind the CSP into behaviours that they might otherwise not engage in 
(Rummery, 2002), it also fundamentally compromises the principles of partnership 
(Powell & Glendinning, 2002) and cooperation (Axelrod, 1984).  
 
To sum up, whilst the regulatory framework governing CSP and NGB relations is 
unlikely to change, the experience and policy learning (Marsh & Smith, 2000; 
Schofield, 2004) to which NGBs have been exposed from the 2009-13 cycle might, in 
some sports, lead to a more collaborative and inclusive approach to the development 
of the whole sport plan.  
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Critical factors that shape the CSP-NGB relationship 
The CSP-NGB relationship is a reflection of the national policy making process 
rather than a self-determined relationship created for mutual benefit. The literature 
reinforced this view, stating that the CSP-NGB relationship is ‘less a relationship 
between individuals (or organisations) characterised by mutual cooperation, 
responsibility and benefit, but more a case of enforced cooperation between unequal 
partners’ (Grix & Phillpots, 2011: 12). The incentive to make the relationship work is 
the core funding (offered at a time when the future funding of CSPs was being 
reviewed) as well as the performance management system, which provides high 
performing CSPs with financial incentives. The same conditions are not placed on the 
NGB. Whilst the NGB faces sanctions for poor performance against agreed targets, it 
is free to determine how and with whom it works. Despite this imbalance, CSPs and 
NGBs identified a range of factors that positively influence the CSP-NGB 
relationship. Figure 8.2 outlines these factors. Whilst we have already discussed the 
limited role of the CSP-NGB relationship in the formal policy formulation process, 
the relationship does play a more significant role in the translation of policy at the 
sub-regional level as well as implementation. This is seen by some as an alternative 
form of policy formulation as those closer to the point of implementation take key 
decisions over what is implemented (Lipsky, 1981); in this view, a more accurate 
representation of actual policy comes from looking at the system from the bottom up. 
This accentuates the importance of the CSP-NGB relationship, particularly the 
notion of co-production where agents can work closely to agree what will be 
implemented, how and by whom. Such an approach is more likely to result in 
alignment between initial policy goals and the programmes and activities 
implemented by CSPs and others. 
 
Unsurprisingly, CSPs and NGBs felt that the particular individuals involved in the 
system were the most important factor in the CSP-NGB relationship. The evidence 
revealed a range of considerations, including both style and substance. Here, 
individuals who have commitment and a range of skills (in particular leadership, 
communication and organisation) are viewed as critical to the development of 
effective CSP-NGB relations. These individuals have been referred to elsewhere as 
‘boundary spanners’ as they possess certain characteristics which allow them to build 
shared meaning and trust across diverse and, at times, divisive policy environs (Daft, 
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1989; Tushman & Scanlan, 1981). Thus, trust and respect is created and harnessed at 
the micro-level where individual agents develop trust based on their interactions 
and, importantly, the follow-through on actions that flow from interactions. Whilst 
initial interactions may be moderated by institutional paradigms of the partner 
organisation (Christensen, 2003), it is the micro-level perspectives that are dominant 
in building trust and mutual respect. This is despite institutional paradigms that in 
some cases breed distrust at the meso-level, principally due to competition for 
resources and pre-existing social structures (Lewis, 2000). The final micro-level 
factor that positively influences the relationship is stakeholder engagement. This 
refers to the two-way process of engagement where CSPs are involved in the NGB 
whole sport plan process and respond as appropriate, and where NGBs are invited to 
work alongside the CSP, viewing it as an important part of the delivery system. This 
reinforces the importance of securing compliance and support from policy agents 
(Dunleavy, 1991) and not leaning too heavily on partner agencies or over-relying on 
coercion in order to achieve policy goals (Agranoff, 2007). 
 
At the meso-level, the most critical factors in the CSP-NGB relationship were viewed 
to be goal clarity, financial resources and structures. These factors were commonly 
cited across all three cases and from a range of different actors, supporting the 
findings of previous studies (Chaskin, 2001; Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002). Here, the 
issue of goal clarity was viewed as particularly important, primarily as CSPs 
commonly reported a lack of clarity or ambiguity regarding the whole sport plan 
process and priorities. Whilst this was an issue in the 2009-13 whole sport plan 
process, the expectations of CSPs are likely to change for the 2013-17 process, largely 
due to the experience of the 2009-13 cycle. This follows Marsh & Smith’s dialectical 
Policy Network Model (2000), in particular the causal relationship between actor’s 
learning, actor’s skill and network interactions and the result of these changes on 
policy outcomes. The policy learning in the 2009-13 cycle may enhance the actor’s 
skill, develop network interactions and as a result, improve the overall policy 
outcome. Conversely, the policy analysis literature reminds us that policy 
frameworks can simplify the policy process and result in an overly rational view 
which fails to take account of the sheer range of variables that are likely to shape the 
policy community (Heclo, 1978). Finally, whilst structures were not a common 
feature across all three cases, this was considered an important finding due to the 
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implications for policy implementation, not to mention the objectives directing this 
study. Structures were viewed as a critical element by some actors as they reflect the 
ability of the NGB to act upon and implement its whole sport plan. A small number 
of NGBs have a clearly articulated system of delivery for some aspects of their plan 
(e.g. England Netball and the Back to Netball programme; the ECB and the Chance 
to Shine initiative). Further, the act of developing ‘implementation structures’ itself 
signifies that the NGB has considered the reality of their plan and given the issue 
serious consideration. Such steps, particularly where these have involved the CSP, 
are reported to be particularly advantageous to the development of effective CSP-
NGB relationships.  
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In terms of barriers or problems that adversely affect the CSP-NGB relationship four 
were identified across the three cases. The first of these, lack of engagement, 
contradicts the point concerning the positive influence of engagement detailed above. 
More specifically, the problem of lack of engagement related to three factors (i) the 
lack of local authority engagement in the CSP, (ii) the lack of CSP/local authority 
engagement in the NGB whole sport plan process, and (iii) the lack of NGB 
engagement in the CSP. The first and third factors will be discussed together as they 
both concern a lack of engagement in the CSP. The second issue will not be 
addressed specifically as this was given detailed attention above (see the Insular 
Nature of the Whole Sport Plan section, page 297 above). The lack of engagement of 
local authorities and the NGB in the CSP related more specifically to the notion of 
self-exclusion, where local authority and NGB agents did not actively engage with the 
CSP rather than the CSP not attempting to engage them. This was an issue in case 1 
in particular, where there were tensions over the role of the CSP, specifically the way 
in which it assumed strategic leadership of sport in the sub-region. Local authorities 
vehemently disputed this, questioning the role and capacity of the CSP, and argued 
that they would be better placed to fulfil the role. This case highlights the 
fragmentation of power at the community level, where the policy community is best 
Figure 8.2 Meso- and micro-level factors that positively influence the CSP-NGB relationship 
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characterised as ‘competitive’ (Adam & Kriesi, 2007). It also illustrates the capability 
of networks to produce inertia, particularly when the partnership is viewed as a zero-
sum game leading organisations to defend policy territory. The evidence in case 1 was 
distinct from that in cases 2 and 3, where the network was viewed to be more 
cooperative. This can be explained in part at least by the distinct nature of the sub 
region in case 1. This is not a county area per se, and actors within the sub-region 
have limited experience of working together. Also, the partnerships in cases 2 and 3 
evolved from earlier iterations that were established by local authorities, and 
therefore authorities had a stronger connection with the partnership. Further, the 
authorities in case 1 were large Metropolitan Authorities with a strong community 
sport tradition and the majority retained a relatively large sport development team. 
In contrast, the smaller authorities in cases 2 and 3 had a streamlined community 
sport development workforce, resulting in greater dependence on the resources that 
the CSP could leverage. Finally, the contrast between the first case and cases 2 and 3 
suggests that situational policy-specific variables are significant in determining the 
likelihood of partnership cooperation (Adam & Kriesi, 2007). The higher levels of 
trust between partners in cases 2 and 3 may be the product of the relatively long 
history of partnership working which was absent in case 1 and/or the experience of 
CSP personnel, many of whom had worked previously in a local government context. 
 
The extent to which NGBs were engaged with the CSP was more or less consistent 
across the three cases. The smaller and medium sports (basketball, golf, athletics, 
swimming and netball) were perceived to be more engaged (despite generally having 
fewer personnel), whereas the larger sports (football, cricket, and tennis) were 
viewed to be less engaged, primarily due to their resources and infrastructure which, 
as the County Director of the ECB in case 3 stated, allows them to focus wholly on 
their own priorities with limited attention to the wider work of CSPs or local 
authorities. Nevertheless, the continuing pressure facing local authority budgets and 
the resulting uncertainty regarding the future of local public sector facility provision 
did prove to be issues that energised the interest of larger NGBs, particularly football 
and cricket. However, the degree to which this galvanised NGB involvement in the 
CSP varied depending on the NGB’s perception of the CSP and the extent to which it 
was seen to represent the network of local authorities in the sub-region. In this 
respect, the larger NGBs are more likely to engage with the CSP if it is viewed to have 
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legitimacy and is able to bring local authorities together as a coordinated network to 
discuss pertinent issues such as facility provision and future facilities planning. 
 
The second major problem that adversely affects the CSP-NGB relationship is one 
that has troubled the entire community sport policy process since the early 1990s, 
and relates to the philosophical basis of each agent’s involvement in sport. Here, 
local authorities are concerned with their community, in particular health and 
wellbeing and improving the quality of life of their local community. In contrast, 
NGBs are concerned with the furtherance of their particular sport, including (but not 
limited to) increasing participation, commercial success and developing excellence. 
Figure 8.3 illustrates the differing priorities of key agents involved in community 
sport at the sub-regional level.  
 
 
                    Figure 8.3 Diversity of priorities in community sport: sub-regional level  
 
At a strategic level, these differences divide the policy sector and create competing 
coalitions. Local authorities utilise policy venues (Sabatier & Jenkins Smith, 1999) 
such as the LGA and CCLOA conferences, not to mention national statistics such as 
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adult and childhood obesity, to bargain and lobby for a wider definition of sport as 
well as underline the social, instrumental role of sport. However, the extent to which 
they do this methodically or consistently is open to debate. In contrast, NGBs utilise 
the politically attractive sphere of potential international success to underscore the 
importance of investing in pure sport. 
 
At the operational level, the implications of the differing philosophies mean that 
community sport agents often pursue a range of strategies and programmes. In all 
three cases CSPs argued that they embraced a strategic level, which involves 
translating and coordinating policy at the local level, as the Director of CSP 3 
explains: 
 
we do our best ... there are balancing acts that need to be achieved 
and conflicts to manage, we know we have slightly different 
priorities, so it’s just a case of being clear about our common goals 
and how we can work together to achieve them ... ultimately, our 
priorities are about participation, supporting NGBs, volunteers and 
coaches, and providing strategic leadership. Strategic leadership is 
all about joining stuff up at the local level, whether that is stuff 
coming down from national level or whether it’s working locally 
across things like health and physical activity (Interview: Director, 
CSP 3; 22 May 2012). 
 
This is a position driven in part by the resource dependency of the CSP, not least 
their reliance on Sport England funding which requires them to support NGBs and 
local authorities, the second largest funder of CSPs. The dynamic also highlights the 
ubiquitous and complex nature of power within community sport. Whilst the DCMS 
and Sport England delegate the primary leadership role in community sport to NGBs 
together with significant funding to support this, the majority of NGBs depend on 
local authority facility provision to enable them to achieve their goals. Also, many 
NGBs require support (financial and knowledge) at the community level to enable 
them to effectively implement their programmes. In contrast, although a small 
number of authorities may require NGB support with securing external funding for 
facility development23, the majority do not require or depend on NGBs to achieve 
                                                          
23 Applications to the Lottery Sport Fund for facility developments now require strategic support from 
NGBs. 
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their goals. As a result, CSPs find themselves playing a key mediating role in which 
they must focus on the mutual benefits of the CSP-NGB relationship whilst working 
more closely with local partners such as local authorities to pursue locally derived 
priorities. Thus, CSPs generally adopt a twin-track strategy where they work as close 
allies of NGBs in community sport policy, as well as working with local community 
partners (including local authorities, Clinical Commissioning Groups, etc.) to address 
broader health and wellbeing concerns. The reality of the situation requires that 
CSPs do their best in a situation that is less than ideal, but the lack of alignment of 
values and priorities is a significant problem that compromises the fundamental 
premise of partnership (Ling, 2000) and takes time and resources away from 
addressing actual policy outcomes (Bloyce et al., 2008).  
 
The third problem that adversely affects the CSP-NGB relationship is, from the 
perspective of the CSP, the creation of a comprehensive performance management 
system that requires the CSP to frequently report performance and demonstrate how 
it is meeting the requirements of Sport England’s core specifications as well as the 
annual targets for participation and drop-off. Whilst this was seen by some CSPs to 
be useful in focusing attention and resources, processes such as the core specification 
and the carrot-and-stick approach attached to achieving numerical targets were 
generally seen to stifle the CSP-NGB relationship and to drive behaviours that were 
more concerned with the superficial appearance of the CSP-NGB relationship rather 
than the deeper skills and processes that underpin it: 
 
I guess the final thing to say is about the target mentality that we all 
work in now. On the one hand it’s fine, we need direction, we need 
it to help prioritise ... The core specification is a little like that, okay, 
this is what I need to do, what I need to offer to be seen in a good 
light. But partnership working needs to be more genuine, it needs 
to go beyond this, it requires a more open conversation about 
vision, priorities and roles and responsibilities (Interview: 
Regional Director, ECB /Governance Chair, Trustee, CSP B4). 
 
Here, Demming’s (2000) work on the deadly diseases of management is instructive 
as it points to the counterproductive nature of overt performance management 
systems, particularly the way in which such systems encourage actions that present 
the impression of effective performance without actually producing effective 
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performance in the longer term. Such systems also affect secondary beliefs which, 
whilst amenable to change, are important in influencing how agents perceive and 
thus behave within the policy subsystem (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). In short, 
the evidence raises questions about the normative values attached to performance 
management systems and the long-term implications for developing a genuine and 
effective CSP-NGB relationship.  
 
The final problem relates to the complexity arising from inconsistency. A number of 
agents referred to the problem of inconsistency. NGBs referred to the inconsistent 
structure and strategy of CSPs. CSPs complained about the lack of consistency within 
NGBs, where at the sub-regional and local levels they are unable to articulate the 
same priorities as those at the national level. In this way the evidence suggests that 
the complexity associated with community sport is more about the nature of the 
work and the perception that community sport lacks uniformity or consistency of 
approach across the same types of organisational types (CSPs or NGBs), rather than 
being solely about the myriad organisations that occupy the community sport 
landscape. Notably, agents argued for greater uniformity across partner 
organisations whilst at the same time underlining their autonomy and individuality, 
and argued for greater flexibility in policy to ensure that it fits appropriately with 
their local socio-economic and/or organisational context. This accentuates a 
contradiction where the need for and importance of autonomy and individuality is 
understood and respected when applied to one’s own institution, yet viewed as 
complex or inconvenient when applied to others. It is also possible that complexity is 
used as a smokescreen for other problems in the policy system. Whilst the term has a 
relatively long and common association with community sport, it is possible that it 
has been used in this study to disguise or hide other problems that agents would 
rather not reveal. This seems reasonable to assume as, on the one hand, the system 
may appear complex to the outsider looking in, but on the other, understanding and 
making sense of intricacies and unique features of the sub-regional system should 
form an integral part of the agent’s day-to-day work, particularly when one considers 
the transitory nature of the sport development workforce where it is often the case 
that CSP personnel work within NGBs or local government, and vice versa. 
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The significance of the CSP-NGB relationship in local policy making and 
implementation 
 
This sub-section has been divided into two parts to address first, the significance of 
the CSP-NGB relationship in local policy making and second, the significance of the 
CSP-NGB relationship in policy implementation. 
 
The significance of the CSP-NGB relationship in local policy making 
While acknowledging that the NGB-led sport for sport coalition has lobbied for and 
secured commitment toward goals that largely align with their traditional sport 
development beliefs at the national level, this has yet to occur at the local level. 
Consequently, the sport for sport coalition is dominant at the national level, but 
remains part of the weaker coalition when considering local-level policy concerns – 
see Figure 8.4. This is associated, in part, with the power and legitimacy of local 
government, which prioritises objectives associated with development through sport 
over those more concerned with the development of sport. Local governments’ 
legitimacy is a function of its mandate from the local electorate, specifically to create 
and pursue policies that support the local community, such as those relating to 
master planning, facility development, health and wellbeing as well as the potential 
afforded by new revenue streams such as Section 106 monies. The dominant position 
of local government in local sport-related policy can also be explained by the recent 
past (Chitty, 2004), in particular, local government’s tradition of formulating sport-
related policy at the local level, whether through formal policy documentation 
(strategies, planning policies, funding criteria) or through the actions of local 
operators (Lipsky, 1980; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003). Further, local 
government’s central position in local policy can be seen to be a result of a lack of 
alternatives (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). At the local level, the sport for sport 
coalition is diluted and fragmented as sports compete with one another to retain 
and/or attract new participants and pursue their own interests. This creates 
significant problems for the CSP-NGB relationship as, rather than representing a 
more powerful, collective voice for community sport, the relationship reflects the 
reality of the singular arrangements that exist between the CSP and individual 
sports. Whilst some sports may be able to galvanise a more effective collaborative 
effort than others due to their organisational capacity, resources, traditional links in 
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the area, or relations with local-level agents, the overall lack of collaboration across 
sports weakens the position of the sport-for-sport coalition. 
 
 
The evidence from the three cases suggests that CSPs attempt to reconcile a position 
in the local level subsystem where they can respond to the needs of the top-down 
sport for sport coalition and at the same time support the development and 
implementation of local policy, which is more commonly concerned with sport for 
development. The ability of CSPs to fulfil this role varies considerably. This is a 
position driven by the CSP’s reputation and is based on its track record in 
cooperating with local partners and mediated by the beliefs and values of agents 
involved in the local network (Sabatier & Weible, 2007).  
 
Policy-specific context such as this plays a significant role in determining whether 
CSPs play a cooperative or competitive role in local policy networks. Here, Adam & 
Kriesi’s (2007) power/interaction model provides a useful lens through which to 
view the fragmentation of power at the community level. As previously mentioned, 
case 1 exhibits a pattern best characterised as ‘competition’, while cases 2 and 3 are 
more closely associated with ‘horizontal cooperation’. What the first case also 
Figure 8.4 Community sport policy subsystem and coalitions at national and local levels 
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illustrates is the capacity of networks to result in inertia when the partnership is 
perceived as a zero-sum game in which organisations defend policy territory. Case 2 
and 3 generally exhibited signs of closer collaboration in the local policy process, 
which can be explained in part at least by historical context, not least the initial role 
of local authorities in the creation of the countywide partnership. It can be attributed 
in part to the relatively limited community sport development capacity in the local 
authorities creating greater dependence on CSP resources. The contrast between case 
1 and cases 2 and 3 underline the significance of the situational policy-specific 
variables in determining the likelihood of partnership cooperation (Adam & Kriesi, 
2007). The higher level of cooperation found in cases 2 and 3 could be explained by 
the higher level of trust and respect between partners, which may be the product of 
the relatively long history of partnership working which was absent in case 1, the 
high proportion of staff who were former local authority employees, and/or the more 
consultative, democratic leadership style of the CSP senior management teams in 
cases 2 and 3. 
 
So, while the CSP-NGB relationship does not in itself play a significant role in the 
formulation of local sport-related policy, CSPs perceived as being effective can and 
do play an important role in local-level policy networks. This does not alter the 
subordinate and constrained position of the CSPs in the national policy context (cf. 
Grix & Phillpots, 2011; Phillpots, 2010); however, it does offer a broader perspective 
of the relative power and autonomy of CSPs to utilise their skills and resources to 
pursue other, locally determined interests that may fall outside the tightly defined 
area of community sport. In this respect, cases 2 and 3 more closely represent the 
integrated structure of policy communities where a common set of values direct the 
work of the CSP (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992). An example of this is the countywide 2020 
vision and strategy for physical activity discussed in case 3. In contrast, case 1 more 
closely reflects an issue network where a measure of agreement exists, but conflict is 
ever-present (ibid, 1992). 
 
Despite the distinct differences in the structure and interaction of networks at the 
sub-regional level, the extent to which any of the three CSPs represent anything more 
than a core team of sports professionals remains a point of debate. Certainly, agents 
expressed more respect for the CSP leadership in cases 2 and 3 compared to case 1. 
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However, this did not include any evidence of the CSP’s ability to develop a true 
partnership that involved and represented the interests of agents at the sub-regional 
level. The CSP is viewed as another agent, another institution or layer in the system 
with which other agents need to cooperate, rather than a representative or umbrella 
body for sport to which other agents belonged. This is problematic at the theoretical 
level as it challenges the beliefs of CSP personnel and contradicts one of the founding 
principles upon which CSPs were developed. Moreover, on a practical level this 
separation of the CSP can waste resources, duplicate effort, and create a them and us 
work culture. It also raises serious questions about the CSP’s capacity to strategically 
lead sport at the sub-regional level. Given the extant literature and the empirical 
work presented above, the broader notion of partnership with which the CSP is 
associated remains a rhetorical point requiring further investigation.  
 
The significance of the CSP-NGB relationship in policy implementation 
The findings relating to implementation underscored the major problems associated 
with implementing community sport policy and highlighted some of the progress 
that has been made in relation to criticisms presented in earlier implementation 
studies (Bardach, 1977; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973). The quantitative and 
qualitative evidence in the study pointed to a clearly defined policy objective, a 
renewed focus on policy objectives and a clear system of evaluating progress. While it 
acknowledges the progress made since the 1970s, the evidence is more useful in 
highlighting the range of challenges that affect the capacity of the CSP-NGB 
relationship in implementing community sport policy.  In particular, three factors 
were viewed as being important in considering the significance of the CSP-NGB 
relationship in policy implementation: (i) the reality of partnership-based 
implementation, (ii) the funding and capacity allocated to implementation, and the 
(iii) the skills and competencies of the community sport workforce. 
 
The evidence challenges Carter’s (2005) vision of a cohesive community sport 
implementation system. Whilst the evidence did reveal close collaboration between 
some CSPs and NGBs in policy implementation—particularly in areas where micro-
level relations were strong and thus trust between agents high—this can at best be 
described as patchy. This can partly be explained by the challenges that are 
embedded in the reality of policy action. This is a point that Pressman & Wildavsky 
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(1973) emphasise, in particular that the exercise of doing is inherently more complex 
than thinking. Here, attention to and consensus on what is to be done is vital. This is 
particularly difficult for community sport as agreeing what is to be done should not 
be the work of one agent alone but, given the interdependent nature of community 
sport, an agreement that should be made across a number of agents. As Good 
observed: 
 
Although administrative reforms are usually designed by a few 
people, invariably they are implemented by many. It is through the 
implementation, and not the design, that the issues, contradictions 
and dilemmas rise to the surface and become grounded in the 
reality of administration and politics. And it is often the 
implementers, not the designers, who are called upon to reconcile 
them (2003: 182). 
 
Thus, rather than aiding the pursuit of policy outcomes, the enforced CSP-NGB 
relationship presents another obstacle and thus makes the process more challenging 
(Bardach, 1977; Bloyce et al., 2008; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973). In sum, 
community sport policy can generally be seen to reflect the schism between those 
who conceive policy and those who have to implement it, a schism made wider by the 
hierarchical, top-down nature of the community sport policy process. In this respect, 
the evidence draws attention to two common and significant problems in community 
sport policy: (i) the need for future policy conception to take account of the whole 
picture, not just the formulation of policy but also the reality of executing it 
(Bardach, 1973), and (ii) less steering and directing of implementing agents and 
greater emphasis on ‘the growth of reflective organisations which are capable of their 
own self-transformation’ and their own self organisation, and thus more likely to 
achieve policy outcomes (Parsons, 2002: 51). 
 
The quantitative and qualitative evidence is convincing in underscoring the perceived 
lack of funding allocated to implementation. To clarify, the evidence does not suggest 
that the £450m allocated to NGB whole sport plans or the £37m invested into CSPs 
for the 2013-17 is insufficient. Rather, it draws attention to the resource allocation 
behaviour of CSPs and NGBs. Here, the dominant view is that resources are used to 
develop the organisational capacity of the NGB rather than being invested in the 
sport at the street-level. This is problematic because, although it broadens the NGB’s 
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infrastructure, it leaves little leeway for developing the capacity of street-level agents 
or for investment into specific implementation projects. Representing this view, the 
Chairman of the Athletics Association in case 2 argued that: 
 
It’s quite simple really, if we want to bring about a change at the 
local level we need more support, we need more capacity at the local 
level. Most of the NGB resource tends to get sucked up at the 
national or regional level. I understand why, but we need to 
challenge ourselves more to get the funding committed at the 
grassroots level, this is where the money is needed and where it will 
make the most difference (Interview: 7 June , 2012). 
 
There are three possible explanations of this behaviour. First, Ostrom’s (2007) 
Institutional Analysis Framework underlines the importance of value judgements 
about the relative importance of the subsystem and how these judgements influence 
the resource allocation behaviour of NGBs. Here, considerations such as the accepted 
norms about policy activities, the level of understanding amongst participants about 
policy activities and the extent to which preferences are homogenous in the action 
arena are important in formalising values and thus influencing how institutions 
allocate resources (Ostrom, 2007). The fragmented nature of community sport, 
particularly the lack of accepted norms, the relatively weak understanding of policy 
activities and the diversity of preferences amongst policy actors helps to explain why 
many NGBs invest internally rather than allocating funding to other policy agents. 
Second, the distribution of external resources into organisations brings with it an 
uncertainty which carries implications for organisational action and behaviour. This 
uncertainty and the actions and behaviour that flow from it are typical in 
organisations that are dependent on or have become accustomed to receiving 
external resources (Polski & Ostrom, 1999). Their first priority is often to secure the 
viability of the organisation for as long as possible (Johnson, 1990). Long-term 
security can be seen as more likely if organisations retain direct control of resources 
rather than committing them to external activities or to third parties (Benson, 1975). 
Similar, viability in the longer term is perceived as being more likely if organisations 
have the human capacity to achieve goals and leverage additional resources. This is 
particularly relevant in the context of the old ‘new public management techniques’ 
which are being utilised in community sport as organisations are incentivised with 
additional resources if they achieve goals but penalised through the claw back of 
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funding if they fail to achieve targets. Third, from an operational perspective, NGBs 
may justify their resource allocation behaviour on the basis of not having the 
human/physical resource to manage and oversee the new, additional activities and 
the associated work. Here, it can be argued that NGBs do their best with what they 
have in terms of developing an infrastructure to create and manage new projects, 
leverage additional resources and meet performance reporting requirements. 
Furthermore, the infrastructure gets NGBs closer to the point of delivery (e.g. 
regional or county level) than would otherwise be possible, enabling them to better 
support existing operators (clubs, colleges and coaches) as well as build new local-
level capacity. 
 
Marsh & Smith’s (2000) dialectical model is instructive when considering the 
implications of this behaviour. It underscores the complex range of cause and effect 
relations within the policy process, in particular the interdependent relationship 
between the policy environment (the structural context) and the actors operating 
within the policy network. The model gives attention to the resource allocation 
behaviour of NGBs and the way in which this is shaped by the environment and the 
policy network and also considers the way in which this influences the policy 
environment and policy network. One implication of this behaviour is that it creates 
(and sustains) a cultural context that more closely represents individualism, self-
interest and institutional survival than one promoting co-operation, common 
interest, and the achievement of positive outcomes for society. Network structures 
and interactions find it difficult to flourish in such a context, which fails to stimulate 
high trust/high involvement interactions (Scheberle, 2004) and emboldens the range 
of socio-psychological limitations that can damage network interactions (Ostrom, 
1999). It is in the broader interests of the policy community to recognise such effects, 
explore different models of resource allocation behaviour, and study the effects of 
such behaviour on network interaction, policy outcomes and, ultimately, the broader 
cultural context within which community sport is inextricably bound. 
 
Another implication of this resource allocation behaviour is the expectation placed 
on volunteers as implementation agents. Whilst this may be viewed as a broader 
problem of the community sport policy process (cf. Harris et al., 2009; Nichols & 
James, 2008; Taylor et al., 2007), it can be directly attributed to the resource 
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allocation decisions of Sport England, NGBs and CSPs. More specifically, these 
circumstances can be viewed as being the result of a lack of resources and the 
inability of (most) NGBs to implement policy at the local level. However, such views 
should be tempered with a more optimistic analysis. For example, imagine policy 
including no reference to VSCs. This would be criticised for being both exclusive and 
short-sighted in ignoring the potential of volunteer-run clubs, many of which 
delivered local sport long before the relatively recent conception of community sport. 
From this standpoint, VSCs are included as implementation agents to harness the 
potential capacity of volunteers. This fits well with the neo-liberal ideology of recent 
governments, in particular the communitarian thinking of New Labour and the Big 
Society rhetoric of the coalition government. This also has the potential to facilitate 
positive sum results for Sport England, NGBs, local sport clubs as well as harness 
active citizenship and lighten the burden on the public purse. 
 
There are, however, a number of problems with this positive assessment. First, the 
position of VSCs within the community sport policy process is assumed and not 
agreed. Their position at the end of the delivery chain requires them to implement 
strategies and programmes of which they have no awareness and no hand in 
developing or consenting to (Harris et al., 2009). This is an issue requiring redress, 
not least as a lack of consent has been shown to be a common cause of policy failure 
(Bardach, 1977; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973; van Meter & van Horn, 1975). The 
second problem flows directly from the resource allocation decisions of NGBs 
discussed above, specifically a lack of funding allocated to clubs for implementing 
policy. Even when VSCs are aware and consent to their role in policy, they usually 
face the challenge of pursuing external funding (via the Sport Lottery Fund, for 
example) or implementing policy with no additional resource. This adds to the range 
of pressures facing VSCs, which include a lack of volunteers, increased bureaucracy, 
poor or insufficient facilities and competing pressures from their members (Harris et 
al., 2009; Taylor et al., 2007). A final problem relates to a lack of understanding or 
respect for the heterogeneity of VSCs (May et al., 2012; Nichols et al., 2012). Little 
attention is given to the range of motives that direct VSCs’ efforts. Research has 
shown that larger, more formal clubs are more likely to play a more effective role in 
policy implementation, whereas smaller or informal club types are more likely to be 
concerned with day-to-day operations (Cuskelly et al., 2006; Harris et al., 2009; May 
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et al., 2012; Nichols & James, 2008; Taylor et al., 2007). More detailed analysis of 
VSC diversity would allow policy makers to more effectively categorise VSC types and 
allocate resources more efficiently, working with clubs that have the enthusiasm and 
capacity to implement community sport policy. To sum up, while it would be 
foolhardy to ignore the potential of the third sector, policy makers and practitioners 
still have a long way to go in developing effective collaboration with the sector.  
 
Whilst recognising the passion and interest of the workforce—indeed, many 
employees are solely driven by the desire to work in sport (Pitchford & Collins, 
2010)—the evidence reveals a perception that it lacks the broader skills needed to be 
highly effective in the policy community. This is a point underlined by the comment 
from the Community Services Manager at the City Council in case 1: 
 
...we all have lots on knowledge on the system and the structures 
and things like Active People and Market Segmentation and that 
sort of thing, but we are all a little wet behind the ears when it 
comes to partnership working and understanding how to go about 
initiating and managing good working relations (Interview: 25 May 
2012). 
 
This is a view reinforced by Allison (2012). As a previous Head of Leisure at Leicester 
City Council, Improvement Manager at Sport England, and Head of Sport/Culture at 
the Improvement and Development Agency, Allison has considerable experience of 
working with NGBs, CSPs and local government. His primary criticism of the sector 
is that it lacks the skills, in particular the quality of leadership, ‘to drive and steer the 
sector through the chaotic landscape ... and as a result [there are] growing levels of 
inertia’ (ibid, 2012: 4). This a largely due to ongoing public sector reforms which 
have resulted in increased competition, externalisation of services, and less 
collaborative leadership within sport as well as a lack of renowned champions for 
sport as older leaders have retired and newer leaders have neither the requisite skills 
nor the positional power to fill their shoes (ibid, 2012). The importance of this issue 
is highlighted further by the collaborative capacity literature, which stresses that 
there is an assumption that agents involved in collaboration have the skills, 
knowledge and competencies to maintain the wellbeing of the partnership and get 
the best out of the collaboration (Chaskin, 2001). Thus, it is incumbent on the wider 
 
 
-322- 
 
network of agents (policy makers, Sector Skills Council, the Chartered Institute, 
Higher Education, NGBs, and CSPs) to more fully assess the skills-based needs of the 
sector. Once these needs are understood, organisations can begin to evaluate existing 
strategies and programmes, and adapt and add refreshed or new programmes that 
are tailored to the needs of the workforce (professional and voluntary; current and 
future). It is important to note here that as is often the case, this is a subject far easier 
to write about than it is to organise. The challenge remains for the wider network (as 
above) to develop a renewed offer of multi-level programmes and courses that more 
closely relate to the operational needs of contemporary sport policy. Doing so will 
likely lead to the policy community having access to more collaborative leaders and 
more actors with the skills required to develop and sustain effective collaborations. 
However, the extent to which these developments will influence policy outcomes will 
depend upon the will and patience of politicians. Unfortunately, political expedience 
is often more important than the potential policy outcomes of such developments. 
These tend to be displaced by shorter, more time-sensitive initiatives that fit neatly 
with a five-year political term. 
 
CSP and NGB attitudes toward the community sport policy process 
The final part of this section is concerned with the attitudes of CSP and NGB agents 
toward the community sport policy process. The discussion focuses on two specific 
aspects. The first, which is evaluated using van Meter & van Horn’s Policy 
Implementation Process model, is agents’ attitudes toward the policy process, 
specifically their direction of response to policy as well as the intensity of response. 
The second aspect is the range of barriers that prevent the network from realising 
policy outcomes. This is illustrative of a more practical type of policy learning that 
occurs where actors identify and learn to cope with or overcome the problems 
associated with policy implementation (Adam & Kriesi, 2007; Birkland, 2005; Marsh 
& Smith, 2000, Schofield, 2004). 
 
Agents’ attitudes toward the policy process 
The quantitative evidence suggests that CSPs and NGBs view community sport policy 
as being clearly defined, with transparent systems of performance management and 
processes in place for regular review. However, their overall assessment of policy 
using the NAO/Audit Commission’s 12 Strategic Questions suggests that there are 
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considerable risks to delivery and reduced efficiency within the policy system. Most 
notably, CSPs and NGBs questioned the resources committed to the policy and CSPs 
raised concerns over the capacity to deliver community sport policy and the lack of 
clarity of NGB plans detailing how and what will be delivered in order to meet 
community sport policy objectives. Further, the quantitative data reinforces previous 
concerns regarding the fragmented nature of the community sport policy process 
(Green, 2003; Houlihan & Green, 2009; Houlihan & White, 2002; McDonald, 1995; 
Roche, 1992), as represented by the diverse priorities of CSPs and NGBs and the 
differing networks of stakeholders with which CSPs and NGBs tend to associate.  
 
Using van Meter & van Horn’s Implementation Framework, the qualitative evidence 
from the three cases suggests that agents generally accept community sport policy. 
This positive response contrasts with other implementation agents such as local 
authorities or VSCs, who more commonly demonstrate neutrality or resistance 
(Harris et al., 2009). This is a position that is likely to be mediated, at least in part, 
by the significant resources invested into CSPs and NGBs. However, whilst CSPs and 
NGBs may generally accept policy goals, they characterise the policy community as 
being problematic due to the top-down nature of policy, the fragmentation that 
persists across community sport policy and the frequent changes in policy objectives, 
strategy and/or structure.  
 
The evidence from the three case studies underlined the top-down reality of the 
community sport policy system and also reinforced the findings of earlier studies that 
reveal the contradiction between policy rhetoric and policy reality (cf. Grix & 
Phillpots, 2011; Phillpots et al., 2010). Here, the rhetoric suggests greater freedom 
and autonomy, but the reality of the community sport policy field reflects a 
hierarchical system, tightly controlled by government. Some CSP and local authority 
agents did acknowledge the attempts of Sport England and/or NGBs to consult; 
however, these attempts were largely viewed as an exercise designed to create the 
illusion of stakeholder engagement rather than genuinely representing any attempt 
to develop a bottom-up approach to policy.  
 
The view of community sport policy as the product of a top-down, centralised system 
is one that is perpetuated across different levels in the system. In this way one group 
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or coalition is always seen to be in power and imposing their interests and passions 
on others from national to the sub-regional level. Such processes are problematic as 
they expose a hierarchical structure founded on a largely superficial notion of power. 
For example, one view of power relations between NGBs and CSPs may see NGBs as 
exercising power over CSPs due to systems and resources established by the DCMS 
and Sport England. However, this interpretation fails to recognise the power of CSPs, 
particular the agency of CSP personnel, many of whom are better connected, and 
more experienced and knowledgeable than the NGB representatives with whom they 
are negotiating. This perspective reinforces the notion of power as being ubiquitous 
and points to the subtle ways in which power permeates social relations (Foucault, 
1982). The cases underline the agency of CSPs to pursue local-level priorities whilst 
also retaining focus on the national community sport priorities. The three cases 
suggest that this works most effectively when the CSP has sufficient resources, 
including human capacity and experience as well as credibility amongst local 
stakeholders. Case 1 in particular illustrated the difficulties in engineering 
collaborative work across CSPs, NGBs and local authorities, especially acceptance of 
a strategic coordinating role for CSPs by local authorities. Cases 2 and 3 illustrated 
the importance of human capacity, experience and credibility, both in terms of 
establishing relations with NGBs pursuing community sport outcomes as well as 
coordinating action on local-level priorities against wider health or sport for 
development outcomes. This perspective builds on the self-organised and non-
hierarchical view of networks (Kenis & Schneider, 1991) and the more recent view of 
the CSP as being externally managed and part of a formal hierarchy (Phillpots et al., 
2010). Combining these views, the evidence demonstrates the nuances of social 
context and its critical role in mediating the nature of interactions at the local level. 
Cases 2 and 3 illustrate networks that have some degree of self-organisation (in 
alliance with other local partners) to pursue interests and priorities that fall outside 
community sport. In contrast, the lack of commitment to a local-level network in 
case 1 resulted in the CSP working only within the relatively constrained and 
hierarchical community sport field. The evidence also suggests a subtle or informal 
regulation of NGBs at the local level primarily by their more experienced CSP 
counterparts. In this way one can view NGBs as being regulated at both national and 
local levels, albeit through different means. 
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All three cases provided evidence to support the notion of community sport as a 
fragmented subsystem as argued in previous studies (cf. Green, 2003; Houlihan & 
Green, 2009; Houlihan & White, 2002; McDonald, 1995; Roche, 1992). Moreover, 
whilst acknowledging that strong and effective CSP-NGB relations do exist, a number 
of comments pointed to the more common experience of community sport being 
preoccupied with competition rather than with building cooperation and consensus. 
These tensions continue despite numerous reviews, reorganisations and 
restructurings. This can be attributed, in part, to the diversity of agents involved in 
policy and the resource allocation amongst them. The problem is deepened by the 
variation in basic value priorities (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1999), the differing 
social context and local conditions that influence CSP and NGB decisions (Hjern & 
Porter, 1981; Marsh & Smith, 2000), and the differing leadership styles exhibited by 
CSPs and NGBs (Stoker, 1991). The evidence from all three cases underscores the 
institutional prioritisation of self-preservation and long-term survival over 
community sport outcomes, especially amongst CSPs who suffer from a relatively 
short history and a shallow institutional foundation. The concern here is not agents’ 
self-interest but the behaviours that flow from it and the wider ramifications for the 
community sport policy field. Table 8.1 provides examples of such behaviours, which 
reflect the extent to which decisions are taken in the interest of the organisation over 
and above those of the policy field. This behaviour severely compromises effective 
collaboration (Frisby et al., 2004; Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002) and the ability of 
agents to coalesce and formalise a genuine epistemic community focussed on the 
interests of policy community (Hass, 1992).  
 
Furthermore, the meanings and common narrative (Lewis, 2000) associated with 
community sport exacerbate its image as an uneven and fragmented policy 
community. In a cyclical system, the factors mentioned above are fuelled by such 
meanings and narratives and help to preserve the fragmented and divisive image of 
community sport. Thus, the solution for policymakers and practitioners not only lies 
in addressing the complex and deep-seated range of factors that contribute to 
fragmentation in community sport, but also in changing the meanings and narrative 
so closely associated with it. 
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Table 8.1 Examples of behaviours that flow from self interest in community sport policy 
Behaviour in relation to  Description of behaviour 
 
Financial resources Resource allocation decisions based principally on what is best 
for the organisation rather than what is more likely to achieve 
policy outcomes. 
 
Knowledge The threat of empowering stakeholders through the sharing of 
knowledge restricts the flow of intelligence across the policy 
community. 
 
Monitoring and evaluation Monitoring and evaluation efforts tend to reflect efforts to 
publicise and sell the good work of each organisation rather than 
genuinely reflecting the achievements and problems associated 
with policy implementation. 
 
 
The final criticism of policy related to the issue of policy change. The problem here 
relates to both the reasons for change and the associated implications. The evidence 
in case 1 and 2 suggests that CSPs view policy as being too easily changed for 
ideological reasons, following the whim of the latest Minister—a criticism which has 
received considerable attention in the literature (cf. Bloyce & Smith, 2010; Collins, 
2010; Houlihan & White, 2002; Hylton & Totten, 2013). This is not only viewed as 
hypocrisy when scrutinised against the backdrop of a government-led campaign for 
greater evidenced-based policy, but it also carries significant implications for 
implementing agents, both operationally and in their ability to realistically achieve 
policy outcomes. Operational concerns rest largely on the agents’ ability to prepare 
for policy. CSPs and NGBs are expected to start implementation on day one, a 
problem exacerbated by the pressure to realise policy goals in a relatively short 
amount of time, and the expectation that, regardless of previous achievements, policy 
goals are likely to change (as was the case in 2005, 2008 and 2011). In contrast, the 
evidence reveals that it takes considerable time to assemble the necessary machinery 
to support implementation. This involves activities such as recruiting personnel, 
discussing and agreeing local initiatives, preparing work programmes, securing 
additional funding, marketing and evaluation. Thus, frequent policy change 
promotes an environment where actors are expected to respond from day one, 
despite the need for preparation and policy-learning where agents need to 
understand the more intricate nature of policy and develop appropriate solutions 
(Adam & Kriesi, 2007). As a result, agents muddle through the first few years of the 
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policy cycle combining efforts to prepare strategy, structures and collaborations with 
attempts to develop short-term initiatives that aim to demonstrate that they are 
actively pursuing policy goals. The broader concerns regarding CSPs’ and NGBs’ 
ability to realistically achieve policy outcomes relate more directly to perceptions 
about the nature of the policy goal. Here, agents cite the difficulty and the time 
needed to support and sustain behaviour change at the micro level as well as change 
the sports culture in England from one concerned principally with spectating to one 
more concerned with playing. 
 
The barriers to effective implementation 
A final point that directly relates to agents’ response to policy is their perception of 
the challenges or barriers that prevent them from realising community sport policy 
outcomes. Whilst each case presented a range of similar themes, there were 
differences between CSPs and NGBs – see Table 8.2. Interestingly, both sets of actors 
tended to focus on general issues (e.g. financial pressures, skills deficit in workforce) 
or specific issues that were the direct responsibility of other stakeholders (e.g. 
facilities). The exception to this was NGBs who identified trust within NGBs (case 1) 
and lack of local level capacity (case 1 and 3) as barriers to effective implementation. 
Almost all NGB representatives in all three cases identified the lack of good quality 
facilities as a major barrier to implementation. The concern here related to access, 
the ageing stock and declining quality of public sector facilities as well as reduced 
facility development primarily seen to be a result of public sector budget reductions. 
NGBs also pointed to the lack of synthesis between school sport and community 
sport as a major barrier to achieving policy outcomes. Agents were particularly vocal 
about the dismantled school sport policy and infrastructure and the implications of 
this for community sport. Related to this, they also voiced concern about the futile 
separation of youth and adult policies as adult participation is far more likely 
amongst adults with high levels of sporting capital in which the school experience 
plays a significant role (Rowe, 2012). 
 
From a CSP perspective, the most commonly cited barrier was overreliance on 
volunteers and volunteer-run sports clubs, underlining concerns raised above about 
the lack of capacity to implement policy. This reinforced findings of earlier studies 
(Harris et al., 2009; May et al., 2012; Nichols & James, 2008). Other notable 
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barriers from CSPs perspectives included increasing financial pressure triggered by 
broader economic conditions and public sector austerity measures; the lack of a 
sports participation culture; a lack of time to enable policy to be effectively 
implemented—a particular challenge when addressing problems which require 
behaviour change at the micro-level; a lack of tradition or culture in adult sports 
participation across England, and a perceived lack of skills in the community sport 
workforce to be able to address the challenges associated with policy.  
 
Table 8.2 Barriers to implementing community sport policy 
Case Barriers 
 CSPs NGBs 
Case 1  Over-reliance on volunteers 
 More realistic period of time 
 Skills deficit in workforce 
 
 Lack of good quality facilities 
 Trust within the NGB 
 Insufficient capacity at local level 
 
Case 2  Over-reliance on volunteers 
 Financial pressure 
 Lack of clarity re: NGB priorities 
 Lack of sport culture 
 
 Lack of good quality facilities 
 Impact of school sport policy on 
community sport policy 
 Difficulties identifying audience 
 
Case 3  Over-reliance on volunteers 
 Financial pressure 
 More realistic period of time 
 Skills deficit in workforce 
 Lack of sports culture 
 Lack of good quality facilities 
 Impact of school sport policy on 
community sport policy 
 Insufficient capacity at local level 
 
Empirical findings – concluding thoughts 
This study represents the first detailed analysis of partnerships in community sport, 
specifically the enforced partnership between CSPs and NGBs. It contributes to 
knowledge in five particular areas.  
 
First, it closely examines the nature of the community sport policy process.  This 
provides a more specific analysis of community sport policy, which reinforces the 
view of community sport as a deviant and fragmented policy system (cf. Bloyce & 
Smith, 2010; Collins, 2010; Grix & Phillpots, 2011; Houlihan & White, 2002; Hylton 
& Totten, 2013): deviant as it fails to represent the shift in power from the centre out 
or the genuine network governance portrayed in the governance narrative (Grix & 
Phillpots, 2011), and fragmented due to its disjointed structure, diverse priorities, 
and deep and complex structures of power. More specifically, the embedded units 
involved in each case (CSPs, NGBs and local authorities) had distinct perceptions 
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more so than each case being distinctive. In other words, agents’ views and 
perceptions were more closely aligned according to organisational type rather than 
the case study of which they were part.  
 
Second, it examines the CSP-NGB relationship and the range of factors that 
positively influence and adversely affect it. Here, meso-level factors such as 
organisational structures, strategies, and resources were found to be critical. 
However, more notable within this meso-level context was the role of individuals 
working in the system. Here, the style (character/approach) and substance 
(perceived skills) of individuals was a critical factor in facilitating high levels of trust 
and mutual respect. This, in turn, led to higher levels of engagement and thus helped 
to build collaborative capacity and therefore more effective CSP-NGB relationships. 
In contrast, the study provided detailed insight into four common barriers that 
adversely affect the CSP-NGB relationship, specifically: (i) a lack of engagement, 
including the self-exclusion of NGBs and LAs in the CSP and the lack of involvement 
of CSPs in the NGB whole sport planning process, (ii) the differing priorities of 
NGBs, CSPs and LAs, (iii) the emphasis on performance management techniques 
and the implications these carry for building the CSP-NGB relationship, and (iv) the 
complexity that flows from multiple agencies with differing strategies and structural 
arrangements. 
 
Third, the study clarifies the significance of the CSP-NGB relationship in local policy 
making. It draws attention to the dominant nature of the sport for sport coalition at 
national level in contrast to the sport for development coalition, dominant at the 
local level. It also underlines the central role of local government in creating and 
developing local policy, primarily a function of its mandate from the local electorate. 
Indeed, the central role of local government in developing local policy is the primary 
reason why local policy appears to focus squarely on the instrumental value of sport. 
The thesis also brings the pivotal nature of the CSP into sharp relief. The evidence 
highlights the role of the CSP in reconciling a position between NGBs and LAs which 
bridges both sport for sport and sport for development outcomes. Finally, the 
perceptions of LA and NGB agents call into question the extent to which the CSP 
represent a true strategic partnership. This is a highly relevant finding, as it appears 
that for many agents the CSP represents another agent in an already saturated policy 
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space, rather than the original conception of a strategic or umbrella organisation that 
brings together key sub-regional agencies. 
 
The significance of the CSP-NGB relationship in policy implementation represents 
the fourth major contribution. The enforced CSP-NGB relationship is more likely to 
provide another obstacle to policy implementation rather than support for it. For 
some NGBs, the partnership with CSPs makes sense and forms an integral part of the 
implementation system. However, this is not the case for all. Alongside this, NGBs 
and LAs provide differing accounts regarding the value of CSPs. Some see them as a 
valuable network, and others view them as an additional tier in the community sport 
bureaucracy. Given the diverse views toward CSPs and the differing social context 
within which actors operate, it would be more effective for agents to determine the 
most appropriate means by which their goals can be achieved. Also related to 
implementation, the findings underscore the self-interest that permeates community 
sport policy as evidenced by the insular nature of the whole sport plan process and 
the associated resource allocation decisions of NGBs. This lack of participatory 
consensus across the community sport system creates a cultural context that is more 
akin to individualism, self-interest and institutional survival than it is a cooperative, 
collective approach to policy implementation. The capacity of the workforce was a 
final factor that caused major concern in regards to the implementation of 
community sport policy. Specific concerns included the lack of resources invested 
into frontline delivery, the lack of leadership and skills across the community sport 
workforce, and the sustained expectation, for many NGBs, that the traditional local-
level infrastructure (i.e. VSCs) is the primary deliverer of community sport policy. 
 
The fifth area relates to agents’ perceptions of the effectiveness of the community 
sport policy process. Here it was clear that agents view both the beginning and end of 
the policy process—policy objectives and policy evaluation mechanisms—to be clearly 
defined and well understood. More problematic, as discussed above, was the middle 
ground of policy implementation. In addressing the major barriers to policy 
implementation, it was notable to see a distinct and different pattern when 
comparing NGB attitudes to those of LAs and CSPs. For example, the latter cited 
capacity (an overreliance on volunteers) as the major barrier to policy 
implementation, whereas NGBs viewed facilities and the ageing stock of primarily 
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publically owned sports facilities as a major barrier to policy implementation. Not 
only do these differences reinforce the diverse views across CSPs and NGBs, they also 
have a defensive tone—neither happens to have direct control over what they 
perceive to be the major barrier preventing policy implementation. 
 
Before concluding the chapter, it is important to acknowledge that many individual 
CSP-NGB relations do manage to flourish, despite the problems noted above. The 
issue is, however, that many more would likely do so under more favourable 
conditions. Moreover, the efficacy of the policy system could be enhanced if the basis 
of the system were viewed to be more about efficiency and effectiveness and less 
about ideology and political expedience. The literature suggests that community 
sport policy could make major gains by balancing the dominant top-down approach 
with a genuine grassroots approach to implementation (Elmore, 1980; Hjern & 
Porter, 1981; Hjern & Hull, 1982; Lipsky, 1971; 1980), thus building greater 
consensus with grassroots implementers (Dunleavy, 1991; van Meter & van Horn, 
1975); simplifying implementation structures (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973); giving 
networks the freedom to select appropriate partners (Ostrom, 1973); and ensuring 
that more human and financial resource is allocated directly to implementation. 
Table 8.3 attempts to crystallise the key findings and provide a more complete 
overview of the problematic nature of the community sport policy process and the 
issues that require redress to create a more favourable policy environment. 
 
Table 8.3 The problematic nature of the community sport policy process 
Variables Description 
 
Social/economic
/political context 
Changes in political leadership emphasising neo-liberal values. Uncertain 
economic conditions. Increasingly aggressive public sector austerity measures. 
Rising incidence of childhood and adult obesity. Participation trends emphasise 
greater interest in informal, individual sport-related pursuits rather than 
traditional team sports. 
 
The policy sub-
system 
Top-down process of policy formulation led by narrow, government-led coalition 
with little or no consensus from street-level operators; policy suffers from 
perceived instability a result of frequent change; attempts to consult 
stakeholders in process seen as a game rather than real engagement; policy 
implementation is overseen by a fragmented group of organisations where 
synthesis of values/priorities is patchy; a lack of financial and human resources 
are allocated directly to implementation. 
 
CSP-NGB Interaction characterised by sense of enforced cooperation; asymmetric 
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interaction governance arrangements between CSPs and NGBs in community sport but this 
does not prevent CSP pursuing local priorities; NGB strategy is emphasised over 
and above CSP strategy, however, NGB strategy fails to specify local level 
priorities; NGB whole sport plan process fails to involve CSPs; the legitimacy of 
the CSP varies considerably, according to perceptions of its status as the strategic 
lead agency for sport in the sub-region; interaction is made more difficult due to 
the diverse priorities and the differing network with which CSPs and NGBs are 
part; new public management techniques stifle the relationship, not enough 
time/resource is given over the developing the softer skills required to make the 
relationship work; very often the complexity of the system, in particular the 
inconsistencies of CSPs and NGBs is used to rationalise the problems associated 
with community sport. 
 
Barriers to 
implementation 
CSPs emphasise an over-reliance on volunteers, financial cuts, skills deficit, a 
lack of sports participation culture;  a lack of time to implement policy and a lack 
of clarity regarding NGB priorities; NGBs highlight a lack of good quality 
facilities, the impact of school sport on community sport, insufficient capacity at 
the local level, difficulties identifying the audience, and trust within the NGB. 
 
 
Assessing the explanatory value of meso-level frameworks in relation to 
community sport 
 
Chapter 2 included a review of four prominent meso-level frameworks for analysing 
the policy process, specifically the institutional analysis framework, the multiple 
streams framework, the advocacy coalition framework, and the policy network 
approach. To date, none of these frameworks have been applied to an examination of 
community sport policy. This section, therefore, considers their value in illuminating 
the community sport policy process. The purpose here is not to repeat the detail of 
Chapter 2; instead, it will briefly evaluate the utility and limitations of each 
framework, including its potential in addressing important aspects of the community 
sport policy process such as exogenous factors, institutional rules, agents’ beliefs and 
values, agent interaction, power, and implementation. 
 
The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework  
The use of the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD) is 
particularly apposite for community sport as it focuses on the way in which 
institutional rules shape the behaviour of rational individuals motivated by self-
interest. The IAD takes the broader context of the action arena as its unit of analysis. 
This arena is critical in community sport as it represents the social space where CSPs 
and NGBs interact, exchange ideas, agree actions and review progress. Attention to 
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these variables extends our understanding of CSP-NGB interactions. It would, for 
example, be useful to examine the rules and norms that CSPs and NGBs use to shape 
individual behaviour. Similarly, it would be helpful to develop a more sophisticated 
understanding (beyond the limitations of the rational actor model) of individual 
motivation and responses to these institutional pressures. The framework highlights 
a number of additional variables in the action arena that would prove useful for 
policymakers, practitioners, and researchers in the community sport policy field, 
including: participants, positions, outcomes, action-outcome linkages, the control 
that participants exercise, information and the cost/benefits of outcomes (Ostrom, 
2007). In the context of this study, the IAD has the potential to illuminate CSP-NGB 
interactions and the way in which they are shaped by institutions (organisations and 
cultural norms). The multi-dimensional nature of the framework makes it 
particularly useful, especially its emphasis on three levels of action: (i) the 
operational tier (e.g. CSPs interact with NGBs in order to receive core funding; CSPs 
strive to perform in order to receive additional funding); (ii) the collective choice tier 
(e.g. national policy rules as determined by the political leaders of the DCMS and 
senior management of Sport England); and (iii) the constitutional tier (e.g. decisions 
made about who can participate in policymaking and the systems that will be used to 
guide the process). The attention that the IAD pays to institutions challenges the 
pluralist doctrine that views organisations as contexts in which politics occur, ‘rather 
than independent or intervening variables in the process’ (Houlihan, 2005: 170). 
Furthermore, it brings to policy analysis an institutional perspective which tends to 
be weak or lacking in other frameworks (Sabatier, 2007). 
 
The framework also examines the influence of three exogenous variables on 
processes and outcomes, namely physical and material conditions, attributes of the 
community, and rules in use. Whilst the terminology may cause confusion (Howlett, 
1998), the breadth of the three exogenous variables provide scope to address the 
factors that significantly influence behaviour within the action arena. For example, it 
provides the basis for a fuller examination of power in community sport and its 
relation to the policy making process. The focus on these variables is particularly 
relevant for a policy field such as community sport characterised by fragmentation, 
resource dependence and a multiplicity of formal and informal rules that create 
incentives and constraints for action (Ostrom, 1999). In sum, the framework is one of 
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the more logically coherent and denser theoretical frameworks that draws attention 
to highly relevant concepts and propositions and has undergone considerable 
empirical testing (Sabatier, 2007). Despite its utility, the findings from this research 
reinforce previous criticisms. For example, the framework does not fully consider 
internal and strategic factors when considering a change in Sport England structure 
or strategy, relying instead on an explanation based solely on exogenous factors. This 
supports Campbell’s (2005) view of the framework as lacking a theoretical 
foundation in institutional change and failing to clarify the underlying causal factors 
behind change. Second, the evidence in this study demonstrates that whilst Sport 
England, CSPs and NGBs all play a role in shaping the beliefs, interests and actions 
of individuals involved in policy, it is ultimately the individual who constructs the 
nature of the arena in which he interacts. Thus, the failure of the IAD to give agency 
more direct attention is a significant weakness, specifically when viewed against 
objectives which seek to analyse the significance of the CSP-NGB relationship in the 
community sport policy process. This adds weight to Houlihan’s view that the 
framework reverts to ‘a vague ideational formulation, […] and collapses into a crude 
form of institutional determinism’ (2005: 170). Third, it fails to consider the various 
ways in which CSPs and NGBs impact the policy process or the circumstances that 
create asymmetrical relations between CSPs, NGBs and other partners within the 
action arena, and circumstances in which institutions may be more or less important 
(Houlihan, 2005). The final weakness of the approach lies in its complexity; it is 
difficult to apply to real-life situations (Schlager, 2007). Whilst complexity can slowly 
be overcome, adding this to a complex subsystem, where there is a long and 
turbulent past with diverse characteristics, norms and rules and where boundaries 
with other policy areas, particularly education, health and community cohesion are 
blurred (Houlihan & White, 2002), is far from ideal. 
 
The Multiple Streams Framework 
The Multiple Streams Framework offers a persuasive critique of the assumption of 
rational decision-making seen in other policy analysis frameworks. It offers a more 
reasonable insight into the sometimes irrational and often ambiguous policy-making 
process (Zahariadis, 2007). In addition, the framework offers escape from the simple 
focus on institutional interests that distort the political system (Houlihan, 2005: 
172). It is particularly useful in understanding how policies are made under 
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conditions of ambiguity (Zahariadis, 2007). In the Multiple Streams Framework 
policy choices regarding the nature of community sport policy can be understood by 
analysing the coupling of two or more streams, which includes problems, policy and 
politics. The coupling process is normally facilitated, or in the case of coupling 
occurring without intervention, responded to by a policy entrepreneur. This latter 
process is of some relevance to the sport policy community as it and its sub-sectors 
(i.e. school, community, elite sport) have had a fairly transparent association with 
entrepreneurs (e.g. schools: Sue Campbell, community: Jennie Price, elite: Sebastian 
Coe/Sue Campbell) who have played a significant role in mobilising institutions and 
opinions, proposing solutions to problems, and generally ensuring the place of sport 
on the political agenda (Green, 2003). The change in community sport policy from 
2013 onwards demonstrates the framework’s utility in examining policy change as a 
result of streams coupling, with the policy entrepreneur playing a facilitative role to 
ensure that windows are appropriately coupled and the positive sum opportunities 
clearly promoted. For example, Jennie Price can be viewed as a policy entrepreneur 
insomuch as she coupled the problems, politics and policy windows to renegotiate a 
more realistic policy target for community sport, changed the new Minister of Sport’s 
perception of Sport England, and created a new DCMS strategy for sport with the 
close involvement of Sport England personnel (see Figure 8.5). Price can be viewed 
as being more than a mere advocate of policy; she is a power broker who is able to 
use her position and skills to manipulate particular situations for the benefit of 
community sport and Sport England. 
 
Finally, the notion of spill-over and the attention that the framework gives to non-
sport issues such as health, community safety, and community development is useful 
as these are highly relevant, particularly with regard to local policy concerns. 
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                         Figure 8.5 Window of opportunity - community sport policy change - 2011 
 
Whilst the study found that the framework was useful in considering agency this was 
limited and secondary to the focus on structure. In particular, the framework was 
useful in drawing attention to the institutional power of NGBs, but weak in 
underlining the agency of CSPs. In short, an approach that combined structural and 
agential factors across all three streams would have greater applicability to the 
community sport policy field. More specifically, whilst the framework provides 
broad, open streams where certain variables may be located, its lack of specificity 
regarding concerns such as individual beliefs, interests, and action was generally 
unhelpful in analysing policy. It was useful in illuminating agenda-setting for 
example, but less helpful as a tool offering analysis of the entire policy process or 
other discrete aspects, such as implementation. This echoes previous criticisms of the 
framework presented by Houlihan (2005), Sabatier (2007), and Schlager, (2007). 
The explanation of the three streams also raises concerns about the reliability of the 
framework. This research found that rather than being independent, they 
overlapped, with a change in one stream triggering a change in another. For example, 
using the illustration of community sport above, it is possible to develop an alternate 
perspective, where the window of opportunity was created by the new government 
and new Minister of Sport and that this change alone brought about issues in the 
policy and problem windows. The framework would also be enhanced by examining 
strategy and the ensuing action that undoubtedly plays a role in opening policy 
windows. This supports Mucciaroni’s (1992) challenge regarding the spontaneity of 
coupling or the notion that it is in some way a chance event.  
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Advocacy Coalition Framework 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is seen to have value in analysing sport 
policy primarily due to its consideration of three internal mechanisms that drive 
policy stability and change: (i) the hierarchy of beliefs that underpin the decisions 
and actions of key policy agents, (ii) how these beliefs, in turn, organise agents into 
competing coalitions, and (iii) the role of the policy brokers in mediating across the 
policy community (Green, 2004, Houlihan, 2005; Parrish, 2003). This distinguishes 
the framework as a sharper, more coherent tool of analysis for the community sport 
sub-sector. The consideration of beliefs sensitises the researcher to the deep 
philosophical differences in the community sport sub-sector regarding the purpose of 
sport and the use of public funding in supporting community sport. The ACF’s 
tripartite belief system pinpoints the different ideas and priorities in the sub-system 
and how these group actors into two coalitions—those who primarily believe in 
community sport for the purpose of addressing broader social problems (health, 
crime, education, and so on) and those who remain fixed on investment in sport for 
its own sake. This proved an important analytical point for the study. For example, it 
revealed the divergent beliefs of CSPs, NGBs and local authorities and the way in 
which these beliefs direct different priorities and the practical implications for 
collaboration. It illuminated the changing dynamic regarding the dominant coalition 
when considering national and local policy contexts. It also looks at the complexities 
that flow from the interconnected (as opposed to nested) nature of multi-tiered 
policy in England, for example the need for CSPs to advocate for pure sport whilst 
retaining a credible voice in the sport for development coalition at the local level. 
Here, the ACF is particularly useful in illuminating the importance of policy brokers 
to mediate differences and reduce conflict across coalitions. Such brokers were 
clearly present in the form of CSP Directors and NGB Lead Officers in cases 2 and 3. 
These individuals were able to more effectively broker positive relations, reduce 
conflict and focus actions due to their democratic leadership style and their inclusive 
approach, which was largely driven by their experience of working in and therefore 
being sensitive to the needs of the public sector.  
 
A further mechanism of the ACF that was particularly relevant to the analysis of 
community sport policy was the concept of policy-oriented learning. The evidence 
from the three cases underlined the need for information and experience, especially 
 
 
-338- 
 
for NGBs in the 2009-2013 policy cycle as they had to learn how to adapt and work 
effectively within the new policy world in which they were allocated a lead role. This 
involved formal learning of the new policy environment (e.g. working with new 
partner agents, learning the current situation, insight into what works, all of which is 
ongoing) together with an informal adjustment of norms, beliefs and values from 
those firmly fixated on youth or performance sport, to an acceptance of a new order 
that included adult or community sport. This brings into sharp relief the 
‘enlightenment function’, the gradual cumulative effect of changing conventions and 
goals that come from being part of the practical policy world (Weiss, 1977). 
 
Up to this point the focus has been on the framework’s utility in examining internal 
processes that drive policy stability and change. Like other frameworks (e.g. the IAD 
and the Policy Networks Approach), the ACF also considers exogenous variables that 
directly shape the policy subsystem. Here, it divides variables into those that are 
more stable (e.g. social structure) and those more susceptible to change (e.g. 
organisational leadership). This was useful for analysing the community sport policy 
field, especially in identifying external events that have the potential to create change 
within the policy subsystem. Furthermore, the study found the framework useful in 
highlighting the interaction between exogenous and endogenous variables and the 
way in which these shape community sport. For example, the change in government 
and the resultant change in the Minister of Sport, alongside the policy failure 
traditionally associated with community sport resulted in a revised policy objective 
with an emphasis on 14- to 24- year-olds. This revision more clearly aligned with 
NGBs values pertaining to youth sport and promoted many NGBs to re-focus and 
base whole sport plans on a more appealing, narrower target group. This supports 
Green’s view of the framework as reflecting the ‘interplay between exogenous and 
endogenous factors … [thus providing] a more dynamic, dialectical approach to the 
analysis of policy’ (2003: 39). 
 
Whilst the ACF has considerable potential in analysing the community sport policy 
process, if utilised alone there are significant weaknesses which would result in a less 
than complete analysis of the field. For example, it fails to consider the relative 
influence of multi-tier policymaking (local, sub-regional, national), which is of direct 
concern to the community sport policy process. Also, while it does provide a wide-
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ranging analysis of the policy process, it fails to offer sufficient insight into the 
interaction between the state and civil society or the organisational arrangements 
that affect the policy process, particularly with regard to the implementation of 
policy. This is a significant omission for two reasons: (i) it fails to give specific 
attention to the arrangements for the implementation of policy, and (ii) it fails to 
recognise the power of institutions to affect action.  
 
Of equal concern is the overly rational explanation of belief systems, particularly the 
normative view of coalitions sharing beliefs (Schlager, 1995). This fails to articulate 
the complexity or nuance found in a sub-system where, for example, there may be 
agents who belong as part of their organisational affiliation to one coalition, but hold 
strong personal views aligned to another. The framework assumes that agent 
behaviour accords wholly with the institution (Oliver, 1991). Thus, whilst the systems 
of belief form a valuable part of the framework, the assumptions underpinning them 
require refinement to allow consideration of the messy, less predictable 
arrangements which tend to exist within coalitions. Further, the lack of clarity 
surrounding coalition membership and the extent to which coalition remains open 
requires clarification, as does the implication that membership of coalitions remains 
open (Houlihan, 2005). This study found that the membership of the dominant 
coalition within the national policy subsystem was restricted (i.e. to NGBs). In short, 
the relatively rational and coherent articulation of the coalition, as presented in the 
literature, does not reflect the complexity or nuance of the reality in community sport 
policy terms. Thus, the concept of competing coalitions can be viewed more as an 
academic exercise that helps to present an outline sketch of the different interests in 
the policy subsystem and does not include the finer detail relating to individual 
beliefs and values, past experiences, or primary and secondary beliefs which coalesce 
to create a more complex and intricate subsystem than portrayed in the framework. 
 
The final concern was the lack of explicit attention given to power within the 
subsystem. Here, the approach assumes that incongruous behaviour (ignoring 
evidence or subverting policy for example) is the result of a lack of awareness, 
understanding, skills or resources rather than a general indifference or resistance to 
policy. This is a notable limitation in community sport terms as CSP-NGB 
interactions (and the outputs that flow from it) are directly shaped by the deep 
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structures of power that underpin it, especially in the context of community sport, 
the leadership role bestowed upon NGBs, their resource allocation decisions, and the 
power of CSPs to pursue local interests alongside national policy. Thus, whilst actors 
may be incongruent, it is possible that this is the result of a deliberate attempt to 
‘manipulate the policy agenda through the mobilisation of bias’  (Houlihan, 2005: 
174). 
 
Policy Network Approach 
Despite the diversity of Policy Network approaches (Atkinson & Coleman, 1992; 
Rhodes & Marsh, 1992), there is general agreement regarding their utility as meso-
level policy tools that can link micro-level and the macro-level analysis (Rhodes & 
Marsh, 1992). This is highly relevant to this study as it focuses primarily on the 
meso-level of analysis but is also concerned with the fit between meso-level and 
macro-level theorising. The major strength of recent developments in the Network 
Approach is the attention to structure and agency, and the range of highly relevant 
variables contained therein. Both Adam & Kreisi (2007) and Marsh & Smith (2000) 
offer models that address both structure and agency. This is of value for community 
sport as it provides the broader structural context for the actions of actors. For 
example, consideration of the structural context of local authorities in case 1 revealed 
that the relative autonomy, size and traditional involvement of these authorities in 
sport development underpinned tensions in the CSP-local authority relationship, 
particularly with regard to the CSP’s assumed strategic leadership of sport in the sub-
region. This consideration of ‘agents who interpret structures and take decisions’ 
(Marsh & Smith, 2000: 4) is instructive for community sport as it extends analysis 
beyond the rational assumptions associated with other approaches. 
 
The range of variables and relationship between variables is also a useful aspect of 
Marsh & Smith’s dialectical model. Whilst some have criticised its lack of theoretical 
specificity (cf. Dowding, 2001), it contains a pragmatic range of variables and 
highlights the dialectical relation between them, an element that was helpful in 
unpacking the evidence. For example, it illustrated the structural elements that 
‘constrain and facilitate agents’ (Marsh & Smith, 2000: 5), particularly with regard to 
the effectiveness of the CSP-NGB relationship. It also pinpointed where structure 
directly influences actors’ resources (e.g. the funding decisions of key agents) and 
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network structure (e.g. the traditional/historical relations between agents), and 
illuminated the reverse relationship, where agents’ resources (e.g. changing the social 
conditions of action) and network structure (e.g. shaping/re-shaping the core set of 
values) directly influence structural context. It is the interaction of these variables 
that ultimately directs the shape of the sub-regional network and creates the range of 
problems and solutions that are considered. In addition, the interaction of structure 
and agency is helpful in understanding how the culture of the sub-regional network 
patterns behaviour. This was particularly helpful in case 2 in understanding the 
cooperative nature of the local network, largely a result of the professional workforce 
remaining in the same organisations for a prolonged period of time. It is also helpful 
in drawing attention to the strategies that networks may use to reproduce or change 
culture, although this was not a particular focus of the study. 
 
The variables included in both models were useful in organising the key concerns of 
policy agents. In particular, the policy domain-specific context (Adam & Kriesi, 
2007) and the actor’s learning, skills and resources (Marsh & Smith, 2000, Schofield, 
2004) were demonstrated to be important drivers of network interaction, 
particularly in regard to issues such as network membership, distribution of power, 
and the establishment of core values. The evidence highlights the bridging role of 
CSPs in working alongside NGBs in the area of pure sport and local authorities in 
sport for development/physical activity. This behaviour enables the CSP to retain its 
position within the community sport policy domain and thus secure continued 
support from Sport England, whilst at the same time responding to local-level 
priorities, a strategy that enables it to build local respect and credibility as well as 
broaden its base of support amongst local health, crime, and community-based 
agencies. 
 
The Network Approach has much in common with the ACF given its emphasis on the 
configuration and interaction of actors within networks, (Adam & Kriesi, 2007). The 
ACF considers belief systems, whereas the policy network approach tends to 
emphasise institutional arrangements, with the outcomes of network being 
associated with ‘the capabilities of the actors and their mode of interaction’ 
(Schlager, 2007: 298). This is useful in two ways. First, it underscores insights 
regarding the skills and experience of actors and the differing mechanisms that drive 
 
 
-342- 
 
variation in network interaction. Of particular interest is the dialectical approach and 
its consideration of actor learning and how this has an interdependent relationship 
with actors’ skills and, in turn, network interaction. In this respect it is assumed that 
the network resembles an epistemic community where members: 
 
share intersubjective understandings; have a shared way of 
knowing; have shared patterns of reasoning; have a policy project 
drawing on shared values, shared causal beliefs, and the use of 
shared discursive practices; and have a shared commitment to the 
application and production of knowledge (Hass, 1992: 3). 
 
This perspective was useful in shedding a contrasting light on the nature of the policy 
process. In particular, it underlines the silo-mentality of the sub-system, where 
policy learning and skills are not addressed holistically across the sub-system but 
individually by CSPs and NGBs. Whilst Sport England occasionally coordinates 
seminars or conferences on issues such as the Active People diagnostic tool or the 
NGB whole sport plan process, the evidence does not reveal a sub-system that 
actively pursues ‘a shared way of knowing [or] ... a shared commitment to the 
application and production of knowledge (Haas, 1992: 3). Instead, policy learning 
and actors’ skills are viewed as institutional assets; knowledge and resources are 
viewed as power that aids the institution in pursuing its goals and, perhaps, a more 
prestigious public profile (Rose & Miller, 1992). Second, it indicates the value of 
multiple perspectives in yielding a fuller, more coherent account of what is a 
complex, messy and unpredictable policy process (Cairney, 2011). These perspectives 
could be developed through a combination of policy tools, for example using aspects 
such as policy network theory and the ACF or meso- and micro-level theories. In this 
respect, the policy network toolkit has an advantage as it was conceived to utilise 
theory at the micro level to consider issues such as implementation or the beliefs and 
values of individual agents. 
 
The final aspect in which the Network Approach offered value was the provision of 
typologies. This work started with Marsh & Rhodes’ typology of network types 
(1992), which identified network types and illuminated their membership, resources 
and power. This was useful in distinguishing larger, more fragmented issue networks 
from narrower, more cooperative policy communities. However, the extent to which 
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the detail of this typology, particularly the characteristics of policy communities and 
issue networks, was helpful in understanding what are essentially government-
imposed sub-regional sport networks is open to question. In particular, whilst group 
membership may be viewed as relatively narrow (a policy community trait), 
interests, resources, power and consensus are all issues that can be seen to align 
more clearly with issue networks. The more recent typology introduced by Adam & 
Kriesi (2007) was particularly useful in examining the fundamental aspects of 
networks, specifically actors’ capabilities and type of interaction. This helped 
categorise the type of interaction in the three cases and provided useful 
characteristics to check and challenge against the nature of the network in the 
evidence. 
 
Whilst the Policy Network approach like the previous frameworks has considerable 
potential, it is not without its weaknesses. The empirical exercise identified four 
weaknesses. First, Atkinson & Coleman (1992) argue that by emphasising 
institutional influence, the approach does not pay enough attention to individual 
beliefs and values. Whilst both Adam & Kriesi and Marsh & Smith give attention to 
network structures and interactions, they do not explicitly detail how beliefs and 
values affect structure or interactions. Second, community sport is multi-tiered; 
distinct policy processes exist at national and local levels. The Policy Network does 
not easily allow for analysis of policy at different levels, focusing instead on a single 
system. Thus, to study multi-tiered systems, the analyst must adapt the framework or 
utilise other frameworks alongside the networks approach. Third, the network 
approach is ambiguous. The literature is diverse, and the numerous approaches and 
concepts that have been developed under the banner of policy networks lack 
consistency in terminology. This supports Peterson who stated that the literature is 
often focussed on ‘trivial questions of terminology and can be embarrassingly self-
absorbed’ (2003: 15). This brings us to the final criticism of the approach—its lack of 
a theoretical basis. This, however, is more of a general problem for positivist 
research, which seeks to demonstrate truth, than for the critical realist perspective 
underpinning this study, which understands knowledge as a social construct and is 
less concerned with testing variables in order to assess the validity of particular 
hypotheses. Thus, it represents a limitation that is more relevant to research 
underpinned by the foundationalist tradition. 
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Policy analysis frameworks – concluding thoughts 
This sub-section aimed to sensitively draw attention to the value and limitations of 
the four policy analysis tools evaluated above. It also discusses the framework that 
offers the greatest potential in analysing the community sport policy process.  
 
The evaluation presented above largely confirms the existing assessment of meso-
level frameworks. All four frameworks have deficiencies, so none is wholly 
satisfactory in analysing the policy process. However, the concepts do illuminate a 
range of variables (and the interplay between them) that directly and indirectly shape 
the policy process. These sensitise the researcher, not only providing a lens, but also 
a structure which supports analysis (van der Heijden, 2012). Thus, whilst there are 
significant weaknesses in the four frameworks, they offer a richer understanding of 
the policy process. Still, one must resist the temptation to add to the range of tools 
(Houlihan, 2005). This would continue the spiralling development of policy 
frameworks, add to the complexity of the policy analysis literature and have limited 
benefit for policy environs outside of community sport. A more productive strategy is 
either to apply the most relevant of the existing concepts with explicit recognition of 
their limitations or pursue a path of theoretical pluralism (van der Heijden, 2012).  
 
With regards to singular frameworks, the policy networks approach is argued to hold 
the greatest utility in providing a structured analysis of community sport, in 
particular Marsh & Smith’s dialectical network approach. This approach meets the 
majority of Houlihan’s (2005) criteria for an adequate analytic framework of sport 
policy. For example, it examines structure and agency and the interplay between the 
two, the administrative infrastructure of the state, the norms and values of society, 
the pattern of interests that represent sport, and the beliefs and values of groups. The 
policy networks approach is particularly relevant for community sport policy as it is 
directly concerned with understanding the ability of groups to interact and work 
alongside government departments. Whilst policy networks have generally been 
criticised for the lack of explicit attention to policy stability and change, the 
dialectical model does give this direct attention by looking at the effect of numerous 
variables on policy outcomes, allowing for a medium-term (five-to 10-year) analysis 
of stability and change. However, the approach is limited in the explicit attention it 
gives to individual agents and how their beliefs and values shape network structure, 
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interaction and policy outcomes. To remedy this shortfall, Adam & Kriesi’s typology 
could be utilised to analyse the type of network interaction flowing from such beliefs 
and values. In addition, micro-level theory could be used alongside the policy 
network approach to further explicate the nature and implications of agent beliefs 
and values. This synthesis of theory fits neatly with the initial conception of policy 
networks as a meso-level tool that can act as the link between macro-level concerns 
(e.g. distribution of power in society) and micro-level theory (e.g. agent beliefs and 
values, Rhodes & Marsh, 1992). Finally, the policy networks approach assumes that 
‘the state is fragmented rather than unified’ (Smith, 1993: 7). This is important 
insofar as it fits with the pluralist view of society which accepts that the state is not 
unified; rather, it is a collection of institutions that are required to cooperate and 
overcome conflict (Rhodes, 1994). Power, then, is based on a dependent rather than 
a zero-sum relationship (Green, 2003).  
 
Theoretical pluralism could provide a more complete and coherent analysis of the 
policy process. It offers complementary analyses of the policy process, which helps to 
overcome the pitfalls associated with single frameworks (van der Heijden, 2012). It 
also guards against a Rashomon effect, where accounts of the same event are 
different, depending upon the framework used (ibid, 2012). The application of 
multiple tools enables complementary analyses where different tools address 
different aspects of the policy process (Cairney, 2011). This allows a broader, more 
sensitive analysis of the policy process, which will undoubtedly produce insights that 
a single lens might not uncover. Table 8.4 provides a brief example of the dominant 
perspective of each of the four frameworks in relation to the 2008 change in the 
community sport policy process. 
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Table 8.4 The dominant perspective seen through four different lenses 
 IAD Multiple Stages 
Framework 
ACF Policy Network 
Approach 
One-line 
narrative 
 
Change as a result of 
new ministerial 
appointment and 
desire of Minister to 
focus on pure sport.  
Window of 
opportunity created 
by coupling of policy, 
politics and problem 
windows. 
Change as a result of 
increasing pressure 
and dominance of 
NGB-led coalition.  
 
Change as a result of 
increasing pressure 
from NGB network 
together with 
favourable structural 
conditions. 
Dependent 
variable 
 
English community 
sport policy 
English community 
sport policy 
English community 
sport policy 
English community 
sport policy 
Type of 
transformation 
Incremental Significant Incremental Incremental 
Explanatory 
variable(s) 
 
Appointment of new 
Minister and 
interaction with 
various actors 
involved. 
The nature of the 
problem; the 
political opportunity; 
the proposals for 
change. 
Interaction between 
advocacy coalitions, 
DCMS and Sport 
England. 
Actors’ skills; actors’ 
resources; network 
structure; and 
network interaction. 
Source: Adapted based on van der Heijden, 2012 
 
 
Theoretical pluralism can also be applied to combine theoretical perspectives at the 
macro, meso and micro levels. While the combined use of macro-micro theory may 
be more common than the use of multiple meso-level frameworks, there are very few 
sport-policy related studies that have utilised macro-, meso- and micro-level theory. 
This approach requires attention as it illuminates the broader context that shapes 
policy agents’ actions (Hay, 1997). As the empirical findings demonstrate, it is 
individual attitude and behaviour that is most critical in influencing the nature of the 
CSP-NGB relationship. However, these factors are highly variable, framed by the 
meso-level environment to which they are inextricably bound. Thus, the dialectical 
relationship between structure and agency extends beyond the meso-level. It is also 
necessary to consider the implications of individual action (micro-level) on actors’ 
behaviour and attitudes towards collaboration and network interaction (meso-level) 
and vice versa. Moreover, these meso- and micro-level attributes are framed by 
macro-level structures that are critical as they ‘exert a causal influence because the 
course of action that people choose to pursue is conditioned by the distribution of 
vested interests and resources embodied in antecedent social structure’ (Lewis, 
2000: 265). Thus, whilst it is argued that one can undertake an adequate analysis of 
the community sport policy process using Marsh & Smith’s dialectical model, a more 
coherent analysis can be achieved by understanding the macro- and micro-level 
environment and how this interacts with the meso-level policy process. This requires 
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the dialectical networks approach to be set within a broader, neo-pluralist 
perspective of the state and utilise relevant micro-level literature concerning 
implementation and collaboration, for example. Such a framework is highly 
instructive for community sport policy as it illustrates the nature of relations between 
specific interests and the state and thus the privileged position of some interests; the 
rhetoric of decentralised power as compared to the reality of state control—albeit 
through different means; the interplay of structure and agency at the meso-level; and 
how network interactions, resources, skills, learning and the social conditions that 
permeate it all affect the beliefs and values of individuals at the micro-level. In this 
way, macro-level structures and micro-level attributes shape the meso-level policy 
field, and to ignore it is to accept a partial or incomplete analysis of the policy 
process. 
 
Reflections on the research process 
These following observations, regarding the theoretical, methodological, and 
empirical parts of the study, represent the major challenges and concerns that I 
encountered as a researcher. They also serve to illustrate the learning from the 
research exercise and the aspects that I would change if I were to undertake a similar 
research project in the future.  
 
Theoretical considerations 
Working on this study over the past four years has helped to further demonstrate the 
interdisciplinary nature of sport policy analysis. In particular, the study included 
aspects that were closely related to political science, sociology, organisational 
behaviour, and economics. On reflection, I struggled as a researcher to discipline 
myself to remain pragmatic and focused on one field of study. Whilst I resisted the 
temptation to stray too far into other theoretical fields (sociological, psychological, 
economics), I did spend considerable time contemplating such approaches. I recall 
many moments sitting at the junction of political science and organisational 
behaviour, knowing that I needed to pursue the former, but seeing so much value 
and relevance in the latter. In no way do I consider this wasted time, but the 
conflicting views I experienced did at times create a foggy mind which was far from 
helpful in developing a free and flowing form of writing. This concern for differing 
perspectives was likely brought about by the combination of my varied teaching 
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practice, my experience in the community sport field and my inability to remain 
disciplined and focussed. However, despite the slower than expected transition from 
reading to writing, I have attempted to provide a theoretical review that focuses on 
the political science family of theory. This was largely a pragmatic decision in light of 
the breadth of the theory, its relevance to community sport yet its sparse application, 
and the ability to illuminate sport through a range of interconnecting macro-, meso- 
and micro-lenses. 
 
Early on in the process of developing my theoretical framework, the focus was on 
developing a comprehensive review of meso-level tools. Familiarising myself with the 
key tenets of each framework, their area of focus, range of and relationship between 
variables, and limitations was a cognitive challenge. This was primarily due to my 
relative inexperience with the policy analysis literature, the extensive, and 
sometimes, vague or ambiguous conceptualisation of analytic tools and their rare 
application to the sport policy field. Once complete, and after discussion with 
Professors Henry and Houlihan, a sub-section focusing on macro-level theory was 
added to the theoretical framework. The preparation work that preceded the macro-
level section was helpful in developing a broader understanding of the policy analysis 
literature and how this can be applied alongside macro- and micro- level theories. 
The lesson from this experience was the need to resist diving straight into the policy 
analysis literature (Sabatier, in particular, as it does little to demonstrate the broader 
view of policy analysis) and to invest more time in reviewing the political science 
literature, particularly macro-level theory and the way in which this sets the broader 
context for meso-level insights. Whilst this may have taken more time and patience 
at the outset, it would have provided a more reliable foundation of knowledge on 
which policy analysis and implementation could be added. 
 
Methodological considerations 
There are three fundamental methodological issues that proved particularly 
challenging in completing the research project. The first of these related to the issue 
of pragmatism. I took the decision to develop a two-phase research design utilising 
quantitative and qualitative methods. On reflection, I would have been wise to follow 
the advice of my supervisor, which was to go straight to the qualitative phase of the 
research, as it would have had limited difference in the overall outcome of the 
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project. Whilst the quantitative phase received a good response from both CSPs and 
NGBs, it revealed no significant differences between CSPs. Furthermore, the 
quantitative nature of the data did not provide a useful base upon which to compare 
and contrast deeper qualitative findings. That said, the findings demonstrated no 
discernible difference in perspectives by CSP type and provided a more detailed 
database from which CSP cases could be selected. However, given the time and effort 
invested in the first phase of research, I feel that I should have stepped back to 
consider why I wished to take the path I did rather than listening to the advice of my 
supervisor. Also, it might have been more productive to pursue a strategy where the 
phases of research were reversed so that the qualitative phase was followed by a 
quantitative phase of research. This would have allowed for specific ideas or 
hypotheses to be tested against a wider group of agents. 
 
The second challenge concerned the structure and nature of the interview questions 
and the possibility that they steered agents’ responses toward specific codes and 
themes. A number of strategies were used to guard against this. First, the study only 
included actors responsible for strategic-level decision making at the sub-regional 
level, where I expected a greater diversity of perspectives due to the heterogeneity of 
local context and the role this plays in shaping actor beliefs and perspectives (Lewis, 
2002). Second, I took the semi-structured approach, as this offers the openness 
required to facilitate discussion without compromising structure, thus aiding 
comparison of responses and analysis (Oppenheim, 1992). The questions were 
designed in such a way as to create an open dialogue without leading the interviewee 
to certain ideas or specifying particular characteristics that might then generate a 
particular opinion (Bryman, 2008). Third, attention was given to the interviewees’ 
response with follow-up probing questions used to unpack points of particular 
interest. This was useful in centring the detail of the discussion on the agents’ 
perspective rather than the question (May, 2001), and gave each interviewee the 
freedom to explore issues that were particularly pertinent to their context, rather 
than being constrained by a very narrow series of questions.  
 
The third challenge was the data analysis and coding exercise. Whilst as a researcher 
I have developed some experience of coding qualitative data, it was the range and 
density of the data that proved particularly difficult to organise. One concern related 
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to the number of themes that were duplicated in different parts of the study. For 
example, the lack of clarity of NGB whole sport plans was an issue that adversely 
affected the CSP-NGB relationship, limited the potential role of CSPs and others in 
policy making and policy implementation, and was cited as a barrier in realising 
community sport policy goals. However, such data actually proved helpful as they 
reinforced the key issues arising from each of the cases. More problematic were the 
unique or very specific themes that could belong to one of three or four different sub 
sections. For example, the lack of consensus amongst implementation agents is a 
code that relates to factors that adversely affect the CSP-NGB relationship, the role of 
the CSP/NGB in policy implementation, the nature of the community sport policy 
process, the extent to which agents believe they are part of a collective system and 
barriers to effective policy implementation. Organising data of this type, particularly 
in the first few days, proved to be a messy exercise. However, the development of a 
coding framework and a layered approach to coding where the data were organised 
and reorganised into different layers relating to the specific research objectives 
helped in developing a more efficient approach to the data coding exercise. 
Furthermore, the experience of immersing oneself in the data is useful in developing 
a clearer judgement of what belongs where. Nevertheless, the experience 
demonstrated to me that less is more; it is key to have a minimal set of questions that 
are suitably open-ended to allow the interviewee to reveal his experiences and 
perspectives in relation to the research objects being explored. 
 
Empirical considerations 
Throughout the process of writing up my cases and discussion chapters I have 
witnessed many epiphanies of new policy analysis models that would have 
undoubtedly changed the face of the policy analysis process! My empirical findings 
triggered ideas for frameworks that would combine the coalition and belief-based 
insights of the ACF with the dialectical capabilities of Marsh & Smith’s Policy 
Networks Approach. Fortunately, I heeded my supervisor’s advice and resisted the 
temptation to create a new model. Whilst I was initially baffled by the complexity 
that lay across the range of frameworks—part of the rationale behind wanting to 
create a new model—I have become more aware of how such frameworks can be 
used, particularly when used in tandem, to sensitise the researcher and develop a 
richer, more coherent insight into the policy process. I have also come to recognise 
 
 
-351- 
 
that complex policy processes require complex theories in order to illuminate the 
mechanisms behind the policy process. 
 
Another reflection relates to the nature of the sport-policy literature and a hope for 
evidence that speaks more positively about agents’ experiences. Unfortunately, this 
was not achieved. There were some encouraging perspectives regarding CSP-NGB 
relations and evidence which infers that the subsystem is generally, albeit slowly, 
moving in the right direction; however, clearly more dominant are the range of 
criticisms and challenges that affect the policy community. The reasons for this have 
not been explored, but plausible explanations can be found in the recent history of 
community sport, in particular its fragmented and divisive nature as well as 
understanding the cynicism and apathy that is cultivated within a system where top-
down control and limited grassroots consent are the norms.  
 
The overriding concern of this study was to provide new insights into the significance 
of the CSP-NGB relationship in the community sport policy process. There were 
times, particularly in the data collection and analysis phases of the study, where I felt 
that this aspiration was perhaps too broad. I felt torn between examining the nature 
of the relationship on the one hand and analysing the policy process on the other. In 
retrospect it was likely this dualism that sparked an interest in other disciplines 
(sociology, organisational behaviour and organisational psychology, for example), 
particularly in relation to explicating the CSP-NGB relationship. However, as time 
passed I learned to focus on the significance of the relationship in the community 
sport policy process. This transition helped me to move away from viewing the 
research objects as two discrete parts and toward a position where I analysed the 
significance of the CSP-NGB collaboration within the community sport policy 
process. In other words, I recognised through my study that antecedent social 
structures constitute the context in which interaction exists and evolves and at the 
same time the way in which interaction affects, albeit slowly and incrementally, 
social structure. This provided fresh insight into the relatively uncharted territory of 
the community sport policy process. Only by using methodological approaches that 
give policy agents a voice will we come to know a different reality of the policy 
process than that proffered by its creators.  
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Appendix 1 
NGB Whole Sport Plan Funding, 2013-17 (source: Sport England, 2013) 
 
Sport Participation 
(m) 
Talent 
(m) 
Total 
investment 
(m) 
  Angling 1.7 0.1 1.0 
  Archery 1.2 0.8 2.0 
  Athletics 17.0 5.0 22.0 
  Badminton 15.0 3.0 18.0 
  Baseball/Softball 2.9 0.1 3.0 
  Basketball 2.1 1.5 3.6 
  Boccia 1.0 0.3 1.3 
  Bowls 2.0 0.0 2.0 
  Boxing 4.6 1.2 5.8 
  Canoeing 7.0 3.2 10.2 
  Cricket 25.9 1.6 27.5 
  Cycling 25.6 6.4 32.0 
  Equestrian 4.9 1.1 6.0 
  Fencing 0.4 0.1 0.5 
  Football 0.4 0.1 0.5 
  Goal ball 0.6 0.2 0.8 
  Golf 9.7 3.3 13.0 
  Gymnastics 10.8 1.0 11.8 
  Handball 1.1 0.1 1.2 
  Hockey 9.9 2.1 12.0 
  Judo 4.6 1.5 6.1 
  Lacrosse 3.0 0.4 3.4 
  Pentathlon 0.3 0.6 0.9 
  Mountaineering 2.7 0.3 3.0 
  Movement/Dance 1.9 0.0 1.9 
  Netball 16.8 8.5 25.3 
  Orienteering 1.6 0.7 2.3 
  Rounders 2.2 0.0 2.2 
  Rowing 6.3 1.9 8.2 
  Rugby League 13.0 4.5 17.5 
  Rugby Union 15.2 4.8 20.0 
  Sailing 5.8 3.5 9.3 
  Shooting 0.9 0.2 1.1 
  Snowsport 1.3 0.2 1.5 
  Squash 2.5 5.0 7.5 
  Swimming 3.5 6.0 9.5 
  Table Tennis 2.2 0.3 2.5 
  Taekwondo 0 1.2 1.2 
  Tennis 3.3 3.8 7.1 
  Triathlon 5.3 2.2 7.5 
  Volleyball 4.3 0.8 5.1 
  Waterskiing 1.2 0.5 1.7 
  Weightlifting 0.8 0.2 1.0 
  Wheelchair Basketball 1.8 0.2 2.0 
  Wheelchair Rugby 0.9 0.3 1.2 
  Wrestling 0.7 0.2 0.9 
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Appendix 2 
Phase one questionnaire 
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Appendix 3 
Results from Cronbach’s Alpha 
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Appendix 4 
Summary of quantitative results 
 
Introduction 
This appendix summarises the quantitative phase of the research. This was primarily 
undertaken to aid the selection of CSP cases. However, the data also provide insight into the 
structure, strategy and partnership relations of CSPs and NGBs, and their attitudes toward 
the community sport policy process.  
 
The structure, organisation and priorities of CSPs and NGBs 
Table A4.1 below presents a range of structural and organisational data relating to CSPs. A 
total of 47 CSPs participated in the first phase of the study (96% response). In sum, 33 CSPs 
(70%) were hosted, meaning that they were based within (hosted by) another organisation, 
usually local government or a University. The remaining 14 CSPs (30%) were non-hosted, 
the majority having ‘company’ status. Two CSPs refused to take part in the study, one citing 
time as a key factor preventing their participation, the other citing research overload. In 
geographical terms, 19 CSPs (40.0%) are located in urban areas, 12 (26.0%) are located in a 
rural area, and 16 CSPs (34.0%) serve both urban and rural areas.  
 
The mean number of full-time equivalent (FTE) staff employed by CSPs was 10, with a 
range between five and 22 FTE employees (=4.8) and no discernible difference in the 
number of staff by organisational status (hosted or non-hosted). The mean number of staff 
did vary by turnover with CSPs with an annual turnover <£1,000,000 employing nine FTE 
employees (=4.2) compared to CSPs with an annual turnover of £1,000,000-£2,000,000 
employing 12 FTE employees (=6.7). CSPs with an annual turnover of <£2,000,000 also 
employed an average of 12 FTE employees (=4.2). Turnover varied across CSPs from 
£450,000 to £2,700,000, with a mean of £1,114,000 (=653,383). Whilst there was 
considerable variation across CSPs, there was limited variation by organisational status, 
with hosted CSPs mean turnover being £1,135,000 compared to £1,053,000 of non-hosted 
CSPs. Finally, mean turnover per capita was calculated using population totals provided by 
each CSP. The mean turnover per capita for CSPs was £1.24, with a range between £3.20 
and £0.41 (=0.78). The mean turnover per capita for hosted CSPs was £1.32 (=0.81) 
compared to a mean of £1.05 (=0.68) for non-hosted CSPs. 
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       Table A4.1: CSP Area, Population and Organisational Resources 
 
 
Table A4.2 below presents a categorisation of NGBs into small, medium and large NGBs 
based of organisational resources. This method of categorisation was developed as turnover 
and staffing infrastructure are deemed to be important in terms of the NGB’s ability to grow 
and sustain participation. Whilst it would have been useful to also include an analysis of 
affiliated members in the classification methodology, there was no reliable or consistent 
data available from all NGBs regarding affiliated members. A total of 27 NGBs participated 
in the first phase of the study (64% response). This method identified four NGBs (15.0%) as 
large with a mean annual turnover24 of £97,500,000 (=46,000,000) and an average of 449 
                                                          
24 The mean turnover was based on the turnover for the 2011-12 financial year. 
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FTE employees (=228). Eleven NGBs (41.0%) were categorised as medium with a mean 
annual turnover of £13,300,000 (=8,500,000) and an average of 141 FTE employees 
(=118). Twelve NGBs (44.0%) were identified as small associations with a mean annual 
turnover of £1,190,000 (=670,000) and an average of 29 FTE employees (=21).  
    
                       Table A4.2: NGB categorisation by organisational resources 
 
                          *funding is allocated differently to other sports, typically through a year one award and ring-fenced funding for years     
                            two, three and four.  
 
Tables A4.3 and A4.4 refer to the organisational priorities of CSPs and NGBs. In short, 
there was a notable difference in the organisational priorities of CSPs and NGBs, with 77% 
of CSPs citing increased participation in physical activity as the highest priority and 89% of 
NGBs identifying increased participation in sport as the highest priority. Further, whilst 
40% of CSPs identified increased participation in sport as the second highest ranking 
priority across CSPs, 59% of NGBs identified elite development as the second highest 
ranking priority. Other priorities across CSPs included workforce development (21%), 
facility development (21%), and widening access to sport/physical activity (17%). This latter 
point was as a relatively high priority for hosted CSPs (24%) but was not identified as a 
priority by any non-hosted CSPs. Conversely, other priorities identified by NGBs included 
talent development (41%), improved governance (19%), and coach development (19%).  
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   Table A4.3: Organisational priorities by CSP 
 
  
   Table A4.4: Organisational priorities by NGB 
 
 
Attitudes toward the CSP-NGB relationship 
Table A4.5 refers to the range of factors that were identified by CSPs and NGBs as positively 
influencing the CSP-NGB relationship. The three most highly ranked factors that were cited 
as positively influencing the CSP-NGB relationship were (i) the skills and attitude of the 
personnel involved (59%); (ii) the translation of whole sport plan priorities down to sub-
regional and local level (50%), and task clarity and commitment (46%). The latter issue 
relates primarily to the clarity of agreed actions, and more importantly the actions being 
followed and appropriately addressed by the responsible agent. Interestingly, 78% of NGBs 
identified the skills and attitude of the personnel involved as the most important factor that 
positively influences CSP-NGB relations, whereas 49% of CSPs noted this as an influential 
factor. Whilst this was still one of the three most influential factors for CSPs, the 51% of 
CSPs identified task clarity and commitment, and the translation of the whole sport plan 
priorities down to the local level as the most influential factors. 
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         Table A4.5: Key factors that have positively influenced CSP-NGB relations 
 
 
Table A4.6 and A4.7 refer to the range of problems and challenges that CSPs and NGBs 
identified as affecting the CSP-NGB relationships. CSPs most commonly identified a lack of 
clarity of whole sport plan priorities (60%) and a lack of voluntary infrastructure within 
sport (45%). Notably, 22% of NGBs also highlighted a lack of clarity regarding NGB whole 
sport plan priorities as a problem. No NGBs identified a lack of voluntary infrastructure 
within sport as a problem or challenge in relation to the NGB/CSP relationship. From an 
NGB perspective, the most frequently reported problems and challenges affecting the CSP-
NGB relationship were a lack of consistency across the organisation and priorities of CSPs 
(44%), a lack of consistency in terms of the CSPs local links and its intelligence and 
understanding of the local area (30%), and a lack of task clarity and commitment (26%). 
 
   Table A4.6: CSP perspective of problems and challenges affecting the CSP-NGB relationship 
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   Table A4.7: NGB perspective of problems and challenges affecting the CSP-NGB relationship 
 
 
Table A4.8 presents CSP and NGB responses to five specific questions about the CSP-NGB 
relationship. In keeping with the principles of critical realism, these views represent actor’s 
interpretations of experience and behaviour concerning the community sport policy 
process. An interesting, normative variation in CSP and NGB opinions can be observed with 
the majority of NGBs generally agreeing that they have a well-developed infrastructure 
extending to implementation at the local level and disagreeing that they prioritised 
traditional club development work over community sport policy. In contrast, the majority of 
CSPs disagreed with the statement about NGB infrastructure extending to the local level 
and agreed that most NGBs continue to prioritise traditional club development work over 
community sport policy. 
 
Table A4.8 CSP and NGB Attitudes toward the CSP-NGB relationship 
Question 
 
CSPs (47) 
Median rank 
(Mean score) 
 
NGBs (27) 
Median rank 
(Mean score) 
Funding is the primary factor that influences positive CSP-NGB 
relations. 
 
Disagree 
(2.8) 
Neither 
(3.1) 
Amongst NGBs you work with, most are clear about how national 
plans will be implemented locally (CSPs) or your NGBs is clear about 
how national plans will be implemented locally (NGBs). 
 
Neither 
(3.1) 
 
 
Agree 
(1.9) 
Amongst NGBs you work with, most have a well-developed 
infrastructure extending to implementation at the local level (CSPs), 
or your NGB has a well-developed infrastructure extending to 
implementation at the local level (NGBs), 
 
Disagree 
(3.6) 
 
 
 
Agree 
(2.3) 
There are frequent differences of opinion between the CSP and NGBs 
regarding the priorities for local level community sport. 
 
Disagree 
(2.2) 
Neither 
(2.7) 
Amongst the NGBs you work with most continue to prioritise 
traditional club development work over strategies to increase adult 
participation in sport (CSPs) or your NGB prioritises traditional club 
development work over strategies to increase adult participation in 
sport. 
 
Agree 
(3.4) 
 
 
 
 
Disagree 
(2.4) 
Coding: 1 = strongly agree; 5=strongly disagree. 
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The data in Table A4.9 were analysed further to test two non-directional hypotheses: 
(hypothesis 1, H1) that there will be a difference between hosted and non-hosted CSPs in 
attitudes toward the CSP-NGB relationship; and (Hypothesis 2, H2) that there will be a 
difference between CSPs by turnover in attitudes toward the CSP-NGB relationship. With 
regard to H1, there was no statistically significant difference by hosted and non-hosted 
CSPs in attitudes toward the CSP-NGB relationship, therefore is it possible to accept the 
alternative hypothesis and reject the null hypothesis.  
 
                               Table A4.9 CSP attitudes towards CSP-NGB relations by CSP hosting 
TOTAL_NGB 
RELATION 
 N Mean Rank 
 Hosted 33 24.43 
 Not Hosted 14 22.88 
 
 Sig.  .729 
 
Similarly, with reference to H2 there was no statistically significant difference by turnover 
in attitudes toward the CSP-NGB relationship, therefore is it possible to accept the 
alternative hypothesis and reject the null hypothesis (see Table A4.10). 
 
                                Table A4.10 CSP attitudes towards CSP-NGB relations by CSP turnover 
TOTAL_NGB 
RELATION 
 N Mean Rank 
< £1,000,000 
£1,000,000 - £2,000,000 
£3,000,000 < 
29 23.33 
14 
4 
22.86 
32.88 
 
 Sig.  .393 
 
 
Attitudes toward the community sport policy process 
Table A4.11 presents CSP and NGB responses to 14 questions based on an original set of 
questions published in the NAO/Audit Commission publication Delivering Efficiency: 
Strengthening the links of public service delivery chains. The questions were adapted to fit 
the community sport policy context. CSPs and NGBs agreed that the policy objective for 
community sport was clearly defined, that appropriate systems are in place to manage the 
risks associated with delivering community sport policy, that there are appropriate 
mechanisms in place for regular feedback and review across CSPs and NGBs, that partners 
work together to develop systems to ensure improved efficiency across the community sport 
policy system, and that there is strong leadership across Sport England. They also share the 
same view with regards to the lack of capacity to deliver community sport policy with both 
CSPs and NGBs disagreeing that there is sufficient capacity across CSPs, NGBs and others 
to achieve the policy objective for community sport. In fact, there was generally very little 
 
 
-391- 
 
variation in the responses of CSPs and NGBs. However, it was possible to observe a minor 
difference of opinion in the responses to questions 2, 3 and 4. Further, the response to 
question 6 is consistent with the normative response of NGBs noted above insomuch as 
NGBs agree that there are clearly coordinated plans for community sport, whereas CSPs 
disagree. This is consistent with an earlier point concerning the problems and challenges 
that affect the CSP-NGB relationship, whereby CSPs noted lack of clarity of the whole sport 
plan priorities as one of the major challenges affecting the relationship. 
 
   Table A4.11 Perceptions of the community sport policy process – by CSP and NGB 
 
    Coding: 1 = strongly agree; 5=strongly disagree. 
 
It is possible to use these responses alongside the NAO/Audit Commission self-assessment 
tool to measure the extent to which CSPs and NGBs feel ‘ready’ to deliver community sport 
policy (cf. Audit Commission, 2006). Indeed, the NAO/Audit Commission stressed that ‘the 
features referred to in each of the questions apply as much to individuals in the delivery 
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chain as they do to organisations’ (2006: 5).This is important to note as the data presented 
below is from individual representatives as opposed to agreed organisational perspectives.  
 
The self-assessment tool is based upon 12 of the above questions (it does not include 
question 3 or 11). For each of the twelve questions a score is given based on the median CSP 
and NGB data. Thus, a median rank of disagree/strongly disagree equals -1; the median 
rank neither equals 0; and the median rank agree or strongly agree is awarded +1.  The 
overall score is calculated by adding the score for each question. Table A4.12 shows a total 
score by CSP of +4, as compared to a total score of +7 by NGB. These scores fall in the same 
range on the NAO/Audit Commission scorecard (i.e. scores between 3-8). It is argued that 
this score reflects a policy system where there is scope for improvement, namely in 
managing the considerable risks to delivery of policy as well as addressing inefficiencies in 
policy delivery (NAO/Audit Commission, 2006). 
 
   Table A4.12 NAO/Audit Commission self-assessment of community sport policy system by CSP   
   and NGB 
 
 
Table A4.13 and A4.14 present the results of two analyses prepared to test the following 
non-directional hypotheses: (hypothesis 3, H3) that there will be a difference between 
hosted and non-hosted CSPs in the perception of the community sport policy process; and 
(Hypothesis 4, H4) that there will be a difference between CSPs by turnover in the 
perception of the community sport policy process. With regard to H3, there was no 
statistically significant difference by hosted and non-hosted CSPs, therefore is it possible to 
accept the alternative hypothesis and reject the null hypothesis (see Table A4.13). 
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                                  Table A4.13 Perceptions of community sport policy process by CSP hosting 
 
Similarly, with reference to H4 there was no statistically significant difference by turnover, 
therefore is it possible to accept the alternative hypothesis and reject the null hypothesis 
(see Table A4.14). 
 
                          Table A4.14 Perceptions of community sport policy process by CSP turnover 
 
The final piece of data to present from the first phase research project is the thematic 
analysis of open response comments included by CSPs and NGBs. The comments were 
made in response to the offer of any additional comments. After reading the comments it 
was possible to organise and re-organise the comments into similar categories or themes. 
Through this process, it was possible to identify a total of four primary themes. The first of 
these relates to the top-down nature of the community sport policy system, whereby 
priorities, resources and processes tend to be determined at the national level, with little 
attention given to local needs or circumstances. The second relates to the funding 
bottleneck, in other words the way in which resource tends to be exhausted at national and 
regional level and fails to make its way down (in sufficient quantity) to grassroots level. The 
third theme underscores the importance of individuals in the system, in particular the 
knowledge, skills, and competencies of people working or volunteering within community 
sport. The final theme relates to stability. In particular, the need for stable political 
commitment and the sense, from one respondent, that the policy process for community 
sport is slowly stabilising around the issue of increased participation. Table A4.15 provides 
a more detailed overview of the themes, presenting the original data alongside each theme. 
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 Table A4.15 Additional comments from CSPs and NGBs 
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Appendix 5 
Schedule of interview questions 
 
CSP-NGB Relationship 
 
Q1. What do you see as the key ingredients of a successful relationship between CSPs and NGBs? 
 
Q2. What would you say are the major factors that create problems or challenges in partnership 
work between CSPs and NGBs?  
 
Q3. If you could wave a magic wand and improve any aspect of the NGB-CSP relationship, what 
would the focus of this improvement be?  
 
Q4. Do you think that the pressure for CSPs and NGBs to work together squeezes out LAs, and if so, 
does this matter?  
 
 
The significance of the relationship in local-level policy making and policy 
implementation 
 
Q5. What are the strategic priorities of your organisation and what process did you through to agree 
these priorities? 
 
Q6. How do you view the requirement for CSPs to strategically coordinate sport across the county 
whilst also delivering specific participation projects? How does this work in practice?  
 
Q7. In what ways do you feel that your organisation is able to influence (i) national level sport-
related policy, and (ii) local level sport-related policy? 
 
 
The community sport policy process 
 
Q8. What do you see as the major tensions or challenges in the community sport policy system? 
 
Q9. If money came to you with no strings attached how would you change your strategy? 
 
Q10. Has there been a change in SE expectations of [your organisation] since 2005. If so, how would 
you say expectations have changed? 
 
Q11. Some people involved in the system suggest that there is not enough resource or capacity at the 
local level to grow and sustain participation in sport—how do you view this assertion? 
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Appendix 6 
Research timeline 
  
 Oct ’09-Sept ‘10 Oct ’10-Sept ‘11 Oct ’11-Sept ‘12 Oct ’12-Sept ‘13 
 
 Oct-
Jan 
Feb-
May 
Jun-
Sept 
Oct-
Jan 
Feb-
May 
Jun-
Sept 
Oct-
Jan 
Feb-
May 
Jun-
Sept 
Oct-
Jan 
Feb-
May 
Jun-
Sept 
Initial reading              
Project 
conceptualisation 
            
Draft literature review             
Draft methods chapter             
Quantitative survey 
(CSPs) 
            
Quantitative survey 
(NGBs) 
            
Documentary analysis             
Draft context chapter             
Identification of cases             
Interviews             
Transcription             
Coding  qualitative data             
Re-analysis/synthesis 
with literature 
            
Draft case studies 
prepared 
            
Draft discussion chapter 
completed 
            
Final paper completed             
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Appendix 7 
Extract from interview transcript 
 
 
The time is 11:15, this is interview #29 with Richard Hunt from 
Suffolk County Council. 
 
[00:13] 
SPENCER: It would be really useful if, just to kick us off you 
could, in a nutshell, summarize your role with Suffolk County 
Council. 
 
[00:20] 
RICHARD:  Okay, right, in a nutshell. [LAUGH]  I think what my role 
is, is a strategic commissioner, essentially.  I’m head of culture, 
sport, communities, libraries, informal learning, a few other things 
that have been shoved my way. 
 
[00:36] 
SPENCER:  Well, that’s grown, hasn’t it? 
 
[00:37] 
RICHARD:  Yeah, it’s grown significantly, but it is essentially, as 
a County Council, it’s a strategic commissioning role, that’s been 
enhanced, really.  In terms of one of the influences on the sport 
policy over the last few years, we’ve our preparations for Legacy 
2012, so that’s been a real stimulus around the county council’s 
commissioning approach toward sport’s relationship with partners, 
around community sport.  So with that strategic commissioning role, 
you obviously have connections with Sport England, it will have 
connections with County Sports Partnership, it will have our 
connections with our district and borough council partners, and 
increasingly, our role is about shaking the market.  We’re not 
providers of any sporting facilities, but it’s about maximizing the 
outcomes from community sport, from a strategic commissioning 
perspective.  That’s probably it in a nutshell, doing the best we 
can for Suffolk CSP, and making sure there’s a sustainable 
infrastructure for sport in Suffolk. 
 
[01:53] 
SPENCER: In a sporting context what is Suffolk County Council’s 
priority for sport within the county?  What’s the absolute priority? 
 
[02:08] 
RICHARD:  If you go back a few years it would have been connected 
with the Local Area Agreement, so that there would have been a clear 
participation priority.  I think since the demise of that, it’s been 
very much a not-for-sports-for-sports-sake dimension, but for the 
outcomes that sport can deliver.  So for example, the priority at 
the moment is the sport and physical activities role in the 
dimension of better health outcomes, essentially.  I suppose if you 
wanted to, we still probably have that drive to get more people 
active, to get more people participating in sport.  But probably, 
over the last few years, couple of years, since the LAA 
specifically, and the national target has dissipated and 
disappeared.  Then that hasn’t necessarily broadened into sport and 
physical activity, and widened the definition of how we want to see 
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sport developing.  Ultimately for us it’s about broader outcomes, 
it’s about access and getting people active. 
 
[03:46] 
SPENCER:  In terms of community sport and the latest DCMS strategy 
to what extent do you think there’s consensus across that policy 
area?  And what I mean by that is, to what extent do you see in 
Suffolk, people pulling in the same direction, on the same page, 
trying to achieve the same thing in sport? 
 
[04:10] 
RICHARD:  I think there is a level of consensus.  I must say, 
obviously the DCMS’s strategy production in general, it was 
shocking, it’s a mission of local government actually, kind of 
remember the words being stated in there, so I think that’s the 
usual sort of dimension we have in dealing with government 
departments. 
 
[04:33] 
SPENCER:  What’s was your response to that as Chair of CCLOA? 
 
[04:39] 
RICHARD:  CCLOA was focused on the sharper end of the consultation 
with Sport England, which we felt initially at least that there 
actually was some listening.  But the strategy itself was rather, 
the usual type of heads up, I’ve got to make a political 
announcement tomorrow.  So I think, you know, obviously there were 
bits and pieces about our losing the targets for participation 
because locally, that stuff, that APS information data has been like 
just gold dust really, for any commissioner of the service.  So the 
ability to feed that type of data into JSNA’s annual public health 
reports bring that segment way ahead of a lot of other service 
areas.  I mean, it’s been a real plus.  In terms of policy 
direction, it breaks down. It breaks down when you get to that local 
context and level, because what does it mean, in terms of starting a 
sports policy at fourteen? Well, who the hell works in that way?  
What NGB works in that way, let alone provision of a local 
authority?  But of course, money can.  The drivers of the money, it 
means you have to, in local context, you have to work hard to make 
it work, and CCLOA has been trying to I guess influence that, trying 
to increase some of the prioritization.  Making sure disability was 
really highly programmed into funding, around the community access 
for schools.  Because if you getting some funding in to developing 
the community youth centre and schools, you’re going to be servicing 
the whole population, and not from fourteen.  But I think there’s 
some good stuff in there, you know, the confirmation of how to build 
the links, trying to get the NGB more closely built into the network 
of understanding what their role can be in local community sport 
provisioning, and not just the …  I tend to say there’s probably 
been …  I mean, before the recent consultation, I cannot too many 
NGB’s are coming past, knocking on my door.  And if I speak to my 
district colleagues, they’re not knocking on their doors either.  I 
think there’s been a sort of relation of going straight to the 
operator rather than the commissioner, which may be because they 
haven’t got a commissioner, I don’t know. 
 
[06:23] 
SPENCER:  How do you see it across Suffolk, in terms of, I get the 
point around the fourteen-plus, and the nature in local communities 
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and families, it doesn’t work in that way.  But in terms of the 
providers and the commissioners, etcetera, do you feel like they’re 
all pointing in the same direction, and on the same page to make 
that work?  Or do you somehow … 
 
[06:57} 
RICHARD:  Well you have to work really hard at that, and that’s 
always been the case of sport, it’s really complex and diffuse. It 
all depends on trust between the different agencies. Ideally, you’ve 
got a CSP that has the capacity to try and harness that and bring 
all that together, to try and get some added value across the pieces 
of the jigsaw.  I don’t think anyone’s cracked that, totally, maybe 
more in a unitary area, you may be able to sort of bring that 
together a little bit more easily but, the political dimensions of 
working in Suffolk with different sets of councillors, different 
political persuaders in some areas, and the identity that each 
district wants, means that for a County Sports Partnership, that’s 
hard, for a county council, that’s quite hard.  But that’s what we 
do, we try to bring that kind of leadership, to bring people 
together to point in the right direction, albeit direction is 
pointed around, we’ll achieve buying into the 2012 Legacy in June is 
the most active county, to drive towards the most active county is 
really long-term Legacy program that’s very much targeted at public 
health, coming into the county council, and the help of the CSP and 
the local authorities. 
 
[07:47] 
SPENCER: You mentioned about NGB’s being built into the network at 
the local level in particular.  When I say local, I’m meaning county 
down to district into local communities.  What do you think are some 
of the problems there?  What prevents that from happening?  What do 
you think the issues are? 
  
[08:03] 
RICHARD: I guess three or four years ago they got their first real 
charge of independence, you know the development funding to kind of 
modernise and reshape themselves.  Some are big and established 
anyway, but for a number, it was quite a significant growth, I 
guess.  The simple thing is, that you have so many differing 
organisational cultures. You have forty-six sports all with their 
own organisational culture, then local government and the CSP and 
that’s before you think about clubs, coaches and other local groups.  
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Appendix 8 
Qualitative coding framework 
 
 
Theme/sub theme/(cases) 
  
 
Sub-section 
  
 
Section by research objective 
 
Approach to managing relations 
-Role of board/core team (1,2,3) 
-Prioritisation of sports (1,2,3) 
-Knowledge (1) 
-Structural arrangements (2,3) 
 
  
The CSP leadership of NGB 
relations 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The CSP-NGB 
relationship  
(Objective 1) 
 
Individuals (1,2,3) 
Principles 
-Mutual respect (1,2) 
-Trust (1,2,3) 
-Engagement (1,2) 
-Clarity of purpose (2,3) 
-Attitude (3) 
Institutional resources (1) 
Culture of sub-regional workforce (2) 
Structures (2,3) 
 
  
 
 
Factors that positively 
influence the CSP-NGB 
relationship 
 
 
Lack of engagement 
-The CSP-local authority relationship (1,2,3) 
-NGB whole sport plan process (1,2,3) 
-Involvement of NGB in CSPs (1,2) 
Diversity of priorities (1,2,3) 
Process over people (1,2) 
Complexity of inconsistency (2,3) 
Lack of empathy (2) 
Lack of clarity of purpose (3) 
 
  
 
 
The problems that adversely 
affect the CSP-NGB 
relationship 
  
 
 
 
Top down system with a narrow coalition (1,2,3) 
Differing roles in national policy (1) 
LAs central role in local policy (1,2,3) 
 
  
 
The role of the CSP/NGBs in 
policy making 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The role of the CSP and 
NGBs in policy making 
and implementation 
(Objective 2) 
Lack of clarity re: WSP priorities (1,2,3) 
Lack of involvement of CSPs/LAs (1,2,3) 
Lack of consensus from street-level agents (1,2,3) 
Enhanced importance of participation (3) 
 
  
Preparation of the whole 
sport plan 
 
Blurred distinction between strategic and delivery 
role of CSP 
-NGB requirements vary (1,2) 
-Resource dependency drives CSP delivery focus (1,2,3)  
-Lack of capacity at local level to implement policy (1,2,3) 
-Depends on local context (2) 
-Changing role of CSP (3) 
Changing role of LAs (1,2,3) 
Lack of local capacity to implement community sport 
policy (1,2,3) 
 
 
  
 
 
The role of the CSP/NGB in 
policy implementation 
 
A top-down system (1,2,3) 
Frequent change (1,2) 
Duplication in the system (1,2) 
More professional community sport system (2,3) 
Unintended consequences of policy (1,2,3) 
 
  
 
The nature of the community 
sport policy process 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CSP/NGB beliefs, 
attitudes and experiences 
regarding the community 
sport policy process 
(Objective 3) 
 
Lack of community sport system (1,3) 
Competition over cooperation (1,2) 
Lack of consensus on priorities (1,2) 
 
 The extent to which agents 
feel part of a collective system 
 
Financial cuts (2,3) 
Lack of consensus (2) 
More investment needed in delivery (1,2,3) 
Require more intelligence (2) 
The culture of sport (2,3) 
Time (1,3) 
Need more non-traditional routes (3) 
Facilities (1,2,3) 
No connection with school sport policy (2,3) 
Trust within NGBs (1) 
Assumptions/expectations (3) 
  
 
 
Challenges that prevent 
agents from delivering 
community sport outcomes 
 
 
 
 
